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PETER FAWCETT 
A TIIENIAN TAXATION FROM THE PISIS'I'RA TIDS TO LYCURGUS 550-
325BC 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I respond to calls by historians for a study of ancient Athenian 
taxation. The thesis is in four parts. In Part One I identify sixteen or so taxes. The 
most important are an import/export tax and a wealth tax, but I argue that recent 
evidence suggests that there may have been a sales tax. I believe that I may have 
identified four new fragments of inscriptions relating to one of the sixteen or so 
taxes. I discuss in some detail two of the most important inscriptions discovered in 
recent years, the Grain-Tax Law and the Law on the Little Panathenaea. In Part 
Two I look at the administration of Athenian taxes and at the extent of the black 
economy (I believe that some coin hoards could be evidence of tax evasion). In Part 
Three I identify, for comparative purposes, taxes in some other states and also 
examine tax agreements Athens and other states made with each other. Part Four 
looks at a number of central themes. First, the nature of Athenian taxes, where I 
argue that there is no real evidence that at least direct taxes were regarded by the 
Greeks as a form of tyranny or that this was the reason that there was no income 
tax. Second, Athenian taxation in a wider context, where I argue that it is not 
impossible that there were some taxes in the earlier part of the fifth century, and 
track the development of taxes during the fifth and fourth centuries. Third, coinage 
and the payment of taxes, where I argue that recent research on fractional coinage 
suggests that the payment of taxes was one of the reasons for the development of 
coinage in Athens. Fourth, the relationship of taxes with income from 
Empire/Confederacy, where I argue that the two varied inversely with each other. 
Fifth, the contribution of taxes to the Athenian economy, where I argue that this 
could have amounted to between a quarter and a third of Athenian state income by 
the time ofLycurgus. 
The Agora in Athens, where tax-farming contracts were drawn up in 
front of and a little to the left of the Theseum; and where a number of 
Athenian tax provisions have been discovered, including the Grain-Tax 
Law and the Law on the Little Panathenaea. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Now listen, father, and don't frown so much. First, work 
out roughly, not with counters but just on your hands, how much 
tribute we receive altogether from the allied cities. Then make 
a separate count of the taxes and the many one-per -cents, 1 court 
dues, mines, markets, harbours, rents, confiscations. Our total 
income from all this is nearly 2000 talents. Now put down 
annual pay for jurors, the maximum figure of6000. We get, 
I think, 150 talents'. 
Ste. Croix, writing in 1981, said that 'it is a melancholy fact, characteristic of our 
sources of information for Greek- even Athenian- economic history, that our fullest 
list of taxes for a single city in any literary source occurs in Comedy : Aristophanes 
Wasps 656-660'.2 
1 I should perhaps say at the outset that in this thesis I - like others writing about Athenian taxes -
refer to this phrase from time to time to suggest that there were indeed many sources of state 
revenue, including taxes, in ancient Athens. In doing so I follow what is I think the general view 
that 'the taxes and the many one-per-cents' is the sort of all-embracing phrase one might expect in 
Aristophanes which includes taxes. In other words, I do not read the words so literally as to suggest 
that there is a distinction between taxes and one-per-cents which are not taxes (compare, for 
example, MacDonald in Hesperia 50 1981 p 142). 
2 The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World p 206. The value of Aristophanes as an historical 
source has been discussed many times (Heath Political Comedy in Aristophanes p 7 said that 'the 
problem of political intent in Aristophanes remains obstinately difficult to evade'). The debate has 
ranged from Gomme (Classical Review 52 1938 pp 97-109) who said that Aristophanes should not 
be taken seriously in political terms to Ste. Croix (The Origin of the Peloponnesian War 1972 
Appendix 29) who took the view that he was an important political dramatist. We shall see other 
examples in this thesis of Aristophanes referring to taxes (compare, for example, pp 4447). My 
own view corresponds more to that of Ste. Croix, The referem:es to taxes should be taken seriously 
2 
For some time now historians have called for a further look at Athenian taxes in the 
light of inscriptions that have been discovered in the last 80 or so years. David Lewis 
expressed this view when he published the editio princeps of the Law on the Little 
Panathenaea in 1959.3 Ronald Stroud echoed this view when he published the editio 
princeps of the Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374-373 BC.4 He wrote that 'there is 
much about the entire system of Athenian taxation that remains obscure. Apart from 
the eisphora, the whole topic would repay closer scrutiny'. Stroud said that Ste. 
Croix's racy formulation, quoted above, 'should not obscure the fact that the time is 
ripe to harvest the rich evidence on taxation that has accumulated in Attic inscriptions 
published since the days of Boeckh and Andreades'. Stroud also drew attention to the 
observations of Migeotte in 1995 : 'Mais Ia masse de l'information vient de 
l'epigraphie. Cette documentation, qui ne cesse de s'enrichir, est loin d'avoir ete 
exploitee comme elle le mente, sans doubte parce qu'elle se presente de maniere 
dispersee et rebutante pour les profanes. Un travail considerable reste done a faire, 
dont les resultats permett:ront de combler des lacunes, de revoir des doctrines etablies 
- par exemple celle concernant les taxes et les imp()ts de type foncier, qui etaient sans 
doubte plus repandus qu'on ne l'admet generalement.'5 
but not necessarily as wholly accurate evidence. We should recognise the meat in the sandwich for 
what it is (in Ste. Croix's words). 
3 Hesperia 28 1959 p 243. 
4 Hesperia Supplement 29 1998 p 27. 
5 Topoi 5 p 10. Compare also Migeotte's article in Symposion 1999 pp 297-313. 
3 
A call for a reevaluation of Athenian taxes - this time maritime taxes - has come from 
Lisa Kallet in her book Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides. She has 
argued that the introduction by Athens of a maritime tax on the ports of the Aegean 
after the disastrous Sicilian Expedition in the second half of the Peloponnesian War 
(or perhaps before its final failure) had a greater significance in Athens' perception of 
her arche than has hitherto been believed. She concluded that 'a full study of maritime 
taxation is badly needed'. 6 
Most recently, John Davies listed taxation systems as one of twenty five topics in an 
agenda for the next generation in writing Greek history. 7 He said that the lack of an 
up to date account of taxation was now a serious hindrance to Greek historians. 
Responding to these challenges is the main reason for undertaking this thesis. 8 
Earlier work : Boeckh and Andreades 
This thesis is the first comprehensive work that has been done on ancient Athenian 
taxes since two towering figures wrote substantial works on Athenian taxes and 
public finance in the early 19th and early 20th centuries respectively. 
6 p 196. 
7 In The Epigrahic Habit : inscriptions in the polis, a conference held in honour of Professor P J 
Rhodes on the occamon of his 65th birthday, 2005 (to be published). 
4 
Boeckh published his first edition of the Staatshaushaltung der Athener in Berlin in 
1817-1818. He focussed on the income and expenditure of the Athenian state from 
the Persian Wars to Alexander. Boeckh wrote approvingly of the financial system at 
Athens. He categorised the ordinary revenues of Athens into four classes - first, 
duties ( tele) arising partly from public domains, including the mines, partly from 
customs and excise, and some taxes upon industry and persons, which only extended 
to the aliens and slaves; second, fines (timemata), together with justice fees and the 
proceeds of confiscated property (demioprata); third, tributes of the allied or subject 
states (phoroi); and, fourth, ordinary liturgies (leitourgiai enkuklioi).9 Boeckh 
thought that of the different revenues of the state, the customs duties were the least 
oppressive, and that liturgies were injurious, because unfair. He declared that 'of all 
taxes none are more repugnant to notions ofliberty (not in a general sense only, but 
also according to the principles entertained by the ancients) than taxes upon persons. 
At Athens it was a recognised principle that taxes were to be imposed upon property, 
and not upon persons. 10 
Andreades wrote the first edition of A History of Greek Public Finance in 1918. 
Andreades' book, as its title suggests, goes much wider than Athenian finance, 
8 I am very grateful for the encouragement and advice that Ronald Stroud and Lisa Kallet gave me 
on visits to the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, that Leopold Migeotte has given me 
in correspondence and that John Davies has given me in conversation. 
9Compare [Aristotle] Oeconomica 2 1346a describing the revenues of free states in the last quarter 
of the 4th century - 'here the most important source of revenue is from the special products of the 
territory; next comes revenue from markets and points of tmnsit; and finally that from ordinary 
transactions (or public services)'. 
10 Boeckh presumably meant citizen persons. The Athenians felt no compunction about taxing 
metics·qua metics, a particular instance of the Greeks' tendency to believe in .citizen rights rather 
than hmnan rights. 
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covering Homeric public finance and the public finance of the Spartans. He covers 
both public expenditure and state revenue of the Athenians, including income from 
the mines at Laurium, court dues, fines, the direct taxes on the metics, liturgies, 
customs dues and the eisphora. He tries to draw conclusions on Athens' regular 
revenues. He looks at an issue that I discuss in Chapter Twelve of this thesis, that is, 
how Lycurgus succeeded in raising an annual income of 1200 talents, 11 and concludes 
'with regard to this, unfortunately, no light is cast by our sources'. Andreades finally 
deals with the Athenian budget. He says that, contrary to what has been said, the 
Athenians had a budget in the sense that they foresaw their expenditures and their 
revenues and tried to strike a balance between them. 
The Athenian Kooomy 
Boeckh and Andreades wrote, then, not only about Athenian taxes but also about 
their place in the Athenian economy. Since their time the whole subject of the ancient 
economy, including the Athenian economy, has been a matter of controversy. Keith 
Hopkins described it as an academic battleground, particularly in the debate about the 
extent to which ancient economies can be compared to modem economies. 12 
The controversy has polarised in an argument between the 'primitivists' and the 
'modernists'. Paul Cartledge has described the two camps. The 'primitivists' (he says) 
11 Seep 336 et seq. 
12 In an introduction to a series of essays in Trade in the Ancient Economy p ix. 
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have argued 'that the Greeks' economy (or economies) differed wholesale from any 
modem (Western, capitalist) economy, and the 'modernists' have discerned in ancient 
Greece smaller -scale or inchoate versions of modem economic life and thought'. This 
debate has moved on to a debate between the 'substantivists' and the 'formalists'. 'For 
the formalists, the ancient economy was a functionally segregated and independently 
instituted sphere of activity with its own profit-maximising, want-satisfYing logic and 
rationality, less "developed" no doubt than any modem economy but recognisably 
similar in kind. Substantivists, on the other hand, hold that the ancient economy was 
not merely less developed but socially embedded and politically overdetermined and 
so - by the standards of neoclassical economics - conspicuously conventional, 
irrational and status-ridden'. 13 Cartledge bas urged that it is crucially important to 
understand that this much more interesting and important substantivist-formalist 
debate should not be confused, as it often is, with the primitivist-modernist debate. 
Not even the most ardent primitivist (he says) would deny that actually quite a bit of 
extra-household economy was practised in ancient Greece. And not even the most 
ardent modernist would deny that some quite basic aspects of Greek economy were 
really rather primitive. 
However, as Cohen has recently reminded us, by the end of the 20th century 'a 
proliferating assortment of sophisticated methodologies and a broadening of academic 
13 Paul Cartledge 'The economy (economies) of ancient Greece' Dialogus 5 1998 pp 5--6, now 
reprinted in The Ancient Economy edd Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden pp 11-32. The 
primitivist/modernist debate has been going on for many years. See Moses Finley in The Ancient 
Economy and compare Millett in Lendirlg and Borrowing in Ancient Athens pp 9-18 and E E Cohen 
Ancient Economy anil Society, for exilmple p 11 et 9eq. ·· 
7 
interests and approaches were clearly working to ameliorate the previous paralysis of 
antithetical struggle over the ancient economy'. 14 These have largely, in Cohen's view, 
ignored what Kurht has called the 'endless battles about the ancient economy' that 
now seem 'to have run their course'. 15 This thesis seeks to join the more recent work 
which, as Cohen describes it, has moved away from the 'old binary paradigm' of 
primititivists and modernists. I discuss this approach in more detail in Chapter Ten 
when I seek to estimate the contribution of Athenian taxes to the Athenian economy. 
Sources 
I will be continually referring in this thesis to the literary and epigraphical evidence 
for taxes in Athens, but how reliable is it? 
A H M Jones in his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Ancient History in the 
University of London in 1948 was pessimistic about the literary and documentary 
evidence for ancient economic history. He said that the literary evidence comes down 
to us through a manuscript tradition which is liable to corruption and therefore 
introduces a large element of hazard in statistics; and that ancient historians were not 
usually interested in economics, which meant that the data were so sparse that it is 
rarely possible to build up a series of comparable figures. Jones was equally 
dismissive of the value of documentary evidence. He says that most inscriptions are 
14 Cohen 'Scheidellvon Reden (edd), The Ancient Economy' BMCR 2003 11 23. 
15 Trade, Traders and the Ancient City p 29. 
8 
honorific and that the rest are mainly records of laws, decrees and treaties and as such 
rarely contain matters of economic interest. Most of what we know about the 
finances of fifth century Athens is derived from the records of the goddess Athene. 
He is even more dismissive of the evidence of papyri. The task of reconstructing the 
public finances of Egypt from papyri, he says, 'is comparable with attempting an 
estimate of the revenue of the United Kingdom from a few pages tom at random from 
the ledgers of the Inland Revenue Offices of, say, Maidenhead, Gloucester and 
Chepstow'. 16 
Cartledge more recently has argued 17 that 'there are few good, let alone statistically 
significant, quantitative data available'. Documents generally are in very short supply. 
In theory (he says) 'inscriptions and coins might be thought our best prospects, but 
they are both flawed in practice. Inscriptions disappoint chiefly by their 
incompleteness or limited scope. Coins do so, rather, because it is often unclear what 
it is they represent'. He goes on to say that the limitations of literary sources are 
obvious. 'Arguably, Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, Demosthenes and Aristotle 
shared an identical or closely similar economic mentality; but were their views 
representative of a wider mentality . . . and, since a crucial part of the evidence these 
writings provide is ideological . . . should that disqualifY such evidence as a basis for 
our notionally non-ideological analyses?'18 
i 6 Ancient Economic History pp 1-2. 
17 In the article in Dia/ogus quoted above. 
9 
It is clearly right to sound a note of caution in using the ancient sources which have 
survived. To put this in the context of this thesis, I sometimes find myself in my 
present work - advising the Governments of developing countries on tax policy -
summarising the tax laws of other countries, and the information I draw on to do this 
is more or less comprehensive and accurate. In this thesis, on the other hand, I will 
for example, discuss a particular Athenian tax, its nature and the impact it had, 
sometimes on the basis of only one or two literary or epigraphical references, simply 
because that is all the evidence there is. Clearly other information, if it had survived, 
could have changed my account dramatically. I, therefore, understand the concerns of 
Jones and Cartledge, but I do not believe that it is not therefore worth trying to build 
up a picture from the available information, as long as one realises, as I do, the 
limitations of this approach. 
We have a thorough account of constitutional history in Aristotle's Athenaion 
Politeia, and Thucydides and the historians give us our main review of public events, 
although I recognise that their accounts, like those of all historians, ancient and 
modern, will inevitably give us their view of what they are describing. 19 Thucydides 
has come in for particular comment in this context. The conventional view was 
expressed by Wade-Gery : 'Readers of all opinions will probably agree that he saw 
more truly, inquired more responsibly, and reported more faithfully than any other 
18 For a discussion on the reliability of the Attic orators, see Harris' Aeschines and Athenian 
Politics, chapter 1, in particular Harris' method for evaluating their reliability as sources. 
19 Compare Rhodes Athenian Democracy and Modem Ideology, ch 1. 
10 
ancient historian'.20 Emily Greenwood's Thucydides and the Shaping of History is the 
latest work to discuss 'the conflicting pull of a pseudo-scientific model of historical 
objectivity, and the counterargument that Thucydides' History is polemical, biased, 
and aims to supplant other conceivable interpretations of events with his vision of the 
war'.
21 Sir Kenneth Dover has argued that we do not, or should no longer, regard 
Thucydides as an 'authority', a term which associated him with Digests, Gospels, Bye 
Laws and the like' and that we cannot classify as true or false any one of the many 
hundreds of narrative data in his work without corroboration of truly independent 
evidence of a different kind (and independence cannot easily be demonstrated from 
the written word alone as ancient authors do not commonly 'confirm' what their 
predecessors have said but merely repeat it).22 
Detailed discussion of these arguments is beyond the remit of this thesis. My method 
in this thesis is to quote evidence where I see it, including in Thucydides, and to seek 
to check it with other evidence, including from other ancient authors, in particular to 
check it with any epigraphical evidence as well. I would not go so far as Michael 
Crawford in describing inscriptions on Athenian legislation as 'extraordinarily 
elliptical and inconsequential' and in comparison with Roman legislation very 
unformulaic and 'unprofessional', 23 but I accept that reading them is not always 
straightforward. I hope that this thesis will show that inscriptions are plentiful and can 
20 OCD3 p 1516 et seq .. 
21 p 111. 
22 
'Thucydides the Teacher?' Ad Fami/iares Vol 28 2005 pp 7-8. 
23 JHS 121 2001~ p 200. 
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be very useful objective evidence, and that their continuing discovery is exciting and 
hall . 24 c engmg. 
Another note of caution is required in relation to the increasing attempts to evaluate 
the evidence there is for taxes in Athens and their place in Athenian life and to evolve 
a quantitative methodology. 25 I recognise that there are both possibilities and pitfalls 
in these attempts. Moses Finley warned that attempts at quantification in matters of 
Greek economics were hazardous and could be misleading, and that advice still holds 
true today. 26 
The final point I would make on ancient sources is that people who undertake 
research projects of the kind I am undertaking are sometimes criticised for supposing 
that everything that can conceivably be known about the past should be known, and 
that everything known is of equal value - compare Finleys damning of the 'democracy 
offacts'.27 As Grote said long ago, the only evidence we possess of the ancient world 
is what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel and continual 
24 As is also the current infra-red technology work on the Oxyrhynchus Papyri being done in Oxford 
(Independent on Sunday 17 Apri12005). 
25 Summarised by, for example, Alec BJamire in 'Athenian Finance 454-404 BC' Hesperia 70 2001 
pp 99-126; W K Pritchett in The Greek State at War Part V p 457 et seq; Edmund Burke 'Lycurgan 
Finances' GRBS 26 1985 pp 251-264 and 'The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era : Some 
Adjustments to the Primitivist Model' TAPA 122 1992 pp 199-226. 
26 The Ancient Economy p 17 et seq including note 24 quoting Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen in 
Analytical Economics Cambridge Mass 1966 p 275 : 'there is a limit to what we can do with 
numbers. as there is to what we can do wi1houl them'. 
27 See Ober Athenian Legacies p 178. Ober admits to spending years happily labouring to produce 
new, if minute, facts (for example, precise measurements of windows) about classical Greek 
fortifications. While he says that such WOik can be fun, the facts it produces may not be regarded as 
useful by one's professional colleagues. 
12 
expressions of qualification of evidence that we make eventually sicken the reader. 28 
This dilemma has divided historians between those who doggedly pursue the evidence 
(often called 'positivist' historians) and those who take a more expansive, less 
detailed, view of the ancient world (often called 'cultural' historians). This is 
illustrated by a recent review by Peter Bang of a book by Leopold Migeotte bringing 
together a lifetime's research on the economy of the Greek world from archaic times 
to the Roman Empire.29 Bang says that Migeotte's 'consciously source-driven 
approach easily falls into the trap of reproducing the blind spots of our surviving 
source material. Rather than an analysis it risks becoming an inventory or descriptive 
survey of our very imperfect evidence.' Bang, further, in a 'more fundamental 
objection to Migeotte's approach', says that 'introducing students to an ancient 
economy is not primarily a question of historical "facts". Just as important is the 
ability to catch their attention and awaken their enthusiasm through comparisons and 
the invocation of "grand theories", models or ideas' (a sort of 'don't think mere facts 
will persuade me' approach). I have no problem with people seeking to put the 
ancient economy in a wider perspective, but the primary purpose of this thesis is to 
meet the challenge posed by Lewis, Stroud, Migeotte, Kallet and Davies, that is to 
give the whole topic of Athenian taxes closer scrutiny. I will then seek to draw some 
tentative conclusions from this admittedly incomplete picture. I would also venture 
the hope that others will, with the benefit of this research, then be better able to 
develop the grand theories, models and ideas to which Bang refers. 
21! A History of Greece v-vi. 
29 
'L. Migeotte : L' economie des cites grecques de l'archarsme au Haul-Empire romain, 2002' in 
Classical Review 53 2003 pp 150-151. 
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The dating of inscriptions 
This thesis is not the place to discuss in detail another matter which has been the 
subject of some controversy for a number of years, but I need to refer to it since it 
concerns the dating of a number of inscriptions which I use as sources for this thesis. 
This is the controversy over the canonical view (a term used by Wade-Gery) that the 
letter sigma was not carved with three bars in official public inscriptions after 446 and 
that the four-barred form was used exclusively from that date on. Mattingly 
questioned this view and the onus was effectively put on him to find an inscription 
with a three-barred sigma that was securely dated after 446. The main effect of 
Mattingly's datings was that many signs of strong imperialism would then date not 
from the time of Pericles but from the time of Cleon. I would pose the question in 
parenthesis on the merits of this all-or-nothing approach, on the footing that the 
general practice changed at a certain date, say 446, but that some letter -cutters from 
time to time either kept to or reverted to the former practice for whatever reason. I 
suppose that the answer to this proposition is that the Athenian Tribute Lists (which I 
discuss on p 299 et seq) are enough to prove that there was a period around 450 in 
which new and old forms could be found even in the same document, but that in 
principle it is reasonable to say that no old forms are currently attested after year x, 
with the implication that an attestation five years later would not shock but one thirty 
years later would. 
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Matters have, however, recently come to a head with the inscription recording the 
alliance between Athens and Egesta (/G i3 11 ), which contains a three-barred sigma 
and the name of an archon. Mattingly had read this name as Antiphon who was 
archon in 418, while some historians read it as Habron, who was archon in 458, and 
yet others took the view that only 'on' could be read. A research team :from the 
University of California, Los Angeles, subjected the inscription to enhancement 
through a computer -assisted enhancement machine, which read Antiphon. In support 
of 418 on historical grounds it has rightly been pointed out that 418 is a better date 
than 458, because the alliance can then be dated in the period when Athens became 
interested in Sicily just before the Sicilian Expedition in 415-413. 
Matthaiou claims to have seen enough on the stone to make Antiphon's name secure, 
and published a paper in 2004 in favour of 418 (in fact he thinks that the alliance was 
made in the 420s and reaffimed in 418-417) on both epigraphical and historical 
grounds, 30 and this is likely to be accepted by historians. I have to confess again in 
parenthesis that when I looked at the inscription in the Epigraphical Museum in 
Athens (with Matthaiou) I could not see Antiphon, but everyone agrees that the 
inscription is very difficult to read with the naked eye. Matthaiou's conclusion does 
not of course mean that all Mattingly's other dates (broadly dating a particular 
inscription some 20 years later than generally agreed) are necessarily right, but that 
they cannot be ruled out on grounds of letter-form alone and that the arguments for 
individual cases should be considered on their own merits. Where I refer to them in 
30 Attikai Epigraphai in memory of Adolf Wilhelm 2004. 
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the text of this thesis, I set out the alternatives. The most important inscription in the 
thesis on the matter of dating is the second Decree of Callias because the generally 
agreed dating could leave open the possibility that the eisphora tax could date from 
an earlier time than is otherwise attested. However, although the generally agreed 
dating in this case was attacked by Mattingly, it was not attacked on the grounds of 
letter forms. 
The s~heme of the thesis 
This thesis, then, is an attempt to investigate the literary, epigraphical and other 
evidence of Athenian taxation, particularly the epigraphical evidence which has come 
to light in recent years, and to relate it, so far as possible, to the wider financial 
context of which it formed a part. And, based on my experience of 35 years working 
on policy and technical issues with the UK tax authority and on my more recent 
experience in tax in developing countries while I have been writing this thesis, this 
thesis will also seek to draw some modest comparisons with modem taxation. 
The thesis will take Athenian taxation to mean - in very general terms - taxes paid by 
Athenians to the state or another agency like a religious body either in Athens or 
elsewhere; taxes paid by non-Athenians temporarily or permanently in Athens; and 
taxes paid to the Athenian state or another agency by those who were not resident in 
Athens. It will not deal comprehensively with three adjacent areas - voluntary 
contributions to the state (liturgies and epidosis), taxes in "other states, and tribute 
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from Empire and contributions from Confederacy - but it will touch on these areas 
and seek to relate these subjects to Athenian taxes. 
The thesis will cover the 225 or so years between the first mention of taxation in 
Athens, in the time of the Pisistratids (we do not, of course, positively know that 
there was no earlier taxation) and the death ofLycurgus, who played the major part 
in the control of the city's finances for a period of twelve years in the second half of 
the 4th century. That is, the years between 550 and 325 BC. 
The main body of the thesis is in four Parts. 
Part One comprises an account of the sixteen or so Athenian taxes of the period 
which I have identified. This takes in inscriptions which have been discovered and the 
substantial research in both literary and epigraphical and other archaeological 
evidence that has been done in the 80 or so years since Andreades. An Appendix 
gives a brief account of voluntariness in the form of liturgies and epidosis. 
Part Two looks at the administration of the taxes, not only at how the taxes were 
administered in Athens but at the extent to which they were complied with, in terms 
of both tax evasion and the invisible economy. 
Part Three takes a sideways look at taxes in some other states and some inter -state 
tax arrangements, not least those which AthenS made herself 
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Finally, Part Four discusses some broader themes: the nature of Athenian taxes; 
Athenian taxation between 550 and 325 in a wider context~ coinage and the payment 
of taxes; the relationship of Athenian taxes to the income Athens received from 
Empire and Confederacy; and the contribution of Athenian taxes, both individually 
and collectively, to the Athenian economy. I will argue -and this is perhaps the main 
theme of the thesis - that taxes are likely to have played a greater part in the Athenian 
economy than has hitherto been generally supposed. 
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PART ONE THE TAXES 
Part One of this thesis gives an account of the sixteen or so Athenian taxes I have identified 
in the 225 years between the Pisistratids and Lycurgus. 
Taxes are normally categorised today as direct or indirect taxes, that is broadly taxes levied 
according to a person's circumstances or taxes levied indiscriminately irrespective of a 
person's circumstances. The conceptual difference is between taxes such as income tax 
which a taxpayer pays directly to the state and taxes such as VAT which a consumer pays 
ultimately but which manufacturers of supplies, for example, actually pay to the state. 
There was no income tax in ancient Athens, but the eisphora, a property tax, was a direct 
tax levied according to a person's circumstances. An import tax, such as we see in ancient 
Athens, would be an indirect tax. I am, however, reluctant to impose the modem distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes too far on a description of ancient Athenian taxes both 
because of the absence of an income tax and also because it is not always clear whether a 
particular tax was levied according to personal circumstances. 
I have therefore grouped ancient Athenian taxes in three categories. Chapter One discusses 
six taxes on Athenians. Chapter Two deals with a range of five other Athenian taxes on 
particular activities. Chapter Three looks at five maritime taxes. Where the evidence for 
these taxes is in inscriptions, the texts of the most important inscriptions are in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis and photographs of most of the inscriptions 
appear at the end of each Chapter. A table summarising the taxes is at the end of Part One 
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before an Appendix on liturgies and epidosis, which were more of the nature of voluntary 
taxes. 
I should make two other general points. First, a number of the taxes are expressed in terms 
of fractions, like twentieth and tenth, rather than as descriptive titles like customs duties or 
percentages which we commonly see today. Second, the taxes sometimes have the same 
names, like eikoste (twentieth), dekate (tenth) and eisphora. These are very ordinary Greek 
words and it is dangerous, if tempting, to assume that they are always the same taxes 
whenever we encounter them. Compare, for example, the range of contexts in which we 
can encounter the English word 'levy'. This is not, however, to say that it is unreasonable to 
seek to argue in particular cases that they are the same taxes, as some have done, for 
example, in the case of the dekate. 
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ONE 
SIX TAXES ON ATHENIANS 
This Chapter discusses six taxes on Athenians, in the chronological order in which they 
first appear. The first known ancient Athenian tax appeared in the time of Pisistratus. One 
of the most important direct taxes and the most widely referred to in Athenian literature 
was the eisphora (a property tax). The eponion may (from recent evidence) have been a 
general sales tax of some kind. Two taxes are referred to by Aristophanes but nobody else: 
we know little of these, but I am assuming that Aristophanes would not have referred to 
them if the joke was not about taxation of some kind. The Chapter concludes with a tax on 
the sales of some state property. The main thread running through this collection of taxes, 
so far as it can be discerned, is that these were all taxes on Athenians generally, where, of 
course, they were subject to them. 
Eikosteldekate 
The first specific reference in the ancient sources to an Athenian tax was to a 5% or 10% 
tax (depending on which source you use) on agricultural produce in the time ofPisistratus. 
Herodotus 1 64 says that Pisistratus 'made himself a strong guard and collected revenue 
both from Athens and from the district of the river Strymon'. There are two more specific 
references to Athenian taxes in the time of the Pisistratids - first, Thucydides 6 54 relates 
that a 5% tax (eikoste) was enacted by the Pisistratids ('the Pisistratids carried the practice 
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of virtue and discretion to a very high degree, considering that they were tyrants, and 
although they exacted from the Athenians only five per cent of their produce, not only did 
they embellish the city, but they also carried on its wars and provided sacrifices for the 
temples'). The second reference is Aristotle Ath Pol 16 4 who wrote that the Pisistratids' 
'revenues were increased by the thorough cultivation of the land. For they levied a tax of 
10% (dekate) on agricultural produce'. 
A variety of explanations for the two rates (5% and 10%) is possible, for example, that the 
10% rate was reduced to 5% by Pisistratus' sons or that Pisistratus' levy was progressive, 
linked to the Solonic property groups. Perhaps Thucydides' context provides a sufficient 
explanation of the 'only' without our having to suppose that a higher rate of tax had been 
levied earlier. And perhaps the explanation of the discrepancy is not that the Athenaion 
Politeia is wrong but rather that 'the specific term eikoste may be subsumed under the 
generic term dekate, ... and in principle the more precise evidence is preferable to the more 
general'. 1 Dover compares the situation that in English an exaction of 5% could be called a 
'tithe' and says that the point of Thucydides' argument is that, despite the modesty of their 
exactions, the tyrants nevertheless executed the tasks for which exactions were required, 
'beautifying the city and carrying their wars to a conclusion'. 2 
The view that the 10% tax was a generic term (like 'tithe') has been thought unlikely by 
others because there is a precise parallel in the 10% tax attributed to Cypselus, tyrant of 
Corinth, by Aristotle Oeconomica 1346 a-b. Stanton argued that since Pisistratus taxed 
1 Rhodes Comm Ath Pol p 215, following Dover. 
2 A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Vol IV pp 329-330. 
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primary produce, he provided further inducement for men with capital to invest in 
secondary industry. He also believed that a tax of 10% under Pisistratus was subsequently 
halved by him or his sons and that perhaps the economic boom which Athens experienced 
enabled a reduction in taxation. 3 
An alternative view of the eikosteldekate 
The discussions of the eikoste/dekate all assume that there was an eikoste/dekate. An 
alternative radical view questions whether there was a tax at all. This view arises from 
work done on Pisistratus by Sancisi-Weerdenburg and some other Dutch historians.4 These 
believe that current arguments as to how Pisistratus gained his power and how he 
succeeded, with his sons, in keeping and expanding it, are less than satisfactory and 
urgently need to be replaced. 
Sancisi-Weerdenburg's view seems to be made up of a number of different strands, but the 
main point she makes is that Aristotle does not say that the tenth was a tax or that it was 
paid to the state, and she asks how it was collected if it was a tax. She says that presumably 
the tax was on agricultural products and paid in natura : that meant that at the time of the 
harvest an army of tax-collectors had to go round Attica to decide what was the share to be 
paid. And that at a time when most hands were engaged in getting the harvest in. 
3 Athenian Politics c 800-500 BC p 117, following Pleket Talanta 1 1969 p 46 n 95. 
4 De Agricultura and Peisistratus and the Tyranny p vii. 
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Sancisi-Weerdenburg refers to K W Welwei, who points out that for such a system one 
would need not only a continuous system of estimating the harvests, but spaces for storage 
of the products and a system of controls as well. Control might have been carried out by the 
naukraroi as Wallinga argues (see Chapter Four),5 but we have not yet found any evidence 
of storage or of institutional assessments of harvests. It is not only difficult to imagine how 
this would work in 6th century Attica, it is even more difficult to understand how such a 
system would have disappeared without a trace at the end of the tyranny. Sancisi-
Weerdenburg suggests that the de kate of Pisistratus was a share in the crop of poor farmers 
he had helped to settle and that Pisistratus was continuing the policy of the landlords of the 
hektemoroi before Solon's intervention, although she still seems to have harvests estimated 
and crops collected, albeit on a smaller scale. 
An early tax 
Our evidence for taxation in this period rests, then, on only a few literary references, and 
we should be very tentative in postulating theories of how it worked. But I believe that 
there is enough evidence to suggest that there was some kind of taxation in the period, and 
I reject the alternative view put by the Dutch historians. The parallel with taxation by 
Cypselus of Corinth together with references by Herodotus, Thucydides and Aristotle 
makes a plausible case for taxation in Athens even if there was no clear distinction between 
the revenue of the tyrant and the revenue of the state. I doubt whether the tax was a tax in 
5 See pp 152-153. 
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kind : the administrative arrangements for collecting a tax in kind would have been 
substantial. I discuss the alternative of payment in cash in Chapter Ten. 6 
As far as the rate of tax is concerned, we have a range of choices - that there was just one 
rate of 5%, that there was a graduated scale, or that it was 10% and was reduced to 5% 
either by Pisistratus who died in 527 or by his sons who succeeded him. One could 
reasonably settle for any of these options. The general view - argued by Dover and Rhodes 
- of a 5% tax is certainly possible, but I am attracted to the more straightforward argument 
ofPleket and Stanton that Aristotle was correct, drawing on the parallel with Cypselus, and 
that Pisistratus imposed a tax of 10%, which was reduced by his sons to 5%. However, I 
understand the argument of those who do not see why a 10% tax in Corinth (if that is 
precise and not generic) has to imply a 10% tax in Athens, and Thucydides is the older 
source and might be more reliable. 
The most important aspects of the eikosteldekate are that it is an early tax on one section of 
the population (maybe at that time the main part of the population), that it seems to have 
lapsed on the fall of the tyrants, and that it is possible that no taxes replaced it for some 
time, possibly for a hundred years. I discuss the nature of the tax further in Chapter Eight? 
6 See p 296 et seq. 
7 See pp 253-256. 
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Eisphora 
The next recorded tax is the eisphora. Eisphora (paying in) is a general word for payments 
made for a common cause by a plurality of contributors, and in particular the name of a 
property tax known in a number of Greek states and in the Ptolemaic Empire. 8 In Athens 
the eisphora was levied on the property of the more wealthy citizens and the metics, 
normally in practice in time of war. 
The eisphora in the 5th century 
The first literary reference to the eisphora in Athens appears in Thucydides 3 19 in the 
winter of 428-427 (the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War) as follows: 
'Now the Athenians, finding themselves in need of additional 
funds for the siege (ofMytilene), having then for the first 
time resorted to an eisphora upon themselves to the amount 
of two hundred talents, also sent to the allies twelve ships 
under the command ofLysicles and four others, to collect 
money from them'. 
It seems likely that the levy of the eisphora at this time was forced on the Athenians by a 
severe shortage of funds. Athens had a reserve of coined silver of 6000T in 431 
8 Rhodes ocd p 514. 
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(Thucydides 2 13 ), but her position had deteriorated since then. The loans to the Athenian 
State from the Sacred Treasuries show that very large sums were borrowed between 432-
431 and 429-428 - 1145T in 432-431, 1370T in 431-430, 1300T in 430-429 and 600T in 
429-428.9 The Athenians presumably realised that they were getting through the temple 
treasuries at an unacceptable rate. Hence the levy of the eisphora. 
But what does the phrase 'then for the first time' mean? Three interpretations have been 
suggested. 
The first is that the eisphora was levied then for the first time ever. The second is that the 
eisphora was levied then for the first time in the Peloponnesian War. The third is that this 
was the first time the eisphora yielded as much as 200T. 10 The first interpretation would 
seem to be the right one, were it not for the fact that the eisphora might have been levied 
before 428. The main problem here is the second Decree of Callias, which refers to an 
eisphora and is usually dated to 434-433. 11 A photograph of the inscription is at the end of 
the Chapter, and the text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of the thesis. The Decree 
says that the monies which are the subject of the Decree shall not be used for any other 
purpose unless the people pass a vote of immunity (adeia) just as when they pass a vote 
about the eisphora. However, this argument is not decisive : all the Decree implies is that 
an eisphora could have been collected; we have no evidence as to whether one was. Others 
have argued that the Decree dates from 422 or 418 on the grounds that there is no record of 
9 ML 72. 
10 Griffith 'A Note on the first Eisphora at Athens' AJAH 2 1977 p 3. 
11 ML 58. 
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a vote of adeia before that latter date (in /G i3 370) in which case one can go back to the 
first interpretation, that is that the eisphora was levied for the first time in 428. 12 
One can at least say that 428 was not the first time anyone thought about the eisphora. If it 
were, one might have expected Thucydides to have added a few words of explanation for 
this new phenomenon. In fact there are a number of references to the eisphora before 428, 
apart from the second Decree of Callias. Thucydides himself in 1 141 had said that 'it was 
accumulated wealth, and not 'forced eisphorai' that sustained wars'. We see a reference to 
the eisphora in Hestiaea in 446, which I discuss below in the context of the liability of non-
residents to the eisphora and in Chapter Nine. 13 Also there is a reference to 'many and large 
eisphorai' in the Tetralogies ascribed to Antiphon of uncertain date. 14 Michael Gagarin's 
recent book Antiphon the Athenian : Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists is 
disappointingly brief on the relationship between Antiphon's words and Thucydides 3 19. 
It is generally believed important on stylistic grounds to place the Tetralogies in an earlier, 
rather than a later, stage in Antiphon's life ( c 480-411 ), if indeed we are looking at only one 
Antiphon : however, the reference to 'many and large eisphorai' casts, in my view, 
substantial doubt on Gagarin's dating of the Tetralogies before the Peloponnesian War. 
Sealey, also writing on the Tetralogies, is rather more interesting. He draws attention to the 
words kai autoi in Thucydides 3 19 (the Athenians even taxed themselves)15 which 
12 Kallet in Money, Expense, and Naval Power p 80 and Mattingly The Athenian Empire Restored pp 216-
222. This is one of the dates which Mattingly has disputed (see my comments on the dating of inscriptions in 
the Introduction) and for which he has proposed 422-421. 
13 We also see a reference to the eisphora in Miletus, which has hitherto been widely dated to 450-449 (JG i3 
21 56). This is another of the dates disputed by Mattingly which should probably now be a later date (like 
426-425). A date of 450-449 for the Miletus regulations always required special pleading over the archon's 
name and the later date is now likely to be generally agreed. 
14 First Tetralogy 2 2 -12. 
15 
'The Tetralogies Ascribed to Antiphon' TAPA 114 1984 p 80. 
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suggests that the Athenians might have levied the eisphora on others before 428 but levied 
it on themselves for the first time in 428. However, Kal atJTol should perhaps be 
contrasted with Kal hrl Tovs ~UJ..lJ..lciXOVS in the same sentence, that is 'the Athenians 
raised among themselves' the eisphora and 'sent out twelve ships to collect tribute among 
the allies'. 
I do not think that we have enough evidence to come to a clear conclusion on Thucydides 3 
19. If, however, the Decree is correctly dated to 434-433, this could take the eisphora well 
back into the middle years of the century, if not earlier. And even if the Decree is dated 
later than 434-433, that could still leave the possibility of a long-standing eisphora. So, as 
with the eikosteldekate in the 6th century, the sparse references to taxes in the early part of 
the 5th century should not necessarily be taken as suggesting that there were no taxes at this 
time, and that is the most important point of the debate for me. 
Whatever the date of the commencement of the eisphora, what happened after its 
commencement? The authors of The Athenian Tribute Lists said that there was every 
reason to believe that the eisphora was abandoned in 425 - indeed that one purpose of the 
new tribute assessment of that year must have been to make a direct tax assessment 
unnecessary. 16 Gomme did not agree. 17 He said that this would have made a mockery of the 
reference to Cleon, who is generally believed to have been responsible for this special tax 
on the well-to-do, in Aristophanes' Knights 774. We know from Lysias 21 1-4 that a 
wealthy man paid out 30 minae and 4000 drachmas in two eisphorai during the period 411-
16 ATL Vol III p 345. 
17 A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Vol II p 279. 
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410 to 403-402. 18 And Lysias 12 20, 25 12 and 30 26 referred to 'pollai eisphorai', which, 
as Gomme says, might mean that the eisphora was levied anything from six to a dozen or 
more times during the Peloponnesian War. 
One should perhaps also mention - although the matter is not free from doubt - the 
possibility of a reference to the eisphora in ML 78 (Decrees relating to the Sicilian 
Expedition: 415 BC)- in line 5 of fragment c (1-lEVOV El Ecr<pepev chav OEE). Thomsen has 
commented that the word espherein on its own need not necessarily refer to an eisphora, 
but that it is most suggestive that three lines earlier appear the words ci:no Tov TlJ..lEJ..lOTOS 
which do belong to the sphere oftaxation. 19 After the Peloponnesian War, an eisphora was 
levied to cover the public debt (Demosthenes 20 12 : 'when the question (of repaying a debt 
to the Spartans) was discussed .... they say that the people chose to pay the eisphora and 
bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement'). 
I believe, on the basis of these references, that the authors of The Athenian Tribute Lists 
were wrong and that whenever the eisphora was established, it continued intermittently for 
the rest of the 5th century. 
18 As Figueira comments in Athens and Aigina p 193, Lysias 21 1-4 does not establish that there were only 
two eisphorai between 411 and 404. It attests two eisphorai while the speaker was a trierarch abroad, perhaps 
between 410-409 or 408-407 and 405-404; and Diodorus 13 64 4 says that profits from plunder gathered by 
Alcibiades in the ~llespont in 410-409 were used specifically to alleviate the burden of the eisphorai at 
A thetis. 
19 Eisphora p 175. 
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The eisphora in the lh century 
If the facts about the 5th century eisphora are a little sparse, we have plenty of detail about 
the workings of the 4th century eisphora. Millett has remarked that historians are largely 
dependent for their detailed reconstruction of economy and society in classical Greece on 
the 160 or so extant speeches of the Attic Orators,20 and we certainly owe much of our 
knowledge of how the eisphora affected people to this source. 
The eisphora was a sporadically levied tax, imposed by decree of the Assembly 
(Demosthenes 3 4). War was surely the principal reason for levying an eisphora, but 
technically it was just a property tax and although historians sometimes refer to it as a war 
tax there is no evidence to suggest that the eisphora was levied specifically (or ring-
fencedly) for military purposes. The tax was paid by both citizens and metics,21 but only by 
the well-off. Some have said that it does not appear to have hit the rich particularly hard 
and have quoted the case of Demosthenes.22 In the ten years of his minority, when his 
property was administered by his guardians, they had to pay 1800 drachmas on a fortune 
that was assessed at 15T and was regarded as amongst the largest in Athens (Demosthenes 
27 37). But Demosthenes came from a family steeped in tax evasion, which he carried 
forward in his generation. Some speeches of Demosthenes quoted in Chapter Five show 
2° Classical Greece ed Robin Osborne p 24. 
21 See Taxes on non-Athenians (metics) in Chapter Two, where I discuss possible alternatives for the metic 
contribution to the eisphora (pp 70-72). 
22 Compare Hansen The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes p 112. 
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that other eisphora-payers did not feel that they had been so lightly treated by the 
eisphora.23 
The total taxable capital (timema) on which the tax was assessed was 5750T according to 
Polybius (2 62 7) or 6000T according to Demosthenes (14 19). The amount of the tax 
raised at any given time was therefore whatever percentage the Assembly fixed - say 1% or 
2%- of5750T or 6000T. So, Demosthenes 14 27 says 'For consider; will anyone propose a 
tax of one per cent now? Then we get sixty talents. Or double it and make it two per cent? 
Still only 120 talents'. 24 
However, it seems that there was a crisis in the collection of the eisphora as the fourth 
century progressed. In the period between 378-377 (the archonship ofNausinicus) and 369 
(if that date is correct) the arrears in the payment of eisphora amounted to 14T, and it was 
not until the early 350s that a determined effort was made- by Androtion- to collect these 
arrears : he had an ad hoc commission of ten (including himself) appointed to collect 
arrears of property tax (Demosthenes 22 42-44) and collected about half the amount due. It 
was against this background that steps were taken over a period of years to reform the 
collection of the eisphora. From 378-377 the tax was collected by dividing the taxpayers 
into 100 symmories ('sharing-together groups' or tax companies). Later, the richest 300 (3 
per symmory) were required to act as advance-payers (proeispherontes) for their 
symmories (Demosthenes 42 25). They had to pay the whole tax immediately it was called 
for and make their own arrangements to reimburse themselves from the other members of 
23 See pp 161-165. 
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the symmones (Demosthenes 50 9). This was possibly a very efficient form of tax 
collection, but it clearly left some proeispherontes short, as in the case of Apollodorus in 
[Demosthenes] 50 9, who paid his taxes in advance, went to serve as a trierarch abroad and 
came back unable to recoup the money from his fellow symmory members (see Chapter 
Five).25 By a law proposed in 358-357 (Demosthenes 47 21 with 44) by Periandros, the 
symmory system was extended to cover the trierarchy as well as the payment of eisphora 
(Demosthenes 4 7 21 )_26 I discuss the trierarchy and the numbers of those liable to the 
eisphora and liturgies in the Appendix to Part One. 27 Historians have ranged these numbers 
from 1200 via 2000 to 6000. 
There is some epigraphical evidence for eisphora as a regular annual tax of 10 talents a 
year in 347-346?8 This tax is recorded in a decree of 302-301 in honour of the metics 
Nikandros and Polyzelos of Ephesos. Opinion is divided about this tax - whether it was 
paid by metics alone or by both citizens and metics (there is a reference to metics in the 
epigraphical evidence). Thomsen believes that the total yield of the eisphora levied on 
citizens and metics each year amounted to 1 0 talents. Others, including myself, believe that 
10 talents was too small an amount to represent the total yield of an eisphora paid by both 
citizens and metics. This tax looks like a different tax for which (inconveniently) the same 
Greek word is used. 
24 It is generally agreed, including by me, that the eisphora was a flat-rate, not a progressive, tax. I discuss the 
arguments in Chapter Eight (pp 246-248). 
25 See pp 164-165. 
26 Gabrielsen Financing the Athenian Fleet pp 182-190 is the most recent thorough discussion of the issues 
involved. 
27 see'pp 131-133. 
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An indication that the well-known eisphora was still up and running in 329 is the fact that 
when Athens honoured Eudemus of Plataea, he was given certain privileges, including 
paying the eisphora along with the Athenians. 29 
Liability of non-residents to the eisphora 
Athenian citizens were liable to the eisphora when they were resident in Athens, but were 
they liable when they were not resident in Athens? (Metics were also liable to the eisphora 
but in most cases one was a metic only if one was resident, so the question of liability to 
the eisphora of a non-resident metic does not normally arise.) There is no clear evidence 
that they were but Figueira has suggested that they might have been so liable. 30 He argued 
this by reference to IG e 41 38-39 where it is said that colonists in Hestiaea paid an 
eisphora. This may have been a local eisphora, he said, but in the absence of any other 
information about an eisphora in Hestiaea, it could have been the Athenian eisphora. 
Figueira compares the Chalcis Decree where xenoi are assumed to be paying taxes to 
Athens (/G e 40 52-57). He suggests that one advantage of this hypothesis is that it 
removes the incongruity of property within Attica being subject to Athenian tax, while 
external property was not. 
Figueira's argument is, on the face of it, an attractive proposition, and indeed seems to be 
widely held (compare OCD3 p 348 where Hornblower writes 'As Athenian citizens, 
cleruchs were liable for military service, paid eisphora, and took part in religious activities 
28 /G ii2 244 19; 505 15. 
29 Tod 198 = R&O 94. 
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at Athens'.) A number of historians had earlier argued the same view, for example, Cary in 
JHS 45 1925 p 244 who said that this must mean that the decree dates after 427 (more 
precisely the winter of 428-427 when Thucydides said that the eisphora was levied 'then 
for the first time'); A J Graham in Colony and Mother City p 172, who saw the words 
Kvp(at EKKAna(at- meaning the Athenian assembly - as decisive; and Mattingly BCH 92 
1968 pp 476-477, who dated both this decree and the Callias decrees to the 420s. 
There is, however, a problem with the eisphora in the decree in that it is coupled with 
chrematon, rather than with eispherein which is the norm. It is true that chrematon and 
eisphora go together in /G i3 21 56 (regulations for Miletus) but without the reference to 
Kvp(at eKKAna(at. The epigraphic evidence we have looked at refers to foreign 
communities (Miletus and Hestiaea) and does not necessarily imply that the eisphora was 
being levied in Athens : the use of the word chrematon suggests that the phrase just means 
'paying in' and is not a technical term at all. It is also true that the two words appear 
together in Xenophon Hellenica 6 2 1 referring to the Athenians being worn out 
XPnllaTC.:>V etaq>opais in 374. But my view overall is that this bit of the text of the decree 
is so fragmentary that we cannot know what is going on and chrematon esphoras does not 
look like the tax called eisphora. 
Since eisphora was a tax on property I would expect property in Attica to be liable whether 
its owner was currently resident or not Gust as Demosthenes' inheritance was liable when 
he was a minor and not in a position to pay). I do not know whether the position was 
30 Athens and Aigina pp 69-70 and 192-193. 
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different depending on whether the property was in an Athenian cleruchy or was in a place 
not subject to Athenian rule. 
In a passage in [Aristotle] Oeconomica 2 1347a Athenian colonists in Potidaea provided 
that, when they needed to levy the eisphora, instead of property being taxed in the deme 
where the owner resided, the levy should be made on every item of property where it was 
situated. 31 Those without property were assessed at two minai a head. This distinction 
between taxation of immovable property where it is situated and taxation of such property 
where the owner is resident is often recognised in modem tax law where immovable 
property is taxed in the country where the property is situated, if for no other reason that it 
is more practical to tax it there. It is interesting that this provision in Potidaea combines 
both poll and property taxation. 32 
Other aspects of the eisphora 
Two further aspects of the eisphora have been the subject of debate in recent years. 
The first centres on what are called the diadikasia documents dated 383-382.33 This is the 
label given to a group of inscriptions containing lists of names in the formula 'B instead of 
A' possibly in suits to decide between claimants for exemption from liturgies referred to in 
the Appendix to Part One (called antidosis). John Davies argued that these diadikasiai 
31 See Bullock Politics, Finance, and Consequences pp 128-129. 
32 [Aristotle] Oec 2 1346a had listed a poll-tax (epikepha/ion) as one of the taxes levied by governors under 
kings- see my comments on Delphi in Chapter Six (pp 194-195). 
33 1aie 1928-1932. 
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concerned membership of an obscure eisphora-paying body named The Thousand. 34 M 
Clark believed that there was a significant obstacle to this theory.35 The deme-based 
registration for reimbursing the proeispherontes that Davies envisaged seemed to conflict 
with evidence from two of the inscriptions showing that litigants in diadikasiai could be 
replaced on the register by citizens from other demes (and indeed other tribes). Clark 
therefore suggested that these documents recorded the results of antidosis proceedings 
concerning the trierarchy, not the eisphora. 
Gabrielsen believes that there are no means by which to connect firmly The Thousand 
either to the eisphora or to the diadikasia documents. Nor is it certain that the documents 
(and the legal proceedings to which they refer) were to produce a list of property owners; 
they may well have been concerned with disputes over payment of public debts. All in all, 
the exact purpose of the diadikasia documents remains too obscure to permit a positive 
identification with a trierarchic register.36 
The second aspect of the eisphora which has been the subject of debate in recent years 
centres on the accounts of the Naval Commissioners dated 370-365.37 John Davies argued 
that the formula 6 Be'lva eioT,veyt<e which is used several times in the inscription means 
payment of an eisphora levy in kind. 38 Brun restated the theory using basically the same 
line of argument (that is, that it was possible for Athenians to discharge their state dues 
34 Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens pp 133-150 : compare Rhodes AJAH 7 1982 pp 11-14 
who suggests a list of property-owners potentially liable for the trierarchy or for all liturgies. 
35 BSA 85 1990 pp 66-67. 
36 Financing theY!thenian Fleetp 71. 
37 JG iP 1609. 
38 Historia 18 1969 pp 309-333. 
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through navy equipment) and no new evidence.39 Gabrielsen believed that the foundation 
on which this view rested was quite frail. 40 He agreed that the formula served the specific 
purpose to mark off privately owned ship's equipment. However, he believed that (1) 
eionveyKe, in naval contexts, could not be associated with the eisphora, and (2) equipment 
listed under the eionveyKe-formula was being deposited in the dockyards on loan only 
whilst it continued to remain the owner's property. 
I do not think that either of Davies' arguments in these two aspects of the eisphora can be 
sustained with any conviction. On the first argument, telling points have been made against 
the proposition and there are only speculative arguments in favour of it. In particular, I 
agree with Gabrielsen that there are no grounds for connecting the Thousand with either the 
eisphora or the diadikasia documents. On the second argument, both Davies (p 318) and 
Brun (p 31 0) admit that the use of eicniveyKe in this entry does not fit their interpretation of 
the formula as meaning payment of eisphora in kind: rather, they prefer to consider it as an 
irregularity, a flaw in the language. I argue generally in this thesis against assuming any 
taxation in kind (with its huge administrative burden) without at least some evidence for it. 
The case for taxation in kind is here weaker than in other parts of this thesis, while 
Gabrielsen's arguments on the use ofeionveyKe in a naval context are relatively strong. 
39 REA 1985 pp 307-317. 
40 ZPE 19 1989 pp 93-99. 
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:4 lake of crocodiles'? 
I have set out above the main facts about the eisphora, but I am conscious that the tax is a 
large subject (Thomsen, for example, wrote a whole book about it). And, as I said at the 
beginning, the eisphora features in the tax laws of other Greek states. The history of the 
Athenian eisphora is uneven. Ste. Croix said that it presented 'a series of difficult 
problems'41 and Pritchett said that it remained 'a lake of crocodiles'. 42 To be sure, there are 
no references in the ancient sources to its origin (unless it really did just begin abruptly in 
428) and the evidence of its later history is variable, if not unplentiful. As will be seen in 
Chapter Twelve, it is not easy to estimate how much the eisphora raised. 43 However, I 
believe that contrary to what Ste. Croix said, the frequent references to the eisphora in 
Demosthenes and the other orators suggest that it was widely levied and that it could have 
produced a substantial revenue for the Athenian state. And the reform programme for 
tightening up on the collection of the eisphora indicates that it was an important tax for the 
Athenians. 
Eponion 
The next Athenian tax, chronologically, for which we have evidence is the eponion, but its 
general nature, unlike that of the eikoste/dekate and the eisphora, is not clear. Both Boeckh 
and Andreades had some difficulty in describing it. Boeckh observed that the grammarians 
mentioned the eponion (Pollux 7 15) but that they did not themselves know accurately what 
41 Class et Med 14 1953, pp 30-70. 
42 The Greek State at War Part V p 474 n 707. 
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its nature was. It has been generally believed that the eponion was a tax on the sales of 
confiscated property in Athens during the period of this thesis. Why it should have been 
levied on such sales, when the receipts of sale were going to the state anyway, is not clear. 
The same considerations apply for that matter to the hekatoste and I discuss that question 
later in this Chapter.44 
Main features of the eponion 
The eponion was one of the taxes which, according to Aristotle 47 2-3, were collected by 
tax-farmers, who bought the contracts for collecting the taxes through the poletai ('sellers') 
- see Chapter Four.45 According to Aristotle, the taxes were recorded on whitened tablets, 
but we nevertheless have records on stone. Langdon in Agora XIX has gathered together 
records on stone of fifty six of such sales of confiscated property, that is the personal and 
real property of persons convicted of crimes of various kinds. The first recorded sales took 
place towards the end of the fifth century and sales are recorded well into the fourth 
century (and beyond). However, the fact that we have no records on stone between the end 
of the fifth century and about 3 70 may suggest that the sales recorded towards the end of 
the fifth century were exceptional confiscations and that confiscations were not normally 
recorded on stone until about 370. 
43 See pp 340-342. 
44 See pp 52-53. 
45 See pp 143-146. 
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I look at three of the larger pieces of evidence for the eponion in ancient Athens, two from 
the end of the fifth century and one dated about 367-366, to give an indication of how the 
eponion seems to have worked. 
The first piece of evidence is what are often referred to as 'The Attic Stelai' - the title 
applied by Pollux 10 97 to stelai, standing in the Eleusinion, which recorded the sale of the 
confiscated property of the profaners of the Mysteries. The stelai also recorded the sale of 
the property of the mutilators of the Herms. They give a fascinating insight into the wealth 
of individual Athenians who were caught up in the scandals and had their property sold in a 
glare of publicity. Much of our information about the crimes comes from Thucydides 6 and 
Andocides Mysteries ( 65 names are mentioned in Andocides and of these 15 appear in the 
epigraphic texts). The date of the Attic Stelai is 414-413, and they have been extensively 
discussed by Pritchett. 46 
The fragments of these lists of sales of the confiscated property of the condemned are 
published as JG i3 421-430 =Agora XIX Pl. There are over 30 fragments from eleven 
stelai. A photograph at the end of this Chapter shows the record of the sale of some of this 
property preceded by two figures. The first is the eponion and the second is the sale price. 
The full text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. The lower half of the 
fragment lists some of the larger sales, those of slaves belonging to the metic 
Cephisodorus, whose name is on the seventeenth line from the bottom. Another photograph 
at the end of this Chapter shows the details of the sale of some of the goods of Alcibiades. 
46 Pritchett Hesperia 22 1953 pp 225-299; 25 1956 pp 178-328; 30 1961 pp 23-29; R Ross Holloway 
Hesperia 35 1966 p 84 and Meritt Hesperia 36 1967 pp 84-86; then Agora XIX Pl. 
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A striking feature of the lists, as Millett observes, is the gap between the expensive items 
like land, houses and slaves on the one hand and trivial items like bronze pots, kitchen 
utensils and tunics on the other. Cash and precious metals could have gone directly to the 
state.47 
Some historians originally assumed that the tax was computed on a percentage basis. Thus 
Hicks and Hill postulated a 1% tax. 48 Pritchett subsequently argued for a sliding scale, or 
what he called a 'bracketed' sales tax, drawing from modern parallels in US taxation. 49 
What Pritchett meant by a bracketed tax was that the tax was in bands and you applied the 
tax according to which band the sale price fell. So (in an Ohio law of 1934), if the price 
was less than 9 cents, there was no tax; if the price was 40 cents or less, the tax was 1 %; if 
the price was over 40 cents and not over 70 cents, the tax was 2% etc. However, he said 
that the Athenian state made sure that no single sale would be taxed less than one per cent. 
Most recently, K Hallofhas argued by reference to IG e 421line 95 and /G e 426 line 120 
that the sales tax was a full and consistent 1% and that it was paid by the buyer ( TCx 
enwvta 6 nptajlEVOS ETEAEt - SEG 32 161 III 6 IV 3 and 12).50 (In the case of the first 
reference he reads, instead ofHH, which yields a sale price of200 drachmas, HH[.] with a 
sales tax (eponion) of2 drachmas 1 obol. In the case of the second reference he rejects the 
restoration of[~"]r[l] (2 drachmas 1 obol) sales tax on a sale price ofHHv). The tax does not 
seem invariably to be an exact 1% but I think that Hallofs straight 1% seems more likely 
than a bracketed tax. 
47 Classical Greece ed Robin Osborne p 35. 
48 A Manual ofGreek Historical Inscriptions 1901 p 143. 
49 Hesperia 1953 p 225 et seq; Archaeology 7 1954 pp 112-113. 
5
° Klio 72 1990 pp 408-409. 
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The second piece of evidence of the eponion is a list of the sales with the tax thereon of the 
confiscated property of the Thirty in 402-401 set up in the Agora, either near the Heliaea or 
near the offices of the poletai. The Thirty were installed in power under Spartan pressure in 
404 and were subsequently deposed. These sales have been discussed by Walbank, 51 and 
now constitute Agora XIX P2. 
The existing list comprises nine fragments which W albank: suggested came from several 
ste/ai. In these fragments the eponion is placed below the sale price, with epo (for eponion) 
sometimes preceding it, rather than by the side of it, as in the Attic Ste/ai. The tax seems to 
have been double the 1% tax in the Attic Stelai. This was first suggested by Pritchett, 
arguing by reference to what is now g line 12 of P2 of Agora XIX. 52 Following 
examination of a squeeze he came to the conclusion that the sales tax read 13 drachmas on 
a sale realising 610 drachmas. Walbank:'s readings confirmed those of Pritchett and 
permitted further assumptions to be made about the sale price and the taxes. In the example 
I gave above the sale price would then be 410 drachmas and the eponion 9 drachmas. It is 
generally thought that the 2% tax was later halved. 
The third piece of evidence is an example of the remaining records of eponia, in that it 
mentions Ta encbvta Kal TCx KnpvKeta (auctioneer's fees) but without any figures. PS in 
Agora XIX is a perfectly preserved inscription dated 367-366, which was found beneath 
the floor of the Tholos (perhaps an indication of where the po/etai operated). The first half 
51 WalbankHesperia 511982 pp 74-98; then Agora XIX P2. 
52 Classical Philology 51 1956 pp 100-102. 
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of the stele relates to the sale of a confiscated house. It describes the location of the house, 
who owned it and how it came to be confiscated. The reference to the eponia (and 
kerukeia) came towards the end of the first half of the stele. The second half of the stele 
relates to the leasing of 1 7 mining properties in the Laurium area. 
I have suggested some possible new fragments of the Attic Stelai arising from articles on 
financial and other public documents by Michael Walbank in Hesperia in 1996 and 1998 
and record my findings in an Endnote to this Chapter. 
A general sales tax? 
I said above that it has been generally assumed that the eponion was simply a tax on the 
sale price of confiscated property. However, we now have evidence from the recently-
discovered Grain-Tax Law of374-373 (dealt with in Chapter Three) that the eponion could 
have been not just a tax on the sale price of confiscated property but a general sales tax. 53 
The eponia and kerukeia mentioned towards the end of the first half of the stele which 
comprises the third piece of evidence above (these words also appear in P3 4-5, P45 3 and 
P53 46) are the same as words in the Grain-Tax Law. In the former case the tax is a tax on 
the sale of confiscated goods, but in the latter the buyer of the contract to supply grain from 
Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros to Athens is required to pay eponia and kerukeia of 20 
drachmas per portion. Stroud observed that he had not found another example of eponia 
53 Seep 104. 
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and kerukeia assessed as a specific sum in drachmas in advance of the 'sale' of a tax 
contract in Athens, and that he did not know why the lawgiver did this in this case. 
It will be interesting to see if any further inscriptions in the period are discovered which 
throw light on this, either in Athens or elsewhere in the Greek world. Eponion was 
apparently a general sales tax in independent Delos in 279 and 278 : it was 5% of the 2% 
harbour tax (see /G xi 2 161A 25-26 and IG xi 2 162A 29-30 and GReger Regionalism and 
Change in the Economy of Independent Delos 314-167 BC pp 254-256). If the eponion was 
not simply a tax on the confiscated property of oligarchs - even if this is how it started - but 
a tax on the sale of goods more generally, this would clearly make a great difference to our 
understanding of taxes in ancient Athens. 
Pentakosioste and tessarakoste 
The next taxes mentioned in the ancient sources are two taxes referred to by Aristophanes 
in Ecclesiazusae 1006-7 and 823-825 respectively, which was written about 392, that is the 
pentakosioste (1/500) and the tessarakoste (1/40). 
The first reference at 1006-7 ('I'm not obliged to. Not unless you've paid the city 1/500th of 
what I'm worth') does not make clear the nature of the tax. 54 It seems to imply some kind of 
property or sales tax. But at so low a rate that it would not be worth collecting except on 
large sums. 
54 Compare SommersteinAristophanes Ecclesiazusae p 225; also his translation. 
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The second reference at 823-825 ('And just recently, didn't we all swear that the city was 
going to get five hundred talents from the two-and-a-half-per-cent tax that Euripides had 
devised?') is to a recent tax of l/40th a year (the tessarakoste) which Euripides (it has been 
suggested, the son of the poet) proposed and was said to be likely to raise 500 talents. This 
could have been an eisphora imposed by an ad hoc Assembly decree, where money was 
required for special needs, usually wartime. 55 For a tax of 2.5% to have an expected yield 
of 500 talents implies that the tax base was believed to be 20,000 talents. This looks wildly 
optimistic, given the known figures for other eisphorai (like the 200 talents yielded in 428). 
In fact, Demosthenes 14 27 says that you needed a tax of a twelfth to produce SOOT, before 
saying that the Athenians would not submit to such a tax. 
Were these real taxes? 
Were these real taxes? I referred in a footnote at the beginning of the Introduction to the 
value of Aristophanes as an historical source. Christopher Pelling, on the matter of making 
comic sense, has suggested treating Aristophanes as illuminating recurrent features of 
everyday life rather than specific happenings or events, and that we need to combine comic 
indications with evidence from other sources. 56 Clearly, if a particular scene is to make 
sense, the occurrence should not be too bewildering to the audience and it should also be 
funny. So in the UK at the present time a comedy might describe a proposal for a 'stealth' 
55 Compare Sommerstein Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae p 209, also his translation. Sommerstein draws 
attention to an earlier eisphora mentioned in !socrates 17 41 (394-393) which he suggests may have been 
imposed on aliens only ('I contributed more than any other foreigner'). 
56 Literary Texts and the Greek Historian, p 130. 
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tax on something particularly ludicrous but the audience may laugh at the reference 
knowing that it is not all that different from some other stealth taxes which the Government 
had recently introduced or tried to introduce. Although the two taxes we are discussing are 
problematical, we should not disregard them out of hand, simply because they appear in 
comedy. Aristophanes may have been exaggerating in his references to the taxes, but these 
references may well have been based on recent proposals for taxes, and they may indicate 
that these were not the only taxes that had been recently proposed. 57 
It is, therefore, worth looking for an explanation of the taxes (particularly the second) in the 
wider picture of the time in which Aristophanes wrote the Ecclesiazusae, about 392. The 
end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 had seen Athens defeated by Sparta but by the mid 
390s Sparta's supremacy was being challenged, both in the Corinthian War in which 
Thebes, Corinth, Argos and Athens were being encouraged by the gold of the Persian agent 
Timocrates, and in a Persian victory over the Spartan fleet which the Athenians tried to 
represent as a Greek victory and after which Aegean cities expelled the garrisons of the 
Spartan Agesilaus. By 392 Athens had ceased to receive Persian subsidies and was in 
financial difficulty. This was the historical setting of these two possible taxes and I am 
quite attracted by the view that the taxes - or some other similar taxes - were seriously 
proposed at this time to meet the shortage of money at Athens. 58 It is generally believed 
that the decrees dealing with salt and coinage (lines 812-822) had the same purpose and 
were also recent. In the event these taxes failed and shortly afterwards Thrasybulus went on 
57 I am grateful for the opportunity I have had to discuss these issues in the context of these taxes with Alan 
Sommerstein. 
58 See Seager 'TiuasYbwus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism' JHS 87 1967 p 111 and Bury/Meiggs History 
of Greece 1975 p 343. 
47 
his expeditions reimposing the eikoste and de kate in the Aegean and Hellespont (discussed 
in Chapter Three). 59 
Hekatoste 
The last tax on Athenians in this Chapter is the 1% tax (hekatoste) paid in relation to land 
in Attica. The inscriptions which record the tax probably date between 343 and 325 and 
were originally set up on the Acropolis, on or in the vicinity of which all sixteen fragments 
were probably found (between 1838 and the second half of the twentieth century). 
Andrejev and Lewis worked on these inscriptions for some time. 60 In 1997 Stephen 
Lambert published the first whole book on the subject of these Rationes Centesimarum. 
The general view is that the tax was paid on the proceeds of land sales. The sellers were all 
corporate groups, that is, groups of Athenian citizens, mostly formal sub-groups of the 
citizen body. The buyers were all individual Athenians. 
The fragments set out, according to a fixed formula, the details of the transactions, that is 
the seller, the officials involved, the property sold, the buyer, the price and the hekatoste (or 
totals of the hekatoste for a sequence of groups). Lewis made three stelai out of these 
fragments, Lambert has made four. A photograph at the end of this Chapter shows a well-
preserved example of one of the fragments. The full text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at 
the end of this thesis. 
59 See pp 100-10 1. 
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Lambert has estimated that about a quarter to a third of the original records have survived, 
so any conclusions we draw about the fragments are based on only a sample of inscriptions, 
and those not necessarily representative of the whole. 61 I believe, however, that with this 
caveat it is possible to draw some worthwhile conclusions. It is generally believed that the 
transactions were the result of Lycurgus' maximising the exploitation of the state's property 
to pay for the state's expenditure, similar to the privatisations that we have seen in modern 
states in recent years. 62 I return to this when I review the wider context of Athenian taxes in 
Chapter Nine. 63 Meanwhile two important questions arise - first whether we are in fact 
talking about sales of property (as the three above historians have argued) or leases of 
property, and second who the hekatoste was paid to. 
Sales of property or leases? 
First, sales of property or leases? Rosivach and Osborne have argued for leases. 64 They 
took the view that the state would not have deprived so many public corporations of their 
prime source of income, especially to help the wealthy add to their holdings of land, and 
that the transactions on these inscriptions record not sales but leases of agricultural property 
retained by public corporations to wealthy citizens whose lump-sum payments covered 
multiple-year leases. The purpose of the stelai was to record all such leases in force in the 
one year they were inscribed and to register the 1% tax assessed on the value of the 
60 See Lewis 'The Athenian Rationes Centesimarum' in M I Finley (ed) Problemes de Ia terre en Grece 
ancienne p 187 et seq= his Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History pp 263-293. 
61 Compare Robin Osborne's comments in his review of Lambert's book inJHS 119 1999 pp 206-207. 
62 Although Brun has recently cautioned against attributing to Lycurgus everything that was done during the 
'Lycurgan era' in Le Legislateur et La Loi dans l'Antiquite pp 187-200. 
63 Seep 287. 
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property. (The 'standard' classical Athenian rent was often of the order of 8%, which raises 
the possibility that the hekatoste might be 1% of the value of the property rather than 1% of 
some purchase price). The whole operation might have had the effect of raising revenues 
for the public corporations, which owned the land, through the euergetism of the wealthy 
who provided the cash and reaped the returns (or perhaps even losses) from the leases, out 
of philotimia. 
One substantial argument against leases is that this would mean very large amounts of land 
being leased. As Lambert has pointed out, if the sum paid was the rent, the capital value of 
the land would be say 12 times greater. So the total of all estates leased (these inscriptions 
suggest for some 300T) multiplied by say 12 would represent 50% or more of the entire 
eisphora value (of 6000T) of Attica, which is not likely. Alternatively, if the price given 
was not what was paid but represented a notional capital equivalent, the actual rent being 
say 8% of the amount shown, this could mean a huge tax of 12.5% on the leases (notional 
capital equivalent 300T, 1% tax 3T, 8% rent 24T on which tax of3T). 
Looking at the arguments from a purely tax point of view, there is evidence of property 
sales in Attica being subject to a tax of 1% or about 1%, whereas there is no evidence that 
such a lease tax was applied in all that we know of Attic leases. Aristophanes Wasps 658 
refers to TCxS noXXas EKaToaTas ('the many one-per-cents'). Lambert draws attention to 
two other pieces of evidence.65 First, Theophrastus in the Laws 21 1 tells us that property 
sales at Athens had to be registered with the authorities 60 days in advance and the buyer 
64 Rosivach 'The Rationes Centesimarum' in Eirene 28 1992 pp 49-61 and earlier, Robin Osborne Demos p 56 
et seq. 
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had to put down 1% of the price, so that his identity would be clear and the opportunity 
given for disputing the sale. Second, there were the sales taxes (eponia) paid on confiscated 
land and other property sold by the poletai, at a rate equivalent to 1% (2% around the end 
of the Peloponnesian War). 66 
I believe that the evidence overall points to sales of property, not leases. 
Who was the hekatoste paid to? 
In the case of both the eponion and the hekatoste, the proceeds of sale went to the state. But 
who was the eponion and hekatoste paid to? And why would the state receive a separate 
amount of tax? 
Lewis believed that the hekatostai went to Athena. He argued this from the findspot of all 
but one of the fragments on the Acropolis; and the parallels with the tribute lists, which 
recorded payments to Athena of a sixtieth of the tribute of Athens' allies in the fifth 
century, and phialai exeleutherikai, records of dedications presented to Athena by 
freedmen on manumission at around the same period as these texts, both of which were 
also found on the Acropolis. 
Lambert argues that, although it seems to have been generally assumed that the eponia in 
the poletai records went to a secular treasury, the close parallels with the hekatoste texts 
65 Rationes Centesimarum p 270. 
66 See p 38 et seq. 
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not only in the fact of the 'tax' and the nature of the transactions, but probably also in its 
rate, suggest that the eponia applied to the poletai sales may rather have gone to Athena 
(PS 36-39 specifies that the polis takes the eponia and kerukeia but this could comprehend 
Athena's treasury on the Acropolis).67 Lambert concludes that 'in the procedure recorded in 
these texts a well established principle may have been applied, for which Theophrastus and 
the po/etai records may also be evidence, that is that Athena's treasury received a 1% tax or 
portion on the proceeds of land sales in Attica ... Most records at Athens were on perishable 
materials, such as whitened boards; only in a minority of cases was it thought necessary to 
go to the expense of a permanent record on stone. It is this sensitivity that explains why the 
records are formally of the hekatostai paid to Athena and not the payments themselves'. 68 
I think, for all these reasons, that both the eponion and the hekatoste were paid to Athena, 
although I am a little uneasy because it seems that 10% of the proceeds of confiscated 
property also went to Athena. Compare the Law of Demophantus in Andocides 1 On The 
Mysteries 96 ('if anyone overthrows the democracy at Athens . . . let his property be 
confiscated and a tenth of it be given to the goddess'). Walbank also takes the view that 
10% of the sale price went to Athena. 69 
Before leaving this matter perhaps I may reflect on a modem parallel. Modem states 
sometimes tax amounts they give to people simply because it would be unfair not to do so 
6
i Although I have not found any parallels for using polis to include the sacred treasuries. As Lambert says, 
'polis' could, of course, mean Acropolis but perhaps not as late as this except in fossilised prepositional 
phrases and echei he polis suggests polis as institution, not polis as location. So I prefer Lambert's argument 
as in the text above. 
68 Rationes Centesimarum pp 272-273. 
69 Hesperia 511982 p 98. 
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as against others who are receiving other amounts, whether from the state or others, which 
are taxable and are taxed. They usually gross up the amounts they pay out - like a boarding 
school allowance for armed forces personnel in the UK - and tax the grossed up amount, 
with the result that both the state and the recipient are neither better nor worse off. Athens 
could then have had a 1% sales tax and levied it even when it was selling things itself, on 
grounds of fairness. However, it is unlikely that Athenians would have thought in this way, 
and Lambert's solution is probably the nearest we can get. 
Was the hekatoste part of a general sales tax? 
I would go one stage further than Lambert on the nature of the hekatoste. Lambert prayed 
in aid, as part of his arguments, the fact that 1% was the rate for the eponion in the fourth 
century, and Andreades thought that the eponion and the hekatoste were one and the same 
tax. I argued earlier in this Chapter that while the eponion may have started as a tax on the 
sales of confiscated property, the reference to it in the Grain-Tax Law suggests that it may 
have developed into a general sales tax (not necessarily on all sales, but on certain 
categories of sales). 7° Could, then, the hekatoste have been part of a general sales tax? It is 
true that the word eponion was used later in the fourth century, but could the hekatoste and 
the eponion at least be parts of the same general tax? In both cases the proceeds of sale 
went to the state treasury and the tax of 1% went (in my view) to the religious treasury. We 
have no other evidence of a general sales tax in Athens but presumably there were good 
reasons to inscribe the confiscations and sales of public land on stone (perhaps for religious 
70 See pp 43-44. 
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reasons or for reasons of record), but no good reasons to inscribe ordinary transactions on 
stone.71 
71 Compare the discussion in R&O p 178. 
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ENDNOTE 
FIRS'f CASE STUDY : SOME POSSffiLE NEW FRAGMENTS OF THE ATTIC 
STELA/ 
In this first case study (the second and third case studies follow Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis respectively) I suggest some possible new fragments of the Attic Stelai. 
The Attic Stelai - the first piece of evidence for the eponion to which I referred in Chapter 
One- were originally in eleven stelai. The first two stelai have been pieced together, so far 
as they could be, from the fragments which have survived and are in the Agora Museum in 
Athens. Pritchett originally described the first stele as having twelve fragments and the 
second stele as having nineteen fragments, but he later published five further fragments and 
Ross Holloway published a yet further fragment. Two of the fragments are in photographs 
at the end of this Chapter. 
In 1996 and 1998 Michael Walbank published fragments of a number of financial and other 
public documents from the Athenian Agora.72 The fragments are so small that it is difficult 
to place any of them with any certainty. But I thought that the figures and the words (or 
parts of them) of four of them - I 6760, I 6452a, I 6452b and I 6356 - bore some 
resemblances to the Attic Stelai and I discussed the first of them with Michael Walbank in 
the Agora Museum in February 2002 and all of them with Stephen Lambert in February 
72 Hesperia 65 1996 pp 433-465 and 67 1998 pp 65-80. 
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2004?3 I attach at the end of this Chapter photographs of the fragments with possible joins; 
the fragments were found in the Agora and originated from the Eleusinium. The texts 
which Michael Walbank published in 1996 and 1998 are in the Epigrahical Dossier at the 
end of the thesis. 
The first fragment (I 6760) 
The first fragment (I 6760) is set out in two columns each seven lines long. The ends of the 
lines in the first column are letters, where there is anything at all (these would be the end of 
the description of property sold in column 1). The beginnings of the line in the second 
column, again where there is anything at all, are figures (these would be the tax on the 
property sold in column 2). Walbank thought that the fragment could have been from the 
record of the confiscation and sale of the property of The Thirty Tyrants, and drew 
attention to the smallness of the figures, possibly reflecting a tax of some kind. My view is 
that the figures could be the eponion tax preceding the sale price and a description of the 
property sold in column 2 as in the Attic Stelai, and that the letters at the end of the first 
column could be the final letters of the descriptions of property sold. 
The first of the three figures is in fact large for tax - 17 drachmas - looking at the stele as a 
whole, and suggests that what was here sold was substantial - the sale price would have 
been 1700 drachmas (with a 1% tax). But the Attic Stelai do feature, among many smaller 
items, large properties, which were presumably the properties where those who had been 
73 I am grateful for the enoourilgement which Michael Walbank and Stephen Lambert generou5ly gave me. I 
am also grateful to Professor Camp and Dr Jordan for the opportunity of studying the inscriptions in the 
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found guilty lived. 74 For example, JG e 430 line 1 describes the sale of a opv'lvov (oak 
coppice), a TTtTV'Lvov (pine grove) and an oiK{a (private residence) for 1800 drachmas 
which, on the basis of a 1% tax, would produce tax of 18 drachmas (some of the figures for 
the tax are missing). Other examples, without a description of the property, are IG e 427, 
line 40 (tax of 22 drachmas and a sale price of 2150 drachmas), line 65 (tax of 20+ 
drachmas restored from a restored sale price of 2040 drachmas) and line 66 (tax of 15+ 
drachmas restored from a restored sale price of 1590 drachmas) and, with a description of 
the property, line 72 (a sale price of 1900 drachmas with a restored tax of 19 drachmas). 
'Restored' means that there are figures missing but that there is enough information for one 
to be fairly sure of the figures overall. 
The most interesting thing about column 1 is the letters ot in line 4. This could, of course, 
be the last two letters of any Greek word ending in ot, and there are two examples in the 
Attic Stelai- 6j3eAlOKOl in IG e 421 lines 93-94 and TTava6eva'U<o{ in IG e 422, lines 42, 
44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58 and 60. The problem with these two examples is that there is a 
gap before ot in I 6760. One example where there is a gap is IG i3 425 lines 75-82, which 
begins with OTcXIJ.VOt Gars of oil, wine and vinegar) a little way back, then the engraver 
seems to have got tired and contented himself with Ta vot and then just ot. A difficulty 
here, however, is the letter before the gap. However, it could be an v and there are in any 
event quite a number of variations of oTcXIJ.VOt in the preceding lines. The other point I 
would mention about column 1 is the only two letters on the first line- as. There are two 
Agora Museum and for the digital photographs of the inscriptions. 
74 Compare Pritchett Hesperia 25 1956 pp 261-276; and N F Jones 'Epigraphic Evidence for Farmstead 
Residence in Attica' ZPE 133 2000 pp 75-90 on the inference that choria were occupied by persons residing 
in oikiai. 
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examples in the Attic Stelai for words ending in as- KaTayvias in JG 13 422 line 37 and 
Kepa~eias in JG 13 425 line 47 (a little before ot in line 75 et seq). The letter heights of the 
fragment are 0.008m in column 1 and 0.006- 0.007m in column 2, with a vertical spacing 
of O.Ollm in each column, which are precisely the measurements of JG e 425-82 
(oTa~vot). 
I looked for possible joins in the existing two Stelai in the Agora Museum with Michael 
Walbank. We tried two and did a squeeze of one. The ftrst possible join is to JG i3 421 lines 
108-140 in the first stele. The problem here is that these lines comprise small items, but 
some of the lines are missing and the large property could fit there. The second possible 
join is to IG i3 422 lines 225-240.JG e 426 lines 75-82 (beginning with OTO~VOl) could ftt 
in with either of these. These possible joins could be investigated further, but whether or 
not a join is found I believe that the fragment may be part of the Attic Stelai representing 
the private residence of one of the condemned. 
The second fragment (I 6452a) 
The second fragment (I 6452a) is a narrow nine-line fragment with figures comprising 
either drachmas or obols. The ftgures could represent the eponion tax at the beginning of a 
line and are very similar to other figures representing the eponion tax both in terms of 
ftgure formation and in terms of spacing. The height of the letters in lines 1-4 is 0.0055m 
and that of the letters in line 6 and following is 0.007 with a vertical chequer of 0.012m. 
These measurements are well within the standard measurements of the Attic Stelai 
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generally. Michael Walbank: said in his account of the fragment in Hesperia that it was 
possible that it belonged to I 6760 (the first fragment above) - footnote 10 on page 450 -
and I believe that it may be part of the Attic Stelai. 
The third fragment (I 6452b) 
The third fragment (I 6452b), in addition to having some numerals, has oo and aoo on two 
separate lines. It is tempting to suggest that this fragment belongs to one of the fragments 
of the Attic Stelai relating to the sale of the property of Alcibiades, 75 because oo and aoo 
(the end of his name) feature in those fragments, for example JG e 421, line 12; 422, line 
193; 424, lines 10 and 27; 426, line 108; 428, line 3; and 430, lines 6, 8, 25 and 33. 
However, this fragment is rather more speculative than the first two, not least because there 
is very little of it. The height of the letters is 0.005- 0.006m in lines 1-3 and 0.009m in line 
3 and following, with a vertical chequer in lines 1-3 of0.0105m, which puts it only on the 
edges of the possibility that it comes from the Attic Stelai. 
The fourth fragment (I 6356) 
The fourth fragment (I 6356) contains a number of letters including KEq>aA. The word 
Keq>aA.mov appears on a number of occasions in the Attic Stelai signifying the total of the 
sale proceeds relating to one of the condemned, for example in JG i3 421, lines 24 and 31 
with the tax and 4 22, line 202 without the tax. The height of the letters is small - 0. 004rn 
75 Compare the photograph of the eponion inscription featuring Alcibiades at the end of this Chapter. 
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(although the height of the letters in /G i3 427 is also 0.004- 0.006m), and the letters may 
be too late stylistically for the period (compare the omicrons). 
New fragments of the Attic Stelai? 
These are small fragments, and it is therefore difficult to draw conclusions from them. But 
Hesperia presumably thought that it was worthwhile to publish them and for conclusions to 
be drawn from them. I therefore believe that it is equally worthwhile to suggest alternative 
conclusions. Similarities to the Attic Stelai are striking, both contextually and technically. I 
think that it is likely that some or all of the fragments relate to tax in some way, and that it 
is arguable that the first two at least come from the Attic Stelai, while that the possibility 
that the third may contain a reference to Alcibiades is intriguing. That these could be 
fragments of the Attic Stelai should certainly be borne in mind if any similar fragments are 
discovered in the future. 
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TWO 
FIVE OTHER A TBENIAN TAXES 
I look in this Chapter at a range of five other Athenian taxes on particular activities. I start 
with the tax or taxes on the silver mines at Laurium; the tax on prostitutes; and the 
metoikion (a tax on foreigners resident in Athens). I then examine the various religious 
taxes, which were distinct from state taxes but the distinction between state and religious 
taxes was always somewhat blurred. Finally, I discuss local taxes, operated through the 
demes into which Attica was divided. 
The tax or taxes on the Laurium silver mines (pentedrachmialeikoste tetarte) 
Laurium was one of the largest mining districts of Greece. Some exploration started in the 
early bronze age, certainly at Thoricus. 1 The mines flourished throughout the 5th century 
until the Peloponnesian War, then declined, revived greatly in the second half of the 4th 
century, were dormant in the 3rd but recovered in the 2nd. 2 
Four literary references -whatever they precisely mean - herald the beginning of the part 
played by the mines in shaping ancient Athenian history. First, Herodotus 7 144 says that 
Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to spend money from the mines at Laurium on the 
construction of two hundred warships for use in the war with Aegina, instead of sharing the 
1 A good restoration bas been made of the washery floor outside the mine at Thoricus. 
61 
money out at a rate of ten drachmas each. Second, Thucydides 1 14 says that Themistocles 
persuaded the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis. Next, 
Aristotle Ath Pol 22 7 records a state profit of 1 OOT in consequence of the discovery of the 
mines at Maronea (that is the Attic Maronea, not the Thracian Maronea), which financed 
100 triremes to fight at Salamis. Finally, Plutarch Themistocles 4 said 'but that the salvation 
which the Greeks achieved at that time came from the sea, and that it was those very 
triremes which restored again the fallen city of Athens, Xerxes himself bore witness, not to 
speak of other proofs'. It appears from the quotation from Herodotus that, when the state 
income from the Laurium mines exceeded a certain amount, the general public received a 
largess, although I am not aware that Athens had a distributable surplus before. Or it may 
be that using the income in this way was simply an alternative. 3 Even if the citizen 
population numbered 30000 (compare Herodotus 5 97), ten drachmas a head would yield 
only SOT, surely too small a sum for the building of 200 ships. Also, the story does not 
make clear whether this is the income from a single year or was built up over some lengthy 
period. I believe that the likeliest explanation is simply that Themistocles persuaded the 
Athenians in 483-482 to give up their share of the Laurium money for that year as a 
contribution towards a ship-building fund. 
2 Compare John Ellis Jones in OCIY p 822. 
3 Compare Herodotus 3 57 (Siphnos) and 6 46 (Thasos) for alternative actions. 
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The financial arrangements for the working of the mines : leases and taxes 
Aristotle, Ath Pol 47 2 states that 'there are the ten poletai, one appointed by lot from each 
phyle. They let out all public contracts, and along with the treasurer of the stratiotic fund 
and those elected to manage the theoric fund they lease the mines and taxes in the presence 
of the boule; and to whomever the boule should choose by vote, they ratify the leased 
mines, both those that are in working condition, which are leased for three years, and those 
that have been conceded, which are leased for [seven] years.'4 The number has been erased 
but it has generally been accepted that it was seven (see next paragraph). 
The main epigraphical evidence for the financial arrangements is the po/etai lists. These are 
lists of mining leases or diagraphai. 5 What we learn from the inscribed lease lists is, 
primarily, who the lessees were and the names, prices and locations of mines. We do not 
learn the length of the leases or what the price stated for each list represents. For the former 
we may turn to Aristotle Ath Po/41 2 above, that is, for three and, probably, seven years. 
The shorter period was for renewals, the longer for new explorations. There is some doubt 
about the latter figure because the numeral is mostly obliterated in the papyrus of the Ath 
Pol in the British Museum. Margaret Crosby argued for the figure seven6 and although 
Mortimer Chambers confirms that the numeral is to be read as three, he accepts Crosby's 
arguments and explains the figure as an error in transcription. 7 Rhodes came to the same 
4 I am quoting the translation in Agora XIX p 57. 
5 Agora XIX p 60 et seq. 
6 Hesperia 19 1950 pp 199-211. 
7 TAPA 96 1965 pp 36-37. 
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conclusion. 8 The Ath Pol does not, on the other hand, help us to clarify the meaning of the 
prices given for the leases. Crosby believed that they represented lump-sum payments for 
the duration of the leases, or possibly annual payments. 9 Hopper considers it more likely 
that they are prytany payments, and his arguments are probably stronger. 10 
All the inscribed leases date within the 4th century, with a period of almost seventy years 
separating the earliest (PS 367-366) from the latest (PSI about 300). There has been some 
discussion as to whether the poletai had anything to do with mine leases before this series 
of inscriptions began. There is no reason to believe that they did not. The reason that we 
possess no records for an earlier period could be that the poletai kept only impermanent 
records then, written up on wooden tablets. 
The legal status of the silver mines has been much disputed, but it now seems clear that the 
state claimed an interest in all mining, and would let out the mining rights, while at least 
some and perhaps most of the land beneath which the silver was mined remained in private 
ownership. 11 The lessee paid in accordance with his contract for the mining rights; he was 
presumably free to dispose of the silver that he mined, the state's mint being an obvious but 
not the only purchaser. Rhodes observes that in the mines of Lusitania half of the ore was 
reserved for the fiscus, but Hadrian allowed the original lessee to buy out the fiscus' share 
for a lump sum ofHS 4000. 12 
8 Comm Ath Pol p 554. 
9 Hesperia 19 1950 pp 203-204. 
10 BSA 48 1953 pp 237-239. 
II BSA 48 1953 pp 205-209,227-228. 
64 
The taxes 
I have so far described the mining leases and the possibility that most of the land involved 
remained in private ownership. Private owners may have let some at least of the land to 
mining contractors, and rent may have been paid to the owners by those mining the silver. 
But what of the taxes? There are two possible references to taxes but they leave a far from 
clear picture. 
There is a reference in Agora XIX P 26line 475 to a 5 drachma payment (pentedrachmia), 
which is generally thought to be a 5 drachma tax. I describe the circumstances in which this 
reference arises in Chapter Five. 13 Kirsty Shipton has recently suggested that all the 
surviving prices for leasing the silver mines are divisible by five : on this basis, she argues, 
the 5 drachma payment must have been a tax payment for lease payments for the whole 
period of the lease. 14 She acknowledges, however, that, given the limitations of our existing 
evidence, the approach she suggests can be no more than a working hypothesis and that it 
will be necessary to test this hypothesis against any future evidence of mine sale prices. 
The other reference is in the Suda (s. V. aypaq>ov ~ETaAAov OlKTI) to a 1/24 silver tax 
(eikoste tetarte), but we cannot say to which period it relates or indeed whether all mines 
had to pay it. 15 Conophagos argued that only KatvoTo~(at paid the 1/24 tax. 16 Aperghis 
has argued that if Katvov ~eTaAAov in the Suda can be translated as 'new mine', perhaps 
12 Comm Ath Pol pp 553-554. 
13 Seep 171. 
14 
'The Prices of the Athenian Silver Mines' ZPE 120 1998 p 62. 
15 Suda A 345. 
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the 1/24 remained fixed. But if it applied to 'new ore production', that is production while 
the mine was new (ie an ergasimon), a larger tax might have been imposed, more like 1/10 
of the silver produced. 17 
There is little certainty, then, about the exact detail of the Athenian state's arrangements for 
leases and tax at Laurium. There is a mass of information about the operation generally, but 
it is not easy to make much sense of it. What is clear is that the Laurium operation was a 
substantial one, starting with Themistocles' use of it in 483-482 and going on to finance the 
Lycurgan administration in the second half of the 4th century, and it would be surprising if 
the Athenian state did not receive a substantial return from it. It remains to be seen whether 
Kirsty Shipton's arguments on the tax arrangements are proved right by further evidence. 
Meanwhile, I am myself much happier with the 1/24 tax mentioned in the Suda. 
The tax on prostitutes (pornikon) 
Prostitution seems to have flourished in Greece as early as the Archaic period. One of the 
means for making Athens an attractive city was the establishment of state-owned brothels 
staffed by slave-women (Athenaeus 13 569 d-e says: 
'Now, Philemon, also, in Brothers, records incidentally that 
Solon, impelled by the crisis which comes in young men's 
lives, purchased and established women in brothels; just so 
16 Le Laurium Antique p 438 note. 
17 
'A Reassessment of the Laurium Mining Lease Records' BICS 42 1997-98 pp 18-19. 
Nicander of Colophon records the same in 
the third book of his History of Colophon; Nicander alleges 
that Solon was the first to found a temple of Aphrodite 
Pandemus from the profits taken in by the women in charge 
of the houses. But to return to Philemon, he, at least, says: 
But you found a law for the use of all men: for you, they say, 
Solon, were the first to see this - a thing democratic, Zeus 
is my witness, and salutary (yes, it is fitting that I should say 
this, Solon); seeing our city full of young men, seeing, too, 
that they were under the compulsion of nature, and that they 
went their erring way in a direction they should not, purchased 
and stationed women in various quarters, equipped and ready 
for all alike. They stand in nakedness, lest you be deceived; 
take a look at everything.') 
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Demosthenes 59 (Against Neaera) gives a very racy account of how prostitutes operated in 
Athens in the fourth century. Apollodorus accuses the wife of Stephanus of having worked 
as a prostitute, although she had received the right of citizenship from the Athenians. Debra 
Hamel's recent book, Trying Neaira, leaves no stone unturned in investigating every 
possible aspect of prostitution in Athens at the time. 18 Not only slaves were prostitutes. 
Like any slave, a prostitute could be granted her freedom by her owner, or could arrange to 
buy her own freedom by contracting a loan from a benefit club composed of past clients. 
18 Yale University Press 2003. 
67 
She would repay the loan from her earnings as a free prostitute (Demosthenes 59 30-32). In 
this way many freedwomen and free non-citizen-women permanently domiciled in Athens 
practised the profession. They had to be registered and were subject to the tax on 
prostitutes (pomikon). 
The main authority for the tax is Aeschines 1 119 ('For he is amazed, he says, if you do not 
all remember that every single year the boule farms out the tax on prostitutes, and that the 
men who buy this tax do not guess, but know precisely, who they are that follow this 
profession'). I deal in more detail with the subject of tax-farming in Part Two, 19 but I may 
perhaps mention here that farmers of the prostitutes' tax (pomotelonai) are mentioned in 
Pollux 7 202 and 9 29, both times quoting from Philonides' Kothomoi, where a list of 
people 'wholly cursed by birth, whore-tax-farmers, frightful Megarians, parricides' are said 
to collect the 2% tax. Ste. Croix argues that pomotelonai here is more likely to be taken as 
an abusive term for all tax-collectors, 20 but I agree with Fisher that 'in favour of a more 
specific attack it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that tax-farmers who had to collect 
from whores and their pimps came in for extra opprobrium'. 21 According to a passage in the 
Suda (s. v. Btaypalllla), the agoranomoi fixed the price which each prostitute was to take 
- it appears that the tax was different according to their different profits, perhaps an early 
manifestation of performance pay, 22 but Cohen argues from several passages in 
Demosthenes and other orators that prices for sexual services largely reflected market 
19 See pp 146-150. 
20 The Origins of the Peloponnesian War pp 271-272 and 398. 
21 Aeschines Against Timarchus p 258. 
22Ataypalllla : TO llia9wlla. Ateypaq>ov yap oi ayopaVOilOl, ooov e8et Aall(3CxVElV 'ri)v halpav 
EKCxOTflV. 
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factors, especially consumer preferences. 23 Loomis has gathered together forty-three 
references to sums paid to female and male prostitutes, but the figures - ranging from a few 
obols to a few drachmas - are not easy to evaluate. 24 
Boeckh, writing in the 19th century, while recognising that a tax on prostitutes existed in 
Rome (compare Suetonius Caligula 40) and in many later Christian states, said that 'the 
most shameful of all taxes in this class is the tax upon prostitutes'. Andreades agreed with 
Boeckh, saying that it was quite right for a state to regulate, but not profit 'by diseased 
manifestations of social life'. He says that this view has been questioned in England 'but 
wrongly it seems to me'. 25 Presumably the Athenians did not regard the taxation of 
prostitutes - or indeed prostitutes - as shameful. Those prostitutes at the top of the social 
scale were called hetairai, the most famous of whom was Aspasia, the friend ofPericles. 
Taxes on non-Athenians : the metoikion and the xenika 
Xenophon Poroi 2 1 says that in resident aliens ( metics) 'we have one of the best sources of 
revenue . . . inasmuch as they are self-supporting and, so far from receiving payment for the 
many services they render to states, they contribute by paying a special tax' (the metoikion). 
The metoikion was the Athenian solution to a problem which has exercised countries in 
modern times. People want to go to live in countries other than their own for a variety of 
23 The Athenian Nation pp 180-183. 
24 Wages, Welfare Costs pp 166-185. 
25 TaX: fs charged in the UK on the profits of a trade and there is nothing in the definition of trade which 
suggests that trades must be legal. 
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reasons, and the governments of those other countries respond to these people in a variety 
of ways. So it was with Athens, which decided not to accept foreigners as citizens but 
admitted them as metics.26 The price the metics had to pay for this was the metoikion, and 
they were also liable to pay the eisphora and perform liturgies if they were wealthy 
enough. Some metics - but not many - got various exemptions, like isoteleia (equality of 
taxation) and enktesis (the right to own real property). I look at the former in more detail in 
Chapter Seven. 27 Metics in Athens were, then, very broadly non-citizens residing for more 
than a short period, perhaps a month. Compare an agreement between two Locrian cities -
Tod 34 6-8, and Aristophanes of Byzantium fr 38 'a metic is anyone who comes from a 
foreign place to live in the city, paying taxes towards certain fixed needs of the city. For a 
number of days he is called a visitor (parepidemos) and is free from taxes, but if he exceeds 
the time laid down he then becomes a metic and liable to taxation'. 
Men paid twelve drachmas a year, independent women (that is, those without a son- or, 
presumably, a husband - who paid) six. The tax was therefore something of a poll-tax, 
being levied on the person, rather than their property or what they did. 28 The metic also 
paid a 3 obol tax (triobolon) to the tax collector. The main authority for these details is 
Pollux 3 55. The metoikion can be compared with the daily wage of a skilled labourer, 
which rose from roughly one to roughly two and a half drachmas during the 4th century. 29 
The tax was not negligible, but its main significance was that it pointed up a social divide. 
26 I discuss in Chapter Seven other ways in which Athens and other states dealt with foreigners through inter-
state tax arrangements. 
27 See pp 208-209. 
28 Compare Whit5l,ilead T!Je Ideology of the Athenian Metic p 75 et seq. 
29 Markle 'Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens' pp 293-297, and Loomis Wages, Welfare Costs and 
Inflation in Classical Athens p 120. 
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The penalty for those convicted of evading its payment was, according to Demosthenes 25 
57, slavery. As Whitehead says, 'defaulters were not merely defrauding the treasury but 
trying to cross the citizenlmetic line'. 
Athens' response to foreigners also had a feminist angle. Stephen Todd draws attention to 
the fact that the obligation to pay the metoikion was imposed on at least some female as 
well as male metics. 30 He says that for women to be taxed at all was extraordinary and 
points to Whitehead's 'plausible' interpretation (based on a somewhat obscure citation in 
Harpocration s.v. l!ETotK(ov) that women who paid the metoikion were metic women living 
independently. Paradoxically, he says, this may have given these women in some sense a 
clearer legal standing than that of their citizen counterparts 'because payment of the 
metoikion would presumably have been recorded, although the details of this are obscure; 
and metic (though not Athenian) women therefore appeared in some form of official 
register'. 
The metics and the eisphora 
If they were sufficiently wealthy, metics were also liable both to perform (certain) 
liturgies and to pay the eisphora. Compare Lysias 12 20: 
'And not even in respect of the smallest fraction of our property 
did we find any mercy at their hands; but our wealth drove them 
30 The Shape of Athenian Law p 197 with n 45. 
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to act as injuriously towards us as others might from anger aroused 
by grievous wrongs. This was not the treatment that we deserved 
at the city's hands, when we had produced all our dramas for the 
festivals and contributed to many eisphorai; when we showed 
ourselves men of orderly life, and performed every duty laid 
upon us; when we had made not a single enemy but had ransomed 
many Athenians from the foe. Such was their reward to us for 
behaving as resident aliens far differently than they did as citizens'. 
The qualifying census for these duties was presumably the same as that for a citizen, but 
there is a puzzling reference in Demosthenes 22 61 and JG i? 244 line 20 to metics paying 
a sixth part of the eisphora. This could refer to an obligation to pay one-sixth more than the 
amount that would be paid by an individual citizen of equivalent wealth. 31 Or metics may 
have simply paid one-sixth of their capital, although as heavy a burden as this would surely 
have been a major disincentive from being a metic in Athens. A further possibility, 
suggested many years ago, is that the metics paid a sixth of the total amount promulgated. 
!socrates 17 41 records that someone 'contributed more than any other foreigner (xenon); 
and when I was myself chosen registrar, I subscribed the largest contribution'. We can 
interpret all this evidence in several ways, including looking at the phrase found in several 
honorific decrees for non-citizens, as we shall see in Part Three (passim), 'to pay the 
eisphora with the Athenians', which could mean that foreigners paid more or less than 
Athenian citizens or the same. 32 The reference remains a puzzle. Xenophon Poroi 2 clearly 
31 Compare Todd The Shape of Athenian Law p 197. 
32 Compare The Ideology of the Athenian Metic pp 78-79. 
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felt that the metics should have more generous treatment than they received. However, if 
IG ii2 244 is not referring to the eisphora we know, as I suggested in Chapter Two,33 the 
sixth part may have been a feature of a different eisphora, and Demosthenes 22 61 may 
have been referring to that different eisphora. 
The xenika 
There is possibly a further tax in the context of metics. Demosthenes 57 31 mentions a 
prohibition on xenoi doing business in the Agora ('it is not permitted to any alien (xenos) to 
do business in the market'), but subsequently (in 57 34) refers to xenika (sc tele) which 
evidently do allow this ('if she was an alien, they ought to have examined the market-tolls, 
and have shown whether she paid the aliens' tax, and from what country she came'.) 
Whitehead suggests that the tax( es) represent a later mitigation of an original simple 
exclusion. It seems reasonable to assume that they fell chiefly upon metics, but we know 
nothing of the details, and they might just as well have fallen on xenoi who did not stay in 
Athens long enough to qualify as metics. 34 
33 Seep 32. 
34 But that cannot be true of Eubulides' mother in Demosthenes 57 34. 
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Taxes paid to religious cults 
It is generally believed that the Athenian state contributed generously to the support of 
many ofthe religious cults practised within its boundaries.35 However, there was a source 
of income used directly for this purpose : taxes the income from which was reserved for 
specific cults. I have identifed seven such taxes. First, a tax on ships anchoring at Sunium, 
apparently to fund cult activities there, perhaps in 460-450.36 Second, a one drachma tax on 
every boat for, possibly, Apollo Delios at Phaleron- TO -nis opaxllfiS TEAOS. 37 Third, tax 
was paid to the Dioscuri (maritime gods) at Athens. 38 Fourth, an annual tax was paid to a 
cult of Apollo (probably Apollo Lykeios to fund the Lykeion, which served as an exercise 
ground for Athens' land army) -2 drachmas for the hippeis, 1 drachma for the hoplites and 
3 obols for the toxotai.39 Fifth, a two drachma tax for Bendis. 40 Sixth, a 5 drachma tax for 
Theseus.41And seventh, a 1 drachma tax for Asklepios. 42 
The second, third and fourth taxes have been seen as evidence for the imposition of taxes 
upon the citizen body in order to fund a variety of state cults in the years immediately 
preceding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. 43 In the case of the second (/G e 130), 
Garland suggests that a cult in the Piraeus, which up till now had been supported wholly by 
voluntary contributions, received from about 432 onwards an income which was funded 
35 Compare Schlaifer 'Notes on Athenian Public Cults' HSCP 51 1940, p 233 et seq. 
36 1ae8. 
37 1ae 13o. 
38 1a e 133. 
39 1ae 138. 
40 1ae 136. 
41 Agora XIX P 26 479-480. 
42 Agora XIX P 26 487. 
43 Garland Introducing New Gods pp 110-111. 
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from a compulsory levy paid by shipowners upon the completion of each sea voyage. The 
state also agreed to provide up to 500 drachmas towards the building of a shrine to the 
same god, the remaining cost to be borne by voluntary subscription. Although the identity 
of the cult is not preserved, a likely beneficiary of this package is Apollo Delios. Athens 
must have greatly offended Apollo when she removed the league treasury from his 
jurisdiction in 454. She would, moreover, have had particular reason to fear his disfavour 
as war with Sparta appeared more and more inevitable in the late 430s, not least in view of 
the publicly stated and unconditional preference for the Peloponnesian side of Apollo at 
Delphi (Thucydides 1 118). 44 
In the case ofthe third (JG e 133), an embarkation tax was levied on passengers and a 2% 
tax charged on imports and exports passing through the Peiraeus. The latter tax was used to 
subsidise the running of the cult of the Anakes, the protectors of sailors, whose accounts 
were henceforth to be the object of public scrutiny by examiners and assessors. Since the 
Anakes were actually Spartan heroes,45 it is just conceivable that the promotion of the cult 
was also in part a response to premonitions of war, being intended to neutralise the twins' 
age-old antipathy towards Athens for Theseus' abduction of their sister Helen. 46 In the case 
ofthe fourth (JG e 138), a cult of Apollo, perhaps Pythios, was awarded a subsidy from an 
annual tax imposed on cavalry, hoplites and archers. 
44 It is not relevant to this thesis how the Athenians coordinated the hostile Apollo of Delphi with the Apollo 
under their control at Delos. 
45 According to Garland The Anakes were certainly based in Lacedaemon, but the Dioscuri were worshipped 
at AJ}lens under_this~name. The Afiakeion was in existence in the 460s (decorated by Polygnotus ofThasos). 
46 ---· - - . - . ' -A difference here between myth and cult. It is doubtful whether Athenians would have been concerned with 
the 'Spartan' nature of the Dioscuri personally. 
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These inscriptions may well, then, hint (as Garland suggests) at a far more extensive and 
detailed system of the financing of public cults than we presently have knowledge of, as 
well as what appears to have been a last-minute bid to secure the goodwill of gods and 
heroes whose loyalty to Athens was questionable at best. 
Parker wonders how many taxes in history have such a spontaneous origin. 47 It can scarcely 
be a coincidence, he says, that most of these decrees relate to shipowners and merchants, 
who at Athens were normally foreigners, and what they illustrate above all is surely the 
characteristic response of Greek states to place as much of the tax burden as possible on 
non-citizen shoulders. The gods could thus profit from the great boom in commercial 
activity that Athens in the 5th century must certainly have experienced. I am not sure that 
that is entirely fair - looking at the range of taxes on Athenians that we are seeing in Part 
One of this thesis - but we can certainly appreciate that foreign shipowners and merchants 
were expected to play their part in financing the Athenian economy. 
Rosivach comments that, apart from what he sees as the problematic (in terms of upon 
whom, how and why the tax was levied) taxes for Theseus and Asclepius (the sixth and 
seventh taxes above), the only evidence we have for religious taxes is from the fifth 
century, and that we have no example of any revenue source other than rentals specifically 
dedicated to the funding of any polis cult in the fourth century.48 However, this is not the 
full story. Lycurgus, as we shall see in Chapter Three, may have used a maritime tax to 
47 Athenian Religion :A History p 125. 
48 The System of Public Sacrifice in Fourth Century Athens 1994 pp 163-164. 
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fund the Festival of the Little Panathenaea.49 The relevant tax was, as I see it, part of 
Lycurgus' wider programme of regulating public religion and putting it on a sound 
financial footing, and Lycurgus may have used other state taxes to fund particular festivals. 
A postscript from Eleusis 
Before I leave taxes paid to religious cults, I should perhaps record the Athenian Decree 
regulating the Offering of the First-fruits at Eleusis, about 422.50 According to the Decree 
all Athenian farmers had to set aside not less than 1/600 of their barley and 1/1200 of their 
wheat to be collected and delivered at Eleusis by their demarchs 'in accordance with 
ancestral custom and the oracle from Delphi' (lines 4-10). Similar first-fruits were collected 
in all the allied cities (lines 14-21) and all other Greek states were, so far as possible, to be 
invited to make similar offerings (lines 30-36).51 I should also record in this context the 
later grain provision of329-328.52 
Local taxation by reference to demes 
Athens and the Attic countryside were divided into 139 local districts or demes. Much has 
been written about the origin and history of this organisation but a discussion of it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The boule was composed of representatives of demes on a 
proportional basis to reflect the fact that some demes were larger than others. Whether each 
49 See p 116 et seq. 
50 ML 73. 
51 Compare the requirement frrst for lonians and eventually for all Delian League members to send offerings 
to the Panathenaea (JG 13 34, 41-43 of 447). 
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deme had to formulate its own budget (dioikesis), that is a balance between income and 
expenditure, at a level determined by its own resources and its own needs, as Whitehead 
suggests, is not clear. 53 I discuss what dioikesis means in Chapter Five. 54 We can, however, 
make up a picture of 'deme income and expenditure', supported by detailed documentation 
where it can be found and Whitehead suggests three forms of fixed and predictable income 
- taxes and liturgies, rents and the interest on loans. 
Athenian citizenship was based on registration in a deme and the demarch had some 
responsibilities for reporting to the polis who was liable for state taxes (see pp 156-157 
below). But it seems on the basis of negative evidence that demes raised their own taxes. 
The (negative) evidence is as follows. In/G ii2 1214, 25-28, one ofthe privileges granted to 
Kallidamas of Cholleidai by the demesmen ofPeiraeus was the right to pay 'the same taxes 
in the deme as the Peiraieis (pay)' and to be exempt from the enktetikon tax. In JG ie 1185, 
4-5, and /G ii2 1186, 25-26, the Eleusinians gave to resident Theban benefactors of the 
community 'immunity from the (taxes) over which the Eleusinioi have authority'. In /G ie 
1187, 16-17, and /G ii2 1188, 29-30, the same deme granted 'immunity' to Athenian 
honorands who were members of other demes; and the demesmen of Coastal Lamptrai did 
the same in /G ii2 1204, 11-12. 
An inscription exhibited in the British Museum (BM 13) sets out regulations for the lease 
of public land by the deme Peiraeus (/G ie 2498), which have been generally dated to 321 
or 318, in which private individuals leased the land without rates or taxes (ate/e) but if any 
52 IG if 1672. 
53 The Demes of Attica 508-ca 250 BC p 149. 
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eisphora was levied on the valuation of the property, the demesmen were to contribute. The 
full text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. This inscription is 
interesting both for the fact that it refers to rates or taxes on the public land leased by the 
deme Piraeus and for the fact that it attests that the eisphora was still available in 321 or 
318 (see the Epilogue for references to it after the period of this thesis). 55 
I have looked for more positive, rather than negative, evidence for deme taxation in deme 
inscriptions. Two inscriptions seemed to merit further investigation - both are in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. First, /G ii2 2345, a fourth century list of 150 
names, possibly mainly or partly from Alopeke, recently republished by Lambert. 56 Some 
of the names have numerals attached to them, but not others. The inscription seems to list 
financial payments of some kind but the names are grouped under thiasoi and a few have 
(different) demotics attached. So I conclude that this may not be a list of deme taxation. 
The second list I have looked at is SEG 24 197, another fourth century list of names, 36 of 
which are preserved, from Amarousi (ancient Athmonon). A rubric appears twice- o[toE 
vnep auTo(?)] ETa~[aVTO- which suggests that this is a list of contributions. The list has 
no figures : Lambert speculates that this is because the contributions were at a standard rate 
(and/or compulsory) or that it may have been invidious or even undemocratic to give 
figures, but this latter seems unlikely to me - compare in this regard the publication of 
54 See pp 154-156. 
55 Seep~ 358-360. 
56 
'IG ii 2345 Thiasoi ofHeracles and the Salaruin.ioi' ZPE 125 1999 pp 93-130, especially n 20 and n 27. I 
am grateful to Stephen Lambert for drawing both these inscriptions to my notice and for the discussions I 
have had with him about them. Lambert believes that both inscriptions record financial payments but he does 
not specifically suggest that they are payments of deme taxation. 
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epidosis lists referred to in the Appendix to Part One of this thesis. 57 Whitehead suggested 
that the purpose of the list may have been repair work on a deme building after the 
Peloponnesian War, while Lambert has postulated other explanations, but it seems to me 
that it could just as well record deme taxation. 
The enktetikon tax 
The enktetikon tax was evidently a tax on landed property in a deme, although it is not 
clear whether it was levied on all property or just property owned by non-demesmen. Since 
the word is related to enktesis - the right of foreigners to hold property in a country - it is 
possible that it was levied only on property owned by non-demesmen. The references we 
have for it seem to be about mid 4th century. It has generally been assumed that all demes 
levied this tax although it is mentioned nowhere else but in Peiraeus. And it may not have 
been anything like as universal as is commonly supposed. In fact, it has recently been 
argued that Peiraeus could have been the only deme in which the tax was levied : many 
Athenians had migrated to Piraeus and the demesmen of Piraeus may have been anxious to 
cash in on this. Further, the fact that it is just for Piraeus that we have a boundary marker in 
the form of a horos monument (IG ii2 2623) may suggest that it was erected to define the 
boundary of the deme for the purpose of the tax. 58 
There has been some discussion on the extent to which people continued to live in demes. 
We know from Thucydides 2 14-17 that people moved to the city at the time of the 
57 See pp 134-135. 
58 Jones The Associations of Classical Athens 1999, p 65. 
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Peloponnesian War but there are plenty of examples of people who lived in demes after the 
Peloponnesian War. Another theory as to the origin of the enktetikon is that it was intended 
to be a deterrent to owning property in another deme, 59 but this is only speculative since we 
know so little about the tax. 
Phratries 
There is no evidence that phratries - groups with hereditary membership and probably 
normally associated with specific localities - raised property taxes from non-members, as 
demes could, and Lambert believes that it is unlikely that they did so if for no other reason 
than that a phratry's territory would have been too ill-defined for it to be feasible. However, 
Lambert argues that the property of phratries, like that of demes, was liable for state taxes 
( eisphorai) for which, in the case he cites, the phratry would continue to be liable during 
the term of the lease. 60 In some analogous cases regarding deme property the lessee was 
liable.61 My view is that a deme was a geographical location, so one can talk of who owned 
(etc) the land within the deme; but a phratry was not. One can talk of land owned by 
members of the phratry;62 but it would not make sense to talk of the land within the phratry. 
59 Traill Organisation p 74 n 8. 
60 The Phatries of Attica p 199 and pp 304-305. 
61 The Demes of Attica 50817- ca 250 BC pp 155-156. 
62 But compare Harris on the absence of any concept akin to the modern legal notion of a partnership or 
corporation Classical Quarterly 39 1989 pp 339-343. 
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THREE 
FIVE MARITIME TAXES 
The context in which Lisa Kallet said that 'a full study of maritime taxation is badly 
needed'1 was the relationship between the 5% tax imposed by the Athenians on the ports of 
the Empire before the final failure of the disastrous Sicilian Expedition and the tribute. The 
scope of this thesis is not wide enough to include the kind of full study that Lisa Kallet 
perhaps envisages, but I look in this Chapter at five maritime taxes in some detail and at 
maritime taxes in a wider context in Chapter Nine, while Chapter Eleven discusses the 
relationship between taxes, including maritime taxes, and income from Empire and 
Confederacy. 
Athens' maritime trading activities 
First, a few comments on Athens' maritime trading activities. There is good literary 
evidence of Athens' maritime trading activities. Pericles in his Funeral Oration in 
Thucydides 2 38 said that 'our city is so great that all the products of the earth flow in upon 
us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more 
home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands'. !socrates 4 42, in the 
fourth century, writes 'for she established the Piraeus as a market in the centre of Greece - a 
market of such abundance that the articles which it is difficult to get, one here, one there, 
from the rest of the world, all these it is easy to procure from Athens'. [Xenophon] Ath Pol 
1 Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides p 196. 
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2 7 said that 'whatever the delicacy in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, Pontus, the 
Peloponnese, or anywhere else, all these have been brought together into one place by 
virtue of naval power'. 
There is also substantial archaeological evidence of Athens' maritime trading activities. In 
the Agora Museum there are some 14,000 catalogued amphoras with stamps of their 
provenance. Athens herself did not apparently manufacture stamped amphoras, from which 
historians have generally concluded that she did not export anything like as much as she 
imported and that what she did export (and she exported particularly wine and olives), she 
did in used amphoras. 
The Piraeus, with its three harbours and central location, was the port of call for much or 
most of Aegean trade. Xenophon Poroi 3 1 said 'in the first place, I presume, (Athens) 
possesses the finest and safest accommodation for shipping, since vessels can anchor there 
and ride safe at their moorings in spite of bad weather'. And that merchants can both import 
and export 'very many classes of goods' or silver : 'for, wherever they sell it, they are sure 
to make a profit on the capital invested'. Cohen has described at some length the special 
commercial maritime courts at Athens (dikai emporikai) which were supranational 
(although they were not instituted until the 340s- Ath Po/52 2). His claims, however, may 
go too far? He lists in this context Demosthenes 21 176 : an Athenian commercial trial 
involving two foreigners; figures appearing as litigants in Demosthenes 32 (Massiliots), 33 
2 See Todd The Shape of Athenian Law pp 334-337 -the dikai emporikai may be 'maritime cases' rather than 
'maritime courts'. 
83 
(Byzantines), 35 (Phaselites); and in Demosthenes 34 and 35 the individuals involved 
include both metics and non-metic foreigners. 3 
In a recently published essay Ste. Croix argued that the Greeks would have laughed at our 
notion that a balance of trade was to be considered 'favourable' when exports exceeded 
imports in value, and that the Greeks were not concerned about encouraging exports.4 (I 
would remark in passing that I do not think that we are as concerned about such a balance 
of trade at the present time as we were when Ste. Croix wrote his essay.) Ste. Croix goes on 
to say that apart from a few passages in Plato and Aristotle there is no evidence that 
practical politicians were concerned about this issue, and that the Athenians even charged 
customs duties on their own exports at the same rate as on imports - 2% in the fourth 
century. Athens did, of course benefit from paying for imports with the silver she produced 
or even with imperial tribute. Bresson5 has recently argued convincingly against the view 
that Greek pole is were concerned mainly about securing a steady supply of imports, but 
showed little interest in promoting exports. He quotes statements made about foreign trade 
not only by Aristotle but also other Greek writers. For example, Aristotle says that no city 
can live without foreign trade, which includes exports and imports and helps to achieve 
autarkeia (Aristotle Politics 1. 9. 6-7). Aristotle advises communities to found cities near the 
sea (Politics 7.6.1) where they can easily export and import (Politics 7.5.4). Other writers 
mention imports and exports together, for example, Thucydides 1.120.2, !socrates Pan 42, 
Plato Laws 8.847 b-d, and Polybius 4.38.8-9. No less important are the actual practices of 
the Greek poleis, particularly the treaties between poleis and between kings and po/eis 
3 Cohen Athenian Maritime Courts p 59. 
4 Athenian Democratic Origins pp 352-355. 
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concerning both imports and exports, for example, Tod 111 and /G i3 117. We shall see 
later in this Chapter how Athens tried to use taxation to intervene directly in the import of 
grain (in the Grain-Tax Law). But aside from this, the Athenians regulated the import of 
grain by both laws and administrative officials. Isager and Hansen have listed four laws - it 
was forbidden to purchase more than a certain amount of grain at a time (Lysias 22 6); it 
was a capital offence for persons resident in Athens to ship grain to harbours other than the 
Piraeus (Demosthenes 34 37; 35 50; Lycurgus 1 27); any grain ship touching in at a 
harbour of the Piraeus was required to unload at least 2/3 of her cargo and might re-export 
a maximum of 1/3 (Aristotle Ath Pol 51 4); and it was forbidden for persons resident in 
Athens to extend a maritime loan unless the ship under contract conveyed grain to the 
Piraeus (Demosthenes 35 51; 61 6,11).6 
More generally, C M Reed has recently argued that Athens resorted to a whole programme 
of measures to attract emporoi and naukleroi (both carried on inter-state trade but the 
former on someone else's ship while the latter owned their own ships).7 
Reed divided Athens' policy in this area into four segments (apparently lumping together 
evidence of different dates to build up a composite picture over a period of time). First, 
attracting maritime traders to Athens. Here he quotes the dikai emporikai; exempting 
Sidonian emporoi from the metoikion;8 giving Phoenician emporoi from Citium in Cyprus 
5 La cite marchande chapter 6. Compare EM Harris review in BMCR 2001 09 04. 
6 Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century BC pp 28-:29. 7 . ., . . . . . . . -
Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World 2003, particularly pp 45-53. 
8 Tod 139 = R&O 21. 
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land on which to build a religious sanctuary;9 and honouring and giving practical assistance 
to Heracleides of Salamis in Cyprus. 10 The second segment involved assisting and 
controlling outward-bound traders. Here Reed quotes negotiating foreign tax exemptions in 
the Bosporus; 11 setting up resident proxenoi abroad to help traders there; and using power 
rather than diplomacy to guarantee the supply of necessities, for example, Cean ruddle. 12 
The third segment was assisting and controlling traders returning to Athens. The evidence 
Reed quotes for this are measures to enforce her policies like the Hellespontophylakes, 13 
the 10 per cent tax at Chrysopolis; 14 convoys protecting grain ships; 15 and measures to deal 
with piracy (including sending a colony to the Adriatic in 325-324). 16 The fourth segment 
was accommodating and controlling traders returning to Athens. Here Reed gives as 
evidence the overseers ofthe import market (epimeletai tou emporiou);17 laws and decrees 
to punish anyone who brought false accusations against emporoi and naukleroi; 18 the 
provision of an official coin tester; 19 and controlling the activities of the grain-sellers 
(sitopolai). 20 
We have, then, quite a large amount of evidence to show how developed were Athens' 
maritime trading activities, and Xenophon's Poroi is the clearest evidence that people were 
beginning to think of a policy. 
9 Tod 189 = R&O 91. 
10 R&095. 
11 Demosthenes 20 29-40 and Tod 167 = R&O 64. 
12 Tod 162 = R&O 40. 
13 ML65. 
14 Xenophon He/lenica 1 1 22 
15 Xenophon He/lenica 54 60-61. 
16 Tod 200 = R&O 100. 
17 Ath Po/514, mentioned for the first time in 375-374 (R&O 25). 
18 Demosthenes 58 10-13, 53-54. 
19 R&025. 
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A one per cent harbour tax and the ellimenion 
The first reference to a maritime tax (as opposed to tribute from Empire) is to a one per 
cent harbour tax, dating perhaps to the 420s. The literary evidence is [Xenophon] Ath Pol 1 
17 which refers to 'the one per cent tax in the Piraeus' and Aristophanes Wasps 658 which 
refers to 'the many one per cents', followed by a tantalising reference to harbours (limenas). 
The epigraphical evidence is /G i3 182, which encourages those who import ships' oars by 
exempting them from a 1% harbour tax and honours Antiochides and Phanosthenes in this 
context. 
Five non-joining fragments make up /G i3 182.21 We have here two decrees. It is not 
possible to establish the subject of the first decree. The subject of the second decree is the 
importation of oars for ships free of the one per cent harbour tax (II 9-15). Presumably 
Athens wanted to encourage the import of oars. Antiochides and Phanosthenes are 
honoured by the Athenian state in connection with this. One point of interest of the 
inscription for this thesis is the date of the inscription (to determine how far back into the 
fifth century we can push maritime tax) and the relationship with the 5% tax of 413. A 
photograph of the inscription, as Walbank assembled it, is at the end of this Chapter and his 
text (IT 9-1 0) is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
20 Lysias 22 passim. 
21 Walbank Hesperia 45 1976 pp 289-295. 
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There is a divergence of opinion about the date of the inscription. Meritt believed that it 
referred to a harbour tax dated by him to 410-406.22 Mattingly argued for a date around 
420?3 Walbank placed the inscription somewhere between the two, between 420 and 415. 
But all three seem to accept the possibility of the one per cent tax itself dating from an 
earlier time. MacDonald argued that the presence of Phanosthenes in Athens after 411 and 
the comparison of letter forms with decrees dated to 410-409 and 407-406 suggested a date 
for the inscription between 410 and 407.24 My view is that Aristophanes Wasps 658 ('the 
many one per cents') could be suggesting that the tax was in existence at least from the 
middle of the 420s and existed contemporaneously with the payment of tribute by the 
allies. 
Boeckh argued for a tax, separate from an import/export tax, simply for the use of harbours 
and drew attention to references to a harbour duty (ellimenion) and collectors of a harbour 
duty (ellimenistai). Eupolis (CAF 1, fr 48 p 269 ap. Pollux 9 29) writes of ellimenion 
'which must be paid before one gets on board', presumably levied on passengers without a 
cargo. The context of the reference in [Xenophon] Ath Poll 17 is that the author is listing 
ways in which Athens benefits from forcing allies to come to Athens for judicial 
proceedings, and says that these allies have to pay the one per cent tax in the Piraeus when 
they come to Athens for judicial proceedings. This suggests that the tax is simply a tax for 
landing at the Piraeus, and this brings us back to the reference to harbours in Aristophanes 
quoted above. But what is the tax one per cent of? The answer presumably is that foot-
22 Hesperia 14 1945 pp 129-132. 
23 
'Periclean Imperialism' p 200. 
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passengers paid some kind of arbitrary tax. But Boeckh went further and suggested that the 
tax was not only an embarkation tax but a transit tax, where a ship was passing through the 
Piraeus with goods bound for elsewhere. The one per cent tax would in this case be a tax on 
one per cent of the value of the goods in transit. 2s 
More generally, Xenophon Poroi 3 2 claimed that it was possible for foreign emporoi, 
when they have sold their cargoes, to re-export the greatest variety of goods which men 
need. Combining this passage with the passages about the great variety of goods imported 
into Athens (for example, Thucydides 2 38 and [Xenophon] Ath Pol2 7), the implication is 
that some of these imports were not bought by Athenians but resold to foreign emporoi and 
exported.26 A transit tax would presumably have been payable on these goods. 
I refer in Chapter Five to an inscription from Caunus of possibly the first century AD 
which includes detailed provisions regarding an ellimenion. 27 Bean, who published the 
inscription, had identified the tax as an import duty, but Pleket reviewed all the references 
to ellimenion and concluded that ellimenion may have been used in a general sense to 
denote the whole of taxes levied in a harbour, but that in particular cases - and the Kaunos 
inscription was one - it was used in a more specific sense as a harbour tax, that is a tax for 
using a harbour.28 
24 Hesperia 50 1981 pp 141-146. Walbank Athenian Proxenies pp 323-324 said that the letter forms 
suggested a date between 420 and 405 and compared them to !G e 109 (410-409) and /G e 123 (407-406), 
while the Attic script suggested a date no later than 407-406. 
25 Aristotle Ath Pol 51 4 and Demosthenes 35 29 suggest that goods were brought into harbours but were 
destined for other ports and therefore not liable for import/export taxes. 
26 Compare Hansen The Concept of the Consumption City, page 41. 
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Most recently Matthaiou has looked again at IG i3 130 dated about 430, one of the taxes 
paid to religious cults, in this case a one drachma tax on every boat for possibly Apollo 
Delios at Phaleron?9 He proposes EAA[liJ.EVlOTas] in line 4 of fragment b instead of 8EA 
(as Lewis read in BSA 55 1960 pp 190-194), as collectors of harbour taxes. The proceeds of 
their activity supported the sanctuary. Two photographs of the inscription are at the end of 
this Chapter, one of the inscription in the Piraeus Museum in which the letters ELL are not 
visible to me and one of the squeeze in Oxford at least part of which is more visible. 
The distinction between a one per cent taxlellimenion and the import/export tax is therefore 
blurred but I believe that it is likely that the former could be both a tax on goods in transit 
and an embarkation tax, separate from the import/export tax.30 
Some historians have always felt that there must have been some kind of import/export 
taxes in Athens in the fifth century. Before leaving the 420s I would mention the possible 
existence of such a tax, dating from the mid-420s, in IG i3 62, a document concerning 
relations with Aphytis, which reads 'Those who wish may] also bring com [according to 
the decrees] voted by the People [and engage in trade] paying whatever taxes (tele) the 
[Athenian people] decrees'? 1 
27 See pp 168-169. 
28 
'Note on a Customs-Law from Caunus' Mnemosyne 11 pp 128-135. 
29 Horos 14-16 p 47 
30 Compare also Hasebroek Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece p 165. 
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A five per cent maritime tax (eikoste) 
The second reference to a maritime tax is securely dated to 413 when, as we have seen, a 
five per cent maritime tax (eikoste) replaced the tribute from Empire (Thucydides 7 28 : 
'because of this (that is, the Sicilian expedition), and then as a result of the serious damage 
caused by (the Spartan occupation of) Decelea, and of the other heavy expenses which fell 
upon them, the Athenians were getting into financial difficulties. At about this time, they 
imposed upon their subjects, instead of the tribute, the 5% tax on imports and exports by 
sea, thinking that in this way more money would be raised. For whilst their expenditure 
was not the same as it had been - but had grown bigger, as the war grew bigger - their 
revenue was becoming less'). 
Although normal re-assessment of tribute would have occurred in autumn 414, Athenian 
income seems unlikely to have been in decline until 413, and autumn 413 is the most likely 
date for this change. 32 Given that tribute seems to have been running at about 900T a year, 
if the Athenians did indeed calculate that a 5% tax would be more lucrative, then they must 
have estimated that the value of goods moving about the Empire exceeded 18, OOOT ( 108 
million drachmas). 
The Athenians were probably soon disillusioned with the eikoste, for while the amount of a 
tribute assessment was beyond dispute the amount accruing from harbour dues depended 
on honest and conscientious book-keeping, and Athenian officials would have had less 
31 The translation of Osborne The Athenian Empire LACfOR 1 2000 p 60. 
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authority after the failure of the Sicilian expedition. 33 I presume that those who contracted 
to collect the tax would have bid for a sum and would have been committed to handing 
over that sum, however much they actually collected, but at the very least the change 
would surely have caused a lot of difficulties. Aristophanes Frogs 363 (in 405) speaks of 
an eikostologos (from Aegina) but Xenophon included among the terms of settlement when 
Calchedon was recovered in 409, that the city should regularly pay her normal tribute, 
implying a fixed sum rather than an annually varying figure (Hellenica 1 3 9) and five 
fragments have been found of a late tribute assessment list. Meiggs concluded that the 
assessment was probably introduced at the time of the Great Panathenaea of 410 when the 
Athenian victory at Cyzicus and the restoration of radical democracy had revived Athenian 
confidence. 34 
This dating has been disputed, and Meiggs suggested that some might think that the 
Xenophon statement is not enough to destroy the inference from Aristophanes' eikostologos 
in 405.35 Mattingly, in particular, has argued that there is no good independent evidence 
that general tribute collection was ever resumed after the introduction of the 5% tax and 
indeed he recently told me that he believed that the eikoste continued until the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. 36 This view has not found wide acceptance and for Meiggs the change 
back to tribute is what we should have expected anyway even without evidence, and the 
32Robin Osborne The Athenian Empire 4th edition p 75. Compare also Dover A Historical Commentary on 
Thucydides Vol IV pp 401-404. 
33Meiggs The Athenian Empire p 369. 
34 Figueira in Athens and Aigina pp 191-193 conjectured that the 5% tax might have been collected in all 
colonies before 413, which would explain why the eikoste continued in Aegina when the tribute was revived. 
It seems to me, however, that this is no more than speculation. 
35 The Athenian Empire Endnote 23 p 438. 
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eikostologos in the Aristophanes Frogs 363 comes from Aegina which was occupied by 
Athenians and so paid no tribute. Such communities might have been required to pay the 
eikoste, since the state was virtually bankrupt, and might have continued to pay it rather 
than phoros. 
An altogether different line has been taken by Lisa Kallet. 37 She argues that the decision to 
abolish the tribute and to impose the eikoste 'is nothing short of extraordinary in the history 
of the arche, representing a major overhaul of its financial and economic basis with far-
reaching implications for the Athenians' conception of their rule'. She says that the change 
suggests the culmination of a shift in the Athenians' conception of their arche from a 
political system to more of an economic system. Lisa Kallet then looks at the practicalities 
of the change. They include that the tax would have affected for the first time non-citizens 
in the communities, the xenoi or metics mainly engaged in trade (that may be so but Athens 
would surely not have cared how the allies raised the tribute money as long as they did so); 
that communities in the arche without major trading ports and inland communities without 
a coastal emporion would have no financial liability; that tax collection would be handled 
by private tax collectors, rather than by the state; and that the charge would have affected 
those outside the arche trading in ports within the arche. 
Because we do not know whether the change worked and because the reference in 
Thucydides is our only source of information, it is difficult to come to any conclusions on 
all this. I am inclined to accept Thucydides' explanation that the main purpose of the 
36 Ancient Society and Institutions, Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday 1966 pp 199-
200andB&4 62 1967pp 13-14. 
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change was to get more money for the war, and to believe that the change was a panic 
measure adopted without consideration of the points made at the end of the previous 
paragraph. But Lisa Kallet is quite right to draw attention to the detailed implications of the 
change, which have not hitherto been fully considered. Taken at its face value, it was a very 
radical change for the reasons she gives. Meiggs is also right to suggest that the change 
would not have produced more money because of the difficulties of collection. If one takes 
the view that this was a panic measure (and Lisa Kallet does not take that view), it would 
certainly have been very difficult to set up a tax collection system to accommodate so 
radical a change on the spur of the moment in the middle of a war. From my tax-collecting 
experience, a change of this kind - involving so many ports in the Empire - would have 
needed much more preparation. The thought of recruiting vast numbers of tax-farmers to 
go to foreign ports and collect more than 900T would have been a daunting prospect. 38 And 
if the eikoste was replaced by the tribute after three or four years, it would not have been 
surpnsmg. 
However, a change of this kind would not have been so difficult in practical terms if there 
were already a system of import/export tax in those ports, and this brings us back to the 
question of whether the 2% tax referred to by Andocides in 40239 was operational long 
before. Or whether the 1% tax already operated in all the ports of the arche. Or, for that 
matter, whether, as some have argued, the tribute had always been financed by local taxes 
in the communities. Lisa Kallet believes (I think) that the change could have continued side 
37 Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides pp 136-140, 195-205. 
38 I am assuming that the reference in Aristotle Ath Pol 24 3 to 700 overseas officials is suspect - see Meiggs 
The Athenian Empire p 215 and Rhodes Comm Ath Pol p 305. 
39 1 Mysteries 133-4. 
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by side with the tribute, if it was reimposed. I, for my part, believe that the eikoste of 413 
may have modified an existing maritime tax or led to a later one. It may, for example, have 
increased a 1% tax to a 5% tax or it may have carried on after 413 at the same time as the 
tribute and been reduced to 2% by 402. 
A ten per cent transit tax (dekate) 
The third reference to a maritime tax is to a ten per cent transit tax, a dekate, in respect of 
goods passing through the Bosporus, dating from 410. 
Xenophon in Hellenica 1 1 22 records that the Athenians under Alcibiades in 410, after 
visiting Cyzicus, Perinthus and Selymbria on the Propontis, proceeded to Chrysopolis near 
Byzantium and fortified it, establishing a tax office (dekateuterion). There they levied a 
dekate (10% tax) from ships sailing out of the Black Sea, leaving behind thirty ships as a 
garrison with two generals, Theramenes and Eumachos, to oversee the region and the ships 
that were sailing out and to inflict whatever other harm they could on the enemy. Polybius 
4 44 3 also records the occupation of Chrysopolis by the Athenians on the advice of 
Alcibiades 'when they first attempted to levy a toll on vessels bound for the Pontus'. 
Polybius said that 'Byzantium possesses the most commodious situation on the sea of any 
commercial city. Against its will no vessel, on account of the uncommonly rapid currents 
in the straits, could either enter or sail out of the Pontus'. 
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There is a reference to a dekate in the first of the Financial Decrees moved by Callias 
usually dated 434-433. The Decree begins by saying that now that the 3000 talents voted 
by the Assembly have been brought up to Athena on the Acropolis, the state is to repay its 
debts to the other gods, as already voted, from the money held by and due to the 
hellenotamiai including 'money from the 10% tax when it has been farmed out'. 40 The full 
text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. Meiggs/Lewis agonised over 
this reference, both because Polybius said that Alcibiades was the first to impose the tax in 
410 with implications for the dating of the Decree and because they thought that a 10% tax 
compared with the normal 2% import/export tax was extraordinarily high and barely 
explicable in peace-time. 41 Pritchett suggested that it might have been the tenth part, given 
to Athena, of the sale of booty brought to Athens (possibly in connection with Cleon's 
campaign in the Pangaean region in 422-421).42 
The reference to a dekate in the Decree without explanation could suggest that it had been 
levied on occasions earlier than the date of the inscription (compare the similar arguments 
for dating the eisphora) and that it was probably a tax levied at the Hellespont on goods, 
especially food, coming from the Black Sea.43 Hornblower coupled the Decree with an 
inscription on relations with Methone, which lays down that Methone may import annually 
a limited quantity of com from Byzantium, but must give notice to the 
'hellespontophylakes' which is the only record of Athenian officers' controlling the 
40 ML 58 7. 
41 ML 58 p 161. 
42 The Greek State at War Part I p 98. 
43 Hornblower The Athenian Empire 3rd edition pp 133-134. 
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shipping. 44 He concluded that the de kate could well go back into the Pentecontaetia and be 
part of Athens' attempt to make a 'closed sea' out of the Aegean, by ensuring that she 
controlled incoming supplies of food. Robin Osborne, following Hornblower, said that the 
10% tax referred to here (Xenophon Hellenica 1 1 22) might be identical with that 
mentioned in the Callias Decrees of the late 430s.45 Rubel has argued more specifically that 
the wording of the inscription (he highlighted particularly the word al;ru .. nos in line 40) 
suggests that the hellespontophylakes were magistrates of the Delian League who were, 
apart from the surveillance of the strait, also responsible for the collection of a toll for the 
passage through the strait. These tolls would then have been imposed on trading ships 
before the Peloponnesian War in the context of the fiscal policy of the Athenian Empire. 46 
The choice of start date for the dekate is, then, is between 434-433 and earlier (aside from 
Mattingly's later date). There is no certain view either way. The former looks the safer 
view, but the general thrust of this thesis is to look for continuity in ancient Athenian 
taxation. I would, therefore, like to think that the view ofHornblower/Osborne/Rubel is the 
right one. 
There is further evidence of a de kate in Demosthenes 20 60 (a reference to Thrasybulus re-
establishing the dekate at Chrysopolis - see below); 22 77 (an uncertain reference to the 
Athenians tithing - dekateuontes - themselves); 24 120 (a reference to people robbing the 
temple of the ten per cent due to Athena : a range of possibilities here - ten per cent from 
sales of confiscated property and ten per cent from sales of booty, and the two per cent due 
44 ML 65. 
45 The Athenian Empire 4th edition p 82 n 180. 
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to the other gods - the pentekoste import/export tax?); and JG ii2 1609 Col ii 97 (an 
uncertain reference in the Accounts of the Naval Commissioners to which I referred in 
Chapter One in the context of other aspects of the eisphora). 47 
The dekate is an interesting tax with a colourful setting. Boeckh described it as a 'mere 
extortion'. Taxes were, of course, a lot lower in his day but, even so, it was a bit on the high 
side by Athenian standards. However, it was not necessarily high by standards in the 
ancient world generally - compare, for example, the 25% tax on incoming goods at Leuke 
Kome. 48 By modern standards it is, if anything, a bit on the low side. In this context it is 
interesting to note in passing that Article 28 of the modern Turkish VAT Act (which is 
what applies to the modern Hellespont) set the VAT tax rate (which includes tax on 
imports) at 10% for each transaction. The Act, however, authorises the Council of 
Ministers to decrease the rate to 1%. What is a little surprising is that the Persians do not 
seem to have levied any taxes on passage through the Hellespont, although they levied 
tribute from cities on either side if it. 
The two per cent tax on imports/exports (pentekoste) 
We now reach the fourth and mam ancient Athenian maritime import/export tax 
(pentekoste). It is generally accepted that the pentekoste - a fiftieth or 2% - produced by 
the time of Lycurgus the greatest yield of all Athenian taxes. The tax was payable on all 
goods, both imports and exports, whatever their place of origin. More specifically, it was 
46 Klio 83 2001 pp 39-51. 
47 See pp 36-37. 
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payable both when goods were unloaded (Demosthenes J5 29-JO) and when ships took in 
cargo (Demosthenes J4 7). 
How the tax was collected 
Andocides 1 Mysteries 13J-4 relates that in 402-401 the tax was auctioned for JOT and the 
collectors (the chief one of whom was Agyrrhius, who later proposed the Grain-Tax Law 
below) made a JT profit; in 401-400 it was auctioned for J6T and the collectors made a 
small profit. There are references to pentekosto/ogoi (collectors of the one-fiftieth or 2%) in 
Demosthenes 21 13J and J4 7. It has been suggested that, since the right to collect the tax 
described by Andocides was bought at auction for as little as JOT- J6T, it may have been 
a rather narrower tax and that the full yield of the pentekoste was larger. 49 Demosthenes 59 
27 gives an interesting gloss on the complications of farming the 2% tax : 'for when on the 
advice of Callistratus you undertook to aid the Lacedaemonians' (in J69, when 
Epaminondas invaded Laconia) 'he at that time opposed in the assembly the vote to do so, 
because he had purchased the right to collect the 2% tax on grain during the peace, and was 
obliged to deposit his collections in the bou/euterion during each prytany. For this he was 
entitled to exemption under the laws and did not go out on that expedition; but he was 
indicted by this man, Stephanus, for avoidance of military duty and being slanderously 
maligned in the latter's speech before the court, was convicted and deprived of his civil 
rights'. 
48 Young 'The Customs-Officer at the Nabataean Port ofLeuke Kome' ZPE 119 1997 pp 266-268. 
49 Seep 336 et seq. 
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Some epigraphical references to the tax 
There are a number of epigraphical references to the tax. First, in /G i3 133 25 on a stele 
which seems to have been set up in the shrine sacred to the Dioscuri called the Anakeion. 50 
Second, in /G ii2 1635 38 in the accounts of the Athenian Commissioners of the Delian 
Temple funds (377-373), the so-called 'Sandwich' marble, possibly erected in the sanctuary 
of Apollo Pythios at Athens, the pentekoste was levied on exported cattle, even belonging 
to the Athenian theoria. 51 Finally, a reference to the pentekoste appears in a decree 
concerning the cities of Ceos of possibly 363-362.52 Line 16 refers to trials in disputes over 
the pentekoste, which Dreher, rejecting Wilhelm's restoration of lines 16-19 in /G ie 404, 
interprets not as an Athenian harbour tax on imports and exports in Peiraeus but as a tax on 
exports from the harbours of Ceos. 53 Brun has recently supported this interpretation, 54 
praying in aid an inscription to which I refer later in this thesis which makes arrangements 
for the export of Cean ruddle to Athens free of taxes. 55 This latter inscription is very 
fragmentary but could be invoked in support of an argument that the former inscription 
refers to a tax on exports from Ceos, and I take this view. 
5
° Compare Wycherley The Athenian Agora Vol III pp 61-65. Stroud in his publication of the Grain-Tax Law 
has (probably successfully) identified the Anakeion. 
51 Tod 125 = R&O 28. 
52 /G ii2 404, SEG 39 73. 
53 Symposion 1985 pp 263-281. 
54 ZPE 147 2004, pp 72-78. 
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Revivals of the eikoste and dekate leading to Confederacy 
I very briefly sketched in Chapter One something of the history of Athens after her defeat 
in the Peloponnesian War in order to seek a possible explanation for the pentakosioste and 
the tessarakoste. 56 The events I described led to the reimposition of the eikoste and de kate 
about 390. 
Thrasybulus made a number of alliances in the northern Aegean about 390, and decrees of 
two of these record the imposition of the eikoste. The first is IG ii2 24 (Harding 25) which 
records Athens' resumption of her alliance with Thasos some time between 389 and 386 
and the imposition of the eikoste. The decree honours leaders of an embassy from Thasos. 
The embassy must be dated after Thrasybulus' expedition to Thrace and the Hellespont 
about 390 (because there is a reference back to that in line 6) and before the Great King's 
Peace in 386. On the evidence of line 6, however, it is clear that formal ties were resumed 
between Athens and Thasos at the time of Thrasybulus' expedition (compare Demosthenes 
20 59). 
The second decree is /G ie 28 (Tod 114 = R&O 18) which records Athens honouring 
Clazomenae in 387-386, enacting that Clazomenae shall pay the 5% tax imposed in the 
time of Thrasybulus. The assembly is at once to determine by vote whether to install a 
governor and garrison at Clazomenae or to allow the Clazomenian demos plenary power to 
decide whether it is or is not prepared to receive them. To this decree is appended a record 
55 Tod 162line 123 = R&O 40 line 33; see pp 210-211 ofthis thesis. 
56 See pp 46-47. 
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of the result of the vote. This exempts the Clazomenians from any other taxation except the 
5% and from the obligation to admit a governor, and declares them free as the Athenians. 
Thrasybulus made alliances with other states, possibly including payment of eikoste, but 
the terms of these alliances are almost entirely unknown. At about the same time Xenophon 
Hellenica 4 8 27 records the re-establishment of Chrysopolis by Thrasybulus, farming out 
the de kate on vessels sailing out of the Pontus. 
In 387-386, under the terms of the King's Peace, Athens lost what Thrasybulus had won for 
her, but was allowed to keep Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, which were to feature in the 
Grain-Tax Law of 374-373 discussed below. Meanwhile in 378-377 a second Athenian 
League (I generally refer to it in this thesis as a Confederacy) was founded. Under this 
arrangement about 70 member states paid 'contributions' (syntaxeis) to Athens. 57 The 
subsequent history of the Confederacy, very briefly, was that after the defeat of the 
Spartans by the Thebans at the battle of Leuctra in 371, Athens supported Sparta against 
Thebes and began pursuing her own ambitions in the Aegean; the League was weakened by 
the Social War of 356-355(?); it finally ended when Philip enrolled Athens in his new 
League of Corinth in 338-337. 
57 Tod 123 = R&O 22. Some take the view that the promise of no pharos at the foundation of the League was 
so emphatic that the introduction of syntaxeis must have taken place at least a few years later. 
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'fhe Grain-Tax Law of 374-373 and the dodekate 
The most recently discovered evidence for the pentekoste is the Grain-Tax Law of 374-
373s8 and the Law on the Little Panathenaea of335,59 and I now turn to these. The Grain-
Tax Law also introduces a new tax- the dodekate (twelfth), and this is the fifth maritime 
tax. 
Surely the most exciting discovery of inscriptions relating to Athenian taxation is that of 
the inscription of the Grain-Tax Law of374-373 by John Camp in 1986 covering the Great 
Drain in the Agora. The inscription was published by Ronald Stroud in 1998.60 I attach a 
new digital photograph of it by John Camp's staff at the end of the Chapter, and the text is 
in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. Stated in simple terms, the Law lays 
down that in order that the Athenian people can have grain publicly available, there should 
be a twelfth tax (dodekate) of grain on the islands ofLemnos, Imbros and Skyros (Athenian 
possessions) and a 2% tax (pentekoste) also in grain. The Law, however, poses so many 
questions that it is more an indication of what we do not know about Athenian taxes than 
an answer to the questions that existed before the discovery of the Law. 
The grain problem 
The background to the Law is that the Athenians, in the years immediately prior to the 
enactment of the Law, had seen how precarious their supply of imported grain was. The 
58 R&O 26. 
s9R&O 81. 
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Spartans effectively blocked for a time the advance of a large number of grain transports 
heading for the Piraeus, and the strain of financing their naval operations was beginning to 
take its toll on the Athenians. Athens had recovered Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros in the 
390s, and the terms of the King's Peace in 387-386 confirmed her right to them. They were 
not only strategically located on the route of the grain ships sailing from the Hellespont to 
the Piraeus (see the satellite photograph at the end of this Chapter), but also produced 
significant quantities of wheat and barley of their own. 
Demosthenes 20 3 1 said 'for you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any 
other nation'. Peter Garnsey has argued that it is not an issue that Athens was a regular 
importer of foreign grain, and that these imports had to be substantial if the Athenians were 
to maintain the level of population and standard of living appropriate for a great power, but 
that there is debate on the extent of Athens' dependency on foreign grain and the date of 
this dependency. 61 Whitby has responded to Garnsey, returning the emphasis to the 
importance of the trade in grain, partly by pointing to doubts about Garnsey's calculations 
and partly by stressing the psychology of the market.62 We can, however, say that the 
wheat surplus of territories in which the Athenians had a stake would have been especially 
welcome, in view of the uncertainties and small scale of wheat-production in Attica. And 
that Lemnos, as Garnsey says, was an obvious target for a special tax in a crisis. 
60 Hesperia Supplement 29 1998. 
61 Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World p 105. 
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Some details of the Law 
The Law was proposed by Agyrrhius, whom we have already met as the eminence grise of 
tax-farmers in 402 in Andocides' Mysteries. 63 The Law provided that tax-farmers were to 
bid to collect portions of 500 medimnoi of grain, 100 medimnoi in wheat and 400 medimnoi 
in barley, or bid in groups (symmories) of 6 to collect portions of 3000 medimnoi. They 
were to bring the grain back to Athens where it was to be sold to the Athenian people at a 
price fixed by the Assembly, the proceeds going to the military fund (stratiotikon). Stroud 
estimated the yield of the tax at some 18 1/2T a year. 
Now, a few tax points. I have already mentioned the twelfth tax (dodekate) and the 
pentekoste (lines 3-8). The tax-farmer was not to make any down-payment (prokatabole), 
as he had to do in what we have hitherto understood to be the tax-farming regulations (lines 
27-29). But he was to pay the sales tax and auctioneer's fees (enc.0vta Kal KnpvKeta) of20 
drachmas a portion. Eponia kai kerokeia is the formula hitherto used only in sales of 
confiscated property which we saw in Chapter One, where I suggested that the use of the 
formula in the Grain-Tax Law might indicate a more general sales tax than we have 
hitherto contemplated, with the wider implications for the Athenian budget.64 The tax-
farmer also had to nominate guarantors. Towards the end of the Law (lines 55-59) we see 
the apodektai allocating (merismos) the down-payment from the islands and as much of the 
pentekoste as was brought in 'last year' from the two-tenths. How does this reconcile with 
no down-payment from the tax-farmers mentioned earlier and the earlier reference to the 
62 In Trade, Traders and the Ancient City edd Parkins and Smith pp 102-128. 
63 See pp 97-98. 
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pentekoste in terms of grain? And - most puzzling of all - there is no mention in the Law of 
payments to the tax-farmers. They presumably would not have collected this tax if they 
were not remunerated in some way. So where did they make their profit? 
These tax points, then, raise a number of questions - who paid the taxes, the nature of the 
twelfth tax (dodekate) and the pentekoste (and why there were two taxes), the apparent 
levying of taxes in kind, rather than in cash, and how the tax-farmers made a profit. The 
Law promulgates a whole new set of regulations governing the collection of the dodekate 
and the disposition of its proceeds. But it is not clear whether they established the tax for 
the first time or were making legislative changes in the collection of a tax already in 
existence. Stroud was not clear on the nature of the dodekate or the pentekoste or the 
relationship between the two. Nor was he clear about whether the taxes were taxes in kind. 
Historians have commented variously about these issues. 65 I give my views on them below, 
although I do not believe that we can be certain about any of them. There are no precedents 
for the dodekate; it looks odd having two taxes - the dodekate and the pentekoste; and there 
are no precedents for a tax in kind in Athens (apart from possibly the Pisistratid 
eikoste!dekate). 
The Law looks like the primary tax legislation that modern states enact, but we lack the 
secondary tax legislation or regulations that modern states enact. Also, the Law breaks off 
suddenly and leaves no instructions for publication, as it normally would have done. This 
may indicate, as Stroud suggests, that the Law was part of a series of provisions published, 
64 See pp 43-44. 
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set up at the same time and now lost, which might have answered all these questions. I 
believe, however, that the Law gives us some clear hints on the answers to the questions, 
which would surely have been in one or both of the pieces of secondary 
legislation/regulations I have postulated. 
Athenian cleruchies on the islands 
A clue to these problems could be the existence of Athenian cleruchies on the islands. 
There are several literary and epigraphical references to Athenian cleruchies in Lemnos, 
Imbros and Skyros in the fourth century.66 The main point of contention is whether there 
was continuous settlement of cleruchs in the islands between the end of the Peloponnesian 
War and the King's Peace- did they return to Athens until Athens recovered the islands or 
did they stay there as an independent community and then accept the revival of the 
Athenian connection? This is not a pressing issue for this thesis, but it seems to me that 
there is no clear evidence either way. The main settlements in Lemnos were Myrina and 
Hephaestia (which both paid tribute to Athens separately in the fifth century). It is 
generally agreed that cleruchs retained the Athenian citizenship (for example, Demosthenes 
4 34 refers to Athenian 'citizens' on Lemnos and Imbros) and fourth century inscriptions 
often refer to 'Athenians' or 'the demos of the Athenians'. 
Robert Parker has referred to the distinctive form of the cleruchy, 'a community with 
limited local autonomy that remained, none the less, part of the Athenian state, of which its 
65Rhooes BMCR 99 3 13 pp 1-4; Hanis ZPE 128 1999 pp 269-272; Osborne Classical Review NS 50 2000 pp 
172-174; and R&O 26. 
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residents continued to be citizens ... Lemnos underwent various vicissitudes, but whatever 
their political status the colonists always regarded themselves as culturally Athenian'. 67 
Parker is, of course, referring to the religious aspects of cleruchies, but the state and secular 
aspects of cleruchies were likely to be inter-connected. 
The dodekate 
The Law begins with the statement 'Law concerning the one-twelfth of the grain of the 
islands'. This sentence finishes in the middle of line 4 and there are no further words on that 
line.68 So the Law is primarily about the dodekate, rather the dodekate and the pentekoste. 
What is the dodekate? The tax rate looks high but not as high as the de kate at Chrysopolis 
referred to above or indeed the grain tax on Delos (oeKcXTTJ Tov ahov) in 279 and 250.69 It 
has been suggested that it was a produce tax, although no such tax is recorded elsewhere in 
Athens. This answer looks an easy way out but a hazardous one, as Lewis found in calling 
thepentekoste in the Law on the Little Panathenaea a produce tax (see below).70 I would be 
happier regarding the dodekate as a kind of levy or rent on the cleruchs that Athens had 
settled on the three islands (and there are precedents for an 8% rent - see Stroud page 32). 
Isager and Skydsgaard have suggested that the tax on the cleruchs could have been a 
66 See Cargill Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century BC. 
67 
'Athenian Religion Abroad' in Lewis Ritual, Finance, Politics pp 340-341 and 343. 
68 I am grateful to Professor Camp and Dr Jordan for the opportunity of studying the inscription (and the Law 
on the Little Panathenaea and the Law on the Amphiaraia) at the Agora Museum in Athens in February 2002 
and February 2003. 
69 Regionalism and Change in the Economy of Independent Delos p 254. 
70 Seep 117. 
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counterweight to the privilege of not being liable to the trierarchy (Demosthenes 14 16) 71 
but this may be reading too much into the context. 
But could the islanders have already been under an obligation to give this amount of grain 
under a previous decree, like the decree in /G ii2 30 as supplemented and re-edited by 
Stroud?72 A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this Chapter and the text of the 
inscription is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of the thesis. Athens regained Lemnos, 
Imbros and Skyros by 392-391 and the King's Peace in 387-386 confirmed its possession of 
them as an exception to the autonomy rule. The Athenian boule and Assembly then passed 
and had inscribed on a stele on the Acropolis a lengthy and detailed decree regulating land 
tenure, residency, and probably other requirements for the inhabitants and klerouchoi on 
Lemnos. Similar regulations may have been published for Skyros and Imbros at the same 
time. Stroud says that line 10 of that decree (which relates only to Lemnos) seems to 
mention a tax (restoring the words KaTa Tiv o[vooeKciTC.u] by reference to a much later 
decree concerning Lemnos) 73 and Salomon suggests that that the grain tax may have been 
introduced in Lemnos shortly after 387-386?4 
The Decree (/G ii2 30) is very fragmentary but one can pick out a number of words, in 
addition to those Stroud picked out, that might suggest that it is relevant to the taxes in the 
Grain-Tax Law. Line 6 has apographe - a register of the pentekostologoi (collectors of the 
71 Ancient GreekAgriculture pp 140-141. 
72 Hesperia 40 1971 pp 162-173 and reprinted by Walbank in Agora XIX L3 and by Woodhead in Agora XVI 
no 41. 
73 Hesperia Supplement 29, p 84 n 197 -JG ii2 1951 fr cline 1, although to be consistent with my agreement 
with Harris on down-payments (see below on pentekoste), this could be referring to the two-tenths in cash of 
the pentekoste. 
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pentekoste) in Demosthenes 34 7. In line 8 we read EKTElOCUOlV ETTi Tiis evcx-rns (compare 
Andocides 1 Mysteries 73 - 'all these had to make their payment in the ninth prytany', 
including those who bought tax collection rights but did not pay the money due). In lines 
19 and 31 there are references to 11io8cums (a rent). (Harris objected to Stroud's suggestion 
that the dodekate in the Grain-Tax Law could be a rent, saying that the word misthosis vel 
sim does not appear in the Grain-Tax Law.) In line 23 there is a reference to Cxllq>•o!3nTwv 
Tfis yfls (disputes over land). Finally, in line 34 there is a reference to those in Salamis and 
with this one can compare /G ? 1 which also has references to 11•o86s and possibly refers 
to Athenian cleruchs paying rent (compare ML 14 and Matthaiou Horos 8-9 1990-1991 pp 
9-14). 
My view is that the absence of any other produce tax in Athens, the fact that an 8% rent has 
precedents and the above references in this Decree dating from 387-386 all point in the 
direction of the dodekate being a rent paid by Athenian cleruchs on Lemnos, Imbros and 
Skyros. 
The pentekoste 
After the dodekate the Grain-Tax Law refers to the tax of one-fiftieth in grain (pentekoste). 
This could have been an export duty payable on the grain leaving the islands. However, it 
seems to me most likely to be the ordinary pentekoste payable as an import tax in Athens 
but this time (unusually) in grain. As I have said above, it looks odd to have two taxes but 
74 Le cleruchie di Atene: Carratteri e funzione p 183. 
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the Athenians had both the eponion and the hekatoste as separate taxes when the whole 
proceeds of the relevant transactions were going to the state (or in that case, as I have 
argued, to the state and Athena). Line 27 says that the tax-farmer was not to make a down-
payment and this is consistent with the tax being a tax in kind. Line 55 refers to 'the down-
payment from the islands' and line 57 refers again to the pentekoste but this time not in 
grain. Here Harris is surely right in arguing that this is referring to the previous year when 
the pentekoste was paid in cash, not in kind (the Law talks about 'in future' in line 59 for the 
new regime). 
Tax-farming 
The Law refers to one twelfth of the grain, suggesting that the tax was a tax in kind, rather 
than, as usual, in cash. The sentence also makes clear that we are talking about the grain of 
the islands, not grain coming from the Black Sea via the islands (as Harris suggests).75 The 
next sentence - lines 5-8 - refers to the dodekate at Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, again 
indicating that we are talking about grain from Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, not the Black 
Sea. Stroud was puzzled at what the tax-farmers were to get out of the whole operation. I 
look at tax-farming generally in Chapter Four76 but the tax-farming regulations (the nomoi 
telonikoi referred to by Demosthenes 24, 96-98, 101 and 122) or the stelai accompanying 
75 Harris has argued that the dodekate was a transit tax (like the dekate in the Hellespont), and that the Grain-
Tax Law encouraged merchants to sell their (Black Sea) grain in the islands for the local market by charging 
a lower rate for imports (the 2% pentekoste) and discouraging them from re-exporting their cargoes to other 
ports by charging a higher mte (the dodekate) for trans-shipment. But Stroud's figures based on the Eleusinian 
aparchai inscription of 329-328 showed that these islands produced a substantial amount of grain. Further, 
the purpose of the Law was to provide Athens with cheap grain, and as Rhodes and Osborne have pointed out 
a transit tax at anY poP!t west of the Hellespont would be likely to be counter-productive, encouraging 
merchants to seek matkets in Asia Minor or take longer routes across the Aegean, possibly never reaching 
southern Greece at all. 
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the Grain-Tax Law might have given us the answer to this question. We assume that 
normally a tax-farmer (and Agyrrhius of all people would have known) would work out the 
likely yield of a tax, bid a little less than this and his profit would be the difference. Here 
the Law makes no reference to what the tax-farmer would get out of the transaction except 
that line 27 says that he has to pay sales tax and auctioneer's fees at the rate of 20 drachmas 
per portion. 
So what hints can we get from the Law itself? The first sentence (line 3) makes clear to the 
grain farmers on Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros that they have to give a twelfth of their grain 
to Athens and they presumably had no appeal against this. The Law then goes on to say 
that tax-farmers may buy a contract to collect this tax (line 6) by reference to portions of 
500 medimnoi (line 8). This suggests to me that the tax-farmer will demand a twelfth from 
each grain farmer to which he is assigned, he will then produce his portion or portions of 
500 medimnoi in Athens and his profit will come from selling on the open market what he 
brings back to Athens in excess of his portion or portions of 500 medimnoi less what he 
paid for the contract, the fees he had to pay and his other expenses. (Presumably the tax-
farmer would bid for the contract, just as he would do in the situation where the tax was in 
cash, not in kind, as described in the previous paragraph). The tax-farmer may also have 
been in a position to buy from the grain farmers other grain at favourable prices and sell 
that at a profit on the open market. And, as Stroud says, the tax-farmer may have had other 
incidental profits, like fees from passengers on the boats which carried the grain. 
76 See pp 146-150. 
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One possibility is that the tax-farmers used measures on the islands different from those 
used in Athens, that the measures used on the islands produced more grain than those used 
in Athens and that this is how the tax-farmers made a profit. Ste. Croix argued in a recently 
published essay that both Greeks and Romans used different measures in this way. 77 His 
essay was on Aristotle Eth Nic 1134b35-1135a3 ('wine and com measures are not 
everywhere equal, but are larger where they buy, and smaller where they sell') and he 
looked at evidence which included a modius-measure of the reign of Domitian found in 
1915 now in Chesters Museum which bore an official inscription on its capacity which was 
almost 10% above the proper capacity of the modius, and also at a number of Athenian 
measures found by the American School of Classical Studies in Athens which showed 
irregularities. Richard Duncan-Jones looked at an alternative explanation for the Chesters 
evidence but has said, in relation to the price of wheat in Roman Egypt under the 
Principate, that the state seems to have habitually used an artaba measure for tax purposes 
which was larger than the commonest one in domestic use. 78 A conclusion from all this is 
that in a world where precise measures were difficult to achieve, people took care to err on 
the safe side and that this is the way the tax farmers on Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros made 
their profit. 
A 're-interpretation' of the Grain-Tax Law 
I have set out my views on the Grain-Tax Law and referred to the views of others. I am 
perhaps more sceptical than others of some of the main explanations of the Law and I 
77 Athenian Democratic Origins pp 334-336 
78 Chiron 6 1976 pp 257-260 
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would perhaps put more emphasis than others on the possible relationship of the Law to 
what I think may be its predecessor- JG ie 30. In particular, as I have made clear, I think 
that the dodekate could have been rent paid by Athenian cleruchs on the islands. That said, 
there is, I think, a general agreement on where we are on the Law at present and on the fact 
that we need further evidence before we can approach any degree of certainty. Alfonso 
Moreno has, however, recently published an article 're-interpreting' the Law in a very 
radical and confident way,79 and I now comment on this reinterpretation. 
Moreno begins his article by setting out a number of propositions which he says are 
'generally agreed'. These include that the dodekate was a previously existing tax in cash, 
that the pentekoste was a tax which originated on Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, that these 
islands lacked native populations and that the Athenian cleruchs on these islands were 
directly responsible from 374-373 for supplying a considerable quantity of public grain to 
Athens. There is no such general agreement on the first two propositions, there is 
considerable debate on the make-up of the populations of the islands in the light of their 
recent history, not least the King's Peace in the previous decade, and while the islands 
doubtless did supply Athens with grain in the fourth century, as in the fifth century, there is 
no evidence that this Law was the setting for this (the Law may never have taken effect or 
it may have been repealed shortly after - compare Demosthenes 59 27 where a 2% 
pentekoste on grain was collected in cash). The Law is certainly not referred to again in the 
existing sources. 
79 ZPE 145 2003 pp 97-106. 
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The main argument of Moreno is that Stroud, in saying that the dodekate was 'our first and 
only evidence for an Athenian tax at the rate of 8 1/3%', crucially overlooks the fact that 
the yearly income defining the taxable capital of the first Solonian class, the 
pentakosiomedimnoi, was also a dodekate. The Solonian value of five hundred medimnoi 
was one-twelfth of one talent (6000 drachmas) and one talent according to Pollux 8 129-
131 was how much a member of the first Solonian class 'expended on the state'. It is true 
thatpentakosiomedimnoi appears in line 12 of IG ii2 30. Nevertheless Moreno's approach is 
similar to Thomsen's approach to the eisphora we will see in Chapter Eight, 80 including -
but not only - the fact that he uses the same sentence from Pollux writing seven centuries 
later as one of his main arguments. And the same counter-arguments by Ste. Croix and 
others are valid in this case. That is, that there is no evidence of Athenian direct income 
taxation before the tyranny or of any connection between the four Solonian classes and 
fifth and fourth century Athenian taxation. Rhodes made the additional point in Comm Ath 
Pol that Pollux's figures, expressed in terms of the talent and the mina, can hardly be 
authentic for the Solonian period. 81 
The arguments on the sale and collection of the tax are no more convincing. Moreno says 
that 'it is safe to assume that the Athenian state would have a record of how many 
pentakosiomedimnoi held land in its cleruchies. It would thus be known in advance (even in 
anticipation of the harvest) exactly how much grain was to be collected'. I think that to 
claim the former assumes a degree of sophistication of Athenian record-keeping which is 
not justified. To claim the latter assumes a touching faith that all harvests will be good 
80 See pp 246-248. 
81 Comm Ath Pol p 140. 
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harvests and produce the same amount of grain, which we know from works of, for 
example, Garnsey is also not justified. Moreno believes that the tax collection was done by 
a single man, and that each pentakosiomedimnos would pay the equivalent of 500 drachmas 
a year (paying 500 medimnoi in kind). He argues this by reference to Plutarch Solon 23 
which says that one medimnos (and a sheep) is equal to one drachma. However the tax is 
computed, 500 drachmas a year is an unprecedented amount of annual tax for an Athenian 
to pay. It is the sort of figure that one would expect to hear about in the speeches of the 
orators. (Moreno also takes the view that the symmories were not tax collectors but 
taxpayers together with the pentakosiomedimnoi.) 
Moreno concludes by saying that the dodekate was in effect an eisphora. He quotes IG i3 
41 38 (dating from either the 440s (Lewis) or the 420s (Mattingly)) where there is a 
reference to Athenian cleruchs at Hestiaea paying an eisphora) but as I said in Chapter One 
this eisphora is linked with chrematon and does not look like the eisphora we know of 
(quite aside from the arguments on its date). 82 Moreno also quotes the annual eisphora of 
10 talents a year dating from 347-346 (JG ii2 244 19 and 505 15) but as I also say in 
Chapter One this does not look like the eisphora we know of either. 83 Moreno is right to 
say that the Grain-Tax Law is enigmatic. I think that he is also right to suggest that the 
dodekate may be some kind of rent paid by cleruchs on the islands and that there may be 
some link to /G ii2 30. But I believe that the greater part of his reinterpretation is most 
unlikely. 
82 Seep 34. 
83 Seep 32. 
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The significance of the Law 
The Grain-Tax Law is a hugely exciting discovery for all the reasons I have given. The 
main problem with the Law is the questions it leaves unanswered. But these unanswered 
questions are, in my view, the main significance of the Law. They make clear, by the Law's 
silence on a whole range of issues, that there must have been a corpus of other tax 
provisions, which if we knew them would probably not only answer the questions I have 
discussed, but also give insights into other aspects of Athenian taxes and their 
administration. In short, the Law shows, in a way that no other ancient Athenian tax 
provision does, that there must have been a not inconsiderable body of Athenian tax law 
that we know nothing about - reinforcing the main argument of this thesis that Athenian 
taxes could have been a substantial part of the Athenian economy. 
The Law on the Little Panathenaea of c 335 
The Law on the Little Panathenaea discovered in 1938 and published by Lewis in 195984 
has been identified as the top of an inscription which included the Decree on the Little 
Panathenaea (JG ii2 334) discovered in 1846.85 The Law lays down that land called the Nea 
should be rented out and that the (contract for collecting the) pentekoste on the land of the 
Nea should be sold in order to finance the Festival of the Little Panathenaea.86 The date of 
the Law would fall, on Tracy's criteria (the letter-cutter of IG ii2 334) between c 345 and c 
84 Hesperia 28 1959 pp 239-247. 
8s R&O 81. 
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85 R&O 81. 
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320 and the archons' names in the mid-330s would fit the space in line 2. Rhodes and 
Osborne have dated the Law to about 335, which would fit well with Athens' acquisition of 
Oropus. 87 The Law was proposed by Aristonicus of Marathon, a well-known politician of 
the period and supporter of the Lycurgan programme. I attach a new digital photograph of 
the Law by John Camp's staff at the end of this Chapter. The text of the Law is in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
The interest of the Law for the purpose of his thesis is the identification of the Nea, because 
on this depends the identification of the pentekoste. Lewis thought that it was land that had 
been fallow (neios) and that the pentekoste was therefore a produce tax. Robert suggested 
that it was the new land that Athens had acquired through Philip of Macedon at Oropus (as 
part of Philip's post-Chaeronea settlement). 88 More specifically, that it was the coastal area: 
Hypereides Defence of Euxenippos 16 said that the territory of Oropus was divided 
between the Athenian tribes, and Robert believed the coastal area was retained by the state, 
which is a not insubstantial area as I saw on a visit to Oropus in February 2003 (see my 
photograph at the end of this Chapter). This would enable the pentekoste to be levied at the 
port of Oropus. Others have suggested alternative sites. Langdon believes that Nea was an 
island near Lemnos, which has since disappeared, 89 and Ove Hansen has argued that it was 
Halonnesus, also near Lemnos. 90 Historians have generally preferred Robert's suggestion 
86 It is now genernlly thought that the Little Panathenaea took place every year, even in Great Panathenaea 
years. It would not be very plausible in this case anyway that the revenue from the Nea (see below) was to be 
drawn only three years in four. See Lambert 'State Laws and Decrees Ir p 146. 
87 R&O 81. 
88Hellenica 11-12 1960 pp 189-203. Rhodes and Osborne follow Knoepfler in making Oropus independent in 
338-335 and returned to Athens in 335. So, if Nea is in Oropus, 335-334 is the best date for the Law. 
89Hesperia 56 1987 pp 47-58. 
90 Eranos 87 1989 pp 70-72. 
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(rejecting the islands suggested by Langdon and Hansen as being too insignificant) but 
have continued to look for confirmation of Oropus as the site of Nea or other alternatives. 
I might mention in passing two other points relevant to this thesis. First, the poletai 'sell 
the pentekoste' (subject to the Council) (line 12), that is they sell the contract for collecting 
the pentekoste, wording which features in the Grain-Tax Law discussed above. Second, the 
reference to the apodektai allocating (merismos) the proceeds to the hieropoioi (see Part 
Two).91 
The subsequent Decree describes how the income from the Nea was to be used. The text 
between the Law and the Decree has been lost but what survives of the Decree is 
formulated as an amendment to a probouleuma of the Council. The Decree presupposes 
information as to the specific amount of money apportioned which cannot have been in the 
Law. 
The identification of Nea 
As I have said, the identification of Nea is important for the identification of the pentekoste. 
One approach is that the Law is, with /G ii2 334, part of the series of measures taken by 
Lycurgus to regulate the religious festivals and put them on a sound financial footing. The 
general proposals ofLycurgus deal with religious reforms, that is /G ii2 333 and associated 
91 Seep 152. 
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inscriptions in Schwenk 21.92 Tracy takes the view that IG ii2 333 and JG ii2 334 are by the 
same hand. 93 As Tracy says, in addition to the Law on the Little Panathenaea, there were 
regulations dating roughly around 330 for the Dipoleia (I 6421 - SEG 25 82) and two other 
festivals that included athletic competitions (I 7063, possibly relating to the Amphiaraon 
and EM 12896- SEG 16 55 possibly relating to the Eleusinion). 
Michael Walbank has published I 7063 (Hesperia Supplement 19 1982 pp 173-182) which 
Tracy believes is by the hand of the cutter of JG ii2 244, although Walbank: thinks that it 
could be by the hand of the cutter of IG ii2 334. I examined the inscription in the Agora 
Museum in Athens in some detail in February 2003 and attach a new digital colour 
photograph of it by John Camp's staff at the end of this Chapter. The text is in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. Photographs of the stone give the impression 
that much of the stone is easy to read, but this impression is false. The surface has been 
much damaged and it appears that the mason has corrected errors without erasing the 
original text. The interesting thing about the inscription in the context of the Law on the 
Little Panathenaea is that line 34 has some letters which could be referring to Nea. Michael 
Walbank's published reading is 
]NNEAN[.]NEENEIW[ 
I found this line particularly difficult to read, although I spent some hours looking at it in 
various lights and taking various squeezes. Stephen Lambert has recently argued that 
92 Athens in the Age of Alexander pp 81-94. 
93 Athenian Democracy in Transition, p 84. 
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whereas Walbank printed ]NNEAN[ and Stroud suggested [-nl]v Neav (SEG 32 86) -
which I had not realised when I first wrote the above - he could be fairly confident only of 
]N[ .. ]N.94 I accept that this stone cannot be taken by itself as respectable evidence of Nea, 
but I would argue that it could be Nea. 
If it was Nea and Michael Walbank is correct in thinking that these regulations relate to the 
Amphiaraia, this could support Robert's view that Nea related to nearby Oropus. One 
dissenting voice to identifying the festival as the Amphiaraia is that of Ove Hansen, who 
took the view in Mnemosyne 38 1985 389-390 that the festival in question is the Bendidia, 
on the basis of a stele in Copenhagen and reading Ev at the end of line 35, rather than 'EA 
(Walbank's reading). I am not sure about the Copenhagen analogy but after study of the 
stone itself I do not think that there are any grounds for reading Ev. 
I cannot, then, respectably argue for Robert's suggestion on the basis of I 7063. The most I 
can say is that a connection is on the very edges of probability. But my more general 
conclusion is that we should stick with Robert, in the absence of anything else, in 
preference to the suggestions of Langdon or Hansen. Further, I would argue that it remains 
worthwhile to take as one approach the possibility that the identification of Nea could be 
related to Lycurgus' programme of regulating festivals and putting them on a sound 
financial basis. 
94 
'Athenian State Laws and Decrees II' p 148. 
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Two other final thoughts. First, we know that the polis was regarded as 'proprietor in chief 
of all land in its territory and land might have hitherto remained unclaimed and unused. 95 
This suggests that Lycurgus might have made a concerted effort to claim some of this land 
near the border with Boeotia both to get some revenue and to make the religious festivals 
self-supporting. In this sense he might have called this land Nea, newly taken over or newly 
consecrated, not necessarily newly taken over after Chaeronea. A second thought is that 
Walbank's inscription refers not to the Festival of Amphiaraia but to the Panathenaea, 
which Walbank included among what he called 'the strongest candidates' in identifying his 
festival before coming down in favour of the Amphiaraia, and that a reference to ten nean 
in his inscription neatly ties up with the reference to Nea in the Law on the Little 
Panathenaea. 
An endowment? 
Joshua Sosin has recently argued that lines 15-16 ofthe Law suggest an endowment, which 
was not to be spent until the revenue from the pentekoste and the rent on the properties in 
the Nea reached 2T.96 Sosin says that in this way the finances of the Festival of the Little 
Panathenaea were put on such a strong footing that there would be no need of debates in 
the future as to how the festival was to be financed. This is an interesting observation and it 
could be right. 
95 See Burford Land and Labor in the Greek World pp 16-33. 
96 
'Two Attic Endowments' ZPE 138 2002 pp 123-128. 
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The importance of maritime taxation 
We shall see in Part Three how widespread maritime taxation is likely to have been in the 
ancient Greek world generally, not so much from the number of extant references in which 
it arises but from the casualness of those references to maritime taxation that we see in 
those cases (as if maritime taxes were fairly common). The early references to maritime 
taxation, that is before the late fifth century references to Athenian maritime taxes, tempts 
one to think that maritime taxes may have been prevalent in Athens before then. We have 
seen in this Chapter how tribute and maritime taxes collided with each other in Athens in 
413. But, whenever maritime taxation started in Athens, I shall be seeking to show later in 
this thesis what I believe was the central role that maritime taxes played in the Athenian 
economy by the time of Lycurgus. For the moment, however, I would argue - again from 
casualness - for the prevalence of maritime taxes in fourth century Athens, looking at what 
the Grain-Tax Law does not tell us about maritime taxes but assumes that we know 
already. 
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Oropus approached by boat from Euboea. Hypereides said that the 
tenitory ofOropus was divided between the Athenian tribes (phylai) . 
Robert believed that the coastal area in the foreground was retained 
by the state and was the Nea. The pentekoste would have been collected 
at the harbour of what is now Scala Oropou. 
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TABLE OF ATHENIAN TAXES 
TAX DATES MAIN FEATURES OTHER ASPECTS MAIN REFERENCES 
EIKOSTEIDEKATE c 546-527 5% or 1 00/o tax on agricultural 1. Share in crops of poor Herodotus 1 64 
produce. farmers Pisistratus had Thucydides 6 54 
settled, continuing the Aristotle Ath Po/16 4 
policy of landlords of 
hektemoroi (Sancisi-
Weerdenburg) 
2. Tax financed loan-fund for 
poor farmers (Millett):ch 8 
3. Tax in return for protection 
(Harris):ch 8 
EISPHORA 428 Property tax levied sporadically 1. Liability of non-residents Thucydides 3 19 
by the Assembly on the well- (Figueira) Demosthenes 3 4; 14 19;42 
off. Tax a percentage of total 2. Whether flat rate or 25;50 9 
taxable capital of 5750T or progressive (Thomsen):ch 8 Polybius 2 62 7 
6000T fixed by the Assembly 3. Whether connected with Pollux 6 129 
(these are fourth century figures diadikasia documents 
:we have no earlier figures). (Davies) 
From 378 taxpayers divided into 4. Whether connected with 
100 symmories and later tax accounts of Naval 
collected by 300 advance Commissioners (Davies) 
payers 
EPONION 414 2% tax on sales of confiscated Sliding scale (Pritchett) or full IG e 421-430 
property, later reduced to 1% 1% (Hallof) AgoraXIXP2 
Possibly a tax on all sales AgoraXIXP5 
(Stroud) 
Who ~d to? (Lambert) 
PENTAKOSJOSTE 392 11500 and 1/40 taxes Possibly proposed to meet Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae ' 
TESSARAJ[OSTE money shortage, but when this 1006-7 and 823-825 
failed Thrasybulus went on 
Asian expedition, reimposing 
-- --------
eikoste and dekale (Seager)_ _ 
L__ 
-- --- -
HEKATOSTE 343-325 1% tax on land sales in Athens Not sales but leases (Rosivach, Rationes Centesimarum 
by corporate groups to Osborne) 
individuals Paid to Athena, rather than polis 
(Lambert) 
SILVER TAXES 1. 5 drachma tax 2% Other dues on those mining Herodotus 7 144 
(pentedrachmia) silver at Laurium Agora XIX P26 475 
2. 1124 silver tax (eikoste SudaA345. 
Ietarte) 
PORNIKON Tax on prostitutes Aeschines 1 119 
METOIKION Tax of 12 drachmas for men. 6 Evidence for the metoikion Tod34 
drachmas for independent generally (Whitehead) Aristophanes of Byzantium fr 
women who lived in Athens for Metics liable to perform 38 
more than a short period but litmgies and pay the eisphora Lysias 12 20 
were not citizens of Athens Demosthenes 22 61 
XENIKA A market tax on metics? Demosthenes 57 34 
RELIGIOUS TAXES 1. Tax on ships anchoring at Evidence for sacred and secular Joes 
Sunium in Athenian society and finance Joe 13o 
2. 1 drachma tax on every (Samons II):ch 8 JOe 133 
boat for Apollo Delios at Offering of First-fruits at JOe 138 
Phaleron Eleusis JO i3 136 
3. tax on Dioscuri (maritime Agora XIX P26 479-480, 487 
gods) 
4. tax to Apollo 
5. 2 drachma tax for Bendis 
6. 5 drachma tax for Theseus 
7. 1 drachma tax for Asclepios 
ENKTETIKON Tax on landed property in a Evidence for the enktetikon JO ii" 1214 
deme generally (Whitehead) JO ii2 1185-1188 
Not clear whether levied on all 
property (Whitehead) 
HEKATOSTE 420-406 1% harbour tax The first known Athenian [Xenophon)Ath Po/117 
harbour tax Aristophanes Wasps 658 
Joe 182 
-
EIKOSTE 413 5% tax on imports and exports Significance of change (Kallet) Th~dides 7 28 
instead of the Athenian tribute Whether tnbute was ever IG ii 24 (Thasos) 
About 390 Revived by Thrasybulus revived (Meiggs/Mattingly) IG ii2 28 (Clazomenae) 
DEKATE 410 10% tax on goods passing Whether this is the same tax Xenophon, Hellenica 11 22 
through the Bosporus referred to in the first Financial Polybius 4 44 3 
About390 Revived by Thrasybulus Decree of Callias dated 434-433 Xenophon, Hellenica 4 8 27 
(Hornblower/Osborne) 
PENTEKOSTE 402-401 2% on imports and exports The Law on the Little Andocides 1 Mysteries 133-134 
Panathenaea : where was nea Demosthenes 14 27; 34 7; 35 
and whether import/export tax 29-30 
or produce tax Hesperia Supplement 29 1998 
(Lewis/Robert/Langdon) Hesperia 28 1959 
The Grain-Tax Law (Stroud) 
DODEKATE 374-373 8 1/3% tax on farming the grain What was the two-tenths? Hesperia Supplement 29 1998 
from Lemnos, lmbros and (Harris) 
Skyros What exactly was the dodekate? 
(Stroud and R&O) 
Whether paid in cash or kind 
(Stroud) 
,_ 
- - - ----~ 
Tax-farming (Stroud and R&O) 
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APPENDIX 
VOLUNTARINESS - LITURGIES AND EPIDOSIS 
There was a strong element of voluntariness in Athenian life, that is, citizens 
supporting the Athenian state other than by way of taxes. This Appendix gives some 
brief background to the main manifestations of this voluntariness, which were 
liturgies and epidosis. 
Liturgies 
There was an obligation on those who were rich enough to perform liturgies when 
called upon to do so, but competition among the elite led many men to perform more 
liturgies, and to spend more money on them, than the minimum that could be required 
of them. The main liturgies were the trierarchy (which involved responsibility for a 
ship in the navy for a year) and the choregia (which involved the production of a 
chorus at music and dramatic festivals) - see the photograph at the end of this 
Appendix of a choregic monument found in 1941. The full text of the monument is in 
the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. Other liturgies in connection with 
festivals included the gymnasiarchy (responsibility for a team competing in an 
athletic festival); hestiasis (feasting : the provision of a banquet); architheoria (the 
leadership of a public delegation to a foreign festival) and eutaxia (see below). 1 At 
1 Some regard the proeisphora, which I discussed in Chapter One (see pp 31-32) as a liturgy. I am not 
however, classifying it as such in this thesis, because it was an advance payment of the eisphora 
which, in theory if not always in practice, the payer could recover from those liable to the eisphora. 
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state level there were at least 97 liturgies in a normal year and at least 118 in a year of 
the Great Panathenaea. 2 
Liturgies were a kind of tax substitute or, as Peter Jones has recently called them, a 
kind of hypothecated tax:3 men spent their money directly instead of having it 
collected from them and spent by others, and it was in the interests of the liturgists to 
stack up socio-political credit by performing some duties. Modern states certainly 
have voluntariness in, for example, promoting charities, the arts and sport, but there 
is no obligation, although in certain circumstances tax relief is given for 
contributions. There are, of course, periodical calls for hypothecated taxes, so that 
people could choose which items of Government expenditure to support. 4 
The trierarchy 
It has been argued that the trierarchy - the most important of the liturgies - was 
instituted by Themistocles in 483-2 to succeed its precursor institution, the naukrariai 
(many still believe that naukrariai were connected with ships, but alternative theories 
have been canvassed in recent years). By the time of the fourth century the burden of 
2 J K Davies JHS 77 1967 pp 33-40. 
3 Ancient and Modem p 107. 
4 Bot4 Boeckh (book 3 chapter 1) and Andreades p 130 claimed that liturgies were common in the 
ancient Greek world generally. Boeckh found 'traces' of liturgies in Byzantium, Siphnos, Keos, Aegina, 
Mytilene and Thebes etc. I agree that 'traces' of liturgies is a good description of the examples he quotes, 
and I would not go as far as Andreades in describing liturgies as a 'pan-Hellenic institution . . . found 
nearly everywhere'. Wilson in The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia pp 113-114 and pp 279-302 
looks at choregiai outside Athens. He certainly produces some evidence of liturgical choregiai in 
Siphnos (!socrates 19 36). He argues for liturgical choregiai in other places, including Aegina, Keos and 
Mytilene, butili.e evi~<!~~ isJ~u)ess than ~<fes' claiP.J)fQ}V~ver, giye!l)\1~-SPJ.Ifseness of evidence 
generally for states other than Athens, it could be that liturgies were fairly widesPread. 
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frequent trierarchies became such that pairs of trierarchs shared the responsibility for 
a trireme in some cases (Demosthenes 21 154), while the actual command or element 
of personal service could be deputed to a paid captain (Demosthenes 21 80; 51 7 -8; 
21 163). In earlier times a trierarchy well performed brought not only personal 
sati:Sfaction but also honour and the recognition of services performed in the interests 
of the polis (Demosthenes 51 7: Lysias 25 12-13).5 Reforms first of Periandros in 
358-357 (Demosthenes 14 16-17; 21 155; 47 21) and then Demosthenes in 340-339 
(Aeschines 3 222; Demosthenes 18 103-104) transformed the trierarchy into little 
more than an institution for collecting finance for the fleet, and virtually left the 
trierarch with the anonymity associated with the payment of tax. Trierarchs may still 
have paid some of the costs directly, while the members of the symmories contributed 
to other costs. 6 The last extant document referring to trierarchies is the naval record of 
323-2, and the trierarchy system was abolished between 317-6 and 307-6 by 
Demetrius ofPhalerum. 
The choregia 
The choregia was central to the organisation and funding of the literary/musical 
festivals in Athens and its demes. The actors were appointed and remunerated 
separately by the polis, but the chorus involved the main part of the expense in these 
productions. The date of the introduction of the choregia is uncertain, but its history 
corresponds roughly with the period of Athenian democracy. For tragedy at the Great 
5 Sinclair Democracy and Participation in Athens p 62. 
6 Gabrielsen Financing the Athenian Fleet p 194 et seq. 
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Dionysia it probably began about 501 (although some prefer a date under the 
tyranny), and about 486 for comedy, which may have been produced by volunteers 
before then (Aristotle Poetics 1449 b 1).7 Throughout the 4th century, social and 
economic strains put pressure on the system. Doubts were raised about the value of 
the enormous expenditure on choregiai in view of the competing needs of military 
funding and in the absence of imperial wealth (Lycurg. Leoc. 139; Demosthenes 20 
26; !socrates 7 54). In 405 at least, choregiai at the Great Dionysia were shared 
between two men (called synchoregoi : schol. Aristophanes Frogs 404 ), and about 
310 Demetrius ofPhalerum abolished the system of competitive choregiai as such. 
Exemption from liturgies 
Aristotle Ath Pol 56 3 lists three grounds of exemption from performing liturgies -
having performed that public service before; or having performed another service and 
the period of exemption not having expired; or of not being of the right age (a man 
serving as Chorus-leader for the boys must be over forty). Rhodes mentions that, in 
addition, hereditary exemption was conferred on various distinguished Athenians 
until Leptines proposed that except for the descendants of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton this exemption should be revoked and none should in future be 
conferred. 8 Demosthenes, in the event, thought that it would be better to spread the 
costs by using the symmory system (compare Demosthenes 20 127, 160). Further, 
7 Peter Wilson OCJY p 323. Peter Wilson's book The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia is the first 
major study of the means by which the classical Athenians organised and funded their many festival 
choruses. Andronike Makris wrote an Ox{()rd D Phil thesis on liturgies in 1994. This has not been 
putiiished but I have benefitted from discuSsing it briefly with her. 
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Rhodes argues that it was probable that men with less than a stated amount of 
property were exempt (compare Demosthenes 20 19) and that it was possible that at 
the time of the Ath Pol the ephebi were exempt from festival liturgies. 
Antidosis 
People could appeal against having to incur the cost of a liturgy (antidosis). A man 
who was called upon to perform a liturgy and claimed that another richer man had 
been passed over could challenge the other man either to perform the liturgy or to 
exchange property with him; if the man challenged would do neither, the case went to 
court as a diadikasia, and the man found to be richer was required to perform the 
liturgy. Some have denied that in the 4th century an actual exchange of property was a 
serious possibility,9 but it probably remained theoretically available, even if most 
Athenians would have thought it too inconvenient to be worth resorting to. 10 We do 
not know of any exchanges that were definitely completed, although some were 
definitely initiated. Lysias 3 20 gives an example of someone who failed in a private 
suit on a challenge to exchange of property. 
8 Comm Ath Pol p 625 
9 For example, L Gemet Bude edition of Demosthenes' Plaidoyers civils ii 1957 pp 72-75; and C 
Mosse La Fin de Ia democratie athenienne 1962 p 153 'n6. 
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Who performed liturgies and was the liturgical class the same as the eisphora 
class? 
Who performed liturgies? 
It is generally thought that the 'upper class' in 4th century Athens was a group of 
some 1000-1200 rich citizens with, at their core, a smaller group of the 3 00 very rich. 
Under a law of 357 the richest 1200 of the citizens, about 4% of the whole, were 
made liable to the trierarchy. 11 Studies that have been made of individual fortunes 
suggest that to be one of the very rich citizens who performed liturgies men would 
have to have had property to the value of at least 3 or 4T. 12 To give an idea of 
comparative wealth, Aristotle Ath Pol 49 4 says that invalids are entitled to a 
maintenance grant if their property is valued at less than 300 drachmas, which means 
that the 1200 liturgists would have 60-75 times the property of the invalids. 13 Metics 
were also liable to perform liturgies- certainly the choregia (compare Lysias 12 20) 
and possibly more but there is some argument on how much more. 14 
Was the liturgical class the same as the eisphora class? 
We do not know for certain whether the group of liturgy-performers was identical 
with the group of eisphora-payers. Demosthenes 20 28 takes for granted that there 
1
° Compare Rhodes Comm Ath Pol pp 624-625. 
11 Rhodes Athenian Boule pp 5-6. Gabrielsen would distinguish between liability for the trierarchy 
and liability for membership of the symmories. 
12 Davies Athenian Propertied Families pp xXlii-xxiv. 
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were more citizens liable to the eisphora than to trierarchies, and historians have 
ranged the numbers liable to the eisphora from 1200 via 2000 to 6000. But only a 
couple of years after Demosthenes' statement !socrates 15 145 refers to 'the 1200 who 
pay eisphora and perform liturgies'. I am attracted to the suggestion that Demosthenes 
focused on eisphora-payers as against trierarchs only, to the exclusion of other 
liturgists whereas !socrates was talking about the eisphora plus all the liturgies 
(comprising both the trierarchy and the festival liturgies). Since the trierarchy fell on 
the wealthiest citizens, who were thereby exempted from festival liturgies 
(Demosthenes 20 19), the number of trierarchs was smaller than the total number of 
citizens performing liturgies (and paying the eisphora). Alternatively, as Rhodes has 
argued, what !socrates said does not prove that the two obligations were coextensive : 
there could have been a class of not quite so rich Athenians who pay the eisphora but 
do not perform liturgies. 
It is normally believed that the symmories used after 358-357 for the trierarchy were 
different from the symmories used since 378-377 for the collection of the eisphora 
(as well as that the class of men liable for the eisphora was wider than the class of 
men liable for the trierarchy and other liturgies). Ruschenbusch and Mosse have 
argued that there was a single class of men liable both for the eisphora and for the 
trierarchy, and that after 358-357 the same symmories were used for both purposes15 
13 Compare Rhodes CommAth Pol p 570. 
14 Compare Whitehead The Ideology of the Athenian Me tic pp 80-83. 15 "' ;_' _· . . - . .. . . . 
Ruschenbusch ZPE 31 1978 pp 275-284; C Mosse Pomts de vue sur Ia jiscalite ant1que 1979 pp 
31-42 
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but I agree with Rhodes that the normal view is to be preferred. 16 They argued, inter 
alia, that there is no suggestion that there were two kinds of symmory, but there is no 
reason to suppose that this was not the case. Most languages use words that have 
different meanings or nuances, and the references they quote are not, in my view, 
sufficiently compelling to displace the assumption that both the figures and the 
arrangements for eisphora-payers and litigants were different. 
A new edition of /G ii2 417 has recently been published by Stephen Lambert. 17 This is 
a list of dedications by liturgists in two columns (possibly preceded by a Law). There 
is a reference to the little-known eutaxia liturgy, signifying good order, often though 
not invariably in a military context. The inscription seems likely to date from the 
Lycurgan period (333-332 or 332-331 ). A photograph of the inscription is at the end 
of this Appendix and the text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
Lambert cautiously believes that there is a good possibility that the list has something 
to do with the panel(s?) of 300 who were liable to the proeisphora and the trierarchy 
(the number of men seems too high for festival liturgies to be in question). Lambert, 
however, refers to Gabrielsen's view that 1200 men were officially liable for 
trierarchies at this period (but see footnote 11 above). Notwithstanding Gabrielsen, I 
am inclined to follow Demosthenes 48 102-108 who suggests that from 340 the 
richest 300 were required to take full responsibility for the trierarchy and bear the 
major part of the burden themselves. 
16 American Journal of Ancient History 7 1982 pp 1-19. 
17 
'Ten Notes on Attic Inscriptions' ZPE 135 2001 pp 52-60, and 'Afterwords' ZPE 141 2002 pp 122-
123. 
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Epidosis 
The liturgy held a position in the grey area between compulsory taxes and citizens 
voluntarily paying amounts to state funds in times of emergency, called epidosis. The 
procedure for epidosis at Athens can be pieced together from several passages in the 
ancient literary sources : Isaeus 5 37-38; Plutarch Alcibiades 10; Plutarch Phocion 9; 
Theophrastus Characters 22 3; Athenaeus 4 168f; and Demosthenes 18 312 and 21 
161. 
An epidosis was invited by a decree of the assembly (which had to go through the 
same procedure of probou/eusis as any other decree). Those who were willing to 
contribute then rose and stated what they would give; while those who were unwilling 
to give anything remained silent or retired from the assembly (Theophrastus' 'mean 
man' gets up and quietly slips out when the matter is raised : Characters 22 3). The 
crowd clapped their hands as pledges were made. The names of those who had 
promised to contribute, together with the amount of their contributions, were written 
on tablets, which were placed before the statues of the Eponymoi, where they 
remained until the amount was paid. It is assumed that few would have failed to 
contribute (at any rate few among the rich and politically active), not to mention the 
matter of patriotism. The public pressure must have been great. Those who 
volunteered epidoseis were not, however, spared public humiliation if they defaulted. 
For example in Isaeus 5 38 :'This sum he promised but did not pay, and his name was 
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posted on a list of defaulters in front of the statues of the Eponymous Heroes, which 
was headed : These are they who voluntarily promised the people to contribute 
money for the salvation of the city and failed to pay the amounts promised'. 
The epidosis is attested at Athens from the time of the Archidamian War (Plutarch 
Alcibiades 10), then quite commonly in the 4th century and later. The most abundant 
evidence is found in the post-classical period. An early reference to the concept of 
voluntary activity in the Persian Wars is in Herodotus 8 17 where Cleinias, son of 
Alcibiades, 'brought to the war two hundred men and a ship of his own, all at his 
private charge'. The best-preserved epigraphical evidence of epidosis is a third 
century decree in the archonship of Diomedon (see the Epilogue to this thesis). 18 
Examples of epidoseis are gifts of triremes, money and weapons. W K Pritchett19 and, 
more recently, V Gabrielsen20 have set out the evidence for epidoseis. 
The cost of liturgies and epidosis 
We have some evidence of the cost of liturgies, particularly from Lysias 21. Davies 
calculated in 1981 that the figures covered a wide range, a choregic liturgy costing 
from 1200 drachmas to 3000 drachmas and a sole trierarchy between 4000 drachmas 
and 6000 drachmas. Compared with the minimum liturgical census of 3-4T, these 
figures could well have taken up a large part of a man's property (and this was in 
18 See pp 359-360. 
19 The Greek State at War Part V p 473 et seq. 
2
° Financing the Athenian Fleet p 199 et seq.: compare IG if 1632. 
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addition to the eisphora)?1 One could compare a man who just qualified for liability 
to the eisphora and liturgies and was subject to the full rigour of that liability and 
those expenses with an UK individual who just qualifies for liability to the higher rate 
of tax ( 40%). In both cases someone who just qualifies arguably pays a 
disproportionate amount of tax etc as compared with someone just below the 
qualification line and someone who is comfortably above the qualification line. 
Gabrielsen has calculated that with an annual number of 60 trierarchies, the total 
private cash spent on the Athenian fleet was of the order of 60-70T a year. And then, 
when the expenditure of 100 festival liturgies, each averaging at least 1000 drachmas, 
is added (compare Lysias 21 1-5), the total contributions of the whole liturgical class 
rise to roughly 77 -87T a year. 22 Peter Wilson has estimated a cost of some 18T for 
five days' choral performance, not including substantial contributions from the polis 
towards the actors' needs, the pay of poets, the cost of sacrificial beasts, the upkeep of 
the theatre and, from some point in the classical period, large-scale theoric 
distributions. 23 
What sort of figures did epidosis involve? There are a number of references in the 
ancient sources to examples of epidosis. The largest epidosis recorded is a gift of 40 
triremes (Plutarch Mora/ia 849F : 'when Philip was preparing to sail against Euboea, 
and the Athenians were afraid, he (Hypereides) assembled forty triremes by private 
contributions, and in his own name and his sons', he gave two triremes, the first 
21 Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens p 82. 
22 Financing the Athenian Fleet p 216. 
23 The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia p 95. 
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made'). Assuming that the cost of a trireme was about 1 T (compare Aristotle Ath Pol 
22 7), this would yield the equivalent of 40T from 40 individuals. 
These figures - 77-87T a year from liturgies and certainly we know of 40T in one 
year for epidosis - are not insubstantial by any standards but should be set alongside 
the figures for taxes set out in Chapter Twelve. 24 
24 See p 336 et seq. 
A monument from the Atrir deme of Aixone honouring rwo kiH>rcsvi for comedy at 
the local D ionysia (probably c. 3 13 B.c.). with a rel ief of Dionysos .md satyr cup-bearer and. 
abow. fi \'e comic masks. 
A choregic monument (source: P Wilson The Athenian 
Institution of the Khoregia) 
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PART TWO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TAXES 
Part Two examines the administration of the taxes. There was not a Department of 
Taxes in Athens, like the Departments of Taxes in modem states, but it is 
convenient to refer generally to the administration of taxes when I discuss how 
taxes were enacted, how they were collected and to what extent they were complied 
with. Taxes in Athens began by being temporary (compare the eisphora in 428) but 
this temporariness should not make us underestimate the functions which were 
performed in the administration of Athenian taxes. 
In Chapter Four I describe how taxes were normally proposed by individuals in the 
Assembly, rather than by a 'Government', although towards the end of the 225 year 
period of the thesis there was more central direction. Most taxes were collected by 
tax-farmers, who bid for the collection of taxes annually, but there was a more 
permanent procedure for collection of the eisphora with a system of advance 
payments. I discuss the archaeological remains in the Agora of the offices of tax 
administration. Tax was administered largely on self-assessment lines with some 
checks and balances. 
Chapter Five looks at the extent to which the tax law was complied with, in terms of 
tax evasion and the invisible economy. We have quite a lot of evidence on attitudes 
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to tax-paying in the 160 or so speeches of the orators in the fourth century, and on 
the invisible economy and bank secrecy. 
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FOUR 
HOW TAXES WERE ADMINISTERED 
How taxes were enacted 
In most modem states taxes originate from the political programme of the 
Government of the day or in some cases the Opposition of the day, and permanent 
civil servants normally advise and assist in the enactment of the legislation. In 
Athens taxes were usually proposed by individuals in the Assembly, but there was 
more central direction by the time ofLycurgus. And there was very much less of a 
permanent civil service in Athens. Aristotle Ath Pol mentions three secretaries of 
the Athenian State, and others (in the fourth century) are known from inscriptions. 
At a low level public slaves worked for the administration - see for example Ath Pol 
47 5. 
Between Solon and the end of the fifth century there was no separate procedure for 
enacting nomoi and laws were embodied in psephismata. In the fourth century there 
were two main kinds of legislation - nomoi and psephismata. The distinction 
between nomos and psephisma was introduced in 403-402 in connection with the 
recodification of the laws of Dracon and Solon. 1 A nomos was a general enactment, 
intended to be valid for all time, and in the 4th century passed by the nomothetai (a 
1 Compare Rhodes The Athenian Boule p 49 et seq. 
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legislative commission selected by lot from citizens).2 A psephisma, by contrast, 
was an enactment passed by the Assembly, specific in scope and/or applied for a 
limited period only. 3 We have seen examples of nomoi in the Grain-Tax Law and 
the Law on the Little Panathenaea, proposed by Agyrrhius and Aristonicus 
respectively. An example of a psephisma is the Financial Decrees of Callias. We 
also saw in the latter the reference to adeia, which the Assembly voted itself to 
protect it when it changed the law. Decree-making went first to the boule and then 
to the Assembly. Law-making went to the nomothetai after the Assembly m 
response to a probouleuma of some kind had set the machinery in motion. 
Tax administration 
The management of Athens' finances was carried out by a number of boards who 
worked with the boule. As Rhodes has said, 'each of(the) boards was involved only 
at one point in the state's finances : the boule was involved at every point and it 
alone could see the whole picture. Only the boule had access to all the information, 
which would show whether extra taxation was needed . . . and this must be the 
reason for the boule's financial predominance'.4 The board which dealt with taxes 
was the poletai who had responsibility for selling tax collection contracts. 
2 Compare Rhodes 'Sessions of Nomothetai in Fourth-Century Athens' in Classical Quarterly 53 
2003, pp 124-129 in which he seeks to hold a balance between their similarity to jurors (in looking at 
the pros and cons of changing the law) and Pieratt's view that they were similar to assemblies. 
Nomothetai were, in Rhodes' view, a 'thoroughly hybrid body'. 
3 Compare Hansen The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes p 399. 
4The Athenian Boule p 105. 
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The poletai had their own office, the Poleterion, which is likely to have been in the 
Agora. It is not known precisely where, but since the poletai worked closely with 
the boule it is likely to have been near the offices of the boule. The majority of 
inscriptions relating to the poletai have been found in the south-west comer of the 
Agora, the concentration being thickest around the Tholos, and one could say that if 
taxes were administered anywhere in Athens it was around here. 5 This is shown in 
my photograph and in Shear's plan at the end of this Chapter, although my 
photograph includes later additions whereas Shear's plan is as about 400. 
Sickinger has argued that since many of the boule's documents were kept in the 
Metroon in the fourth century, it seems safe to assume that the poletai documents 
were also deposited there. 6 He believes that, whether or not the poletai kept their 
own documents, the keeping of records relating to state contracts suited the boule's 
overall concern for state finances and that it would have been natural for the boule 
to keep its own records of these transactions. There is no clear evidence of where 
the records were kept in the Tholos/Bouleuterion/Metroon complex, but Sickinger's 
view seems likely. 
The main exception to the procedure for the collection of taxes through the poletai 
was the collection of the eisphora, which from 378-377 was carried out through 
symmories, and later the proeisphora. Taxpayers were divided into 100 symmories 
('tax-sharing groups') in 378-377 and later the richest 300 (3 per symmory) were 
5 Compare Shear's article 'Bouleuterion, Metroon and the Archives at Athens' Studies in the 
Ancient Greek Polis, Historia Einzelschriften 95 1995 pp 157-190. 
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required to act as advance-payers (proeispherontes) for their symmories. When an 
eisphora was imposed, registrars (epigrapheis) were appointed, who checked the 
worth of self-assessed property. 
The poletai 
The main literary source for the poletai is Aristotle Ath Pol 4 7 2-3 which informs us 
that 'there are the ten poletai, one appointed by lot from each phyle.7 They let out all 
public contracts, and along with the treasurer of the strati otic fund and those elected 
to manage the theoric fund they lease the mines and taxes in the presence of the 
boule; and to whomever the boule should choose by vote, they ratify the leased 
mines, both those that are in working condition, which are leased for three years, 
and those that have been conceded, which are leased for [seven] years. And in the 
presence of the boule they sell the property of those men exiled by the Areopagus 
and of other exiles, and the nine archons ratify the sales. And they record on 
whitened tablets the taxes leased for the current year, and the purchaser and for how 
much he bought it, and they hand these tablets over to the boule. They record 
separately on ten tablets those who have to pay instalments every prytany and those 
who have to pay three times a year, making a separate list for each instalment, and 
those who have to pay in the ninth prytany. They also record the lands and houses 
confiscated and sold by judgement of the lawcourt. For they sell these too. The 
6 Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens p 128. 
7 I quoted part of this source in Chapter Two in relation to the silver tax (see p 62), but I am 
quoting the whole paragraph here for convenience (translation in Agora XIX p 57). 
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price of houses must be paid within five years, the price of the land within ten 
years. They pay these instalments in the ninth prytany'. 
The involvement of the poletai in the farming out of taxes is attested in a number of 
inscriptions, but actual poletai records of these matters seem never to have been 
inscribed on stone, possibly because the farming out of taxes was re-leased 
annually. 8 The leasing of mines by the poletai was recorded on stone possibly 
because the leases were for longer periods. The records of tax contracts were 
written on the whitened tablets (leukomata) referred to by Aristotle above and 
cancelled when the obligation was discharged. So it is not surprising that nothing 
survives. The sale by the poletai of the privilege of collecting state taxes is found in 
three inscriptions. In JG e 130 6, they sell the right to collect a one-drachma levy on 
shipowners on Peiraeus. In the fragment of JG ii2 334 (the Law on the Little 
Panathenaea in Chapter Three) the poletai are believed to be correctly restored as 
selling the right to collect the pentekoste.9 Finally, in JG i3 136, they are believed to 
be responsible for the collection of the two-drachma tax of Bendis. The boule 
supervised the poletai making contracts for the collection of tax. 
Aristotle says that the poletai were responsible for recording the sales of 
confiscated property. In distinction to the practice of not recording on stone actual 
details of taxes which had been farmed out, the sales of confiscated property, like 
the leasing of mines, were recorded on stone as we saw in Part One, or at least those 
8 Compare R&O 36, p 178. 
9 Seep 117. 
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of 415-414 and 402-401 and those from about 3 70 onwards. 10 John Davies has 
suggested that the confiscations and sales of 415-414 and 402-401 were major 
affairs in highly tense and politicised contexts and that the stelai had as much a 
symbolic as a practical purpose, that of making an example of state villains. 11 This 
seems a likely explanation, and the practice of recording sales of confiscated 
property on stone continued in the fourth century, at least from about 370. 
The poletai existed in the time of Solon according to Aristotle Ath Pol 7 3 and are 
epigraphically attested in the middle of the 5th century. 12 There seems no reason to 
doubt that the boule's supervision of the poletai goes back to the reforms of 
Ephialtes. 13 
There has been some discussion as to whether the poletai let rights to collect tax (or 
indeed sell state property or lease mines) by auction or in some other way. Hallof 
argued that the poletai did not arrive at the amounts in question through a public 
auction, but that what evidence there is pointed to the exact opposite procedure, that 
is sales to pre-selected individuals. 14 However, Langdon pronounced in favour of 
auction in Agora XIX p 58 and reaffrrmed that view in Ritual, Finance, Politics pp 
253-265. He countered Hallof, having found nothing in the lines he quoted (llS-
153 and 153-185 of JG ii2 1582) incompatible with a public auction conducted by 
10 Seep 39. 
11 
'Accounts and Accountability in Classical Athens' in Lewis Ritual, Finance, Politics pp 210-
211. 
12 ML 85 34-35 and 86 8-9. 
13 Rhodes The Athenian Boule p 96. 
14 Klio 72 1990 pp 403-426. 
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the poletai. He argued on the basis of the Attic Stelai, mining leases, and literary 
evidence for other activities of the poletai, including tax-farming contracts, that 
their normal method of disposing of such items was to the highest bidder in a public 
auction. The state wanted to get good prices from the leases and concessions it 
offered, but a free and open auction was regarded as the most fair and normally 
generated the desired revenue. I agree with Langdon on this. 
Tax1armers 
The political constitution of Athens made no provision for a government bureau of 
tax-collection. There are references to the pentekostologoi, for example in 
Demosthenes 21 133, who confiscated goods as customs officers (Loeb translation) 
and they may indeed have been customs officials, as distinct from tax-farmers. But 
see MacDowell Demosthenes against Meidias p 353 OUP 1990, who seems to 
believe that these pentekostologoi were Athenian tax collectors and Liddle and 
Scott translate the verb in question as 'seized goods in default of payment'. 
MacDowell refers to Knoepfler BCH 105 1981 pp 328-329 who suggested that the 
tax collectors were rather those of Chalcis taxing imports at Argoura but, as 
MacDowell says, there is no other evidence that Chalcis had a pentekoste or 
pentekostologoi. The Athenian state, then, used private individuals for tax 
collection, and tax-farming regulations (nomoi telonikoi) ordered how the tax-
collection system was to work, except for the separate tax-collection arrangement 
for the eisphora. 
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I have argued that all indirect taxes were sold at auction to the highest bidders. 15 
Taxes were sold for one year only in the hope of stimulating competition among 
bidders, but in fact there was a tendency for tax-farmers to establish control of 
bidding. Tax-collection required the maintenance of a large force, which could not 
be assembled and disbanded without considerable financial loss. Tax-farmers were 
able to consult the records of tax proceeds in the office of the poletai, and so 
determine the maximum bid that would allow a profit. They bid a little less than the 
taxes they expected to receive and kept the profit, but if they collected less than 
they bid, they had to make up the shortfall. (Compare in Chapter Three the 
collectors of the 2% pentekoste making a profit of 3 T in 402-401, and a small profit 
the next year from outlays of 30T and 36T respectively.)16 When the tax-collection 
contract was purchased, the purchaser had to provide sureties who guaranteed to 
pay the money due to the treasury if the purchaser failed to do so, and as we shall 
see in Chapter Five there were sanctions against guarantors not meeting their 
obligations (Agora XIX P 26). 17 The system of tax-farming in this way passed the 
uncertainty from the state to individuals: the state knew that it would get 36T from 
the 2% tax in 401-400~ the tax-farmers' incentive to collect as much as possible was 
that they made up the shortfall or pocketed the surplus. 
Aristotle 4 7 3 said that the amount of the successful bid might be paid in 
instalments every prytany or three times a year or in the ninth prytany. Rhodes in 
15 Arid oompare Youtie 'Publicans and Sinners' ZPE 11967 pp 8-9. 
16 See pp 97-98. 
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his Commentary says that we do not know how it was decided how the sum on a 
contract should be paid. 18 Demosthenes 24 97 refers to 'what we call the 
supplementary payments' and complains that Timocrates' law would worsen the 
state's finances by allowing certain payments to be deferred until the ninth prytany. 
The problem is further complicated by the Suda which states categorically that 
when taxes are sold, there are two payments - the down-payment (prokatabo/e) and 
the supplementary payment (proskatabolema). 19 I therefore agree with Rhodes that 
we do not know what the procedure was. All we can say in the context of this thesis 
is that there was no down-payment in the case of the Grain-Tax Law - presumably 
because the tax was paid in kind, but, as Rhodes and Osborne - accepting Harris' 
interpretation, as I do (see page 110 and footnote 65 on page 106 above) - the 
down-payment referred to in lines 55-57 of the Law is presumably one already 
promised under the old arrangements in which bids were in money; and that in the 
cases of the metoikion, the tax on the mines and some religious taxes at least the 
taxes seem to have been paid in ten instalments (see Agora XIX P26 in Chapter 
Five below and Hopper BSA 48 1953 pp 224-239).20 
The new evidence of the Grain-Tax Law suggests that tax-farmers may also have 
bid for tax-farming contracts where the tax was in kind. The tax-farmer would bid 
for and fulfil the contract, as when the tax was in cash, but with the important 
17 See pp 170-171. 
18 Comm Ath Pol p 555. 
19 s.v. npoKaTaj3oll.n Kal npoaKaTaj36ll.ru..la : 'when the taxes were sold, they used to grant 
two instalments to the purchasers through which the money had to be paid in. Accordingly, that 
portion of the money they paid into the public treasury before embarking on the project is called 
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difference that he would sell on the open market what he brought back to Athens in 
excess of the contract and his profit would come from the receipts of this sale, less 
the fees he had incurred and other expenses. We do not know whether the Grain-
Tax Law was repeated. It may have heralded an innovatory type of tax-farming 
devised by the veteran tax-farmer Agyrrhius, which appeared later in Egypt and the 
Roman Empire. 21 There may also have been other kinds of tax-farming of which we 
are unaware. 
Literary references to tax-farmers are scarcely more flattering to tax officials than 
they are in any society, ancient or modem. Aristophanes refers to the extortionate 
methods of tax-farmers in Knights 247-250. Theophrastus Characters 6 gives tax-
farming as an example of what the shameless man may do. Tax-farmers were faced 
with the maximum of temptation, and the grounds for the bad reputation that they 
earned were clear. Even Andocides in the passage referred to above is a bit 
ambivalent on what profit tax-farmers should make. After saying that he outwitted 
his rivals in bidding for a tax-farming contract, he said that he prevented his 
opponents from distributing among themselves six talents of your (my emphasis) 
money. 
the down-payment. That which is paid by means of a second payment is called the supplementary 
payment'. 
""2o Seep 171. 
21 Tax-fanning, both in money and in kind, seems to have been common in Ptolemaic Egypt (see, 
for example, Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt pp 53 and 145) and the Roman Empire but I 
have not seen a case without specific payment. See the case study on tax-farming in Asia Minor at 
the end of this Part of the thesis. 
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The tax-farmer most known to us is perhaps Agyrrhius, who proposed the Grain-
Tax Law. We have seen how Agyrrhius was the leader of a group who farmed the 
2% tax at Athens (Andocides 1 Mysteries 133-134)?2 Andocides refers to him as 
'kalos k'agathos' with some irony. He was a veteran politician at the time of the 
Grain-Tax Law, having, among other things, been a member of the boule in the first 
year of restored democracy (403-402)/3 served as a general in about 389 and been 
imprisoned for illegal possession of public money, perhaps between 388 and 374 
(Demosthenes 24 134-135). Stroud lists many other details of Agyrrhius' career. He 
was clearly prominent and very active in political life, openly engaging in business 
as a tax-collector with enough success to make him very rich. He obviously moved 
easily in what we would today call the corridors of power, in the boule, the ekklesia, 
the nomothetai, and the Athenian military establishment, and was well-placed to 
propose the Grain-Tax Law. But this was not the end of the Agyrrhius family in tax 
matters : John Davies has drawn attention to his nephew Callistratus, in exile after 
361, helping Macedon to increase its revenues from harbour dues, and Callistratus' 
associate Chabrias recommending to his Egyptian employer Tachos in 360 
ingenious and far-reaching taxation measures for the sake of paying his mercenaries 
(see Chapter Six). 24 
22 See pp 97-98. 
23 See IG ii2 1. 
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The apodektai 
Records of contracts were kept by a demosios on behalf of the boule and it was his 
duty to give the lists of the sums currently due to the apodektai, the official 
receivers of public revenue (Aristotle Ath Pol 47 5). The apodektai deleted the 
records of those who did pay, and noted the defaulters. It then became the 
responsibility of the boule to take action against defaulters. When I say that the 
apodektai deleted the records of those who did pay, it is not clear whether Ath Pol 
4 7 2-3 refers to one series of documents or two and, if it refers to two, it may be that 
only the notes of payments due were destroyed and the separate records of the 
contracts were not. 25 
The apodektai paid the revenue into the central state treasury in the 5th century. 
Payments were made from it by the kolakretai. There were other treasuries in the 
fifth century, including the Treasury of Athena and, after the decrees of Callias, the 
Treasury of the Other Gods; at some times these two were amalgamated. (W S 
Ferguson has set out the history of the Treasuries of Athena and the Other Gods.26 
The Other Gods were referred to in the Decrees of Callias of 434-433, Athena and 
the Other Gods were amalgamated about 407, they were separated in the 3 80s and 
amalgamated by the 340s). And there was the Delian League treasury, whose 
administration remained independent of the state treasury until about 411. 
24 Classics in Progress p 242. See pp 198-199. 
25 See Rhodes 'Public Documents in the Greek States : Archives and Inscriptions' Part ll Greece 
and Rome 48 2001 p 148 note 18; ThomasOra/ Tradition pp 53-54 with note 28; and Sickinger 
Public Records pp 68-70. 
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The apodektai continued to receive the revenue in the fourth century. They 
apportioned (merismos) the money among the various spending authorities, like the 
theoric (for civil expenditure) and the stratiotic (for military expenditure) funds. 
The first extant reference for the merismos is a decree of386 (Tod 116 = R&O 19). 
John Davies has suggested that the Law's correlate was presumably the nomoi 
telonikoi?7 The merismos has rightly been cited as evidence that Athens was 
running a budget, working out how it could afford various amounts of expenditure, 
rather than just living from hand to mouth. We saw examples of the procedure in 
the two laws we looked at in some detail in Chapter Three- the Grain-Tax Law28 
and the Law on the Little Panathenaea. 29 
The naukrariai and the kolakretai 
There were two other institutions in the tax administration field, which dated from 
the period before the time of this thesis but which were abolished in the 5th century. 
They are the naukrariai and the kolakretai. 
Aristotle Ath Pol 8 3 says that 'naukraroi had been set in charge of the naukraries, 
with responsibility for revenue and expenditure accruing; that is why it is written at 
26 The Treasurers of Athena. 
27 
'Accounts and Accountability in Classical Athens' in Lewis Ritual, Finance, Politics p 205 and 
n 15. 
28 Seep 104. 
29 Seep 118. 
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many places in the laws of Solon no longer in use "the naukraroi to collect" and "to 
pay from the naukraric fund"'. Naukrariai were early divisions of the population of 
Attica. It is generally thought that the name implied a connection with the Athenian 
navy but alternatives have been suggested, such as a connection with temples. 
There are said to have been twelve naukrariai in each of the four old tribes, phylai 
(Aristotle Ath Pol 8 3). According to Cleidemus FGrH 323 F8 Cleisthenes raised 
their number to 50, to fit his new tribes, but according to Aristotle Ath Pol 21 5 they 
were replaced by Cleisthenes' demes. There is no evidence of their existence after 
500, and if they did survive Cleisthenes' reforms, and were concerned with ships, 
they presumably disappeared in the wake of the enlargement of the fleet by 
Themistocles in the late 480s. 30 What their full duties were is speculative, but it has 
been argued that in the 7th century the naukraroi were the chief revenue collectors 
of Athens,31 and that under the Pisistratids they collected taxes due to the state (such 
as the 5% or 10% tax I have referred in Chapter One). 32 
The kolakretai were Athenian officials in charge of spending public money in the 
fifth century. The date of their institution is not known, but they existed at least as 
early as the time of Solon (Aristotle Ath Pol 7 3). References in inscriptions and in 
Aristophanes show that they still had charge of spending public money in the 5th 
century, including the pay of jurors. They are not heard of after 411 and were 
probably abolished in that year, and an enlarged board of Hellenotamiai 
30 Rhodes OCD3 p 1029. 
31 Compare Wallinga 'The Athenian Naukraroi' in Peisistratos and the Tyranny ed Heleen Sancisi-
Weeidenburg p 143. · 
32 See pp 20-24. 
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administered both the city's funds and the funds of the Delian League (compare 
Aristotle on the future constitution of Athens, Ath Po/30 2). 
Dioikesis 
Dioikesis has usually been taken to mean the state's financial administration as a 
whole (compare Andocides 3 25, the formal title of Lycurgus 6 ETil Tii ototKf)oet 
and /G ii2 463, 36 referring to Habron, son ofLycurgus in 307-306). A recent new 
reading of c + e and f 9 of /G ii2 333 (provision of cult equipment etc) - EK Tiis 
ototKfl[oecus- has, however, prompted me to reconsider the meaning of the word.33 
In this case something (possibly redemptions of advance loans) was being paid out 
of the dioikesis and the presence of lJEp{~eo8[at in the previous line makes this 
more likely. Stephen Lambert quoted examples of EK Tiis ototKf)oews in /G ii2 
1202 (decree of Aixone) 10-12 and Hyp. Fr 118. There are also some references to 
the phrase in Ionian cities. See I Magnesis (on-the-Maeander) 53, 70-71 (decree of 
Clazomenae); 97, 25-27 (decree ofTeos); and SEG 41 1003 II 20-21 (Teos again). 34 
These latter references are all cases where the source for costs of 
publication/hospitality/expenses is being specified. 
This reconsideration led me to a more general question as to whether dioikesis as 
fund was separate from other funds, like the stratiotika and theorika, or whether it 
comprehended them. On the face of it dioikesis was separate from both (compare 
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the Grain-Tax Law where money from the sale of grain goes to the stratiotika in 
lines 54-55 but downpayment from the islands and the pentekoste goes to the 
dioikesis in line 59 (which may be a fund or the state's general revenue) and 
Aeschines 3 25 where the superintendents of the Theoric Fund are distinguished 
from almost the whole administration of the state (oxe5ov Tilv OATJV 5toiKnmv ... 
Tfis n6Aecus). 
I am, of course, trying to answer a large question (of separateness) on the basis of a 
small proportion (presumably) of the references to dioikesis that originally existed 
and it is possible that there may have been different answers to the question at 
different times in the fourth century (compare Aeschines 3 25 again 'in earlier 
times, the city used to ... '). I have come to the conclusion that dioikesis was 
possibly like the modern English word 'revenue' which seems to expand or contract 
in common parlance, sometimes meaning the office to which one sends a cheque 
for payment of tax, sometimes the account or fund into which the tax authority puts 
the cheque, sometimes the general administration of taxes as a whole and 
sometimes the fund out of which the Government pays for, for example, education 
or defence. And this is quite aside from all its non-tax connotations. 
My view, then, is that dioikesis certainly had a very wide meaning, like the state's 
financial administration as a whole; that, by concrete application of that, it could 
denote the totality of the state's regular turnover, the moneys received through the 
33 Lambert 'Athenian State Laws and Decrees II' ZPE 154 2005 p 142. I am grateful to Stephen 
Lambert for making me rethink dioikesis. 
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apodektai and spent by the various authorities to whom the apodektai distributed 
them; that there is some evidence - certainly line 9 in this case - that it may have a 
more specific meaning like a particular fund but some will be reluctant to believe 
without good evidence to the contrary that there was a particular fund, either the 
'float' of the apodektai or any other, which was called the dioikesis; that there is 
some evidence to suggest that some funds like the theorika and stratiotika were 
separate funds that were not comprehended by the dioikesis, but that there are not 
enough references to dioikesis for us to be absolutely sure of its meaning and that in 
any event its meaning may have changed several times in the fourth century. 
Income and expenditure flows 
Two charts from Jochen Bleicken's Die athenische Democratie, 2nd edition, 
attached to the end of this Chapter, bring together the flows of state income and 
expenditure. The first of the two charts shows the flow of income and expenditure 
in the fifth century. The income excludes liturgies and the eisphora and shows, on 
the left side, purely Athenian income and, on the right side, the income from 
Empire. All the income passes through the hands of the apodektai and then to the 
kolakretai. The second chart shows the flow of income and expenditure in the 
fourth century. The income excludes liturgies and distinguishes between the 
eisphora on the right side and other income on the left side. The other income 
34 I am grateful to Charles Crowther for drawing these Ionian references to my attention. 
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passes through the hands of the apodektai and then is subject to the merismos where 
it is divided between civil and military expenditure. 
Taxpayers' records 
The surviving sources give little information about any records that may have been 
kept of taxpayers' transactions in relation to indirect taxes. Presumably taxes were 
paid as transactions took place. As far as direct taxes are concerned, it is generally 
thought that the state did little to assess property accurately or even to record who 
owned what; and that direct taxation was based on self-assessment. 35 But there is 
rather more information available here, based on citizenship. 
To be an Athenian citizen it was necessary to register in a deme, and a list of 
citizens was presumably held in each of the demes. Historians have discussed at 
some length how this list was translated into the lists of those liable for the eisphora 
and the liturgies. It is believed that demarchs had some responsibility for telling the 
polis who on these lists was liable for the eisphora and the liturgies, 36 whether you 
believe with Davies37 and Rhodes38 that there were lists of those liable for the 
trierarchy (in Rhodes' case from 357 : before this the responsibility laid with the 
35 Davidson Courtesans and Fishcakes p 242; Finley Land and Credit in Ancient Athens 500- 200 
BC; Osborne Demos p 76; Gabrielsen 'Phanera andAphanes Ousia in Classical Athens' Class et 
Med 37 1986 p 99. 
36 Compare FaragunaAthenaeum 1997 pp 7-33 
37 Wealth and the Power of Wealth pp 24-25; and p 141 where Davies believed that the eisphora 
was a<fuiiriistered by the delnarChS until the introduction of symrnories in 378-377. 
38 
'Problems in AthenianEisphora and Liturgies' AJAH7 1982 p 3. 
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generals) or whether you believe with Gabrielsen that there were no registers.39 One 
instance of reporting occurs in [Demosthenes] 50 8-9: 'for when you had voted that 
the members of the boule on behalf of the demesmen should report the names of 
those who were members of the deme and those who owned property in them, my 
name was reported for three demes, as my property was in land'. 
What happened after the eisphora-payers and liturgists were identified? !socrates 17 
41 makes clear that when an eisphora was imposed, registrars (epigrapheis) were 
appointed, but presumably this did not amount to a land registry. It seems that the 
worth of the property was self-assessed for the eisphora, though checked by the 
epigrapheis. We do not, however, know where and by whom the assessments were 
stored, or how often they were revised. A Fuks compares the situation in Athens 
with the situation in the Bellum Achaicum in Polybius 38 15 11 where taxpayers 
were forced to pay contrary to their self-assessment ( atJTWV Tipoa{pems), that is, 
contrary to what they professed to have. 40 
There are a number of literary references relating to a declaration of assets for tax 
and related matters as follows. First, !socrates 17 49 : 'Yet he is the man who, 
though he alleged that the slave whom he himself had spirited away had been 
enslaved by us, yet listed this same person in his property-schedule (ev TOtS 
Tll!TU.tamv) as a slave along with his other servants, and then when Menexenus 
demanded that his slave give testimony under torture, Pasion brought about his 
39 Financing the Athenian Fleet pp 68-83. 
40 JHS90 1970 p 83 n 35. 
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release on the ground that he was a freedman'. Second, Demosthenes 27 7 : ' ... in 
the tax-company (symmory) they agreed on my behalf to a tax of 500 drachmas on 
every 25 minas ... However, I had better inform you in detail what portions of 
the property were producing a profit and what were unproductive, and what 
were their respective values'. Third, Demosthenes 42 18 : 'But you know the law, 
men of the jury, for you enacted it, that which expressly makes this provision, that 
those offering to exchange fortunes (antidosis) with one another, when they under 
oath report their inventories, shall swear also the following oath : I will give you a 
true and honest inventory of my property except that in the silver mines, all of 
which the laws have made exempt from taxes'. 
These three references suggest that the timema of a man's property was 
comprehensive, certainly slaves in the case of the first reference and very likely 
other movable property and land. The sources generally, then, give evidence of 
reporting but rather less of record-keeping. Millett has suggested that the antidosis 
procedure (in the case of liturgies) in theory at any rate enabled the state to have 
public services performed by wealthy people without the need for a cumbersome 
and inaccurate registration of property.41 However, the reference in !socrates to 
epigrapheis may indicate that there could have been, as with modern UK practice, 
some kind of self-assessment and at least some checking by reference to records. 
41 Classical Greece ed Robin Osborne p 28. 
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A tax office on the outposts of Empire 
I have referred above to the offices of tax administration in the Agora. 42 I now refer 
- at the end of this Chapter on how taxes were administered - to a tax office on the 
outposts of Empire. In Chapter Three (page 93 et seq) I discussed the dekate, the 
10% tax on goods passing through the Bosporus. Xenophon Hellenica 1 1 22 
records the fortification and establishment of a tax office (dekateuterion) at 
Chrysopolis- the modem Dskiidar in the suburbs of Istanbul- in 410 to collect this 
tax 'from vessels sailing out of the Pontus'. See the map at the end of this Chapter. 
42 See pp 141-143. 
The main buildings of the Athenian tax administration in the Agora - the 
Old Bouleuterion (later called the Metroon) and the Tholos. It is believed 
that the tax-farming contracts were drawn up in these buildings. 
\ ~0 \ 
BOULEUTERION 
SQUARE 
NEW BOULEUTERION 
~ . ~ ·~~~~~~~~ 
[] ~~~~~~~~ 
~ ·~-~~~~~~~~ 
OLD BOULEUTERION 
R OA OWAY 
Plan ofthe main buildings ofthe tax administration 
Art der 
AbgaL:·~. 
private 
und 
SU!athche 
Einnehmer 
Kassen 
entscheidende 
Beht>rden 
Verbraucher 
der Mittel 
System der Einnahmen und Aosgabeli im 5. J ahrhundert 
(ohne Leiturgien und Eisphora) 
Abgabepjlichtige der Polis Athen abgabepflichtige Bund 
Metoikion 
ZO!Ie 
t 
Steuer ... bzw. 
Zollp~chter 
~ 
Poleten 
Verldiufe 
Pachten 
Strafgelder 
+ 
Praktores 
~ / 
·--Apodekten 
~ 
Kasse der Kolakreten Kasse der Hel1enoutm1m 
• . 4 . . Ka t 
I sett II vere1mgte sse I unter 20 Hellenotamiai 
I/ ----· _ __, &....:.--
VolksYersamndung 
(unter Kontrolle des Rates) 
ausgebende Behorden 
------------~----~----------------~------------------------~---. 
Art der 
.Abgabe 
private 
und 
staatliche 
Einnehmer 
entscheidehde 
Behorden 
Verbraucher 
der Mittel 
Merismos und Elsphora in der ersten Hilfte des 4. Jahrhunderts 
(ohne Leiturgien) 
Abgabepflichtige der Polis Athen 
Metotkion Verkiiufe Strafgelder 
ZOile Pachten 
. + I Steuer- bzw. . Zollpachter 
~· 
Poleten Praktores 
"x / 
Apodekten 
+ Merismos 
(BeschluB durch Apodekten u. Rat) 
t 
Kassen von Kollegien und 
Insti tutionen 
Proeisphora Eisphora 
'~ t ·' 
\ Symmorien 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ ;i 
\ l 
VolksversannnlPDil 
The general principles of Athenian income and expenditure 
,;.i'.,_ •. -~a uo.q_."\..,, 
<-...,., _ ............. _ .. -~~' ... .. "'"_.., ...... , 
.... ,,....,._, . ., .. , ...... ,.,... ... ,...,..~ """"-... ..... , 
....... ,, 
' .... ~ 
Gypopolis Col/1)-
---" I 
r 
Panium Pr. 
Symplegades/Kyaneai 
lnss. 
, .. Gomon °,. ~- .-· 1 
/ - --, 
1
.1'·: Myrileion • 
. I ·.- _. Aphrodysium 
I ---
1 / 
/ 
I 
I 
. I 
Cor•cium Pr. ,.,. .,... 
Phosphot us -• -~8 '\fdochadion .'$!1~ ;··· 
:r "I ·-· f :! / · ' . 1. 
: Timaea lli-' 'thalcaea ._-. 4 Chelae '. 
/ 
· ' 
\ 
1-!ieron (Byzanllon)/' _ __../. - ·- . · 
. ·. '. ·~ :>"' t_.,._.l~illon Pr. /ff.ie~~n (~~alk~doriion)/Zeus ·(j~~~~· : 
, _ J ~ .. 
· '-..... . . . ..,., Sim~s Pr. .Ar;vr~nion . . I - ,... 
..- . 1, ~-· .. erculif. K~ine . ~a los Agros ( ~ Pr. \ . .• ·. . . • . 
\, otk•i• Pel,. + ~~pbne J\1afriomene-?/1'!yi:np_haion? 
_ .... -..,.--- I 
1<./eides kai Kleith,.,. tou P~tou~\ / Moukaporis . 
\ ' , / Crort)'<h ' 
PharmakJatfherapeia ' --.,:: 
, -.--- ', \- '""mykos 
Pithec_J Portu~\ Aietou \ · 
:-.,_ R~ynkos '• ~~!!l.~~f!hermemeri•t 
. I -;;;:- ~~ ''' · .-~Comaiodes?,. 1 
inlani/ 
:allinici 
,. __ , 
Lasthenesll...eosthentoo/Sosthenlon -. Oxyrrous 
--- . ---:-..---
. , . · . Heeate, '(· 1 Akoimeton 
... ' _ .. i'i ___ _ 
Kyparodesp1 /- j 
. ---- 1 Eirenaion 
Phidalia Petra/ I Bo;;;;u;;;-
. o_ 
, _;• ~ \~ ~ Phlela/J'hi3ie 
P:T-~ ! --,;;~ 
Pyrrhlas Cyon J ~·-. I>Jn . . · 
. . ,~ i Potamonion 
CheJai/PhilemporOs.,' 1 Echo~/• o Nausikteia .. 
. --1 ---.- . 
• • . , ~ >: .. • Pr. ?'Proochthoi/Brochthoi 
Al'laplous?/Promotou? 1 Hi •li•i I . · -
ll. 'B•c:c• ' Colli , J'r. / . ~ I "'ii;ih;u/ t~auslmachlon J.:•,:· 
Kalamos · i ;...;"""· ="---
--- 6 S#ne.a· Metanoia . 
: Parabolos& --. c---
Rhodioh Periboloi , "• .. ~ ,d'Kikonion · 
. . d A rcheion <Rhoi.zou.s•i Akr• l Pegai/ S. Mamas,o-~. ,.,. ---_.. ., -;-;-."'""0--:-.---'--
Krenides Therrn•sr;s> · -\lo" Jasonion/D .. phlle ~ 
• ;:;;;;;,:--- .,,,,o~' ---7 --
h --; ,.... / 
oe. 6 .. g , J " o" .r ·· · 
. o .. .t>·'~" •'•V,· . 
. d.o : n. ":"'%,. l,_ k.1;.*Q~ · ~Damalis/Bous ... 
c. ' Chrysopol is ~ · . 
Bosporios \ 
Pr. \ 
ZANTIUM 
H~ r <Ji un/Hic rei a • 
. / 
\ 
' \ E . 
• \ utrop1ou r--
.... 
. .., 
--~ 
"' .... "'· '" Rouphinianai/Drys 
.. , -·· 
Atlas of th~ Greek and 
orld 
'·- -·· .... . 
Poleat ikon .. ~ 
'· 
":IJI) 
., 
\ 
'•1.1_'~~· 
\\ 
.f-11 ri~ l'r. 
l"'!.?f' 
) bO . 'f 
l Kolone Pr. 
~Pr. 
-- _ ... ------t -~ -, 
__ - --- Rhebas 
--- ... ....-
( ',-; 
. ~-.') 
.. • 
• i 
.···-· 
\.·· ~· ,";/'' .-
~· · ·· vJo ·~~-t····-,.~ 
- l_._-:_, 
·. ______ i 
----:, 
i '•. J 
_j 
,~; 
-· ........ . """· 
' .;-·--
0,"){1 
S. AUXENTJOU/SKOPA . · ' 
MONS 
··-· ·-; 
OXffA · 
·;;roN'S 
i 
FIVE 
ATTITUDES TO TAX COMPLIANCE TAX EVASION AND THE 
INVISffiLE ECONOMY 
161 
This Chapter looks at attitudes to tax compliance in ancient Athens and the extent to 
which tax compliance was achieved. Modem discussions of tax compliance 
normally distinguish between tax evasion (where people evade tax by breaking the 
law) and tax avoidance (where people avoid paying tax while still keeping within 
the law). Non-compliance in ancient Athens generally involved evasion rather than 
avoidance, but this evasion often involved, as modem tax evasion does, the 
invisible economy. 
Tax compliance 
I first look at six literary references to people paying their tax liabilities and 
discharging their obligations to perform liturgies. 
First, Aristophanes in Lysias 19 42-43: 
'Now, Aristophanes had acquired a house with land for more 
than five talents, had produced dramas on his own account 
and on his father's at a cost of five thousand drachmas, 
and had spent eighty minas on equipping warships; on account 
of the two, no less than forty minas have been contributed 
to eisphorai; for the Sicilian expedition he spent a hundred 
minas, and for commissioning the warships, when the Cypriots 
came and you gave them the ten vessels, he supplied thirty 
thousand drachmas to pay the light infantry and purchase 
their arms. The total of all these sums amounts to little short 
of fifteen talents'. 
Second, an anonymous defendant in Lysias 21 1-5: 
' ... appointed to produce tragic drama, I spent thirty minas 
and two months later, at the Thargelia, two thousand drachmas, 
when I won a victory with a male chorus; and in the 
archonship of Glaucippus, at the Great Panathenaea, eight 
hundred drachmas on pyrrhic dancers. Besides, I won a victory 
with a male chorus at the Dionysia under the same archon, 
and spent on it, including the dedication of the tripod, 
five thousand drachmas; then, in the time ofDiocles, three 
hundred on a cyclic chorus at the Little Panathenaea. 
In the meantime, for seven years I equipped warships, 
at a cost of six talents. Although I have borne all these 
expenses, and have faced daily peril in your service 
abroad, I have nevertheless paid the eisphora- one of thirty 
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minas and another of four thousand drachmas. As soon as 
I returned to these shores, in the archonship of Alexias, 
I was producing games for the Promethea, and won 
a victory after spending twelve minas. Then, later, I 
was appointed to produce a chorus of children, and 
spent more than fifteen minas. In the archonship 
ofEucleides I produced comic drama for Cephisodorus 
and won a victory, spending on it, with the dedication of the 
equipment, sixteen minas; and at the Little Panathenaea 
I produced a chorus of beardless pyrrhic dancers, and spent 
seven minas. I have won a victory with a warship in the 
race at Sunium, spending fifteen minas; and besides I had 
the conduct of sacred missions and ceremonial processions 
and other duties of the sort, for which my expenses have 
come to more than thirty minas. Of these sums that I have 
enumerated, had I chosen to limit my liturgies to the 
letter of the law, I should have spent not one quarter'. 
Third, Thrasippus in Isaeus 4 27: 
'Thrasippus, the father ofHagnon and Hagnotheus, has 
before now undertaken liturgies and paid the eisphora 
and otherwise proved himself a worthy citizen'. 
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Fourth, Phanostratus and Chaerestratus in Isaeus 6 60-61 : 
'Phanostratus ... (and) Chaerestratus ... have paid all the 
eisphorai, being numbered among the 
proeispherontes'. 
Fifth, an unknown pleader in Demosthenes 47 54: 
'They thought to get, not only so much, but far more, 
for they expected to find the stock of household furniture 
which I formerly had; but because of my liturgies and eisphora 
payments and my liberality toward you, some of the furniture 
is lying in pawn, and some has been sold'. 
Finally, Apollodorus in [Demosthenes] 50 9: 
'I was the first to pay the proeisphora, and I did not seek to get 
myself excused either on the ground that I was serving as a 
trierarch and could not defray the costs of two liturgies at 
once, or that the laws did not permit such a thing. And I 
have never recovered the money which I advanced, because 
at the time I was abroad in your service as trierarch, and 
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afterwards, when I returned, I found that the money from 
those who had resources had already been gathered in by 
others, and that those who were left had nothing'. 
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These examples illustrate that eisphora-payers were often the very people who had 
to finance liturgies as well. All liturgists were also payers of the eisphora ; what is 
disputed is whether, and if so how many, non-liturgists were payers of the eisphora 
too. 
I now look at sanctions on both taxpayers and officials for not paying over taxes to 
the state. 
Sanctions on taxpayers 
First, two examples relating to the eisphora. 
First, Demosthenes 22 53 suggests that defaulting eisphora-payers escaped the 
official collector by clambering over roofs and hiding under beds ('what if a poor 
man, or a rich man for that matter who has spent much money and is naturally 
perhaps rather short of cash, should have to climb over the roof to a neighbour's 
house or creep under the bed to avoid being caught and dragged off to gaol'). 1 It 
appears, therefore, that gaol may have been a punishment for defaulting eisphora-
1 Compare Millett Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens p 69. 
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payers: although it is disputed whether gaol was ever a punishment, it was certainly 
available as a precautionary measure against public debtors. 
The second example relating to the eisphora is not a sanction on not paying the 
eisphora as such but the suggestion that difficulties in collecting the eisphora may 
have led to the institution of the proeisphora? The earliest certain mention of the 
proeisphora is dated 364-363 (Isaeus 6 60). But a little earlier in 369 Athens made 
an alliance with her erstwhile foe, Sparta, in the face of the threat of Thebes. The 
Athenians decided, in Demosthenes' words (16 12), 'to pay the eisphora and to risk 
their lives for the safety of the Spartans'. Sinclair believes that the situation 
demanded the urgent raising of money and was one in which the richest Athenians, 
many of them well-known for their pro-Spartan sympathies, would have found the 
prepayment of property tax more acceptable. This is, however, an uncertain 
generalisation : Sparta had made itself pretty widely unpopular since the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. 
Then there was a sanction on metics not paymg their taxes. Ancient sources 
mention the poletai in association with the metoikion (Demosthenes 25 57; Pollux 8 
99), not as lessors of the tax, which they surely were, but as sellers into slavery of 
metics who defaulted in paying it. Demosthenes says 'when she persisted .... he 
seized her with his own hands and dragged her off to the auction-room at the aliens' 
2 See Rhodes 'Athenian Democracy after 403 BC' Classical Journal75 p 311. As Rhodes pithily put 
it, 'in the light of the fact that the Athenians clearly had difficulties in collecting the eisphora, it was 
decided that, whoever was out of pocket over the elsphora, the state ought not to be'; and Sinclair 
Democracy and Participation in Athens p 63. 
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registry (poleterion metoikiou ), and if her tax had not happened to be duly paid, she 
would have been put up for sale, thanks to this man who owed his safety to her'. 
In the field of indirect taxes, we have the reference in Demosthenes 35 28 to a 
'thieves' harbour' (phoron limen) where Athenian indirect dues could be avoided, 
but it is unlikely that much revenue was lost by such smuggling, since otherwise we 
should expect it to have been suppressed. 3 We do not know precisely how the 
maritime tax was operated in Athens, but we have two inscriptions from other parts 
of Greece, perhaps a hundred years later, which indicate how the tax was operated 
in those states at that time. It is not unlikely that provisions of this kind were 
operated by Athens and other Greek states during the period of this thesis, and I 
therefore believe that it is worth looking at them in a little detail. And I look at a 
third inscription from Caunus probably from the first century AD, mainly because it 
is such a comprehensive set of customs regulations. 
The first of the two inscriptions from other parts of Greece is a Decree of 
Cyparissia, dating from the 4th or 3rd century, laying down sanctions for not paying 
the import and export tax at Cyparissia in Messenia, which at that time was an 
independent polis in the southern Peloponnese. 4 The Decree provided that anyone 
importing or exporting goods had to make a declaration to the tax collector 
(pentekosto/ogos). The penalty for not doing this was ten times the value of the 
goods, and if the importer/exporter undervalued the goods in his declaration, the tax 
3 Compare Stockton The Classical A then ian Democracy p l3. 
4 /Gv 11421. 
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collector imposed a surcharge. A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this 
Chapter. The text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
The second inscription is a law passed by 220 in Delos to regulate the trade in wood 
and wood products, which forbade sellers to offer their wares for a higher or lower 
price than they had declared on import to the Delian harbour officials 
(pentekostologoi) (lines 9-1 0). 5 Some historians have suggested that the purpose of 
this provision was consumer protection. This does not seem likely to me - how 
would consumers benefit from a law which forbade them from buying from 
importers at a lower price? I think that it is likely that the law was intended to 
ensure that the full amount of the pentekoste was paid. The law required importers 
to use the public wood scales to prevent under- or over-weighing (lines 1-2). Sales 
direct from the ship were also prohibited (lines 3-4). A photograph of the 
inscription is at the end of the Chapter. The text of the inscription is in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
The third inscription, customs regulations from possibly the first century AD from 
Caunus, is on several large blocks of stone. The provision sets out the taxing 
measures, 
6 for example, that the tax on slaves and salt shall continue to be paid in 
accordance with the existing regulations, but offers tax incentives to attract shipping 
into the harbour at Caunus, which had suffered from silting of the sea. (In this 
5 ID 509. 9-10 (=SJG3 975; Epigraphica vol 1 ed Pleket 1 10. 9-10); Reger Regionalism and 
Change in the Economy of Independent Delos p 11. 
6 I am quoting from the account of the results of 35 years of research by Ogiin and Isik published in 
2003. For the text see Bean 'Notes and Inscriptions from Caunus' JHS14 1954 pp 97-105. 
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context compare the tax incentives offered by some countries today.) It lays down 
regulations for goods in transit in three categories : first, cargoes brought into 
Caunus and immediately taken out again pay no duty and are not even registered; 
second, cargoes which stay at Caunus for longer than the second day but do not 
leave the ship must be registered but pay no import duty; and third, goods put on 
shore for conveyance to another destination must be registered but do not pay any 
import duty. In the last two cases - and this is the relevance of the inscription for 
this Chapter - goods that failed to be registered would be liable to confiscation, and 
the confiscated goods went to the tax collectors, not to the state. A photograph of 
the inscription is at the end of this Chapter? 
I think that these inscriptions are very significant, showing prectse rules for 
collection of the maritime taxes in Cyparissia, Delos and Caunus. The first, more 
general, provision makes clear that Cyparissia was very anxious to prevent any tax 
evasion on imported goods. The second is rather more sophisticated and 
superficially has resonances with modem transfer pricing legislation (which seeks 
to counter prices of goods passing normally between related parties being 
manipulated to avoid tax). The third shows customs regulations in detail (and tax 
being used as an incentive) and the sanctions for non-compliance. 
7 I have referred to these regulations in the context of e/limenion in Chapter Three (pages 86-89). 
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Sanctions on officials 
There were considerable checks on officials in Athens generally. There was a 
dokimasia, a vetting to check fitness for office. Prospective archons were asked 
about their ancestry and family shrines, their treatment of their parents, their 
payment of taxes (do you pay your taxes?), and their military service. 8 Accusations 
might be brought, and the candidates were given the opportunity to reply. Interim 
financial accounts had to be produced each prytany and at the end of the year 
financial accounts had to be produced (logos) with a general examination 
(euthynai).9 Examples of people who fell foul of these procedures were Cimon, 
Pericles and Callistratus (although Callistratus was not necessarily condemned as an 
office-holder: possibly an eisangelia for being a rhetor and not speaking in Athens1 
best interests - compare Hansen Eisangelia where this is case no 87). 10 The 
Hellenotamiae some time in the 450s or 440s were condemned for embezzlement 
but the truth was discovered when nine had been executed and the Thesmothetae of 
344-343 were deposed but reinstated. 11 
Tax-farmers had an obligation to the state and could be treated as public debtors if 
they defaulted. We saw a reference to guarantors in the Grain-Tax Law (line 29), 
and Demosthenes 24 97 declares that if holders of sacred or civil moneys fail to pay 
8 AristotleAth Po/55 3. 
9 AristotleAth Po/48 3-5. 
10 Aristotle Ath Pol 27 1 (Cimon); Thucydides 2 59 (Pericles); [Aristotle] Oec II 1350 a 16-23 
(Callistratus). I owe this survey to Professor P J Rhodes1 Valedictory Lecture Euthynai (Accounting) 
on 9 May 2005. 
,· .•. 
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the appropriate money to the Council-house, the Council shall recover the money 
by enforcing the statutes applicable to tax-farmers. 
We do not know precisely what these statutes provided for but Euthycles, son of 
Euthymenides, of the deme of Myrrhinous, denounced for confiscation a tenement 
house belonging to Meixidemus of Myrrhinous, who was in debt to the public 
treasury of the Athenians. Meixidemus' debt had arisen from his going surety for 
various individuals who were undertaking public contracts : for Philistides, son of 
Philistides, of Aixone, who had contracted to collect the metoikion tax of 343-342 
but had failed to produce his 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th payments of 100 drachmas, and had 
also undertaken to raise the 5 drachma tax in the mines but had not produced the 6th, 
7th and 8th payments for this, of 125 drachmas each; for Telemachus, son of 
Hermolochus, a metic living in the Piraeus who had taken a share in the raising of 
the 5 drachma tax for Theseus but had failed to pay the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 
1Oth instalments of 100 drachmas . . . for Calli crates, son of Calli crates, a metic 
living in the mining deme of Besa, who had taken a share in the raising of the 
drachma tax for Asclepius but had not produced the 7th, 8th, 9th and lOth payments of 
36 drachmas 4 obols. The tenement house was in the event bought by Telemachus, 
son of Theangelus, of Acharnai for 3 705 drachmas 2 obols. Since this met the sum 
of the outstanding debts, Meixidemus was presumably thus released from his 
obligations. 12 
11 Antiphon V Herodes 69 (Hellenotamiae); [Demosthenes) 58 27-28 (Thesmothetae). 
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Andocides 1 On the Mysteries 73 lists the categories of disenfranchisement for 
those that suffered atimia. Those who bought contracts for collecting tax and failed 
to pay for them, and those who gave security for the payment of the purchase-
money for contracts for collecting tax, had to make their payments in the ninth 
prytany. Otherwise they had to pay double and their properties were sold. 13 Todd 
says that atimia was hereditary but that full payment (of the doubled debt) by the 
debtor or his heirs automatically restored his or their status as epitimoi. 14 
The invisible economy 
I look now at what has generally been referred to as the invisible economy (that is, 
where people evade tax by putting their property out of sight). 15 
Lysias 20 23 links 'invisible' assets and tax evasion : 'That he was a friend of the 
people, I will prove to you. First of all, how many were the campaigns in which he 
served without once shirking his duty, can be told, from personal knowledge, by his 
fellow-demesmen. Then, when he might well have put his fortune away out of sight 
and refused to help you, he preferred that you should know of it, in order that, even 
if he chose to do wrong, he could have no chance, but must contribute to the 
eisphora and perform his liturgies'. Demosthenes 45 66 explains how men like 
12 Agora XIX P26 and compare Robin Osborne Demos p 1 et seq. 
13 See Andocides 1 On the Mysteries ed MacDowell pp 106-107. 
14 The Shape of Athenian Law p 143. 
15 I have drawn on the work done by Cohen Athenian Economy and Society pp 194-201. 
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Stephanus, who wished to avoid liturgies and the eisphora, might use their banks to 
hide their property : 
'This course of action, involving so great disgrace, he has adopted, 
men of Athens, with a view to evading his duties to the state 
and to conceal his wealth, that he might make secret profits by 
means of the bank, and never serve as choregus or trierarch, 
or perform any other of the public duties which befit his station'. 
Demosthenes was himself 'heir to a long tradition of tax avoidance', as Cohen puts 
it. His father's estate, as set out in the litigation described in Demosthenes 27-31, 
would have made the elder Demosthenes liable for performing liturgies, but he 
seems to have kept his property 'invisible' and avoided performing any liturgies. His 
son, the statesman, was said by Dinarchus 1 111 to be the 'wealthiest Athenian' but 
never to have acquired anything that could be attributed to him (phaneron) 
(Dinarchus 1 70). John Davies says that 'even with all the allowance for the 
prejudice and caricaturing of Dinarchus, he gives the impression ( 1 69-71) that 
Demosthenes had little or no phanera ousia except his house in Peiraeus; and if 
Dinarchus' statement (1 69) can be trusted that this house had yielded only 50 
drachmas in an eisphora, the unlikelihood that the eisphora was at a lower rate than 
one per cent puts the maximum value of the house at 5000 drachmas (and it may 
have been considerably less) ... The truth presumably was that by the 330s his 
personal fortune had become so inextricably mixed with his political moneys, of 
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which he himself was in some sense the bursar, that he could not make any 
declaration of it without committing political suicide'. 16 
Cohen argues that since the eisphora, liturgies etc 'were imposed only on those who 
appeared to own the largest amounts of property, the system provided direct 
motivation for the masking of assets and the growth of the "invisible economy" ... 
But skill at hiding assets could have no adverse effect on state revenue : one 
person's success (in avoiding taxes) was attained at another's cost (in paying those 
taxes)'. 17 Cohen contrasts this with modem systems of taxation and says that where 
a change in the value of a resident's total property or income results in a difference 
in overall taxes due, the Athenian state received the same revenues or services 
without reference to overall economic conditions and without regard to the identity 
of the particular taxpayers ultimately liable. Cohen's assembly of the evidence of 
the invisible economy is convincing but I think that he exaggerates the difference 
between ancient Athenian and modem systems of taxation. Modem states, like 
ancient states, decide how much money they want to raise, and the more the yield of 
some taxes is reduced by avoidance/evasion, the more they have to try to raise by 
other means. 
Cohen has recently gone further and argued that in fourth century Athens tax laws 
and administration effectively encouraged the growth of a clandestine (aphanes) 
economy which provided much of the capital investment required for maritime 
16 Davies Athenian Propertied Families 600- 300 BC p 138. 
17 Athenian Economy and Society pp 197-198. 
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commerce, although there is no indication in surviving sources that such an effect 
was intended. This flourishing commerce in tum created new wealth that, because 
of Athens' taxation policies, tended to remain within the clandestine economy, 
providing yet more potential capital for sea trade - thus fuelling the growth of 
Athens as the dominant entrepot in the eastern Mediterranan, and fostering the 
private banks which expedited this trade. 18 I find Cohen's analysis on the 
progressiveness of the Athenian tax system and the resulting clandestine economy 
convincing, if a little overstated. The financing of maritime trade is, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis but if what Cohen says about it is true, a flatter tax 
system might well have resulted in less clandestine activity ending up in the 
financing of maritime trade. I suspect that critics of Cohen's conclusion on maritime 
trade will focus on the nature of the evidence on which he relies. 
Coin hoards 
James Davidson has suggested that another way to hide your property was to bury 
it, and that this ancient tax-dodger's conjuring trick of coin hoards has been the very 
foundation of the modem discipline of numismatics. 19 In this connection 
Gabrielsen draws attention to the coin hoards at Thoricus in southern Attica in 296-
294 and in Piraeus in 400-380. 20 Millett refers to Lysias (12 10-11), who had a 
18 
'Unintended Consequences? The Economic Effect of Athenian Tax Laws' Symposion 2001. 
19 Courtesans and Fishcakes p 244. 
20 
'Phanera and aphanes ousia in Classical Athens' Class et Med 37 1986 p 109. 
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strongbox comprising 3 talents of silver, 400 Cyzicene staters, 100 Persian darics 
and 4 silver cups. 21 
In October 1969 the Belgian Archaeological Mission in Greece discovered a pot 
containing 283 silver tetradrachms, 4 triobols and 5 gold staters, carefully buried 
beneath the floor of a house in the city area of Thoricus (see the photographs at the 
end of this Chapter). It is very likely that for some reason unknown to us the owner 
of this treasure thought it safer to convert his money into aphanes at some date after 
296-294. Gabrielsen cites a modern parallel in which the Danish tax authorities 
made unsuccessful attempts to identify the owners of a modern Danish coin hoard. 
Could the Thoricus hoard be an example of Athenian tax evasion? Numismatists I 
have spoken to about this are sceptical. Their reading of coin hoards is that they are 
bank deposits by any other name where, for whatever reason, people have not 
deposited the money in a bank. I accept that there is no literary evidence for people 
burying coin hoards to evade tax as there is for people putting money in banks to 
evade taxes. However, I suggest that any modern taxman would be surprised if the 
evasion of taxes was not at least one motive for burying a hoard of coins. Even if 
tax evasion was not the only motive in troubled times, a bag of coins under the 
floorboards is a form of wealth which probably would not be declared. 
The tax system thus offered wealthy residents of Attica considerable incentive to 
place or keep their property in the 'invisible' economy; there, financial assets -
21 Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens p 170 and n 13. 
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deposits and loans - constituted the least traceable form of unseen property. 
Athenians who kept their wealth concealed in this way were often able to avoid 
undertaking liturgies and paying taxes generally. In the appeals procedure against 
having to perform liturgies (antidosis), losers were almost certainly to be those who 
had maintained their assets in more visible form and so could be shown to have 
larger estates. 
How compliant were the Athenians? 
Estimates of modem tax compliance usually put countries in a league for the 'tax 
gap' (between tax that is due under the law and tax that is paid in practice) from 
about 5% to about 25%+, with 10% being fairly common. It is impossible to tell 
what the figure for ancient Athens would have been but, in relation to the invisible 
economy, the state did not, so far as we are aware, have any legislation at all about 
banks. In Demosthenes 45 66 (quoted above) Stephanus is seeking secrecy from the 
state. Only through placing funds with bankers in confidence and obtaining a yield 
thereon would Stephanus have been able both to 'conceal his wealth' and to obtain 
'secret returns', and thereby avoid costly liturgies. Most modem states have 
legislation enabling their tax administrations to receive certain types of information 
about a bank's customers in order to protect their tax take. And they are anxious for 
other states to have similar legislation so that people cannot move money abroad 
tax-free as in the recent debate in the European Union about having a common 
regime for withholding tax from interest paid throughout the Union. 
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From the evidence we have of sanctions there seems to have been some effective 
deterrent from evading the eisphora and certainly some mechanism with the 
proeisphora to shift any loss of tax from the state to the 300 wealthiest individuals 
of the state. An Athenian tax evader was more likely to be challenged by a jealous 
fellow-citizen, whereas a modem one is more likely to be found out by official 
checks. And there seem to have been sanctions against metoikion non-payers. If the 
Cyparissian inscription is anything to go by and its provisions were replicated in 
Athens, there may have been on the spot financial penalties in the case of the 
import/export tax computed by reference to the value of the imported/exported 
goods. It is possible that the eponion, hekatoste and silver tax were collected at the 
same time as the transactions themselves took place (as under the modem deduction 
of tax at source). Beyond this we can only guess at what sanctions there were for 
other taxes, except that clearly potential dekate-defaulters would have had to have 
run the gauntlet of the garrison stationed at Chrysopolis, and 4111 century eikoste-
defaulters would have had to contend with the Athenian fleet. On the other hand, 
there seems to have been a fairly well-developed system of sanctions for public 
officials and tax-farmers. 
It seems that the ancient Athenian state knew roughly what each tax should yield -
compare Demosthenes 14 27 (an eisphora of 1% yields 60T, a tax of 2% yields 
120T) - and tax-farmers must have had a pretty good idea of what to bid for the 
right to collect various taxes. (You knew what last year's contract was sold for, you 
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knew whether the contractors paid up, and you probably heard over the grapevine if 
the contractors did particularly well or particularly badly for themselves.) We may 
therefore presume that there was a reasonably effective system of sanctions for 
Athenian taxation but that the invisible economy could have resulted in a rather 
bigger 'tax gap' than in some modem tax systems. 
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ENDNOTE 
SECOND CASE STUDY : THIRD CENTURY TAX-FARMERS IN 
COLOPHON 
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This second case study looks at third century tax-farmers at Colophon in Asia 
Minor. Chapters Four and Five summarised how tax-farmers operated in Athens 
and what sanctions there were for maladministration during the period of this 
thesis. 1 The discovery of the Grain-Tax Law of 374-373 advanced our 
knowledge of these matters but what further developments ensued? An 
inscription from the mid-third century published in 1998 (the same year as 
publication of the Grain-Tax Law) discovered at Claros gives us an indication of 
such further developments. A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this 
Endnote. The text of the inscription is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of 
this thesis. 
The inscription was discovered in the ruins of the sanctuary of Apollo at Claros 
where (according to the inscription) it was set up. It was published by Etienne 
and Migeotte in BCH 122 1998 and was reported in SEG 48 1404. The 
inscription records two decrees about a scandal involving tax-farmers at 
Colophon and Colophon-by-the-Sea (the second decree appears first). 
Both Colophon and Notion on the coast not far away paid tribute to Athens in 
the fifth century. The inhabitants of Colophon were expelled from their city by 
Lysimachus in 294 to set up a new Ephesus but were allowed to return in 289? 
Excavations at Notion have apparently shown that many inhabitants of 
Colophon resettled there, the name being changed to Colophon-by-the-Sea. 
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Claros was in the territory of Colophon and contained the famous temple and 
oracle of Apollo. It was excavated before the First World War and after the 
Second World War, and finally from 1987. 
Translation 
I have found it easier to read the second, earlier, decree first, that is, lines 33-46 
of the inscription, then the first, later, decree. 
(First, later, decree, lines 1-32) 
'Under Konnion, on the 23 (or 28) Poseidon, it was decided by the Council and 
the people, Poses, son of Apollonius, put a proposal of the epimenioi to the vote; 
since, in the past, certain citizens, farming taxes, not of the city, but from 
elsewhere, put pressure contrary to justice on those who have received the right 
to hold property in the territory, be it decided by the Council and people that it 
should not be allowed for any citizen nor inhabitant of the territory of Colophon 
to farm taxes from elsewhere except from Colophon-by-the-Sea; that whoever 
farms or takes a part in farming or receives some of the revenues of the taxes in 
kind in their courtyard is to be liable for a thousand drachmas which will be 
consecrated to Apollo; that anyone who wishes may denounce him to the 
nomophylakes, receiving half the sum; if an individual suffers an injustice from 
one of the tax-farmers or the tax-farmer from the individuals there shall be 
summonses in accordance with the law, and the trials shall be held at the same 
time as the proceedings relative to contracts and to tax farming in accordance 
with the ordinance of the king; that this decree should be inscribed on a stone 
1 See pp 146-150 and 170-172. 
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stele and erected in the sanctuary of Apollo; also the decree voted under Sittas 
on the proposal of the epimenioi so that no citizen pays taxes contrary to justice; 
that the po/etai should award the contract for the work and that the oikonomos 
should pay the money for the work'. 
(Second, earlier, decree, lines 33-46) 
'Under Sittas, the 24 (or 27) Metageitnion, it was decided by the Council and the 
people, Xoutos put a proposal of the epimenioi to the vote; so that no citizen 
should pay taxes contrary to justice, be it decided by the Council and the people: 
if anyone brings lawsuits arising out of tax farming against one of the 
Colophonians living at Notion or at Colophon or in the phrouria of Colophon -
except those registered at Notion or at Colophon3 - that he should be liable to 
half as much again of the money if he is convicted; that the recovery shall be 
made against him as after a judgement for extortion against the law; that he 
should besides be liable for a thousand drachmas to the god; that anyone who 
wishes may denounce him receiving halfofthe sum'. 
Notes 
• Line 7. Gauthier would have expected i]vwxAovv rather than ev6x[Aov]v 
and comments that the photograph does not allow any verification. On napa 
Tiis TTOAEc..JS OAA 1 a AA06ev : Etienne and Migeotte think that tax collectors 
2 Land J Robert C/aros I pp 83-85. 
3 I am grateful for the comments made by members of Professor Robert Parker's Greek 
Epigraplfy Workshop in Oxford when I led a discussion on this inscription in October 2005. I 
am particularly grateful to Peter Thonemann who suggested that the exception in line 40 
qualified TIS in line 37, not the taxpayers in line 39. I discuss this in the sununing up of the 
inscription below. 
183 
have (lawfully) contracted to collect taxes for, for example, Ephesus, and 
have been trying to collect these taxes from people with land in the xc..0pa of 
Colophon, and that the decree forbids such collection; Gauthier thinks that the 
tax collectors have unjustly (as Colophonians) contracted, and that the decree 
forbids them to take such contracts. Gauthier seems right, because there 
would otherwise be no point in lines 10-13 if applied to people who lawfully 
take an Ephesian contract. 
• Line 8. TOVS EVEKTT)~.usvovs TOVS EV Tilt xc:.vpm. According to Etienne and 
Migeotte these were non-citizen farmers living inside the urban centres who 
were apparently ignorant of the tax laws. The fraud may have been detected 
when the regular taxes were due, and the farmers refused to pay twice. 
Gauthier translates 'proprietors of our land'. 
• Line 12. Ko:\oq>c:.vv1c:.vv. Compare I Magnesia 53 lines 75-77 KoAoq>wvtot 
oi -nlv apxafav lTOAlV OlKOVVTES. 
• Line 13. Ko:\oq>~vos Tfls eni 8aAaTTT)t. Compare i Magnesia 53 lines 78-
79. 
• Line 14. lJ.ETaoxnt. Implies a syndicate of tax-farmers (lJ.ETEXEtv), 
distinguished from sole tax-farmers ( apxc..0vns) - compare Andocides 1 
Mysteries 133. This would confirm the existence of syndicates of tax-
farmers outside Athens. 
• av:\fit. Refers to tax-farmers who stored their products in their courtyard, 
and suggests that at least some taxes were paid in kind. See Hellmann Topoi 
4 1994 p 135, who says in relation to Delos that such a courtyard was an 
essential element in a rural property and that in certain cases it was the 
whole farm. 
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• Line 15. TO\iTc.uv TtVa. Refers to TEAll, 'some of these' indicates the 
revenues of the taxes in kind. The context is against meaning 'some of these 
(tax-farmers)', Ttva being masculine singular. 
• Line 18. Tovs voJ.!o<pvAaKas. Before this inscription they were known by 
reference to only one text (see BCH 39 1915 p 45). 
• Line 23. KaTa To Staypal.ll.la Tov (3am.Aec.us. This occurs only in the 
later decree and probably refers to the farming of royal taxes. The king could 
be Lysimachus (before 281) or a Seleucid (Antiochus I 281-261 or 
Antiochus II 261-246) or someone after the middle of the third century. It is 
clear that both cities were subject cities at least at the time of the later 
decree, and the fact that the king is not named may suggest that the cities 
had been subject cities for some time. 
• Line 30. Tovs Tic.uAnTas. That is, those who sold the tax-farming contracts 
- compare, in Athens, the poletai records in The Athenian Agora Vol XIX. 
• Line 40. ypa<pc.uVTat. 'Registered' to be preferred to 'accused'. The 
inhabitants of <ppovpta registered in Notion and Colophon were probably 
members of civic militiae stationed at those sites, and were clearly liable to 
the taxes like everyone else. 
• Lines 45-46. The verb <pmveTc.u reflects cpams in Athens and other cities 
where the informer was rewarded by half the fine. 
Summing up of what the inscription says and dating of the inscription 
The earlier decree provides that no citizen should pay taxes contrary to what is 
just. The penalty payable by a guilty tax-farmer is the tax that has been wrongly 
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paid plus half that amount and 1000 drachmas to Apollo. The inscription lists 
three categories of citizens - those living at Notion, those living at Colophon 
and those living in the phrouria. 
The later decree is concerned with a particular category of foreigner, that is, 
those who have received the right to own property in the territory or, as Gauthier 
puts it, land-owners in our territory. The decree provides that neither a citizen 
nor a foreign resident tax-farmer may levy tax on these people except that of 
Colophon-by-the-Sea on the footing that these foreign landowners dated from 
294-290 when the Colophonians were expelled from Colophon. The penalty 
arrangements are similar to those of the earlier decree, and the taxes have to be 
in conformity with the royal ordinance. 
Etienne and Migeotte define the guilty tax-farmer in the earlier decree as anyone 
who brings lawsuits arising out of tax-farming against one of the Colophonians 
living at Notion or at Colophon or in the phrouria of Colophon, except those 
registered at Notion or Colophon. It was suggested at the Oxford Workshop 
which discussed this inscription (see footnote 3) that this exception qualifies the 
tax farmer, not the taxpayers. I wrote to Migeotte with this interpretation, 
observing that the concept of a Colophonian citizen resident in the phrouria but 
not registered in Notion or Colophon seemed self-contradictory - if he was not 
registered, how could he be a citizen? If our interpretation were right, there 
would then be a symmetry between the two decrees, in that both decrees would 
be trying to protect Colophonian residents against non-local taxes, the earlier 
decree being directed against non-locals trying to collect (presumably non-local) 
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taxes from Colophonians, the later decree being directed against Colophonians 
trying to collect non-local taxes from persons resident in Colophonian territory. 
In his reply Migeotte did not accept our objection to his reading because in his 
view all the people concerned were citizens of either Notion or Colophon and 
that there were two types of civic lists, one for those living in Notion or 
Colophon and one for those living in the phrouria. He agreed that the matter 
was not free from doubt, although on our interpretation the sentence would have 
been badly drafted (which we accept). He did, however, say that he found our 
symmetry argument 'seductive'. My view is that, while the matter is certainly not 
free from doubt, the stated purpose of the earlier decree, that is 'so that no 
citizen should pay taxes contrary to justice', on balance favours our revised 
interpretation. 
Etienne and Migeotte discuss the dating m some detail. Of the four names 
mentioned in the decrees (lines 1, 3-4, 33 and 34-35) only that of Poses has a 
patronymic. Konnion and Sittas appear several times in an inscription at the end 
of the fourth century (Migeotte Les souscriptions 1992, number 69), but not the 
other two. They say that the script of the inscription is more similar to that of an 
inscription dated to the second half of the third century (Metras of Cyzicus) 
(BCH 39 1915 p 36) than the inscription at the end of the fourth century. But 
they admit that it has similarities to the script of that inscription. The dating of 
the founding of Colophon-by-the Sea appears reasonably secure, but there is 
plenty of room for discussion of the date of the royal diagramma, which 
Gauthier links with Antiochus I or II. The inscription has in the light of all the 
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evidence been generally dated in the first half of the 3rd century BC, possibly 
about 250. 
Greek taxes and tax-farming 
The inscription is valuable in throwing light on the relationship between 
Colophon and Colophon-by-the-Sea. ~vv8f)KT} is specifically referred to in two 
documents and there are clear indications of sympoliteia (common magistrates, 
calendar, defence and coinage). But the main relevance of the inscription to this 
thesis is the tax aspects of it. 
There are three particular aspects to which I would draw attention. 
First, we have seen tax-farmers forming syndicates in Athens. Andocides 1 On 
The Mysteries 133-134 has references to l..lETEXEtv, with which we can compare 
l..lETaoxnt in line 14 of this inscription. There are no references of this kind in 
the Grain-Tax Law, but we have there references to symmories - syndicates - of 
six tax-farmers in line 33 and even if you agree with Moreno's re-interpretation 
of the Law and take the view that these symmories were groups of taxpayers, 
not tax-farmers, you would probably accept -with Moreno -that this does not 
exclude a leader - apxwvns - of the tax syndicate. So we can say that tax 
syndicates continued into the third century. 
Second, it is clear that in the Grain-Tax Law the tax-farmers were to collect the 
grain and take it to Athens (lines 10-15), where it was sold (lines 40-44) and the 
proceeds given to the stratiotikon (lines 54-55). I have argued that the Grain-
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Tax Law was the only recorded example of Athenian taxes being paid in kind 
during the period of this thesis. The Colophon inscription also seems to provide 
for payment of at least some taxes in kind- compare avAflt in line 14. The tax-
farmers presumably paid the Colophon authorities for the right to collect the tax, 
and their profit was the difference between what they paid the Colophon 
authorities and the tax they received whether in cash or in kind. Pleket did not 
see this as quite so clear. He focused on the alternative translations of TOVTC..uv 
Ttva but, however you translate these words, it seems to me, as Etienne and 
Migeotte argue, that ci:py\lptov in line 41 is referring to the fine, not the whole 
of the tax-farmer's receipts. So I see this inscription as confirming the practice of 
levying taxes in kind (after the Grain-Tax Law). 
Third, the inscription gives a good idea of the sanctions on tax farmers for 
maladministration - see line 15 et seq. The guilty tax-farmer has to pay the tax 
that has been wrongly paid plus half that amount and 1000 drachmas to Apollo. 
We have no provisions of this kind in the Grain-Tax Law. What we do have is 
guarantors in line 29, as indeed we do in Andocides and we saw in Chapter Five 
what happened to Euthycles of the deme ofMyrrhinous, who acted as guarantor 
for some tax-farmers and on their default had his property confiscated. As I also 
said in Chapter Five, Andocides Mysteries 73 includes in the list of those who 
could be disenfranchised and therefore suffered atimia those who bought 
contracts for collecting tax and defaulted on paying the proceeds to the state. 4 
These, however, are all examples of tax-farmers not paying over to the state the 
tax they had collected. In the Colophon inscription we are looking at tax-
4 Seep 172. 
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farmers behaving contrary to justice against taxpayers and I am not aware of this 
offence in the surviving Athenian sources. 
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PART THREE TAXATION IN SOME OTHER STATES AND TAX 
ARRANGEMENTS ATHENS AND SOME OTHER STATES MADE WITH 
EACH01'BER 
Part Three deals with what modem tax administrations would call 'international' 
matters. That is, tax regimes in some other states and tax arrangements Athens and 
some other states made with each other. 
Chapter Six looks at taxes in some other states, both in Greece and elsewhere, including 
those which threatened Athens at the beginning and at the end of the period of this 
thesis, that is Persia and Macedon respectively. Our knowledge of taxes in these other 
states during the period of this thesis is sometimes more sketchy than it is in Athens, 
but where it exists, it often suggests a wider tax canvas in the state concerned than the 
particular fragment of information itself And recording what we have puts Athens' 
taxes in some kind of context. 
Chapter Seven looks at some tax arrangements which Athens made with some other 
states and individuals, and at arrangements some states other than Athens made with 
each other (again to put Athens' inter-state tax arrangements in context). These mainly 
involve giving tax exemption (ateleia) or tax equality (isoteleia) to citizens of the other 
state, either collectively or individually and either on a reciprocal basis or to reward 
services. Chapter Seven also deals with what we would today call diplomatic immunity, 
that is, states giving tax exemption to proxenoi, who represented other states. 
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This is not an exhaustive list of taxes and arrangements, 1 but I believe that it gives a 
representative picture of the evidence available. 
1 For a fuller account of ateleia and isoteleia see Henry Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees pp 
241-:-261, and fora fulleraccountofproxenies,see:Walbank Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century BC 
and Marek Die Proxenie. I am grateful for the opportunity Alan Henry and Michael Walbank both gave 
me at the British School at Athens to discuss these issues. 
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SIX 
TAXES IN SOME OTHER STATES 
This Chapter highlights a sample of what we know of taxes in other states? 
'fwo early maritime taxes 
I begin with two early examples of states apparently levying maritime taxation. 3 
The first is a 6th century inscription recording some of the resources used for the 
construction of the Chersiphron-Metagenes temple at Ephesus. Much of the inscription 
is unintelligible but John Davies has suggested that the words indicate that some kind 
of turnover tax was being levied. Among the items listed is 'silver fr[ om the ] flee[t---] 
seventy mnai'. It has been argued that this may have been some kind of maritime tax. 4 
The second is a newly-deciphered Aramaic text of an erased customs account from 475 
on the Ahiquar Scroll from Elephantine. 5 The customs duties were collected from 
Ionian and Phoenician ships and handed over to the royal treasury. The Ionian ships 
paid duty in silver and gold of about one fifth of the imported goods, a harbour tax and 
an oil tax. There were also duties on exports. This inscription is interesting because it 
2 Other than what we know from tax arrangements, which are dealt with in Chapter Seven. 
3 I am grateful to Jack Kroll of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens for drawing these 
examples to my attention. 
4 Die Inschriften von Ephesos Ia 1; Money and its Uses in the Greek World 2001 p 121. 
5 Yardenis 'Maritime Tmde and Royal Accountancy in an Erased Custome Account from 475 BCE. 
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shows that Ionian ships were paying import and export taxes as early as 475, and that 
Ionian states might have themselves levied such taxes at this time. 
Corinth, Cyzicus, Delphi, Mende, Xanthos and Boeotian cities 
Now, six states with evidence of taxes of various kinds - Corinth, Cyzicus, Delphi, 
Mende, Xanthos and Boeotian cities. 
[Aristotle] Oeconomica 2 1346a-b relates that Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth c.657-627, 
ordered the Corinthians to make a return of their possessions and levied a 10% tax on 
them. Some have seen a parallel here with Pisistratus, although doubt has been 
expressed whether Cypselus did levy the tax. 6 Cypselus' son Periander, c 627-587, was 
said to have raised 'no other taxes but was satisfied with those on the market and the 
harbours' (Heracl Lemb. 20 = Ar. Fr. 611 20 Rose), which suggests that he may have 
abolished some of the taxes his father levied or that the tradition about his father was 
invented. I refer later in this Chapter to the tolls or taxes on the diolkos across the 
Isthmus of Corinth. 7 
A decree of the 6th century from Cyzicus on the Propontis mentions five taxes -
andrapodonia (slave-dealing), hipponia (horse-dealing), the talanton, the nausson and 
the tetarte (fourth), in addition to taxation from which an individual might be given 
on the Ahiquar Scroll from Elephantine' Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 293, 
pp67-78, 
6 Salmon Wealthy Corinth p 196. 
7 Seep 206. 
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exemption. 8 The first two clearly concern taxes on the sale of slaves and horses. The 
talanton looks like a tax on the use of public scales. The nausson seems to be a tax on 
the movement of goods by boat. The tetarte is less easy to explain, not least because it 
is at so high a rate - 25%, although I referred in Chapter Three to the 25% tax on 
incoming goods at Leuke Kome. 9 Whatever the particular detail of the taxes, it is 
interesting that there was such a range of taxes in Cyzicus as early as the sixth century. 
An Amphictyonic decree at Delphi dated between 400 and 356 refers to taxes levied in 
the harbour by the Amphictyons. In particular, it seems to exempt from the payment of 
the harbour tax (ellimenion) certain persons who arrive and depart on a mission 
(pompa), that is the hieromnemones, the pylagorai, and those who accompany them. 
The victims of a violation of this privilege could place charges in the Amphictyonic 
Council, on the same conditions as the theoroi. 10 Also, there was an appeal for gifts for 
the rebuilding of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi after a disaster from either fire or 
earthquake reduced it to ruins in 373-372. We have a number of records of gifts. Tod 
140 = R&O 45 is the record for Spring 360, giving a mixture of '2"d obol' levies and 
voluntary gifts from states outside the Amphictyony and individuals - at each session of 
the Amphictyonic Council a list was drawn up and inscribed of those states or 
individuals who during the past half-year had contributed in money or in kind and of 
these lists numerous fragments survive. It seems likely that several of the contributions 
came from a poll tax of some kind- compare epikephalion in [Aristotle] Oec II 1346 
8 Pleket Epigraphica Vol I 1964 p 34. 
9 Seep97. 
10 SEG 44 425 (LeFevre BCH 118 1994 pp 99-112) and SEG 45 469 (Salviat BCH 119 1995 pp 565-
571). 
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AS. The largest gifts were made by states, but some came from individuals. In this 
record seven gifts of states are recorded - from Megara, Troezen, Cyphara and (outside 
the Amphictyony) Naxos, Messenia, Naucratis and Apollonia- and 28 individual gifts 
totalling 8530 drachmas altogether. The individual donors, who include six women, are 
from Sparta, Arcadia, Phlius, Athens, Thebes, Thespiae, Pharsalus, Larisa, Apollonia, 
Tragilus, Naxos, Phaselis, Syracuse and Selinus. A commission of naopoioi ('temple 
builders'), representing the members of the Amphictyony, collected the funds. 11 The 
'first obol', a levy of one obol per person in the member states of the Amphictyony, was 
collected in 366-361 and a 'second obol' in 361-356. The people of Apollonia 
contributed a shipment of barley. 
There is a reference to taxation in Mende in [Aristotle] Oeconomica 1350a 
'The people of Mende used to meet the expenses of administration 
from harbour and other duties, but refrained from collecting 
the imposts on land and on houses. They kept, however, a register 
of the owners, and when the state was in need of funds, they 
collected the arrears. Meanwhile the owners had the advantage 
of trafficking with their whole property undiminished by any 
payment of percentages.' 
11 Ian Rutherford has recently assembled some neglected data from the accounts of the Delphic 
naopoioi, particularly focusing on Keian Theoria to Delphi ZPE 147 2004 pp 107-114. 
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As Hodkinson has observed, this suggests that the Mendaians were unusual, not in 
levying capital taxes, but rather in their method of collection. 12 
In Xanthos, there is a trilingual edict - with recently discovered fragments of Greek and 
Lycian text, the third is Aramaic- concerning exemption from commercial taxes dated 
341-340 - 336-335 (the dates of Pixodarus' satrapy). 13 There was a tax on commerce 
(dekate) from which the inhabitants in the nearby valley were exempted by the satrap. 
Finally, on the basis of epigraphical evidence, largely from the Hellenistic period, 
Migeotte has analysed the revenues of Boeotian cities, with occasional references to 
federal revenues. 14 There is evidence of a direct tax on land, on the tenth part of the 
value of the harvest rather than the tenth part of the rent, payment of a telos (tax) to the 
city or league 'if it is necessary', that is a special ad hoc tax, harbour-taxes and customs-
dues, indirect taxes (on the use of the oracle and manumissions) and liturgies. 
Sparta 
Next, Athens' mam rival in classical times - Sparta. It has, until recently, been 
generally believed that Sparta did not have its own coinage and had no source of 
revenue nor any reserve to compare with Athens' tribute and Athens' savings at the 
beginning of the Peloponnesian War, but as Stephen Hodkinson said in his Inaugural 
12 Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, p 189. 
13 SEG 36 1216. The same satrap was responsible for this and for another document, SEG 27 942=R&O 
78; in connection with that an earlier date was originally proposed but was refuted by Badian and 
Hornblower- Badian 'A Document of Artaxerxes IV?' p 40 et seq; Hornblower Mauso/us pp 46-48. 
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Lecture as Professor of Ancient History in the University of Nottingham in April 2005 
modern perspectives are changing all the time. Hodkinson had given a more detailed 
exposition of private possessions and movable wealth in his recent book and had 
suggested that monetary and non-monetary transactions co-existed. In particular, that 
Spartans were not forbidden to possess gold and silver coinage, except in the early 
fourth century BC. 15 
Peloponnesian financial weakness was referred to by Pericles (Thucydides 1 141) and 
admitted by Archidamus (Thucydides 1 80) and the Corinthians (Thucydides 1 121). 
One means of remedying it was to receive extraordinary contributions in cash and kind 
from outside Sparta, and these are recorded in an inscription dated, since the finding of 
an additional fragment, either about 427-416 or about 411 (views are divided between 
these dates). 16 However, Sparta's appeal for contributions from outside Sparta to the 
Spartan war-fund in the event proved inadequate. Thucydides 8 and Xenophon 
Hellenica make it clear that substantial subventions of Persian gold made possible the 
eventual Spartan victory over Athens in 405. 17 Thucydides 1 10 says that Sparta was 
not 'adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices' (as compared with Athens) : 
the truth is probably that Sparta did not go in for public civil expenditure on any large 
14 BoeotiaAntiqua IV 1994 pp 3-15. 
15 See Chapter 5 of Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta. 
16 SEG 39 370. 
17 This is the general view of Sparta's financial position during the Peloponnesian War. However, this 
may not be the full story. I am grateful to Mrs Jennifer Cargill-Thompson (previously Warren) for 
~wing my attention to her articles in Numismatic Chronicle 143 1983 pp 23-56, 144 1984 pp 1-24 and 
145 1985 pp 45-46 where she argues that Sicyon, a faithful ally of Sparta, was producing coins during 
this period; I believe that Mrs Cargill-Thompson has recently urged in papers in two conferences that 
Sicyon's possible contribution to the Spartan war effort should not be neglected. 
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scale, and did not need revenue. But Sparta did have some public buildings, 18 which 
must have been financed somehow, and did hold some elaborate festivals, such as the 
Gymnopaidiai and the Hyacinthia. 
The Spartans may have levied market taxes and customs dues but the receipts may have 
been relatively low (compare Xenophon Hellenica 3 3 5 for Sparta as a regional 
market). There is evidence for some kind of property taxation in Sparta in Aristotle 
Politics 1271bll-15: 
'Public finance is also badly regulated by the Spartiates : they are 
obliged to undertake large-scale wars, but there is never any 
money in the public treasury; they pay eisphorai badly, for as 
most of the land is the property of the Spartiates themselves, they 
do not enquire too closely into one another's eisphorai'. 
But whether this eisphora was anything like the Athenian eisphora is not clear. 
Aristotle obviously did not think that it worked. Saunders believes that the lack of 
enquiry suggests not just greed and reluctance to pay but systemmatic corruption. 19 
Hodkinson (I have used his translation above) gives an interesting general account of 
Spartan finance, together with some further references to the taxation of Spartan 
18 For a recent brief account see Waywell 'Sparta and its topography' BICS 43 2000 pp 1-26. 
19 Aristotle Politics Books I and II p 158. 
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citizens?0 Aristotle Politics 1270b3-5 states that fathers of four sons were exempt from 
all taxes (anAfl ml:vTc.uv). According to Plutarch (Ages. 35 2) the descendants of 
Anticrates, the man who killed the Theban general Epaminondas, were granted 
perpetual exemption from taxes (ateleia). But what were these taxes? Hodkinson may 
be right in suggesting that the solution may lie in the fact that Aristotle Politics 
1271a36-37 refers to the contributions to the common messes as a tax (telos). Every 
Spartiate had to belong to a common mess and Hodkinson has discussed in some detail 
the levies on agricultural produce which formed contributions to mess dues. My view 
is that although matters are much clearer following the work that has been done on 
Sparta in the last few years, there is still too little evidence for taxes in Sparta to suggest 
that we are here talking of taxes as I discuss them in the context of Athens. 
Persia 
I now mention, because he made some Greeks subject to him and tried to make other 
Greeks, including Athens, subject to him at the battle of Marathon in 490, the taxes 
levied by Darius of Persia at the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth 
century. 
We have two fine sources- Herodotus' famous passage (3 89 et seq) and the thousands 
of Elamite tablets found in the treasury and fortifications of Persepolis. According to 
Herodotus' account, the Persian Empire was divided into 20 regions, each comprising 
20 Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta p 188 et seq. 
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one or more lands or peoples who jointly paid a fixed sum of tribute to the king. The 
total tribute was 14,560 Euboean talents, the Ionians and adjacent regions, for example, 
paying 400 talents in silver. 
Herodotus 3 97 says that 'Persia is the only country which I did not record as paying 
tribute (phoros); for the Persians are exempt from paying taxes'. However, the 
Persepolis Fortification texts seem to record tax payments by the Persians in the 
administrative districts of Persia. 21 Aperghis has argued that some 600 texts describe 
movements of commodities from producers to royal storehouses, and that it would not 
be unreasonable to see this as a form of taxation of Persian nobles and commoners by 
the king. Tax collectors were sent out to collect the taxes which were paid in the form 
of livestock, and which are recorded on clay tablets (see 137 and 138 of Maria Brosius' 
collection of texts). He concludes that this interpretation enables him to make a good 
case for a highly organised and well managed economic centre, which contradicts 
Herodotus' statement that Persia was tax-exempt. I believe that this oversimplifies 
Herodotus' statement. Surely Herodotus was saying that the Persians were not 
themselves subject to tribute but that all the other peoples in the Empire were (compare 
the situation in Rome where tributum was not levied on Roman citizens in Italy after 
167 BC). However, Persians were liable to the taxes in the form of livestock as 
21 See Brosius The Persian Empire from Cyrus II to Artaxerxes I pp 77-88; Lewis 'The Persepolis 
Fortification Texts' and 'Persians in Herodotus' Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History pp 
325-331 and 345-361; Tuplin in Carradice (ed) Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian 
Empires, p 138; andAchaemenid History XI (edd Brosius and Kurht) pp 51-59. 
201 
Aperghis has argued. Aperghis compared the taxation of the Hellenistic kings with that 
of Darius. 22 
The study of the Persepolis treasury and fortification texts, which mainly deal with the 
movement and expenditure of food commodities in the region of Persepolis in the 15 
years down to 493, has been proceeding for a number of years now, and there is still 
much research to be done on them. From what we know so far, however, it is 
interesting to reflect on the extent of what appears to be a highly developed tax system 
in Persia at the end of the sixth century at a time when tax systems in Greek states were 
either non-existent or at an early stage. 
Corsaro has written a useful survey of royal and urban taxes under the Achaemenid 
Dynasty (550-350) and its successors the Hellenistic kings. 23 He argues that kings 
levied direct (OeKaTfl, 6yo6n, eiKooTi]) taxes on land, on persons (hnKE<paAmov, 
xetpcuva;tov), on cattle and on bees, and indirect taxes on selling of goods (eTiwvta) 
and customs dues on goods entering or leaving their kingdom. Cities paid direct and 
indirect taxes to the kings (annual pharos; personal taxes; eponion on goods exported to 
or sold in royal territory). Cities also had their own taxes : phoroi paid by dependent 
people on urban xwpa and various direct taxes. 
22 
'Population - Production- Taxation -Coinage' Hellenistic Economies edd Archibald, Davies, 
Gabrielsen and Oliver p 77 et seq. 
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Macedon 
Macedon was, of course, Athens' main enemy towards the end of the period of this 
thesis. As Hatzopoulos has observed, the most comprehensive statement on 
Macedonian tax occurs perhaps in Arrian's account of the measures taken by Alexander 
after the battle of Granicus in favour of the dead and their families (Arrian Anab 1 16 
5)?4 The exemptions covered taxes due from possession of royal land, military service 
and levies of an uncertain nature. There is no recorded example of an eisphora of the 
Athenian type. When the Macedonian kings were in economic straits, they resorted to 
other devices. We know that there were transit taxes in the treaty with the Chalcidians 
(see below), ellimenion in [Aristotle] Oeconomica 1350a, (dues) EiaayovTt Kai 
E~ayoVT\ Ti.0V ETTt KTJlOE\ in Perdiccas' grant and EiaayoVT\ Kat e~ayovTt Kat 
TTCUAOVVT\ Kai WVOVI-lEVCU\ TTAflV ooa ETT1 El-lTTOptat, in the new grant to 
Chairephanes (Hatzopoulos Vol II Epigraphic Appendix no 20 and 21). 
Two Athenian tax consultants abroad 
Now two Athenians advising foreign states on their taxes. 25 
First, Callistratus, the nephew of Agyrrhius, the mover ofthe Athenian Grain-Tax Law, 
in exile after 361 helping Macedon to increase its revenues from harbour dues: 
23 RE4 87 1985, 1986 pp 73-95. 
24 Macedonian Institutions under the Kings Vol 1 p 437 et seq. 
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'Callistratus, when in Macedon, caused the harbour dues, which 
were usually sold for twenty talents, to produce twice as much. 
For noticing that only the wealthier men were accustomed to 
buy them because the sureties for the twenty talents were obliged 
to show talent for talent, he issued a proclamation that anyone 
might buy the dues on giving securities for one-third of the 
amount, or as much as could be procured in each case'. 26 
It appears that the purpose of this provision, by reducing the deposit, was to enable less 
rich people to compete for the tax-farming contract. 
Second, Callistratus' associate Chabrias advising his Egyptian employer Tachos in 360 
on tax provisions to enable him to pay his mercenaries: 
'Moreover, each inhabitant was to contribute a stated proportion 
of his household and personal possessions; and when grain was 
sold, buyer and seller were each to contribute, apart from the 
price, one obol per artabe; while a tax of one tenth was to be 
imposed on profits arising from ships and workshops and other sources 
of gain. Again, when Tachos was on the point of setting out from 
Egypt, Chabrias advised him to requisition all uncoined 
gold and silver in the possession of the inhabitants; and when 
25 Referred to by Davies in Classics in Progress p 242. 
26 [Aristotle] Oeconomica 1350a. 
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most of them complied, he bade the king make use of the bullion, 
and refer the lenders to the governors of his provinces for 
compensation out of the taxes'. 27 
Tachos' provision looks like a kind of sales tax - compare the possibility of a general 
sales tax in Athens, discussed in chapter One. 28 
It is interesting to see that states in the fourth century were not averse to using tax 
consultants from other states to advise them on their taxation policy ('And Callistratus 
is, of course, Agyrrhius' nephew' you can hear them say), in much the same way as 
developing states do at the present time. 
Naucratis 
It has been suggested that Chabrias above may have been restoring the tax imposed by 
Nektanebis I twenty years earlier in 380 in the stele of Naucratis in Egypt. A large 
number of Greek objects such as pottery have been found at Naucratis and the stele 
records regulations concerning the taxes due to the Temple ofNeith in Sais. The King 
gave the Temple ofNeith in Sais first a tenth of all the gold, silver, timber, and worked 
wood, of everything coming from the Greek Sea, and of everything reckoned to the 
royal domain in the town named Hent. Second, he gave the goddess a tenth of the gold 
27 [Aristotle] Oeconomica 1350b-135la. 
28 See pp 43-44. 
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and silver as well as of all the goods produced in Naucratis. 29 Herodotus 2 178 recorded 
the Greeks who were associated with Naucratis- the Ionians of Chios, Teos, Phocaea 
and Clazomenae, the Dorians of Rhodes, Cnidos, Halicarnassus and Phaselis and the 
Aeolians ofMytilene. As Glotz put it, it was for the benefit of his tax collectors that the 
Pharaoh concentrated Greek trade in Naucratis. 30 Herodotus 2 180 also recorded the 
gifts from Naucratis to the temple at Delphi when it was destroyed by fire in the 540s. 
So here we see in the above examples an Athenian restoring Egyptian taxes on Greek 
goods in Egypt and a Greek city in Egypt contributing to the rebuilding of the Temple 
at Delphi. 
Transit taxes 
I referred in Chapter Three to the dekate which the Athenians levied in the 
Hellespont? 1 I mention finally for comparative purposes four transit taxes which other 
states levied. 
The first, about 600, was a transit tax levied by Crisa which controlled the roads from 
the Crisaean Gulf to Delphi. Strabo 9 3 4 said that the Crisaeans 'already prosperous 
because of the duties levied on imports from Sicily and Italy, imposed harsh taxes on 
those who came to visit the temple' (at Delphi). 
29 Mt>ller, Naukratis, p 207. 
30 Ancient Greece at Work p 116. 
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The second was the tax (or toll) on the diolkos, the transit route over the Isthmus of 
Corinth. Periander constructed the dio/kos in the early sixth century, and it continued 
in use until Roman times. It enabled ships to be carried from one side of the Isthmus of 
Corinth to the other, thus avoiding the journey round the foot of the Peloponnese. 
Unfortunately, not much in the way of hard facts is known about it.32 Thucydides 1 13 
attests to 'wealthy' Corinth's maritime trade, perhaps particularly transit trade (although 
he does not specifically mention the dio/kos). As Cook says, there are a dozen or so 
explicit or probable references to the diolkos in ancient literature, one relevant 
inscription and some remains of its track (see the photograph at the end of this 
Chapter). There has been some discussion as to whether it was used for military or 
commercial purposes. It seems likely that it was used for the latter and that tolls were 
collected from those using it. Compare Aristophanes Thesm 647-648 for the frequent 
use of the diolkos and Strabo 8 6 20 for the likelihood that tolls were imposed on those 
using it. Also, the taxes in the Heracleides reference quoted under Corinth at the 
beginning of this Chapter would presumably have included charges for using the 
dio/kos. 
Third, a diagoge in an alliance between Macedon and the Chalcidians, as we saw 
above under my comments on taxes in Macedon. The pentekoste was the standard tax 
levied on imports and exports in Greece generally, as well as in Athens. But there was 
another type of tax, the diagoge. The two are distinguished in the inscription recording 
an alliance between Amyntas ill ofMacedon and the Chalcidians in the 390s-380s (Tod 
31 See pp 94-97. 
32 Compare Cook JHS 99 1979 pp 152-153 and Salmon Wealthy Corinth passim particularly pp 
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111 = R&O 12). This allowed for both export (exagoge) and transit (diagoge) of goods 
on a reciprocal basis on payment of the relevant dues. 33 
Fourth, transport taxes paid by Greek merchants in Thrace, recorded in an inscription 
discovered in 1990 on regulations concerning Pistirus on the Hebrus (Maritza) west of 
Philippopolis issued by a successor ofKotys I after 359?4 This is the first evidence of 
transport taxes paid by Greek merchants in Thrace. It has been suggested that the 
original intention of the document was to protect the rights of the inhabitants of 
Maronea, which was privileged by Kotys. 
137 and 202. 
33 I have distinguished between diagoge and exagoge (and to that I may add eisagoge in the next 
example of transport taxes in Pistirus). I referred in Chapter Three to ellimenion which may have been 
used to denote the whole of taxes levied in a luubour or any particular type of tax, such as a tax for 
using the facilities of a luubour (see pp 86-89). 
34SEG 43 486; BCH 118 1994 pp 1-15. 
The diolkos at Corinth 
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SEVEN 
TAX ARRANGEMENTS ATHENS AND SOME OTHER STATES MADE 
W:U:m EACH OTHER 
This Chapter looks at some tax arrangements that Athens and some other states made 
with each other. These provided for either tax exemption (ateleia) or tax equality 
(isoteleia). This Chapter also looks at proxenoi, individuals who represented other 
states and received privileges in return, sometimes ateleia. 
Ateleia and isoteleia 
The epigraphical evidence for grants of ateleia to foreigners is not extensive and is 
virtually confined to the fifth and fourth centuries. 1 Alan Henry remarks that any 
investigation into the modes of expression used to formulate such grants is hampered 
by the extremely fragmentary nature of the extant examples, and that it is frequently 
impossible to determine which particular kind of tax exemption is being granted 
because, where the context is missing, the available space may admit of more than one 
restoration. The epigraphical evidence for grants of isoteleia, on the other hand, is very 
sparse and is almost entirely confined to the fourth century. 2 
1 But there is widespread epigraphical evidence of ate/eia given by other states after these centuries. This 
evidence is presently being gathered together by Lene Rubinstein in an AHRB study she is doing on 
ateleia in the Greek world to c 150 BC. For example, poleis that awarded grants of ateleia panton 
include Delos, Delphi, Ephesus, ilium, Cos, Crannon, Lampsacus, Lindos, Lousoi, Magnesia Maj, Olous, 
Oropus, Priene, Stratus and Thaumacion. I am grateful to Dr Rubinstein for discussing her project with 
me. 
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It is not clear precisely what privileges a grant of isoteleia entailed. Rhodes has noted 
that it has been disputed how large a packet of privileges is denoted by the various 
words indicating a privileged status. 3 Athenian honorific decrees show a considerable 
variety in the range of titles and privileges which they mention, and do not make it clear 
whether a clause mentioning a privilege such as oikias enktesis (the right of holding 
property in a state freqently given as a privilege or reward to foreigners) is to be 
regarded as explanatory of or supplementary to a clause conferring such a status as 
isoteleia. 4 It may be that isoteleia amounted to more than mere exemption from 
payment of the metoikion. 
I believe that Rhodes has correctly summed up the situation as follows. 'The minimum 
privilege which all isoteleis must enjoy is exemption from the metoikion and any other 
tax that was levied on metics but not on citizens; equality with citizens in liability for 
the eisphora and other taxes . . . may have been thought of as part of rather than an 
addition to isoteleia;5 oikias enktesis is more likely to have been thought of as a further 
privilege given with the status than as an essential part of the status. 6 . . . Undoubtedly 
the Athenians were haphazard either in the selection of privileges offered to different 
honorands or in the specification of the privileges attached to different statuses or in 
both'. 7 
2 See Henry Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees, chapter viii on ate/eia and isoteleia pp 241and 
and246. 
3 CommAth Polp 653: compare Whitehead The Ideology oftheAthenian Metic pp 11-13. 
4 Pecirka The Formula for the Grant ofEnktesis in Attic Inscriptions pp 152-159. 
5 CompareiG ii2 287 2-7. 
6 Compare IG if 8. 
7 Comm Ath Pol p 653. Ate/eia was also used as exemption from having to perform liturgies - see IG ii2 
1140 and 114 7 in the first half of the fourth century. 
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Tax arrangements between Athens and some other states. 
Athens giving tax exemption on a reciprocal basis 
Athens gave tax exemption on a reciprocal basis in the agreement with the Bosporus 
(Demosthenes 20 29-40 and Tod 167 = R&O 64). The Bosporan kingdom normally 
levied an export duty of 3 Y2 % on com, but one of the privileges given to Athens was 
exemption from this duty. Athens responded by conferring on the kings honorary 
citizenship and ateleia. The original exemption was given to Leucon who reigned over 
the Bosporus from 393 to 353, and the stele gives exemption to the sons of Leucon -
Spartocus, Paerisades and Apollonius - in 347-346. Demosthenes 34 36 refers to the 
republication of a decree in the Bosporus allowing 'anyone who wishes' to transport 
grain to Athens free of tax. 8 
There is what seems at first sight a case of reciprocity in the agreement setting out the 
terms of Athenian relations with Chalcis in 446-445,9 after Athens recovered Euboea 
following the latter's revolt (ML 52). Hestiaea was destroyed because of the part it 
played in the revolt but the Athenians made a settlement with Chalcis. The decree 
provides that 'the aliens at Chalcis, save those who, resident there, pay taxes to Athens 
8 Arguably the dates for Leucon are five years later but the dating has not been definitively resolved. 
Compare Werner - 'Die Dynastie der Spartokiden' in Historia IV 1955 pp 412-444. R&O accept 
Werner's dates without great confidence. However, the exact dates of Leucon do not matter for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
9 Even ifsome decrees with old-style lettering are now to be dated later, the arguments in ML pp 143-
144 for dating the decree to 446-445 are still cogent and in my view are on balance to be preferred. 
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and any one who has received from the Athenian people a grant of exemption, shall in 
all other cases pay taxes to Chalcis as do also the Chalcidians'. 
These words have been discussed on several occasions. Some have taken the view that 
the aliens resident in Chalcis were not of Athenian nationality. 10 Others that they were 
Athenian cleruchs, 11 or that the xenoi oikountes were simply foreigners resident in 
Chalcis, who were subject to the tax and to the conditions of this decree, whether they 
were allies of Athens or not. 12 On this latter view cargoes heading for Athens would not 
be subject to this tax, but this exemption would not apply to imports going to Chalcis. 
Piraeus was therefore favoured and the commercial power of Chalcis was considerably 
reduced; and this arrangement was linked to a relatively low figure for the tribute 
imposed on Chalcis. 
A further view is that the taxes in question could only have been liturgies and the 
eisphora; that the people in question would therefore have been either Chalcidian 
metics, who would have come to Athens and registered as metics in Athens, or 
Athenian metics, who would have come to Chalcis and registered as metics; and that 
those who would have received tax exemption at Athens would have been refugees 
from other states who were given hospitality and tax exemption in Athens. 13 It has also 
been contended that the Chalcis Decree does not constitute evidence that Athens tried 
to impose democracies on rebellious allies after their subjugation and that the 
10 ML p 143; Henry ZPE 35 1979 pp 287-291. 
II Smart ZPE 24 1977 PP 231-232. 
12 Pebarthe ZPE 126 1999 pp 142-146; SEG 49 42. 
13 Giovamrini ZPE 133 2000 pp 61-74. 
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Athenians acknowledge in the Decree the right of the Chalcidians to insist on the 
performance of civic duties in Chalcis on the part of aliens (xenoi) resident there. The 
Athenians among these resident xenoi, who were exempted from these obligations, 
were therefore neither colonists nor cleruchs, but most probably individual settlers who 
had been given land in Chalcidian territory by Tolmides in the 450s. 14 
Most recently, Pebarthe has returned to the debate, rejecting Giovannini•s view and 
arguing that the decree was concerned with levying (and exempting) transit taxes at 
Chalcis. 15 He compares other examples of diagoge (particularly Amyntas III and 
Chalcis Tod 111), Chrysopolis, eikostologoi at Aegina and Methone 
Hellespontophylakes. This takes the arguments away from where they have been in this 
most commented on of decrees and one can see that Chalcis was a likely candidate for a 
diagoge, but it is no more than speculative. 
I take a more straightforward view. This was an agreement made between Athens and 
Chalcis, with Athens having the stronger negotiating hand after putting down the revolt 
ofEuboea. Chalcis clearly wanted to retain its taxing rights. Athens equally clearly was 
reluctant for Chalcis to levy taxation on those to whom she had given tax exemption. 
So both sides got their way. Athens kept her taxing rights and maintained the tax 
exemptions she had given but Chalcis had taxing rights in all other cases. As 
Giovannini says, this was, then, hardly an agreement based on reciprocity because it is 
unilaterally favourable to Athens inasmuch as a Chalcidian who would have been 
14 OstwaldJHS 122 2002 pp 134-143. 
15 Historia 54 2005, pp 84-92. 
213 
registered as a metic in Athens while keeping his domicile in Chalcis would have been 
subject to liturgies and the eisphora in Athens and ceased to be so subject in Chalcis, 
while an Athenian who took his domicile in Chalcis would not have been liable to the 
taxes of a metic. 
It is interesting to compare the situation 1 00 years later when an agreement was made 
between Athens and the Euboean League under which double taxation was avoided 
through cities not being obliged to pay syntaxeis to the Athenian Confederacy if they 
paid syntaxeis to their own league (Aeschines 3 100-1 05). 
Three examples of Athens exempting individuals of other states from the metoikion 
Next, three examples of Athens exempting individuals of other states from the 
metoikion. First, a decree dated by Tod about 367 but by Rhodes and Osborne at 378-
376 because the honour was paid for out of the '10 talent fund', honouring Strato, king 
of Sidon. The decree exempted Sidonian citizens normally resident in Sidon from the 
metoikion and the eisphora and from the obligation to undertake the choregia, if they 
settled temporarily at Athens for the purpose of trade (Tod 139 = R&O 21). 
Second, a decree dated 348-347 enacting that the Assembly should decide whether to 
give Olynthian refugees from Philip of Macedon, after he had captured and destroyed 
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their city, exemption from the metoikion- anAetav] TOV J..lETOtK[iov (Tod 166).16 The 
fact that the stele exists suggests that the Assembly decided to give such exemption. 
The background to this decree is that Olynthus had made a treaty with Philip of 
Macedon in 357-356 but became concerned with the rise ofMacedon and declared war 
on Philip. Philip defeated Olynthus and razed it to the ground. Some Olynthians sought 
refuge in Athens and it was these who were exempted from the metoikion by Athens. 
Third, a decree dated 337 in which the Athenians gave exemption from the metoikion 
(cXTeAEm To J..lETOtKiov), and parity with Athenian citizens in the payment of the 
eisphora (Tas eia<popas ... J..lETa 1\Snva{c.vv eimpepetv), to Acarnanians who had 
supported Athens under Phormio and Carphinas, until they returned home (Tod 178 = 
R&O 77). It seems that some Acarnanians under the pro-Athenian leaders Phormio and 
Carphinas had fought with the Athenians at Chaeronea. They were also given the right 
of possessing whatever houses they wished (enktesis). There are other examples of 
exemption from the metoikion in IG ii2 33 5 et seq (Mantineans and Thasians) and 545 
12 (Thessalians). 
16 However, both the beneficiaries and the date are purely conjectural, as Tod recognised (an alternative 
interpretation is that the decree relates to the Methoneans who fled to Athens on the fall of their city in 
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Cean ruddle 
Athens exempted non-Athenians in respect of other taxes. Decrees dated before 350 
relate to the Athenian monopoly of Cean ruddle (Tod 162 = R&O 40). 17 Tod says that 
'ruddle, or red ochre, was much in demand in the ancient world as a pigment and as a 
drug'. Some have thought that the Athenians were interested in it only because it was 
indispensable in the painting of triremes, but Tod felt that in view of the multiplicity of 
its uses this could hardly be true. There are three decrees in this collection, relating to 
three Cean cities - Carthaea, Coresus and Iulis. The third of these decrees - from Iulis -
fixes the date at which exemption from a certain tax was to take effect. The text has 
several lacunae, but I take it that Iulis is giving some exemption from its export tax. I 
suggest in this thesis that this may have been an example of a tax agreement being 
made as a matter of foreign policy but the text is so uncertain that no definite 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Examples of Athens giving isoteleia to residents of other states 
There is a literary reference to isoteleia in Xenophon Hellenica 2 4 25 where 
Thrasybulus offers isoteleia to xenoi before the battle of Munychia in 403 in order to 
354). 
17 Rhodes and Osborne, however, found the decrees puzzling, pointing out that there were other 
sources of ruddle, even Laurium, and that Athens did not need a monopoly of ruddle. 
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attract a sufficient following. 18 In this battle Thrasybulus sought (successfully) to bring 
the rule of the Thirty to a close after the end of the Peloponnesian War. 
There are a number of epigraphical references to isoteleia. In /G ii2 1 09b 19-24 dated 
363-362 a proposal is made to give an award of isoteleia to a group of Delphian exiles. 
In /G ii2 276 12-15 dated about 342 a similar grant is made to one Asclepiodorus and 
his descendants as a reward for his efforts in 'fighting the enemy'. And in /G ii2 660 5-7 
there is a block grant of isoteleia for the Tenians (after the middle of the fourth 
century). A number of inscriptions give what is in effect isoteleia without actually 
using the word (for example, Tod 100 = R&O 4 -rewards for the liberators- updated 
by M J Osborne). 19 The word isoteleia does not survive in the fragments ofTod 100 but 
Rhodes and Osborne follow M J Osborne in restoring it in the decree. Martha Taylor in 
a recent article looks at fragments of another inscription and argues that up to 40 metics 
could have been given isoteleia. 2° Finally, there are some inscriptions where isoteleia 
has been wholly or partially restored. For example, isoteleia has been partially restored 
in /G ii2 287 dated about 336-335 (iooTe[AE]tav oiKo[uotv 1\]Sftvnotv) and wholly 
restored in /G ii2 288 ([iooTeAEtav 1\Sftvnm]). The latter is without parallel, although 
IG ie 287 gives some precedent for the restoration.21 /G ii2 180 has a plausible 
1\Sftvnmv cXT[eAEtav]; and in /G ie 86 Pecirka accepted Wilhelm's [aTeAEtav] 
1\Sftvnmv]. Knoepfler believes that the restoration is sure,22 but that can never be said 
18 Rhodes Comm Ath Pol pp 474-475 lists the various proposals to reward liberators. 
19 Naturalization in Athens D6, p 37 et seq. 
20 
'One Hundred Heroes ofPhyle?' Hesperia 71 2002 pp 377-397. 
21 I am grateful for the correspondence which I have had on these inscriptions and on some other 
inscriptions discussed in this Chapter with Stephen Lambert and Peter Rhodes. 
22 Eretria XI, p 57. 
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of unparalleled wording, totally restored. By the second half of the fourth century 
isoteleia was the term normally found at Athens and I cannot think of an alternative 
with the right number of letters. In view of this and the precedent of IG ie 287 I would 
say that, while the restoration is not sure pace Knoepfler, it is nevertheless plausible. 
A frustratingly slight piece of an honorary decree 
Ronald Stroud published in 1971 a fragment of a decree found on the north slope of the 
Acropolis in 1939 (EM 13407). A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this 
Chapter and the inscription is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of the thesis, but 
the most relevant part of the text reads : 
[Kal eTJvat TiavT[ ......... J\8nva]-
['lov Ka]l T(;)v eioq>[----------] 
[ ...... ] ~n e~ei[vat--------] 
Briefly, this decree seems to relate to someone called Pant-, being honoured by Athens, 
by way of crowns (not quoted above) and something to do with the eisphora. Stroud 
believed that the reference to the eisphora suggested that it was a citizenship decree. 23 
M J Osborne argued that there was no sound reason for accepting this suggestion. 24 
23 Hesperia 40 1971 pp 178-179 no 26. 
24 BSA 67 1972 p 145 and Naturalization 3-4. 135 X 32. 
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It seems to me, assuming that we are talking about the Athenian eisphora, that there are 
four scenarios to consider. First, that the honorand was an Athenian and was being 
made liable to the eisphora. As Osborne suggested against Stroud, this can be ruled out 
because Athenians were liable to the eisphora anyway. Second, that the honorand was 
an Athenian and was being exempted from the eisphora. This would be unparalleled. 
Third, that the honorand was a foreigner and was being given the privilege of paying 
the eisphora on the same terms as the Athenians. There are examples of this, like Tod 
178 = R&O 77, but normally with tas eisphoras in the accusative plural (Henry, 
Honours and Privileges pp 249-250). Henry also says that there are not many 
precedents for foreigners being awarded crowns but Tod 178 = R&O 77 is, of course, 
one such precedent. Fourth, that the honorand was a foreigner and was being exempted 
from the eisphora. Tod 139 is a precedent for this. In addition, I would argue that the 
genitive Twv eta<p[opwv] would go with ateles or ateleia, even though Tod 139 uses 
the accusative. Although I have not encountered the genitive there are precedents for 
the genitive of other taxes, like metoikiou and hapanton; I would also argue that there is 
a similarity between l-lll e~e'i[vm] in line 9 and the same words being used in a negative 
way in line 34 ofTod 139. 
I favour the fourth scenario, that is, a foreigner being honoured at Athens, fairly 
exceptionally being exempted from the eisphora and fairly exceptionally being 
awarded crowns, and I would therefore restore the inscription with Twv eta<popwv, 
dependent on ateles or ateleia. 
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Three examples of other states giving tax exemption to individual Athenians 
Other states gave tax exemption to individual Athenians : I cite three examples, all of 
which indicate taxation in those states. The first is Erythrae honouring Conon in 394. 
Erythrae was a member of the Athenian Empire until she revolted in 412. She was an 
ally of Sparta until 394, when Conon and Pharnabazus defeated the Spartan fleet off 
Cnidus, expelled the Spartan harmosts from the area and promised many cities 
independence. Diodorus 14 84 3 named Erythrae as one of those who joined Con on and 
Erythrae at that time honoured Conon with 'exemption from taxation for all goods, 
import and export, both in time of war and in time of peace' ( aTeAetav TicXVTc:uv 
XPlll.lclTC:UV Kai eaayc:uyils Kai E~ayc:uyils Kai lTOAElJO Kai eipnvns) (Tod 106 = 
R&O 8)/5 and also proxenia (see below).26 I would mention in passing that this is a 
good example of evidence of a maritime tax in Erythrae. 
The second example is Cius honouring Athenodorus soon after 360. Cius, a colony 
established in the seventh century on the southern shore of the Propontis by Miletus, 
praised in this Decree Athenodorus, an Athenian by birth, for his services and gave him 
a series of privileges similar to Conon's, including tax exemption for all goods 
25 Compare enaywyf) in an Athenian decree about 330, which would apparently be a hapax in 
Athenian decrees and may have something to do with a privilege in relation to import/export : see 
Lambert ZPE 148 2004 pp 184-186. 
26 The examples which follow normally gave the individuals other honours as well as tax exemption, but 
since this thesis is about tax, not honours, I have not listed the non-tax honours. I should, however, say 
that these non-tax honours included euergesia (the title of benefactor), proedria (the privilege of front 
seats at games, theatres and the public assemblies), promanteia (the right of consulting an oracle), 
prodikia (priority of trial), asylia (inviolability), politeia (citizenship) and eisagoge and exagoge 
(freedom to import and export). Since tax exemption was sometimes involved in proxenia I have 
stipulated where the indiViduals were made proxenoi - see proxenoi below (pp 224-228). 
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(cniAetav naVT(.o)V) (Tod 149). Athenodorus spent most of his life serving Persia and 
fell foul of Alexander the Great. We do not know what services Athenodorus gave to 
Cius, because the wording of the Decree is not clear. 
The third example is Arcesine, on the island of Amorgos, honouring Androtion 
probably in the 350s -there is no dating formula in the text (Tod 152 = R&O 51). 
Amorgos, with its three cities, Arcesine, Minoa and Aegiale, appears as a single 
community in a special category of the Athenian tribute lists from 434-433 to 429-428. 
In 373 or perhaps 375 it joined the Athenian Confederacy. We do not know the 
circumstances in which Athens set up a governor and a garrison at Arcesine, contrary to 
her earlier promises. Androtion, who was an orator and politician in Athens and the 
writer of an Atthis, is, however, honoured in this Decree by the Arcesinian people for 
his kindness as governor and is given, among other things, total exemption from 
taxation (cXTEAEtav naVT(.o)V). He was also 'inscribed as a proxenos and benefactor of 
Arcesine, both himself and his descendants'. 
'fax arrangements between states other than Athens 
Exemption from taxes in the early part of the fifth century 
A law of the Eastern Locrians relative to their colony at Naupactus dated 500(?) - 475 
sets out the relationship between those of the Eastern Locrians going as colonists to 
Naupactus in Western Locris and their mother state (ML 20). Meiggs/Lewis argued that 
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the law was certainly earlier than the seizure of Naupactus by Athens about 46027 but 
could not be sure how much earlier. The Law lays down that the colonists at Naupactus 
will pay no tax unless and until they return to the mother state, nor will they be liable to 
tax in the mother state. The main interest of the law for this thesis is the existence of 
taxes in Greece at such an early date. And the fact that taxes assume a not insubstantial 
role in the whole arrangement suggests that the taxes in question were not negligible. 
Two possible examples of states other than Athens giving each other tax exemption on a 
reciprocal basis 
It seems that other states may have given each other tax exemption on a reciprocal 
basis. Two possible examples. First, Leucon gave some concession to Mytilene on the 
export duty on wheat from the Bosporus about 350 (Tod 163). The text is damaged and 
there is no specific mention of reciprocity, as in the case of Athens;28 also it is not clear 
whether the concession amounted to the full exemption that Leucon gave to Athens. It 
seems that it may have been more like a partial exemption from the tax. I have, 
however, tentatively listed the inscription under this heading because of its similarity to 
that of Athens. Second, a treaty between Olbia and its mother-city Miletus shared 
religious, financial and judicial privileges on a reciprocal basis, including ateleia, about 
330 (Tod 195 = R&O 93). An interesting variation on the usual tax exemption formulae 
is that the inscription goes on to say that if a Milesian at Olbia wished to hold a 
magistracy, he must apply formally to the Council, in which case he became liable to 
27 This date depends on a chronology for the Third Messenian War which Lewis later abandoned. I 
would say 456-455 (cfRhodes The Athenian Empire p 14). 
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taxation in the normal way (evTeAns is here the counterpart of aTEAtis). Further, 
ateleia was available only to Milesians who did not have civic status or participate in 
magistracies and law courts in any other city. 29 This example gives evidence of taxation 
in Olbia and Miletus. 
Four examples of states other than Athens giving tax exemption to individuals of other 
states. 
I cite four examples of states other than Athens giving tax exemption to individuals of 
other states, all of them indicating taxation in those states. First, Eretria gave tax 
exemption to Hegelochus of Taras, who may have commanded some ships from Taras 
in the Spartan force which defeated 36 Athenian ships in 411. Hegelochus was also 
made a proxenos. Following this Eretria revolted from Athens (ML 82). Second, 
Oropus honoured two Macedonians, Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, and Amyntas, son 
of Antiochus, in two contemporaneous decrees about 338-335, including giving them 
ateleia and proxenia?0 We do not know what services these men gave to Oropus, but 
Rhodes and Osborne suggest that it was possibly in connection with liberation from 
Thebes (Tod 164 = R&O 75). Third, Delphi honoured Nearchus, one of the leading 
officers of Alexander the Great and Antigonus, about 336, including giving him ateleia 
in a list of privileges. Again, we do not know why Delphi honoured him in this way 
(Tod 182). Fourth, Priene honoured Antigonus, who led the Greek allies when 
28 Seep 210. 
29 Another - later (early 3'd century) - interesting variation is the proxeny decree of the Plataseis giving 
exemption from taxation to Diocles from Cos, exeept for royal dues (Labraunda Greek htscriptions 42). 
3° Following Knoep:Oer on the date in PiernrtAristote et Athenes p 291 with n 36 and p 295 with n 50. 
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Alexander invaded Asia Minor, giving him tax exemption 'in all respects that relate to 
his household with the exception ofthe land' (aTEAEtav lTOVTC.:>V ooa eis TOV oTKov 
TOV eaVTOV lTAtlY yiis) in 334 (Tod 186). Is this evidence of a property tax (eisphora) 
in Priene? Antigonus was also given other privileges. It is not clear why Antigonus was 
honoured, but Alexander seems to have had a special relationship with Priene -
compare the inscriptions in the British Museum (Tod 184 and Tod 185 = R&O 86). 
Erythrae 's tax arrangements 
I have referred to the agreement made by Erythrae honouring the Athenian Con on. 31 I 
now refer to three other inscriptions, in which Erythrae honoured individuals of other 
states. First, Mausolus, the Carian satrap, possibly in the mid 350s, was given, among 
other things, tax exemption (ateleia). Erythrae may have been seeking to strengthen its 
position in the face of Athenian hostility (the bestowal of these honours is indicated 
only in general terms) (Tod 155 = R&O 56). Second, Idrieus, son of Hecatomnos of 
Mylasa and brother ofMausolus, was given 'exemption from taxation for all he imports 
or exports' (SEG 31 969 = Harding 28B) presumably in 351-350 - 344-343 when 
Idrieus was satrap. And third, Hermias of Atarneus about 350-342 -this arrangement 
gave each party the right, in time of war, to deposit its property for greater safety in the 
territory of the other, after giving fair notice, without paying import duty on it. There 
was a proviso that if such property were sold, a tax of 2% was paid on it and that, if the 
property was not removed within 30 days of the conclusion of peace, the usual import 
31 Seep 219. 
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duty was paid (Tod 165 = R&O 68). These inscriptions are of particular interest 
because they show the existence of taxation, particularly maritime taxation, in Erythrae 
and Atarneus. The text of the stele in R&O 68 is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end 
of this thesis. The four agreements made by Erythrae - these three and the one 
honouring the Athenian Conon - also show that Erythrae, if not a state with what we 
would today call tax haven tendencies, at least could be said to have pursued an 
international financial policy which was nothing if not opportunistic. 32 
Diplomatic immunity : proxenoi 
States of the present day commonly provide for the exemption from tax of diplomats 
etc. Ancient Greek states did not have permanent diplomats resident in other states, as 
present day states do, but they did have, as present day states have, what might be 
called honorary consuls - local citizens who served as proxenoi and looked after the 
affairs of the other state. The earliest references to proxenies date from the beginning of 
the fifth century. The earliest literary reference is Herodotus 8 136 ('Mardonius sent a 
messenger to Athens, Alexander, son of Amyntas . . . learning that Alexander was a 
proxenos and benefactor to the Athenians'.) The earliest epigraphical reference is /G IX 
32 Erythrae, one of the 12 cities of the Ionian League opposite Chios, was a prosperous city from the 
beginning. It was a member of the Delian League, but after revolting from Athens, had to pay a tribute of 
7T, which was among the highest tributes in Ionia. Tod remarks how Hermias, who pursued an anti-
Persian policy and entered into relations with Philip II of Macedon, and Erythrae . sought by mutual 
consent to maintain their independence of Persia In the event Erythrae continued to prosper under 
Alexander the Great and the Seleucids as a free and immune state. 
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Supp 549 (an Eretrian proxeny decree).33 Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz has recently 
reviewed the evidence for the meaning of proxenoi in Western Greece, arguing against 
the view that in Western Greece proxenos did not have its normal meaning at all. She 
concludes that proxenia 'emerges from the sources as a multifaceted institution, 
concerned not only with entertaining foreigners and protecting them from any violent 
act or insult, but also with mediating between them and the polis and, in this respect, 
also with guaranteeing their good behaviour and granting them legal 
assistance .. . Proxenoi could perform but one of these functions and still be considered 
as proxenoi, and they could be chosen to this service by a foreign community or by 
their own polis. '34 
Michael Walbank identified 94 Athenian proxenies in the fifth century, only a fraction 
he believed of the total number of proxenies maintained by Athens during this period 
(he took the view that Athens maintained a proxenos in each of the states of the Empire 
and also in many other states with which she had dealings).35 The epigraphical evidence 
for these proxenies sets out honours and privileges most commonly awarded in return 
for these services. Sometimes ateleia is mentioned (7 times), as is exemption from the 
metoikion (4 times). Examples are Athens honouring Heracleides ofClazomenae in 423 
or after- Darius was first attested as king in February 423 (ML 70 with an additional 
fragment in JG i3 227 + addenda in fasc. ii); and Eretria honouring Hegelochus in 411 
(ML 82). 
33 Wallace Hesperia 5 1936 pp 273-284; Walker Archaic Ere tria p 237. 
34 ZPE 147 2004 pp 93-106. 
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There is no work comparable to Walbank's on Athenian proxenies in the fourth century. 
But examples of tax exemptions given in the fourth century include Erythrae honouring 
Conon in 394 (Tod 106 = R&O 8), Erythrae honouring Mausolus in the mid 350s (Tod 
155 = R&O 56), Macedonians honoured by Oropus 338-335 (Tod 164 = R&O 75), 
Delphi honouring Nearchus about 336 (Tod 182) and Priene honouring Antigonus in 
338-335 (Tod 186). These all use the word proxenos, but they are shifting from 
proxenos as a serious appointment to proxenos as an honorific title. 
Stephen Lambert has published a proxeny decree that had previously been published in 
two parts, that of Demosthenes proposing proxenies for three Megarians (see the 
photograph of the three Megarians at the end of this Chapter and the text in the 
Epigraphical Dossier). 36 There is no reference to any honours the proxenoi were 
entitled to, but several lines are missing from the middle of the decree. Lambert 
suggests that 'relevant in this connexion may be Demosthenes 20 131 which, if the text 
is not corrupt and the rhetoric not exaggerated, seems to imply that, in 355, large 
numbers of Megarians and Messenians enjoyed ateleia in Athens'. ('Again, perhaps 
they will say in their haphazard style that some citizens, by claiming to be Megarians 
and Messenians, at once gain immunity, whole crowds at a time ... '). 
There was a gradual extension of tax privileges for proxenoi during the fifth and fourth 
centuries. As Whitehead says, a fifth century proxenos who stayed in his own city did 
not need Athenian residence privileges, but his fourth century counterpart who went to 
35 Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century BC pp vi and 27 (n 22). 
36 ZPE 137 2001, pp 55-68, particularly p 66 and notes 32 and 33. 
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Athens (and was therefore not a proxenos of the old kind) and perhaps stayed there had 
to be given status. So 'he was first exempted from metoikion, and then began to acquire 
more substantial privileges like isoteleia - initially in explicit individual grants (for 
example, JG ie 83), then if IG ii2 288 is correctly restored, as a matter of course by the 
mid-fourth century, until finally there was no need even to mention it'. 37 
An example of proxenies which Greek states other than Athens had with each other is a 
fourth-century stele from Calymnos in the British Museum (BM 245), which records 
three decrees appointing foreigners as proxenoi. 38 They were to act as consular agents 
for Calymnos in their own cities, and in return were given privileges at Calymnos, 
including freedom from import and export taxes (again, another reference to a maritime 
import/export tax in a Greek state). The text of the stele recording the decrees is in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 
A brief description of proxenies would not be complete without giving the other side of 
the coin. Just as modem diplomats include among their ranks what one might 
euphemistically call military intelligence gatherers, so it has been argued that proxenoi 
in ancient Greece were involved in just such an activity. Gerolymatos has gathered 
together a series of exemptions which he believes demonstrates that the proxenies were 
used by the Greeks as one means of information gathering and as a way of instigating 
different types of intelligence operations against their enemies. 39 Gerolymatos cites as 
one example Athenian proxenoi in Mytilene, which rebelled from the Athenian Empire 
37 The Ideology of the Athenian Metic p 13. 
38 Tituli Calymnii (ASAA x:xii-x:xiii = 2 vi-vii 1944-5) 1. 
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at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Intelligence from the proxenia was a key 
factor in the Athenian victory; without it the Mytileneans would have had ample time to 
prepare and the outcome might have been different. 
What do we learn from inter-state tax arrangements? 
Two general points and then one specific point. 
First, modem states make tax agreements with each other primarily to ensure that their 
taxpayers are not taxed twice in the two countries on the same income. They also make 
agreements to give effect to other policy objectives, like encouraging inward or 
outward investment, facilitating teachers working in different countries and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion. Reciprocity is an important factor in negotiating these 
agreements but not invariably so. The main aim of Athens in making the arrangements 
referred to above has some similarities to the aims of present day states. The Bosporus 
agreement (Tod 167 = R&O 64) is an example of two states making an agreement for 
tax exemption on the basis of some kind of reciprocity. Metoikion agreements (Tod 166 
and Tod 178 = R&O 77) were made to reward people who had given service to Athens 
and accorded them parity with Athenian citizens. The Cean agreement could have been 
made to encourage trade in ruddle (Tod 162 = R&O 40). A distinction from the 
arrangements of modem states is that some of the agreements gave tax exemption to 
particular individuals rather than more generally, which modem agreements do not 
39 Espionage and Treason passim 
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normally give. We see the same kind of tax arrangements made by other states with 
each other. Of the some hundred fourth century inscriptions set out in both Tod and 
Rhodes and Osborne, at least a fifth have references to tax, about half relating to Athens 
and about half relating to other states. And some of the remaining inscriptions may 
have originally had references to tax, now lost. The arrangements also suggest that 
there is likely to have been a wide network of consular officials in the ancient Greek 
world who benefitted from exemption from taxation, as modern diplomats do. 
Second, the agreements give evidence of taxes in states other than Athens where there 
is no other evidence of taxes. For example, Arcesine, Atarneus, Bosporus, Chalcidians, 
Ceos, Cius, Erythrae, Calymnos, Miletus, Oropus and Priene. Most of these references 
are to tax exemption generally, but some are to specific taxes, including maritime taxes. 
I believe that the evidence which I have assembled in this Chapter- incomplete though 
it is - suggests that taxation was more widespread in Greek states in the classical period 
than is sometimes believed (not necessarily by professional academics) and give an 
important insight into the economic life of ancient Greece. 
To what extent were people given total exemption .from taxes? 
The specific point that we can learn from inter-state tax arrangements is the extent to 
which the agreements indicate that people were given total exemption from taxes in 
Athens and elsewhere. There is no example of an Athenian being given exemption from 
the eisphora. There are, however, examples of foreigners being given various 
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exemptions by Athens, including from the eisphora. Tod 139 exempts Sidonian citizens 
from the metoikion and the eisphora. Tod 166 and Tod 178 = R&O 77 give Olynthians 
and Acarnanians respectively exemption from the metoikion and Demosthenes 20 29-
40 and Tod 167 = R&O 64 give the Bosporan kings ate/eia. And, conversely, there are 
examples of foreigners being given the privilege of paying the eisphora 'with the 
Athenians', like the Acarnanians (Tod 178 = R&O 77) and Eudemus of Plataea (Tod 
198 = R&O 94). Compare in this regard the treaty between Olbia and its mother-city 
Miletus (Tod 195 = R&O 93) where if a Milesian at Olbia wished to hold a magistracy 
he became liable to tax. 
A number of inscriptions give ateleia panton. What does this mean? Henry argues that 
there is only one piece of evidence that it means total ate/eia, and that is /G ie 286 
where ate/eia is combined with the equally rare asylia (which R&O 75 define as 
'immunity from the violent seizure of property - sylan - to which a foreigner might 
otherwise be exposed') in this case applying to goods being traded. Henry's view that 
ateleia panton in this inscription means total ateleia is the orthodox view, but I would 
argue that ateleia panton regularly refers to chrematon rather than telon, and means not 
immunity from all taxation of any kind but immunity from import and export duties, 
which I would suggest is a reasonable interpretation if all recipients of this benefit are 
or at any rate may be non-resident. In Tod 152 = R&O 51 Androtion was or was about 
to be no longer resident in Arcesine when he was awarded ateleia. Erythrae for Conon 
(Tod 106 = R&O 8) is explicit in meaning exemption from all import and export duties, 
not all taxes; Cius for Athenodorus (Tod 149) strongly implies it; Erythrae for 
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Mausolus (Tod 155 = R&O 56) similarly implies it; Oropus for Macedonians (Tod 164 
= R&O 75) does not imply it so strongly but does also mention asylia; Delphi for 
Nearchus (Tod 182) likewise combines ateleia with asylia; Priene for Antigonus (Tod 
186) is intriguing - it gives Antigonus partial ateleia - exemption in all respects that 
relate to his household with the exception of the land. One might go further and 
construe kai autois kai chremasin with both ateleian panton and asylian. .w 
The two financial obligations of metics were payment of the metoikion and the 
eisphora. I discussed in Chapter Two whether the metics paid the eisphora on 
disadvantageous terms (compare the references to a sixth part of the eisphora).41 
Isoteleia for a metic would then mean exemption from the metoikion and paying the 
eisphora just as Athenians (Tas Eimpopas EimpepEtV KaBanEp 1\Bnvaiot). It is not 
known whether mention of the latter was for emphasis or was additional. /G ii2 287 
suggests the latter because the words following oiKo[vmv 1\]Bnvnow are followed by 
(K]al T[as] Eiocpopas Eio<pepEtv Kal Ta TeAn TEAEiv Ka9anEp 1\Bnvaiot. There is 
then the further question whether isoteleia was not merely financial but (even when 
they are not explicitly mentioned) covers the military obligations which sometimes are 
explicitly mentioned. 
4
° Compare Stephen Lambert ZPE 158 2007 p 136. 
41 See pp 70-72. 
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ENDNOTE 
THIRD CASE STUDY : TAXATION IN THASOS AND THASOS' 
RELATIONSHIP WITH ATHENS 
In this third case study I look at both what taxes there were in Thasos and also, briefly, 
the relationship between Thasos and Athens in the context of this thesis. The island of 
Thasos was one of the more prosperous Greek states during the period of this thesis, 
and it has one of the best-preserved agora complexes in Greece. The French School at 
Athens has excavated and studied the island for many years. 
Taxes in Thasos 
There are two survtvmg references to taxes in Thasos, one literary and one 
epigraphical. The first is in Herodotus 6 46, which says that the Thasians paid no tax 
on their crops (ateleis karpon) but drew an annual revenue from the mainland and the 
mines of 200-300T. Herodotus goes on to say that he has seen the mines in Thasos ('a 
whole mountain has been turned upside down in the search for gold'). Herodotus' 
statement has led to some discussion on the more general proposition that the presence 
of mines might have determined whether there were taxes on agricultural produce in 
ancient Greece generally (that is, that Athens and Thasos - with their mines - did not 
levy such taxes but other states did). 42 Any assertions of this kind are purely 
speculative, but it is sensible to reckon that states without an obvious source of 
42 Pleket 'Economic history of the ancient world and epigraphy : some introductory remarks' 1972 pp 
251- 252. 
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revenue have to look harder for others. Herodotus' phrase - ateleis karpon - may, 
however, suggest that taxes on agricultural produce were widespread in Greece 
generally at the time as opposed to in Thasos or that there may have been some other 
kind of taxation in Thasos at the time. 
The second piece of evidence on taxes in Thasos is an incomplete inscription in two 
parts found in the Agora area, dated (it is generally believed) around the end of the fifth 
century. The inscription was found many years ago but has been republished by Salviat 
and seems to refer to a tax (telos) on commerce, mainly on wine, supervised by the 
karpologoi. 43 A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this Endnote. The text of 
the inscription is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. The inscription 
has been discussed by several historians over the years, and there is general agreement 
that the karpologoi were collectors of some tax, perhaps collecting taxes on the harvest, 
particularly vines, but also concerned with maritime commerce on wine and grain and 
the taxes levied on them. The reason for the latter suggestion is that there are references 
in the inscription to cargo boats in line 8, cape Pachys (which overlooks the harbour of 
Thasos) in line 15 and purchases and sales in lines 21 and 22. Some have argued that 
the inscription is referring to direct taxes, but in the absence of a less damaged text I 
believe that the inscription refers to indirect taxes. I discuss in the following paragraphs 
more specifically the most likely subjects ofthe indirect taxes. 44 
43 Salviat 'Levin de Thasos, Amphores, vin et sources ecrites' BCH Supplement 13 1986, pp 152-153; 
181. 
44 I me11tion in passing, in tbe context of Atheniantaxes and Thasos' copying Athenian practices, the 
recently discovered Stele du Port (SEG 42 785 1992) which refers to restrictions on prostitutes (see, 
for example, A J Graham 'The Woman in the Widow' JHS 118 1998 pp 22-40). There is no evidence 
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The wine trade 
Thasian wine was one of the most noted wines of ancient Greece, and I agree with 
historians generally that the telos is likely to have been levied on wine and its export at 
any rate by the end of the fifth century. Aristophanes praises Thasian wine on a number 
of occasions - its pleasant smell (Plutus 1021 ); those nice little bottles of Thasian wine 
('they stay in your head a long time when those others have lost their bouquet and 
completely evaporated. So they are by far the best ... ') (Ecclesiazusae 1149); and again 
its bouquet (Lysistrata 196 et seq). 
There is substantial epigraphic evidence for the wine trade in Thasos. A wine law of 
about 470 (SEG 18 347 1962) sets out the sanctions for breaking the law and says that 
ignorance of the law will be no excuse. A more detailed wine law of about 420 (IG Xll 
Supp 347) lays down when grapes are to be harvested and sets out sanctions for 
breaking the law; it also forbids Thasian ships from bringing foreign wine into the area 
between Athos and Pachys. No less telling evidence of the wine trade than these 
inscriptions are the thousands of amphoras with Thasian stamps found all over the 
Greek world, in Macedon, Thrace, the Black Sea, Athens, Delos, Alexandria and even 
further afield. 
for such a tax in Thasos. 
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Mines and marble 
Thasos was also famous in antiquity for its mines and marble, and it is possible that 
these may have been subject to the te/os referred to in the inscription. I have referred 
above to Thasos' mines both on the mainland and on Thasos producing 200-300T a year 
in Herodotus' time. The resulting coins have been found in many places over the 
ancient World. Thasian marble was also exported all over the ancient World. Seneca 
commented 'we think ourselves poor ... if our pools are not lined with Thasian marble' 
(Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 86 6). The remains of these marble workings are 
spectacularly evident on Thasos today - see a photograph I took of them in September 
2005 at the end of this Endnote. 
Thasian traders in Pistirus 
The inscription discovered at Pistirus in Bulgaria in 1990 to which I referred in Chapter 
Six mentions Thasian traders operating in Pistirus and enjoying exemption from taxes 
on goods moving between Maronea and Pistirus and various other emporia (lines 20-24 
and 33-34).45 A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this Endnote. The text is 
in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of the thesis. As I said in Chapter Six, this is the 
first evidence of transport taxes paid by Greek merchants in Thrace, but the fact that 
these regulations refer to exemption from taxes might suggest that such taxes were not 
at least unknown, if not common, in the area at this time (about 359). 
45 Seep 207. 
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The relationship between Thasos and Athens in the context of this thesis 
Thasos was a member of the Delian League and enjoyed prosperity in the early years of 
the League, contributing ships rather than tribute. However, it revolted from Athens in 
465 in a dispute over mining and trading rights on the mainland, but surrendered after a 
two-year siege by Cimon, pulling down its walls, delivering over its ships, paying 
tribute in future and giving up both the mainland and the mines (Thucydides 1 101 ). 
Thasos paid 3T tribute a year but between 447-446 and 444-443 this was increased to 
30T, as much as any Greek state. Various reasons have been advanced for this increase, 
most recently summarised by Pebarthe. 46 First, that the Athenians would have restored 
to the Thasians their possessions on the mainland. Second, that the Thasian economy 
had soared. Third, that the question that should be asked is not why Thasos paid 30T 
from this date, but why it paid as little as 3T before this date, and the answer to this is 
that 3 T represented a special reduction in the light of the indemnity that she had to pay 
following the revolt from Athens. 
Following the suppression of the revolt of Thasos it seems that some rich Athenians 
acquired property on the island. Adeimantos, a friend of Alcibiades, appears on a list 
of the Attic Stelai with property on Thasos - a farm fully equipped with storage pithoi, 
sold as part of the farm in 414. Oikos and agros fetched 950+ drachmas (Attic Stelai VI 
55-56).47 A photograph of the inscription is at the end of this Endnote. 
46 
'Thasos, l' Empire d' Athenes et lesEmporia de Thrace' ZPE 136 1999 pp 131-154. 
47 ML 79 and Amyx Hesperia 27 1958, pp 168-170. 
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Thasos agam revolted from Athens in 411 but the revolt was suppressed by 
Thrasybulus in 407. Neapolis (the modem Kavala) on the mainland, a colony of 
Thasos, which was incorporated into the Delian League after the first revolt of Thasos 
and stayed loyal to Athens during the second revolt of Thasos, was duly honoured by 
Athens for her actions (ML 89). Thrasybulus returned to Thasos in 389 and Thasos 
agreed to a 5% tax, as we saw in Chapter Three (/G ii2 24). 48 This was a precursor of 
the Confederacy, which Thasos joined. 
48 See pp 100-10 1. 
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PART FOUR CENTRAL THEMES 
This Part looks at some broader issues of Athenian taxation and the part it played in the 
Athenian economy. 
I deal with five areas- the nature of Athenian taxes, Athenian taxation between 550 and 
325 in a wider context, coinage and the payment of taxes, the relationship of Athenian 
taxes to Athens' income from Empire and Confederacy and the contribution of Athenian 
taxes to the Athenian economy. There will inevitably be some overlap both between what I 
write on each of the themes and what I have written in earlier parts of the thesis. 
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EIGHT 
THE NATURE OF ATHENIAN TAXES 
I discuss in this Chapter some aspects of the nature of Athenian taxes. I examine first 
the commonly-stated view that taxes, or at any rate direct taxes, in the ancient Greek 
world, including Athens, were seen as a mark of tyranny; then at the reasons why 
Athens did not have an income tax; and finally more generally at the kinds of taxes, 
both direct and indirect, that Athens did have. 
Taxes not seen as a mark of tyranny 
It is often said that taxes - certainly direct taxes - were seen as a symbol of oppression in 
the ancient Greek world. This was the view ofBoeckh, Andreades and Finley. 1 It is also 
very frequently said in passing, as if it were an incontrovertible fact, most recently by 
Donald Kagan in his book The Peloponnesian War and by his reviewer in TLS (Polly 
Low).2 
There are some ancient literary sources referring to taxation, and tyranny and taxation. 
Only the most sensitive of readers would detect much more than a tone of voice, if that, 
to suggest a connection between taxation and oppression in the references to Pisistratus' 
eikoste/dekate in Thucydides 6 54 and Ath Po/16 4. Christopher Tuplin, while allowing 
that taxation does not figure very prominently in characterisations of tyranny, has, 
1 For example, Finley in The Ancient Economy pp 95-96 : 'In a city-state, furthermore, the land was in 
principle free from regular taxation. A tithe or other form of direct tax on the land, said the Greeks, was 
the mark of a tyranny, and so firmly rooted was this view that they never allowed an emergency war tax, 
such as the Athenian eisphora, to drift into permanence (nor did the Romans of the Republic), unlike the 
pattern with which other societies have been very familiar'. Income tax in the UK is also, in a sense, a 
temporary tax in that it has to be reenacted every year. 
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however, pointed to some more direct juxtapositions between tyranny and taxation. 3 
First, Aristotle Politics 1313b 25 et seq includes taxation among the methods used by 
tyrants ('it is a device of tyrants to make the subjects poor .. .instances of this are ... the 
building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids; and the levying of 
taxes ... '). Second, Xenophon Symposium 4 32, in which Charmides explains that when 
rich he had to pay phoros to the demos like a slave (referring to the system by which 
slaves worked for hire, paying a proportion of their earnings to their legal owner), 
whereas now he is poor he is like a tyrant, since the city pays a tax ( TEAos <pepovoa) 
and supports him (this seems to refer to pay for, for example, jury duty). As Tuplin says, 
'the idea of tyrants being supported by city-taxation is evidently banal enough to provide 
a simile for the use of public revenue to sustain the poorer classes'. And finally, 
Aristophanes Wasps 498 et seq, where Bdelycleon complains that people hurl 
accusations of tyranny at anyone suspected of dissenting from radical democratic 
ideology: for example, if you buy a small fish and ask for free onions to accompany it, 
the vegetable-seller says 'Are you trying to set up a tyranny or do you expect Athens to 
provide you with flavouring?' <pepetv i}ouoj.laTa has made some translators think of 
imperial subjects paying phoros to Athens; if a reference is intended (writes Tuplin) to 
the payment of formal dues, it need have nothing to do with imperial tribute. 4 
I quoted Boeckh in the Introduction to this thesis to the effect that 'at Athens it was a 
recognised principle that taxes were to be imposed upon property, and not upon 
having started as an emergency war tax in 1798-1799 in the time of Pitt the Younger. 
2 p 104 and TLS 6 February 2004 p 28. 
3 
'Imperial Tyranny : Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Political Metaphor' in Crux Essays 
presented toG EM de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday p 352. 
4 SommersteinAristophanes Wasps pp 187-188 thinks of the Persian king's gifts in kind to high-ranking 
dependants : the man the vegetable-seller is rebuking is already, she says, behaving as if the Persian king 
had conquered Athens and ordered its people to supply the man with his condiments. 
241 
persons'. 5 Gauthier has recently drawn attention to a number of inscriptions which refer 
to ateleia tou somatos. 6 He has assembled ten inscriptions from Priene and to these he 
has added two recent discoveries from Theangela and Mylasa. He has cogently argued 
that these inscriptions are referring to exemption from taxation, not exemption from 
military service. These inscriptions are mainly a little later than the period of this thesis, 
but suggest that these references are an indication that at least some Greek states did not 
necessarily consider taxes on the person to be totally repugnant. 
There is little other modem discussion on Finley's comments. Where they are referred 
to, they are normally quoted with approbation but no argumentation other than quoting 
Tertullian in the second century AD. 7 Stephen Hodkinson has rightly argued that 
conditions in Tertullian's day were very different from those in ancient Greece, 8 and I 
am astonished that anyone ever used Tertullian's remarks as evidence for ancient 
Greece. I am not clear whether the chapter on Taxes In Agriculture by Isager and 
Skydsgaard9 on Finley's dictum was intended to be a defence of it or an attack on it but 
either way I do not think that it takes the argument any further. 
I am not, of course, suggesting that no one ever complained about taxation in ancient 
Athens. People have always complained about taxation and no doubt always will, and 
there is a reference to direct taxation being unpopular among wealthy Greeks in 
Aristotle Politics 1320a20-2 ('And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of democracy tend to 
have larger populations and it is difficult for their citizens to sit in the assembly without 
5 See p.4. 
6 
'i\:t:eAetg Tou aw~-AaTos' Chiron 21 1991, pp 49-68, especially pp 65-66. 
7 Apologeticus adversus gentes 13 : 'as the field has less value if it be taxed, so men are less esteemed if 
they pay a poll tax, inasmuch as this is a token of slavery'. 
8 Property and wealth in Classical Sparta chapter 6. 
9 Ancient Greek Agriculture pp 135-144. 
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pay, and this in a state where there do not happen to be resources is inimical to the 
notables (for pay has to be obtained from an eisphora and confiscation, and from 
corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the overthrow of many democracies 
before now ... '). But I do not read here a connection between taxation and oppression. I, 
therefore, submit that the ancient sources do not, taken together, constitute evidence for 
the very strong assertions that have been made that the ancient Greeks saw a connection 
between taxation and oppression. Because under a tyranny there is often not a clear 
distinction between the tyrant's personal property and the state's property, I suggest that 
when a tyrant does impose taxes, this tends to be perceived as confiscating the citizens' 
property to enrich himself So the levying of taxes comes to be thought of as something 
which tyrants characteristically do - from which it does not automatically follow that 
other kinds of regime do not do it. 
No income tax 
Athens (and Greece) did not have an income tax, and the standard orthodoxy is that an 
income tax would have been a symbol of oppression. I rejected the oppression argument 
above. I think, rather, that Ste. Croix was right when he said that, except for a tithe on 
agricultural produce, as levied by Pisistratus, 'the concept of a man's having an income 
in money which can be measured and utilised for political or fiscal purposes is very 
modem and depends upon far more sophisticated systems of accounting than the ancient 
world ever knew'. 10 Ste. Croix said that in no Greek state are the citizens known to have 
been classified in terms of money income; that it is unlikely that any Greek ever had 
occasion to reckon his total income in money; and that there is no evidence that 
10 
'Rudi Thomsen: Eisphora' The Classical Review NS 16 1966 p 92. 
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estimates of wealth, official or unofficial, were ever made in such terms. 11 However, 
even in the ranks of Ste. Croix's disciples there was a dissenting voice. Richard Maeve, 
in his essay in Crux for Ste. Croix's 75th birthday, suggested that the reason Greeks did 
not tax income was not that they had not developed modern methods of accounting for 
profit and loss but that they saw no need to tax income. 12 He said that if the ancient 
Greeks had decided to tax 'income' rather than 'capital', 'then those involved in 
assessment and collection of direct taxes would have begun to work out something and 
developed conventions to meet the need'. 
Anyone with knowledge of modern tax systems knows that taxing income is not easy: 
there are so many difficulties in defining it, detecting it, assessing it and collecting it. As 
John Hicks said in 1969, 'it is only quite lately (and even now not everywhere) that the 
conditions for the imposition of an efficient income tax have begun to exist. There can 
be no income tax until there is a means (an accepted means) of ascertaining income; but 
income is an economic concept that is quite sophisticated. A merchant must calculate 
his profit on a particular venture . . . but he has no reason to attribute that profit to a 
particular annual period, as must be done for the purpose of an income tax. It is only by 
the accumulation of conventions . . . that an acceptable way of taxing such profits has 
been built up. Thus, it was hardly possible for income tax to get off the ground at all 
until there was a fairly large body of wealthy persons with incomes that were easy to 
assess'.
13 
There is no doubt in my mind that the explanation given by Ste. Croix and John Hicks is 
correct. I find Richard Maeve's conclusion weak and implausible - it assumes a degree 
11 
'Demosthenes' Timema and the AthenianEisphora' in Class et Med 14 1953 p 41. 
12 Crux pp 233-261. 
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of financial sophistication in 5th and 4th century Athens that is most unlikely. I would 
add a further reason based on my own experience working as a tax consultant in 
developing countries at the present time. When you are setting up a tax system for the 
first time, you focus first on indirect taxes (Kosovo is an example, but there are others). 
Indirect taxes much more readily produce the required revenue quickly. Setting up an 
income tax system for which a country is unprepared both politically and fiscally is 
another proposition altogether. I know that 21st century Kosovo is not 5th century 
Athens, but in both cases tax systems were being set up for the first time. 
Wealth taxes 
The main direct taxes or quasi-taxes in Athens were wealth taxes. The eisphora appears 
in a number of guises in ancient Greek literature and epigraphy, but it should not always 
be assumed that they are all referring specifically to the eisphora as we know it in 
Athens. I have referred in Chapter One to eisphora when combined with chrematon (in 
the case of Miletus and Hestiaea), where I suggested that it was not used in any 
technical sense. 14 Plato Laws 955d says that chrematon eisphoras should be based not 
only on the value of property but also on its produce, but I do not know of any instance 
of the term being used in the latter sense. I also referred in Chapter One to the eisphora 
being used as a poll tax in Potidaea on persons who had no property. 15 
Coming back to Athens, the eisphora was what we would today call a wealth tax. We do 
not have a wealth tax in the UK but some other countries, like France, currently have 
such a tax. The eisphora was levied on between 6% and 10% of the citizens of ancient 
13 A Theory of Economic History p 83. 
14 Seep 34. 
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Athens (if one takes the number of Athenian citizens after the time of the Peloponnesian 
War at between 20,000 and 30,000). In the case of modern France it is levied on net 
wealth above 720,000 euros on a sliding scale starting at 0.55%. 
After the beginning of the Peloponnesian War we have many references to the eisphora, 
which that war clearly necessitated. As Robin Osborne reminded us in his Inaugural 
Lecture on 'Changing Visions of Democracy' as Professor of Ancient History at the 
University of Cambridge on 23 January 2002, one of his predecessors - A H M Jones -
had devoted about half of his Inaugural Lecture 50 years previously to the eisphora. 
Jones examined what he said was the general impression that Athenians were an idle, 
cowardly, pleasure-loving crew who would not fight or pay their taxes. 
Jones looked at three aspects of the question. First, he concluded that the eisphora was 
not a progressive tax, in the sense that all those liable to it paid the same proportion of 
their capital. I would argue that it was a progressive tax, in the general sense that it was 
paid only by the well-off. Second, he concluded that 6000 people were liable to the 
eisphora, which is at the top end of the numbers suggested generally by historians, 
ranging from 1200 to 6000, usually 2000. Third, he concluded that 'very little' eisphora 
was raised. As I will be arguing in Chapter Twelve, I believe that Jones (and Ste. Croix) 
were wrong on this. 16 Some have laid emphasis on the fact that the eisphora was not 
levied every year but only when needed. I cannot, however, believe that the tax was not 
a substantial and fairly regular tax, with all the references to it that we see in the works 
of the orators and the comment in Xenophon Hellenica 6 2 that the Athenians were 
'worn out by levies of the eisphora', which Jones seems to have regarded with 
15 Seep 35. 
16 Seep 340 et seq. 
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amusement. The eisphora applied to metics as well as citizens, and I have suggested that 
it could have applied to non-resident Athenian citizens who still had property in Attica. 
Was the eisphora a .flat-rate or a progressive tax? 
I have argued above that the eisphora was progressive in a general sense but could it 
ever have been .fully progressive? Boeckh argued that the tax in Athens was progressive. 
Others followed him in this view. In more recent times the debate has largely subsided 
with the publication of Thomsen's work on the subject and the very powerful review of 
the book by Ste. Croix. 17 
Thomsen agreed with Ste. Croix that after 3 78-7 the Athenians imposed a flat rate on 
assessed capital. But, unlike Ste. Croix, he held that earlier there had been progressive 
taxation. He inferred this chiefly from Pollux 8 129 et seq, which said : 
'There were four census classes, the pentakosiomedimnoi, the 
hippeis, the zeugitai, and the thetes. The pentakosiomedimnoi were 
so called because they produced five hundred dry and liquid 
measures, and they paid one talent into the treasury. The hippeis 
seem to have been so called because they could rear horses; they 
produced three hundred measures and paid half a talent. The 
zeugitai were composed of those who produced at least two 
hundred measures, and they paid ten minae. The thetes did not hold 
any magistracy, and they did not pay anything'. 
17 Classical Review NS 16 1966 pp 90-93 in which he referred to his earlier article in Class et Med 14 
1953 p 30 et seq. 
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Thomsen then turned to a fragment from the atthidographer Cleidemus, as reported by 
Photios (Photios vavKpap1a) FGrH 323 F8 as follows: 
'Cleidemus states in his third book that, when Cleisthenes 
instituted ten tribes instead of the old four, they [the Athenians] 
were also divided into fifty parts, which they called naucraries, 
just as the hundred parts, into which they are now divided, are 
called symmories'. 
Thomsen assumed that the hundred symmories of Cleidemus existed at the date to 
which Pollux refers, and that the amounts of tax given for the various classes by Pollux 
do, in fact, indicate what the pentakosiomedimnoi, the hippeis, and the zeugitai inscribed 
in each symmory had to pay when an eisphora was levied. The total tax would, then, be 
100 x (1 + Y2 + 1/6) = 166 2/3 talents. This, on the assumption that the metics paid 33 
1/3 talents, yields the 200T that Thucydides postulated for 428 (3 19). 'This is a most 
remarkable result', said Thomsen. 'This striking accord leaves no room to doubt that we 
have really hit upon the correct interpretation of the Pollux passage'. 18 
Ste. Croix said that before accepting as proof what is in reality no more than the 
conjunction of two equally implausible hypotheses, we have to remind ourselves firmly 
that in all this welter of guesswork there is only one ascertained fact : one levy of 
eisphora, that of 428-427, is known from Thucydides to have produced 200 talents. Ste. 
Croix concluded that it was inconceivable that the citizens of Athens or any other 
18 Eisphora, p 116. 
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ancient state could ever have been assessed, either for taxation or for membership of 
classes, in terms of money income; and that there is not a scrap of evidence that they 
ever were. 19 This conclusion has been generally accepted ever since, and the eisphora is 
regarded as a property tax. 
My view is that there is very little evidence for the early history of the eisphora, and any 
theories are bound to be speculative. There is certainly no very clear evidence that the 
eisphora was a progressive tax in the sense that Thomsen envisaged it (that is, in terms 
of money income). Thomsen's case depends on forcing two rather obscure references in 
Pollux and Cleidemus. Thomsen accepts that the tax was flat-rate after 378-7 but argues 
for a progressive rate in terms of money income before then with evidence which Ste. 
Croix has dealt with convincingly, and no one has revived the issue. In short, the 
eisphora was a flat-rate property tax and there are really no grounds for saying 
otherwise. There is, however, a broader sense in which the eisphora was a progressive 
tax, as I said above in relation to Jones' view, in that it applied -like liturgies -only to 
the better-off generally, however they were defined, but not by reference to money 
income in that category. Those with property below the threshold paid nothing. 
Quasi wealth taxes 
Then there were the quasi wealth taxes. What the well-to-do did not contribute in 
income taxes, they contributed in liturgies as the numerous references in the orators 
show. This was direct taxation in kind. It was an accepted principle in Athens that the 
wealthier citizens had a moral obligation to spend their wealth for the public good 
19 Compare Ste. Croix on p 242. 
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(Xenophon Oeconomicus 2 5-8). Aristotle Politics 132la 31-32 in that part of the 
Politics devoted to advising oligarchs how to run a state of which they are in control 
says that liturgies should be attached to magistracies 'in order that the common people 
may be willing to acquiesce in their own exclusion from office and may sympathise 
with those who have to pay a high price for the privilege'. Ste. Croix wonders how many 
'thinking' members of the ruling class in the fourth century shared Aristotle's 
sentiments. 20 
The question of what precise role liturgical expenditure played in democracy has been 
answered in widely divergent ways. Views range, on the one side, from liturgies being 
an aristocratic institution at odds with the democracy; causing an over-reliance on the 
elite, not vital to democracy and in fact weakening it; and foreshadowing oligarchy; to, 
on the other side, being important to democracy as a highly effective form of taxation, 
as well as bringing a claim to power through the bond of charis, that is, the reciprocal 
exchange of favours; and the democratic answer to the need to overcome the disparity 
between rich and poor for which rich Athenians were recompensed by corresponding 
honours?1 Most recently, Rhodes has argued that we should not associate choregoi too 
closely with democracy. He said that 'the Athenian choregoi were part of that interaction 
of mass and elite (quoting from Ober's Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, Princeton 
1989) which took a distinctive form in classical, democratic Athens; but they are a 
particular instance of a much wider phenomenon'. 22 
20 The Class Struggle in the Ancient World pp 305-306. 
21 Summarised by Kallet in 'Accounting for Culture in Fifth-Century Athens' in Democracy, Empire, and 
the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens pp 54-57. 
22 
'Nothing to do with Democracy : Athenian Drama and the Polis' JHS 123 2003, p 108. 
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Lisa Kallet argues that the evidence points m the direction of the 'democratic' 
interpretation of liturgies and notes - as far as the extant evidence suggests - the absence 
of liturgical avoidance in the fifth century in contrast to its prevalence in the fourth 
century. She argues 'that the existence of the empire and the profits wealthy Athenians 
acquired from it, including ownership of foreign land, help to explain an evident 
willingness to perform liturgies in the fifth century and, in this and other ways, support a 
system of governing that had a symbiotic relationship with the empire'. Gabrielsen also 
observes that the Athenian liturgy system in the classical period was firmly attached to 
democracy and that later oligarchic ideology sat uneasily with the liturgical demands 
imposed on men of affluence. 23 It should, however, be remembered that the evidence for 
liturgies is to be found overwhelmingly in law court speeches, of which we have very 
few earlier than 400. Finley saw liturgies as, in part, the democratic answer to the 
inequality between rich and poor, quoting Aeschines 1 11 ('expending my resources for 
your enjoyment') and [Xenophon] Ath Pol 1 13 ('the common people demand payment 
for singing, running, dancing and sailing on ships in order that they may get the money 
and the rich become poorer')?4 I do not see liturgies as being particularly democratic 
(although it is true that they were a highly effective form of taxation), but democratic 
Athens got the system to work in a particular way (the obligation of the richest who 
cannot claim exemption), which harnessed aristocratic competitiveness for public 
purposes. 
Millett has called liturgies 'an integral part of the politeia'. 25 They played an important 
part in litigations. The rich quite shamelessly used liturgies as proof of their innocence 
in court cases (how would someone who has performed so many liturgies do the sort of 
23 Financing the Athenian Fleet pp 7-8. 
24 The Ancient Economy p 152. 
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thing he is accused of? Or, you can be assured (gentlemen of the jury) that a verdict in 
my favour will be to the advantage of Athens in the future.) As Millett demonstrates, 
this 'one good turn deserves another' approach based on a theme of public service is 
reflected in many of the speeches of the orators. By the same token, opponents are 
blackened by accusations that they have skimped on their public obligations : for 
example, in Demosthenes 42 3 it is argued that the respondent was far richer but had 
never taken on liturgies or paid up eisphora. !socrates 12 145 summed up the position 
when he said that 'liturgies are burdensome to those to whom they are assigned, but do 
bestow a kind of status (time)'. More negatively, Theophrastus 26 4 has his Character 
labelled 'The Oligarch' ask 'when will we cease being ruined by liturgies and 
trierarchies?' 
It is interesting to note that many of the references to liturgies in the orators link 
performing liturgies with paying the eisphora, illustrating perhaps the close connection 
in the public mind between liturgies and taxes, and they were also the two main burdens 
imposed on rich but not on run-of-the-mill citizens. As I said in the Appendix to Part 
One, the liturgy held a position in the grey area between compulsory taxes and citizens 
voluntarily paying amounts to state funds in times of emergency, the epidosis. 26 
Substantial sums of money were paid to the state by way of epidosis, and there were the 
same sanctions as with taxes for defaulting on what the person had promised to pay. 
25 
'The Rhetoric of Reciprocity in Classical Athens' in Gill Reciprocity in Ancient Greece p 252. 
26 See pp 134-135. 
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A tax on foreigners 
The Athenians had no hesitation in levying taxes on foreigners. The metoikion was 
admittedly modest but it was a powerful symbol of the inferiority of metics as opposed 
to citizens. The Athenians clearly did not have the susceptibilities of political 
correctness that modem states have on discrimination against foreigners. 27 And with the 
metoikion went the xenika, which may have extended to all foreign traders in the Agora, 
not just metics. Xenophon Poroi (2 1) lists his suggestions for increasing the number of 
metics in Athens but he did not touch the metoikion. The metics were indispensable to 
the democracy because of all the economic services they provided in the fields of 
manufacture and trade, because of the revenues they brought to the city without costing 
anything, and because of their use in the army and navy. Finley has observed that 
Athenian citizens put their vital interests, like the com supply, in the hands of non-
Athenians because they were not prepared in sufficient numbers to carry on those 
activities themselves. 28 Metics had to take their share of liturgies and the eisphora, if 
they were sufficiently wealthy. Athens in recognition of this did, on occasions, give 
individual metics isoteleia, equal rights with citizens, which not only released them 
from the metoikion but also gave them the public esteem enjoyed by citizens, but I 
imagine that these would have been only a small proportion of the whole. 
27 Although not all modem states. For example, Peter Rhodes tells me that Florida has discriminatory 
taxation against foreigners : there are no state income taxes in Florida, as there are in most American states, 
but there is a metics' tax on all rents for accommodation for under six months. There is a state sales tax, 
and when it was recently proposed that more items should be taxed but at a lower rate, it was argued that 
this would impose more of the burden on residents. 
28 The Ancient Economy p 60. 
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It is not clear how widespread the concept of a metoikion was in Greece more generally. 
There are actual references to it in three of Athens' neighbours - Oropus (Lysias 31 9), 
Aegina (Demosthenes 23 211) and Megara (Demosthenes 29 3). 
Taxes on farming 
Pisistratus levied a tax on agricultural produce. It may have been a tax in kind, but I am 
doubtful. 29 It may have partnered the development of coinage in Athens and thereby 
helped to develop the fiscal role of the state and this is my preferred view. 30 If this tax 
was a tax on income, it was the only main tax on income in Athens in the period of this 
thesis. 31 Indeed, it is the only recorded tax on farming in the period of this thesis. Like 
Lewis and others, I find this surprising, and like Lewis and others, I prefer to suspect 
that there were later taxes on farming, but there is, as yet, no evidence for them. 
But why did Pisistratus introduce this tax? Several historians have sought to answer this 
question, most recently Paul Millett and Edward Harris. 32 
The background is the seisachtheia, which is generally believed to be some kind of 
reform by Solon about 594 in the long transition from the aristocratic society of the 
early Archaic period to the democratic society of the classical period. Millett contends 
that Solon's legislation might have done nothing to get to the root of the agrarian crisis 
that was threatening the peasant proprietors. This (he says) 'is perhaps reflected in the 
29 See pp 23-24. 
30 Current orthodoxy puts the introduction of coinage in Athens slightly earlier than Pisistratus' period of 
continuous rule, but Pisistmtus certainly developed it. Compare Chapter Ten below- p 293 et seq .. 
31 I say 'main' because it is possible that the tax on prostitutes was a tax on the income they earned. 
32 For earlier historians see Mosse, who speculated that the four property classes were not introduced by 
Solon but made their first appearance in connection with Pisistratus' produce tax Anna/es (ESC) 34 1979 
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three decades of disorder that led up to the tyranny of Pisistratus with its popular 
support'. 
Millett has drawn attention to the reference in Aristotle Ath Pol 16 2-4 to loans that 
Pisistratus made to those who could not support themselves by farming and believed 
that it was a reasonable assumption that the loan-fund was financed by the levy on 
produce in the same section of the Ath Pol as follows 
'Among other things, he (Pisistratus) was benevolent, mild and 
forgiving to those who did wrong. What is more, he made 
advances of cash to those who were without the means to further 
their work, and support themselves by farming. He had two 
motives for this: he did not want them to live in the city, but 
scattered in the country; and if they had enough to live on and 
were busy with their own affairs, they would neither want to 
meddle with affairs of state, nor have the time to do so. At the 
same time, the working of the land increased his revenues, 
for he took a tenth of the produce'. (Millett's translation). 
This way, Millett argued, the peasant loans could have a redistributive function, with 
the tax in kind falling most heavily on larger landowners. 
Following the reference to the tax in Aristotle, Aristotle goes on to describe Pisistratus' 
tours of the country (Ath Pol16 6) where a farmer on Mount Hymettus was digging and 
pp 425-437; the hektemoroi were discussed in great detail by Ste. Croix and Andrews - see Athenian 
Democratic Origins pp 109 et seq. 
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cultivating what was nothing but stones. Pisistratus sent his attendant to ask the farmer 
what he got out of the piece of ground. 'A lot of aches and pains' the farmer said 'and of 
these aches and pains Pisistratus ought to take his 10%'. Pisistratus was pleased with his 
frankness and industry and gave him exemption from all taxes. 33 Millett concluded that 
this anecdote about Pisistratus' grant of exemption to the struggling hill-farmer as the 
origin of the term 'tax-free land' (xc.upiov ciTEAes) could imply that the poorest peasants 
were free from the levy. 34 
Harris has suggested a connection between the tax and its antecedents. 35 That is, that 
Pisistratus attempted to extend an old system of payment in return for protection and 
maintaining internal order. His rivals wanted to revive a payment of one-sixth or 16 
2/3% of produce made by the hektemoroi in the period shortly after Solon's reforms but 
Pisistratus charged only 10% or, more likely (in Harris' view), 5% for his services. 
Harris says that it is no wonder Pisistratus enjoyed widespread popularity during his 
reign, which Thucydides reports was a Golden Age (Thucydides 6 54) : after the 
domination by the local lords, the tyranny of Pisistratus was a bargain. Harris has also 
written an article arguing that Solon did not abolish debt-bondage, but only enslavement 
for debt. He believes that abolishing enslavement for debt is different from the 
Seisachtheia, which liberated the hektemoroi from the payment of 'protection money' 
they had to pay to their lords. 36 
33 Or perhaps 'exemption from all taxes on his land' (atele hapanton and variants is a common formula -
compare my survey in Chapter Seven). 
34 Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens p 51. 
35 
'A New Solution to the Riddle of the Seisachtheia' The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece 
E 107 et seq. 
6 Classical Quarterly NS 52 2003 pp 415-430. 
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It looks a little odd to me that the only Pisistratid tax was a tax on agricultural income 
(even though there seems to have been a precedent in Corinth), particularly when it 
seems that it fell upon the poorest in society (no doubt, it fell on more well-to-do people 
as well). This suggests to me that it was not just a straight 5% or 1 00/o tax on agricultural 
income as it is usually believed, but could have been part of a wider canvas. I find 
Millett's argument, based on the juxtaposition of loans and tax in Aristotle, attractive. I 
also think that Harris is right to look for a wider context, but the context in which he 
develops his argument is very much more complicated, as anyone reading the 
correspondence between Ste. Croix and Andrews on the hektemoroi referred to above 
will understand. My own view is that the seisachtheia was essentially the abolition of 
the dependent status and the obligations of the hektemoroi and I have some difficulty in 
seeing traces of the hektemoroi being revived at the time of Pisistratus in the context of 
this tax. 
What we would call indirect taxes 
If the Greeks - including Athenians - had any reservations about levying what we would 
call direct taxes, they had no reservations at all about levying what we would call 
indirect taxes. There was generally no discrimination between citizens and non-citizens 
in the raising of these taxes (except the xenika mentioned above). Athenian indirect 
taxes fell equally on the Athenians, their allies and everybody else, Greek or non-Greek, 
who came within the Athenian sphere of influence. 
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I referred in Chapter Three above to the possibility that Athens levied not only 
import/export taxes but transit/embarkation taxes. 37 Compare the reference in 
[Xenophon] Ath Pol 1 17 where allies had to pay a one per cent tax in the Piraeus when 
they came to Athens for judicial proceedings, and the references to ellimenia (compare 
Pollux 8 132). Any thought that a maritime import/export tax might have been counter-
productive to Athenian trade was outweighed by the advantages offered by the Piraeus 
and the fact that it is likely that such taxes were common throughout the Greek world. 
The pentekoste tax would have contributed to Athens' economic growth in the form of 
capital improvements and giving employment. All merchants bringing goods into the 
Piraeus would have received equal protection and marketing facilities, and it would have 
been natural for Greek merchants to base their activities there. Again, as I said in 
Chapter Three, Athenian sources of the classical period refer to the variety and 
abundance of all the foreign goods that were to be found in Athens (Thucydides 2 3 8 in 
the 5th century and !socrates 4 42 in the 4th century and [Xenophon] Ath Pol2 7). Athens 
benefited from the skill, capital and enterprise of foreign merchants. At the same time, 
as we have seen, foreigners were obliged to pay the metoikion for the privilege of living 
in Athens and they were also (like Athenian citizens) subject to performing liturgies and 
making contributions (epidoseis). 
We are now learning of other indirect taxes, which may have played a more significant 
part in the Athenian economy than we have so far realised. The most recently 
discovered is the dodekate, and we are not clear at this stage what exactly that tax was. 
Then there is the eponion, which could - from the evidence of the newly discovered 
Grain-Tax Law - be a general sales tax, not just a tax on the sale of confiscated property 
37 See pp 86-89. 
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(and compare the hekatoste, which was levied on the sales of state property). If this is 
true, it could have raised a substantial amount of money. Finally, the religious taxes are 
starting to throw a lot more light on the relationship between the sacred treasuries and 
the polis. We have known for some time how the state used religious funds in times of 
emergency, particularly at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, but recent work has 
shown how the sacred treasuries levied tax on their own account, again particularly at 
the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, including levying it from foreigners. 
Indirect taxes may also have been used for wider economic reasons, although in general 
Athens and other Greek states did not do very much by way of •controlling trade• by way 
of taxes. Taxes were levied at Athens at the same rate for all imports and exports. 
Athens certainly attempted to control some imports for its own self-interest, but not 
exports. The newly discovered Grain-Tax Law has shown us tax measures Athens took 
to ensure a supply of grain. Other non-tax measures Athens took to control imports 
include the law which made it illegal to contract a loan on a ship which would not bring 
grain on the return journey to Athens (in Demosthenes 3 5 51 the plaintiff lent money for 
carrying wine to the Black Sea and on the return journey bringing wheat to Athens). 
Andreades himself said that •the foreign policy of the Athenians was largely a grain 
policy•_38 Similarly, the dekate tax that was levied at Chrysopolis could well have been 
part of Athens• attempt to make a •closed sea• out of the Aegean by ensuring that she 
controlled incoming supplies of food. Then there are the decrees relating to the export of 
Cean ruddle, although, as I said in Chapter Seven, the text is so uncertain on tax 
exemption that no real conclusions can be drawn. 39 
38 A History of Greek Public Finance p 243. 
39 Seep 215. 
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I drew attention in Part Three to the use Athens and other Greek states made of ateleia 
and isoteleia (for both direct and indirect taxation) as instruments of foreign policy, for 
example as part of a reciprocal tax arrangement as in the case of the Bosporus and 
rewarding foreigners with tax exemption for services given in the case of the Olynthians 
and the Acarnanians. 40 We have a number of these arrangements, covering relations 
both between Athens and other states and between other states, and it is likely that they 
constitute only a small part of a wider network of such arrangements. 
Another respect in which Athens followed Greece generally was in the treatment of 
mines. For Greek cities generally which had important mines on their territories or in 
their sphere of influence, there was a source of revenue which could not be allowed to 
remain in the form of private property. The general tendency for Greek cities was to 
monopolise the ownership of mines in order to ensure their revenues. 41 Athens derived 
the largest part of the silver from the Laurium silver mines, which she used for striking 
her abundant silver coinage in the classical period and which was one of the key 
elements of her prosperity. She kept for herself the ownership of the mines, but instead 
of exploiting the mines directly for her own benefit leased them out to individuals (who 
were all apparently citizens) for periods and sums which varied according to the type of 
mine that was being worked, and tax, it seems, was also paid. Athens benefited from a 
combination of rents and taxes from the mines, as the UK has benefited from a similar 
combination of rents and taxes in the case ofNorth Sea oil. 42 
40 See pp 210 and 213-214. 
41 Compare Herodotus 3 57 for the mines of Siphnos and Herodotus 6 46-4 7 for the mines of Thasos. 
42 Although the 12.5% UK North Sea royalty for North Sea Oil was abolished from 1 January 2003.Tb.is 
was part of an overall package to create a stable long-term fiscal framework for the next stage of 
development of the North Sea. Companies now pay a 10% supplementary charge on North Sea profits and 
receive a 100% first year allowance for capital expenditure in the North Sea to promote investment. 
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The relationship between sacred and secular taxes 
As we have seen, there were both sacred and secular taxes in Athens. We do not have 
enough evidence to draw any very dogmatic conclusions about the relationship between 
the two. It is clear that the Athenian state sometimes financed religion and that Athenian 
religion sometimes financed the state, for example, in the loans made at the beginning of 
the Peloponnesian War.43 There is a blurring of boundaries between what was secular 
and what was sacred revenue (in practice, at times of crisis, they were all used for the 
same purpose). 
L J Samons II has summarised what evidence there is for what he calls 'sacral' and 
'secular' in Athenian society and finance. 44 He argues that 'in the end, contemporary 
English usage, our own Judaeo-Christian influenced views of the "sacred" and the 
radical secularism of modern regimes inevitably cloud the discussion of Athenian 
finance and society', and suggests that 'perhaps it would be best to avoid the modem 
terms entirely and simply to state that Athena's and other gods' treasures (coinage and 
other items) were all hiera, and were employed for ends both hiera and hosia. The 
demosion contained funds that were at once hosia (acceptable to the gods) and demosia 
(owned by the demos) and could be used for ends that were demosia (provided that they 
were not anosia) or hiera. Thus, for example, Demosthenes 24 96-98 demonstrates the 
connections between tax revenues (tete), moneys 'both hiera and hosia' (96) and 
funding for diverse polis activities including sacrifices, the cavalry and meetings of the 
boule and ecclesia'. 
43 ML 72. There were repayments after the Peace of Nicias, but borrowing was resumed, and towards the 
end of the War we find the sacred treasuries providing money from income, presumably because they had 
no money left (JG e 375, line 3 of 410-409). 
44 Empire of the Owl pp 325-329. 
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The strict position was that the treasuries of the gods belonged primarily to the gods, 
and so when Athens used them to finance the Peloponnesian War, it did not regard them 
as just another bank account to raid but treated the sums it took as loans, carefully 
recorded. Ste. Croix took a rather more cynical view. 45 He argued that the borrowings 
'were essentially book-keeping transactions, a mere transferring of public money from 
one treasury controlled by the State to another', and that the Assembly appointed both 
sacred and public treasurers. Pericles, Ste. Croix argued, was a sceptic and the 
borrowing was a pretence. As it turned out, Ste. Croix continued, it was hardly possible 
for the loans to be repaid and in due course they were conveniently forgotten. I do not 
agree with Ste. Croix. It can at least be said, first, that the temple treasuries were kept 
separate from the city's secular treasuries, and, second, that paying for the War was not 
an ordinary duty of the temple treasuries, so that when they did so the payments were 
considered as loans and interest was reckoned - at a lower level after some years, as the 
interest on First World War Loans was reduced in 1932 (as Rhodes has pointed out).46 
There is therefore some conceptual difference between temple treasuries and secular 
treasuries. 
Robert Parker summed up the more general relationship between the state and religion 
by saying that when a foreigner takes possession and asserts control of a Greek state, the 
possession and assertion of control relates not to the pnyx or the courts, but to the 
acropolis or other great sanctuary, the sacred centre, the summation of the city's 
identity. 47 Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood's summing up was that the role of the polis in 
45 
'Greek and Roman Accounting' pp 26-27. 
46 The interest was at a mte equivalent to 6% to 426 but 1.2% afterwards. History of the Greek Classical 
Worldp 93. 
47 Cleomenes on the Acropolis p 26. 
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the articulation of Greek religion was matched by the role of religion in the articulation 
of the polis: religion provided the framework and the symbolic focus of the polis. Greek 
religion was the very centre ofthe Greekpolis.48 
It is interesting to compare the relationship of state and religion in Christian countries 
since classical times. Tithes (literally a tenth of a person's income) have been levied in 
Christian countries until comparatively recently to support the clergy, maintain churches 
and assist the poor. Tithing was also a principal source of subsidy for the construction of 
many cathedrals in Europe. Tithes were gradually phased out in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, but remnants of tithing exist in certain Protestant European countries. In 
Germany, for example, citizens must pay a church tax unless they formally renounce 
membership of a church. In England we have an established Church of England, which 
used to receive tithes but is now financed by voluntary contributions, income from 
property and, most recently, English Heritage and the lottery. 49 English Heritage money 
is raised partly from taxes and the lottery is a kind of tax on betting, so a loose 
connection between church and state finances in England remains, but not on the scale 
of the relationship between state and religion in Athens. 50 
Local taxes 
An Athenian was referred to by his name, his father's name and the deme he came from. 
Membership of a deme was a sine qua non of an Athenian's political status. As Robin 
48 The Greek City from Homer to Alexander p 322. 
49 Strictly this is for the maintenance of churches as 'heritage buildings' to be enjoyed by religious and 
irreligious alike, not to support them in their religious function, but the religious function is indirectly 
supported if English Heritage and the lottery have paid, for example, to make the building weatherproof. 
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Osborne has said, whatever an Athenian's deme of origin, he could not afford to ignore 
it if he wanted to exercise his political rights, because it was the deme that first 
recognised him as a citizen and it was through the deme that he would run for office as 
bou/eutes. 51 Effectively this meant that involvement with, if not residence in, 52 the deme 
was essential for any man who wished to enjoy a full political life, or the social life that 
depended on it. In addition, we have seen in Chapter Two that local taxes were levied 
not only by the deme from which you came, but also by the deme in which you had 
property, if it was different from your own deme (the enktetikon).53 It is likely therefore 
that deme taxation was a not insubstantial feature of Athenian life. 
So, why Athenian taxes? 
I have argued that it is too simplistic to make generalisations about tyranny and taxation. 
Democracy itself was also regarded by some ancient sources as a tyranny, and taxes 
were instruments of both tyranny and democracy. When the Athenians levied the 
eisphora while trying to balance their books in the Archidamian War - balancing the 
loans from the sacred treasuries and reassessing the tribute from the Empire to raise 
funds to fight the war - I doubt whether tyranny was uppermost in their minds (except 
for their tyranny over the Empire). 54 The Athenian tax system was a combination of 
what we would today call direct and indirect taxes but without an income tax, which 
was a much too sophisticated concept for 5th and 4th century Athens. The eisphora 
5
° Compare The Victorian Church by Owen Chadwick, Adam and Charles Black London 1970. I am 
grateful for the conversations I have had on Church of England finance with Dr Peter Cooper following 
his unpublished PhD thesis which touches on these issues. 
51 Demos p 184. 
52 Prol>l.lbly by the fourth century a significant proportion of citizens no longer lived in the deme to which 
they beionged. 
53 See pp 76-80. 
54 Compare the relationship between Athenian taxes and Athens' income from Empire and Confederacy in 
Chapter Eleven. 
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(particularly the proeisphora) and liturgies (and epidosis) were effectively progressive 
taxes based on wealth in the sense that they applied only to the better-off rather than 'by 
reference to money income' as Thomsen used the term. Cohen argued that the Athenian 
system constituted 'the quintessence of progressive taxation' and Andreades saw the tax 
burden as a bleeding of the wealthy55 The indirect taxes, on the other hand, were 
regressive taxes. Further, the tax system, like modem tax systems, may have been used 
for wider economic and foreign policy objectives as well as providing revenue for the 
state. 
55 Cohen Athenian Economy and Society p 194; AndreadesA History of Greek Public Finance p 359. 
265 
NINE 
ATHENIAN TAXATION BETWEEN 550 AND 325 IN A WIDER CONTEXT 
In this Chapter I look at taxation in Athens between 550 and 325 in a wider context, 
in particular when (or it) and why taxes came to be levied. I could hardly, of course, 
have discussed the taxes in Part One without saying something of the immediate 
context in which they were enacted, but this Chapter seeks to look at the broader 
picture, sometimes cross-referring to Part One where appropriate. It will be clear 
from earlier parts of the thesis that the incidence of taxes in ancient Athens was not 
constant throughout the period of the thesis, any more than it is from one year to the 
next in any age. The period of the thesis started with taxes imposed by the 
Pisistratids, and the first section of this Chapter considers the sketchy evidence for 
taxes between the Pisistratids and the Peloponnesian War. In the second section of 
this Chapter I try to show how the Peloponnesian War seemed, from the extant 
sources at any rate, to precipitate an impetus towards taxes (whether or not there 
had been any taxes since the Pisistratids). This, I shall argue, was part of the more 
general cultural revolution that Athens underwent from 430 to 380 (strictly 378), 
when the Confederacy was founded. In the third section of this Chapter- from 380 
(or 378) to the time ofLycurgus- I discuss how Athens' attempts at raising revenue 
abroad through the Confederacy gradually fell away and how, under Eubulus and 
Lycurgus, taxes were established as a major source of income for Athens. 
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(i) FROM THE PISISTRATIDS TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
Thucydides and Aristotle referred to the introduction of a tax on agricultural 
produce of 5% or 10% by the Pisistratids,l and Aristotle told of a poor hill-farmer 
who complained about the tax to Pisistratus while he was passing by, only to be 
rewarded by Pisistratus with exemption from the tax. 2 However, the evidence for 
Athenian taxes for 100 years or so thereafter, that is until the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War, cannot be described as more than sketchy. 
This may be because of the randomness of our sources. But it is generally believed 
that Athens benefited from the Delian League during this period, and this could be 
the reason for the lack of a mention of taxes. The Delian League's treasury was 
separate from the Athenian state treasury until about 411. So the tribute did not 
simply get absorbed into the totality of Athens' revenue. Nevertheless, I think that 
we can say that at the very least some things were paid for from the tribute (for 
example, those expenses of the navy and its campaigns which were not borne by 
trierarchs), which made it easier for the state to afford other things. But were there 
taxes during this period? 
The nature and quantity of our evidence about Athenian finances before the 
Peloponnesian War make it difficult to draw any clear conclusions but according to 
Thucydides 2 13 there was a reserve at one time of 9700T which had fallen to 
6000T by 431 (after the building work on the Acropolis and the siege ofPotidaea). 
1 Thucydides 6 54 and AristotleAth Po/16 4. 
2 Aristotle Ath Po/16 6. 
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And, taking Thucydides 2 13 and Xenophon Anabasis 7 27 together, Athens' annual 
income in 431 was 1 OOOT of which 600T came from the Empire and 400T from 
domestic sources. 
The general view 
As French has observed on the transition from the Pisistratids to democracy, 
whatever success the Pisistratids had in running Attica, they owed to the strength of 
their centralised administration, its monopoly of power, and its ruthlessness in 
carrying out decisions made at the centre. 3 'If the only forces at the disposal of the 
government were now citizen forces, some degree of power must be returned to the 
people~ consent rather than repression must be the keynote of the new 
administration. This involved a serious danger that measures beneficial to the 
economy, but unpopular with the people, would lapse, like the taxation imposed on 
primary production, which had yielded the capital needed to build up the country's 
resources'. It is therefore generally argued that taxation was a casualty of the 
democratic regime~ that, in short, taxation was an institution of the tyranny and that 
it was abolished with the tyranny. 
The contrary view 
But there have been doubters. Most famously Lewis, in his publication of the Law 
on the Little Panathenaea, where he took the view that the pentekoste in that Law 
was a produce tax and observed that we are too easily inclined to think that a 
3 The Growth of the Athenian &onomy 1964 pp 65-66. 
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produce tax disappeared from Attica with the Pisistratids. 4 His view on the nature of 
the pentekoste in that Law was not in the event generally accepted, but his wider 
doubt is shared by some others, including myself. If there was no taxation after the 
Pisistratids, how did Athens finance, first the Persian Wars, and second the · 
expenditure she incurred from the time of the Persian Wars at least until the transfer 
of the treasury of the Delian League to Athens after 454? It is generally agreed -
albeit in the absence of evidence to the contrary - that Athens did not spend tribute 
income directly for internal purposes until the 440s. 
First, the costs of the Persian Wars, which must have been substantial. Peter Green 
argues persuasively that Athens' finances were inadequate during the Persian Wars. 5 
'The city lived', he said, 'almost literally, from hand to mouth', although this was 
largely true right down to the time of Eubulus. Exports of wine, oil, marble and 
ceramic ware were increasing and Themistocles' Piraeus project was progressing 
but 'some other secure source of income was needed'. It was at this stage that the 
Laurium silver mines came good, and that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to 
build a fleet with the proceeds of the silver instead of distributing it among 
themselves. References in Herodotus 7 144, Thucydides 1 14, and later (perhaps 
drawing on Herodotus and Thucydides), Aristotle Ath Pol 22 7 and Plutarch 
1hemistoc/es 4 testify to the Athenians building ships in the 480s from the proceeds 
of the silver mines, which contributed to defeating the Persians at Salamis and 
establishing Athens as the leading naval power in the Aegean. Also in Aeschylus' 
Persae 238, where Atossa asks whether the Athenians have a sufficient store of 
wealth in their homes, and the Chorus answer that 'they possess a treasure 
4 
'Law on the Lesser Panathenaea' Hesperia 28 1959 pp 243-244. 
5 The Greco-Persian Wars p 49. 
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underground, a fountain of silver' (Green's translation). This silver was so good that 
it soon became standard exchange throughout the Aegean and paid for military and 
other expenses. 
Green is persuasive, as I have said, but I do not believe that his account gives the 
full story. Herodotus and, later (again, perhaps drawing on Herodotus), Plutarch 
mention the pay that had to be distributed to Athens' fighting forces during the 
Persian Wars and that was only one expense. It seems most unlikely that Laurium 
was the only source of revenue. The naukraroi - who may have presided over some 
kind of taxation - disappeared after Themistocles' activity above (if they had not 
disappeared earlier), and the fleet - as opposed to the hoplite fighting force at 
Marathon - was assuming a greater role and had to be paid for. 
Second, there is Government expenditure from the time of the Persian Wars down 
to at least 454. It is possible that at least some military expenditure was met in some 
way from the Delian League even before 454; for example, the fleet of the Delian 
League could have carried out some duties which Athens would otherwise have had 
to finance herself, like protecting her grain supply. But there were the costs of 
running the civil administration - jury pay (introduced in the 450s?), and the boule 
(attested in 411, probably introduced before 431). 
No doubt there were other costs which the city had to meet during this period. For 
example, the recent excavations undertaken in building the new Metro system in 
Athens have excitingly revealed the extent of the Athenian water-supply pipeline. 
The pipeline uncovered by the excavations at Evangelismos station is thought to 
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have been constructed during the Pisistratid period, that is, between 527 and 510, 
bringing water from the river Ilissus and springs on the slopes of Mount Hymettos. 
It is generally thought that the pipeline continued down to what is now Syntagma 
station in the first half of the fifth century (see the photograph taken from The City 
Beneath the City at the end of this Chapter : these and other finds are well exhibited 
in the new Metro stations at Evangelismos and Syntagma). 
I conclude that the cost of civil administration in the first half of the fifth century 
could well have been substantial and it is not clear how it was financed if not (at 
least partly) by taxation. 
Evidence for taxation 
I believe that there is some evidence for taxation between the Pisistratids and the 
Peloponnesian War and I now look at it chronologically. 
First, there is an Athenian decree concerning Salamis (ML 14). This deals with the 
status and obligations of men living in Salamis and it is generally believed that it 
refers to Athenian cleruchs who have settled in Salamis. Lines 1-3 of the decree 
declare that the cleruchs must pay taxes and give military service to Athens. 
Meiggs/ Lewis said that the main evidence for the date of the decree 'lies in the 
letter forms and the arrangement of the text' and that it could date to any time 
between c 520 and c 480. They dated it more specifically to about 506 ('the period 
immediately following the reforms of Cleisthenes offers a good context'). Lewis 
dated it to about 510-500 in IG i3 1. The decree, then, suggests - if Meiggs/ Lewis 
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are correct in their conclusions - some taxation in Athens following the reforms of 
Cleisthenes. 6 
But what taxation? I discussed Pollux 8 129 et seq in Chapter Eight in the context 
of whether the eisphora was a flat-rate or a progressive tax. 7 It is interesting that 
Ste. Croix in a recently-published essay (but written in 1960), while (rightly) 
adhering to his view that the Pollux reference was no argument for a sliding scale of 
taxation, accepted the passage as probable evidence that the census classes were 
intended to be used as the basis for direct taxation. 8 The three top classes would pay 
at the same rate, whatever it was on each occasion, but on a notional assessment 
which was different for each class, so that if the rate of the levy was 1%, for 
example, each Pentakosiosmedimnos would pay 60 drachmas, each Hippeus 30 
drachmas and each Zeugites 10 drachmas. He said that whether tax was ever levied 
on this basis was another matter but that, if it was, the most likely time was in 508-
507 when Cleisthenes' constitution was promulgated. He added that he could not, 
however, believe that 'this very crude system' remained in use for very long during 
the fifth century. Ste. Croix's interpretation of the Pollux reference is possible, both 
in the way the tax was computed and in the date (although the reference could be an 
argument for taxation earlier than 508-507 - for example, in the time of Solon), but 
I believe that it could be an explanation of the taxation referred to in ML 14. 
6 Since ML 14 the debate has continued with the discovery of a new fragment (-]os) which 
Matthaiou has, placed at the end of the first line of the inscription which suggests that the decree is 
about either Athenians or cleruchs (Horos 8-9 1990-1991 pp 9-14). For the wider debate see Taylor 
Salamis and the Salaminioi pp 12-21. 
7 See pp 246-248. 
8 Athenian Democratic Origins pp 56-60. 
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Second, Aristotle Ath Pol 24 3, referring to Aristeides and the setting up of the 
Delian League in 4 78, said that 'the combined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes 
and the allies served to feed 20,000 men'. RhodesAth Pol Comm p 300 believes that 
this means taxes paid by Athenians and foreigners in Attica, and Mosse's edition of 
Aristotle Ath Pof is more explicit, referring inter alia to taxes levied at the Piraeus. 
Third, the word eisphora first appears in the Hestiaea (Hill B54 23 = IG i3 41 38) 
regulations of 446. However, the context where the word occurs is fragmentary, and 
the inscription relates to payments made by a foreign community and does not 
necessarily imply that the eisphora had been levied at that time in Athens. The 
word is used with chrematon - which suggests that here it may just mean 'paying in' 
and is not a technical term at all. L J Samons IT believes that the reassessment of 
tribute decree of 425-424 provides some evidence that most cities or synteleis 
collected their tribute payments through local eisphorai or property taxes and 
suggests that given the context the reference to the eisphora in the inscription 
should probably be connected with the collection oftribute. 10 Since the matter is not 
clear, we can say that there is evidence here of some kind of eisphora during the 
period but not necessarily in Athens. But if there was eisphora elsewhere, there 
could have been eisphora in Athens. 
Fourth, there are the two references to taxes in the Financial Decrees of Callias, 11 
which, if dated to 434-433, suggest that taxes of some kind could have been levied 
some time earlier than this date. The full texts of these Decrees are in the 
Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. In the first of the Financial Decrees of 
9 Aristote Constitution d' Athenes p 56. 
10 Empire of the Ow/2000 p 182. 
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Callias there is a reference to a dekate. As I said in Chapter Three, 12 there is literary 
evidence of a dekate in 410 where it was a tax levied at the Hellespont on goods, 
especially food, coming from the Black Sea. Some have argued that these 
references are to one and the same tax and that this tax could well go back into the 
Pentakontaetia as part of a 'closed sea policy' for the Aegean. 13 Another possibility 
is that it may have been the tenth part of the sale ofbooty brought to Athens. 14 
In the second of the Financial Decrees of Callias we learn that no eisphora could be 
moved without a preliminary vote of adeia (that is, a kind of immunity) to the 
Assembly. (This was a way of slowing down contentious decisions : the Assembly 
had to vote itself immunity at one meeting and decide at another). As I said in 
Chapter One, 15 the reference indicates that eisphora could have been collected 
about or before this time but not that it was. If, of course, it was, this could take the 
eisphora well back into the middle years of the century, if not earlier. 
Fifth, there is the tantalising reference in Thucydides 3 19 to the eisphora of 200T 
being collected in 428/427 'then for the first time'. Thucydides 1 141 said, some 
three years earlier, that 'it is accumulated wealth, and not forced eisphorai, that 
sustains wars'. Again, I believe that this reference could be read with the second of 
the Financial Decrees of Callias in suggesting that the eisphora could have been 
longstanding by the time of the Peloponnesian War. 
11 ML58. 
12 See pp 94-97. 
13 Robin Osborne The Athenian Empire 4th edition 2000 pp 82 and 59. 
14 Pritchett The Greek State at War Part I 1991 p 98. 
274 
Some taxation not ruled out 
This, then, is some evidence of the possibility of some taxation in Athens between 
the Pisistratids and the Peloponnesian War. It is true that it does not give any very 
clear indication that there were taxes in Athens in this period, but I believe that at 
least some taxes were likely. With this evidence one may put the statement of 
Aristophanes at the beginning of this thesis that Athens' income in the 420s was 
2000T, as suggesting some taxes in addition to the eisphora. Of the various taxes I 
have referred to, I suggest that maritime import/export/transit/embarkation taxes are 
the most likely possibility. I believe, in short, that this evidence -together with my 
concerns about the sources of Athenian expenditure during at least the pre-454 
period, if not later - at least does not rule out taxation in this period even if it does 
not rule it in~ and that Lewis may one day prove to be right. 
15 Seep 26 et seq. 
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(ii) THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF 430-380 
Major wars inevitably change the societies that engage in them. The First World 
War and the Second World War both changed English society radically. So it was 
with the Peloponnesian War and Athens. Between 432 and 404 Athens lost half its 
population, its empire and practically all its fleet. This precipitated something of a 
cultural revolution which affected every part of its life, social, political and artistic 
over the fifty-year period from 430 to 380. 16 The war affected patterns of 
landowning, food production and importation. From 413 the silver mines at 
Laurium, which had contributed so much to Athens' imperial prosperity in the 
previous 50 years, were effectively put out of action. The Sicilian disaster shook 
Athenian confidence and was followed by two brief periods of oligarchy. When the 
democracy was restored in 403, it was different from the democracy which Athens 
enjoyed in 430, not just in formal constitutional rules and practices but in attitudes. 
There was also cultural change, in tragedies and comedies both in themes and forms 
and in the iconography of Athenian red-figure pottery. This revolution was 
manifested in state finance, not least in taxation. During the period 430 to 380 
Athens moved from a heavy reliance on financing from Empire to seeking to stand 
on its own feet, and taxes played a part in that process. There is undoubtedly some 
truth in Robert Parker's claim that Greeks generally tried to get other people to pay 
taxes to finance them, 17 and this is particularly seen in the development of maritime 
taxation (although maritime tax was, of course, paid by Athenians and non-
16 I acknowledge here a large debt of gratitude to the inspiration I have received from the seminars of 
Professor Robin Osborne in relation to his AHRB research project 'The Anatomy of the Cultural 
Revolution 430-380 BC' in Cambridge over the last three years, which explored all these themes. 
17 Athenian Religion p 125. 
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Athenians alike). Nevertheless the Athenians expected the wealthy to pay a fair 
amount of taxes in the form of the eisphora and liturgies. But these attempts by 
Athens to become self-supporting proved insufficient and by the end of the period 
430-380 Athens was trying once again to supplement its income first on a 
piecemeal basis and then from the Confederacy. 
I look first at how Athens dealt with these financial problems between 430 and 400 
both on the domestic front and on the maritime front, then at to what extent the 
Empire financed Athens. Finally, I discuss how Athens dealt with a second 
financial crisis after the loss of Empire between 400 and 380. 
The domestic front 
As we have seen, Thucydides 3 19 declared that in 428-427 an eisphora of 200T 
was levied 'then for the first time' to meet the shortfall in the state's finances, and I 
have given the evidence for the tax being levied later, if not every year. The amount 
raised in 428-427 was roughly half the amount of annual tribute from the Empire 
before the War according to the tribute lists. There are a couple of references in 
Aristophanes' Knights 773-776 and 923-926, which may give a clue to the political 
circumstances in which the eisphora was introduced. It seems from these references 
that Cleon, the demagogue, was in some way involved in the eisphora. He may 
have proposed that the tax was levied on one or more occasions ('you'll pay me a 
fine penalty for this, when I squeeze you with eisphorai; for I'll arrange to get you 
registered among the rich'). 18 
18 Reminiscent of Denis Healey in his May 1978 Budget speech who threatened to squeeze the rich 
until the pips squeaked. 
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The next recorded tax chronologically was the eponion in 415. Again we see the 
democracy taxing wealthy men (although Thucydides 6 61 says that there was a 
fear that the culprits were plotting against the democracy, it is not certain that they 
were and some do not believe that they were), this time on the confiscation of their 
property. There are several references to the eponion taxing sales of confiscated 
property in the fourth century. But the fact that the eponion is referred to as a sales 
tax on the grain brought from Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros in the recently-
discovered Grain-Tax Law of374-373 19 suggests that the eponion may have been a 
general sales tax, and this could have substantial consequences for Athenian 
finance. 
There is no reason to doubt that Athens levied four other taxes at this time. The first 
two were taxes levied on particular activities in Athens : the silver tax, levied on the 
mines at Laurium before they collapsed, and the tax on prostitutes. The third was 
the metoikion, levied on metics, foreigners staying in Athens. And fourth, a local 
taxation based on demes. And it is likely that Athenian religious taxes, some of 
which are recorded just before the Peloponnesian War (see Chapter Two), were 
levied at this time. 20 
The maritime front 
The tribute was reassessed in 425 to between 1460 and 1500T although I doubt if 
the Athenians actually managed to collect as much as that, and some think that it 
19 Hesperia Supplement 29 1998. 
20 Seep 73 et seq. 
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was scaled down to lOOOT in 422. It was replaced by a 5% tax in 413 towards the 
end of the disastrous Sicilian Expedition (Thucydides 7 28), Lisa Kallet arguing that 
this represented a change in the Athenians' conception of their rule, in particular, 
that it marked a shift from a political system to more of an economic system. 21 My 
feeling is that it is more likely to have been a panic measure resulting from the 
shock of the Sicilian disaster. It certainly marked a practical change in Athens' tax 
collecting arrangements. As Kagan has recently put it, the tax shifted the burden 
from landowners to merchants, who benefitted from the Empire and might be more 
willing to pay taxes and be better disposed to Athens. 22 
Meanwhile Athens in the person of Alcibiades continued trying to find more 
income in 410 by levying (or re-levying, if you take the view that this is the same 
tax as that referred to in the first Financial Decree of Calli as - see in (i) above in this 
Chapter) a 10% tax on traffic passing through the Hellespont. This was a further 
development of Athens' imperial philosophy, which had ramifications not only for 
Athens' finance but for her wider foreign policy of a closed Aegean Sea and the 
provision of grain from the Black Sea. Finally, we have the first main evidence for a 
maritime import/export tax in Andocides 1 Mysteries 133-134 referring to tax-
farmers bidding for the right to collect a 2% maritime import/export tax. 
21 Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydldes passim including p 196 . .Kallet also·argues that 
the change may be connected with the Coinage Decree, to which I refer in Chapter Ten (p 301 et 
seq). I do not share her enthusiasm for this proposition : the Coinage Decree is already a very 
controversial subject and there is so little evidence for the eikoste. 
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To what extent did the Empire finance Athens? 
It is often said that the Deli an League/Empire financed Athens, and no survey of the 
periods covered by both Part 1 and Part 2 of this Chapter would be complete 
without discussing what evidence there is for the proposition that the League 
actually paid money to Athens, as opposed to Athens merely benefitting indirectly 
from the League. 
Ten Hellenotamiai were originally responsible both for receiving and disbursing the 
funds of the Delian League, while ten apodektai received and ten kolakretai 
disbursed the funds of the Athenian state. The apodektai survived into the fourth 
century but the kolakretai are last attested in 418-41 7 or 416-415. In or after 410 the 
Hellenotamiai numbered twenty and made payments which earlier would have been 
made by the kolakretai, so it is likely that the imperial and city treasuries were 
amalgamated about this time (see Aristotle Ath Po/30 2 and Rhodes Comm Ath Pol 
pp 391-392). 
The authors of The Athenian Tribute Lists set out detailed argumentation of how 
funds passed from the League to Athens, partly arguing from the Strasbourg 
Papyrus, an uncertain text which some interpret as suggesting that a tribute reserve 
of 5000T was brought up to the Acropolis and placed in the keeping of Athena with 
a possible further 3000T later?3 Lisa Kallet attacked, I think successfully, the whole 
An reconstruction but she did not prove that there was no diversion of League 
22 The Peloponnesian Warp 329. 
23 Vol 3 pp 326-345. 
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money. Indeed she did not dismiss the suggestion in Plutarch Pericles 12 2 that 
some money had been given by the League to Athens. 24 Giovannini later argued 
that only the aparche of 1/60 was spent on the Acropolis buildings. 25 No one has 
argued categorically that no funds were paid by the League to Athens and my view 
is that given the efforts Athens made to keep the League together it would be 
surprising if no funds found their way to Athens. I believe, in short, that it is likely 
that the Empire did fund Athens directly but that that there is no certain evidence of 
the extent to which it did so. However much the funds were, they were clearly not 
enough because Athens levied the eisphora in 428 and continued to levy it, even if 
only sporadically, and the 5% tax of 413 looks like a tax levied by Athens and for 
Athens alone. 
A second financial crisis 
When Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, it also lost the Empire and the tribute 
from Empire. It seems that the measures it had taken on the domestic and maritime 
fronts, as described above, were not enough. Athens did receive some money from 
the Persians in 396 :the satrap Pharnabazus sent a Rhodian agent called Timocrates 
with SOT to bribe Argos, Corinth, Thebes and Athens to join Persia against Sparta. 
This seems to have contributed to a revival of Athenian naval power. I have 
suggested that it is possible that Athens tried to raise further taxes, like the 
pentakosioste and the tessarakoste in the 390s, to improve her financial position. 
What is clear is that Thrasybulus then reestablished the dekate in the Hellespont. 
He also imposed a 5% tax on Thasos (/G ii2 24) and Clazomenae (/G ii2 28 = R&O 
24 C4 1989 (= CSC4 20) pp 252-266. 
25 Historia 39 1990 pp 129-148; 46 1997 pp 145-157. 
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18) about the same time. Other states may have paid this tax as well but these are 
the only ones we know of It seems to me that Athens' main concern at this time 
was twofold, although the two strands were linked - restoring the Empire and 
receiving income from allies (in the absence of further domestic taxes), and 
Thrasybulus responded to these concerns. 26 
I would argue that these actions and taxes were the precursors of the Confederacy, 
which was established at the end of this period of 430-380, in 378-377?7 It is true 
that the epigraphical evidence for the Confederacy, when it was established, sets out 
in some detail that this was not to be a second Empire, in that it laid down that there 
was to be no tribute, and that Athens was not going to do various things to the 
members which it had done to the Delian League's members. There were 
contributions (syntaxeis) to Athens assessed and collected by the synedrion of the 
allies. I accept that there is no evidence that any money from the syntaxeis was 
diverted to Athenian purposes, but this does not mean that none was. Some, like 
Cargill, take the view that Athens' intentions were honourable both at the time of 
the establishment of the Confederacy and throughout the period of the 
Confederacy. 28 Others are inclined to give the Athenians some credit for its 
intentions at the beginning of the Confederacy but not throughout. Maybe Athens 
never grew rich on the syntaxeis but I cannot help thinking that the wording on the 
stele has some of the hallmarks of what we know of as modem 'spin', that the 
Confederacy was in reality an attempt to resurrect the old Empire, and that it was in 
this sense a continuation of the policy which Thrasybulus carried out of reviving the 
26 Compare Seager 'Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian hnperialism, 396-386 BC', JHS 87, 1967 pp 
95-115 and Cawkwell 'The hnperialism ofThrasybulus' Classical Quarterly 26 1976 pp 270-277. 
27 R&O 22. 
28 The Second Athenian League pp 189 et seq. 
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eikoste and the dekate before the Confederacy, which I discussed in Chapter 
Three. 29 Plutarch observed in his Solon 15 2 that 'later writers observe that the 
ancient Athenians used to cover up the ugliness of things with polite and endearing 
names. Thus they called prostitutes 'companions', tribute 'contributions' (Tovs oe 
<p6povs crvvTa~ElS), the garrison of a city its 'guard' and the prison a 'chamber"'. 
Tax and financial administration 
The period 430-380 saw two important developments in tax and financial 
administration. First, it is clear from the Agora Excavations that there was 
substantial building in the Agora between 430 and 400. It is thought that the new 
Bouleuterion, which accommodated, among other things, the administration of the 
tax-farming - poletai - records, dates from 410 to 405. The second development 
concerns the allocation of income to expenditure. Athens in the fourth century 
apportioned its income formally between civil and military expenditure. The first 
time this apportionment - merismos - is recorded is in an inscription of 386 (Tod 
116 = R&O 19). In the fifth century income had been assigned to state expenditure 
informally as and when it was required. I have suggested that this merismos shows a 
degree of state budgeting not always appreciated, although the allocation was 
strictly to different spending authorities rather than to expenditure for different 
purposes. 
29 Compare /G e228 = JG ih2, dated 385-384, which contains the words ev TWJ.l n6l\e[wv oowv 
i\]9nv[aio)-[t KpaT]oo[t)v but this part of the inscription is generally thought to be a republication 
of an earlier decree from the fifth centmy (compare Dover HCT 4 pp 379-380 and Rhodes The 
Athenian Boule pp 83-84). This is not the only example of a fourth century inscription which could 
be said to be a republication of a fifth centmy inscription and there is a sense, as Polly Low argues in 
JHS 125 2005 pp 95-99, that tliese inscriptions have to be taken seriously as fourth century 
documents. She concludes that these decrees are about imperial power, not of a coercive variety but 
a power that 'depends on status, prestige and the ability to outbid one's rivals in a battle of 
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Finance in a period of turmoil 
I have suggested in this Part that taxes were as much a part of the cultural 
revolution of 430 to 380 as other issues. Building up a picture from fragmentary 
information is always hazardous, but I have argued that in the two segments of the 
period- 430 to 400 and 400 to 380- Athens was undoubtedly seeking new forms of 
finance first to fight the Peloponnesian War (and the eisphora was clearly an 
important part of that strategy) and second to recover from its defeat in that War 
(and the maritime taxes, and the activities of Thrasybulus in the Aegean and 
Hellespont were an equally important part of that strategy). By the end of the period 
I believe that Athens was looking to a combination of finance both from taxes, 
direct and indirect, and from the Confederacy. 
competitive generosity'. I find Polly Low's comments helpful in support of my half-way house view 
on Athens' position on the Confederacy. 
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(iii) FROM CONFEDERACY TO L YCURGUS 
In the first two sections of this Chapter I argued that there is likely to have been at 
least some taxation in the period between the Pisistratids and the Peloponnesian 
War, and that the latter gave rise to an impetus towards taxation in the period 430 to 
380. In this section I argue that after the failure of Athens to raise income from a 
second Empire there is likely to have been a lot of taxation by the time of Eubulus 
and Lycurgus: in fact, that the period ofEubulus and Lycurgus was, as it were, the 
golden age of Athenian taxation. 
Sophisticated tax lawmaking 
The most recently discovered evidence we have of new taxes between 380 and the 
time of Eubulus and Lycurgus is the Grain-Tax Law in 374-373. It is worth 
mentioning how sophisticated tax lawmaking, as demonstrated by this Law, had 
become by this time. 30 John Davies has recently remarked that this Law and 
Nicophon's Coinage Law of 375-374, also newly discovered, 'both reveal the 
workings of sophisticated minds, accustomed to thinking an administrative-political 
problem through, devising a tightly defined step-by-step procedure to deal with it, 
driving it through the political process, and buttressing the new procedure with 
appropriate sanctions to make sure it is effectively carried out'. 31 If the Law's 
drafting seems vague and awkward in places - as some have suggested - this may at 
least partly be explained by the fact that related legislation has not, so far, survived. 
Also, my experience of many years trying to draft modem tax laws is that the end 
30 Pace Michael Crawford's comments above on Greek inscriptions generally (see pp l0-11). 
31 Classics in Progress 2002 p 242. 
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product sometimes does not always look, for a variety of reasons, as workmanlike 
as one would have wished. For example, amendments that sometimes have to be 
made at short notice during the passage of legislation, in order to get as wide 
agreement as possible, often make the legislation look less than elegant. I guess that 
it is not unlikely that Agyrrhius had to take on board last minute amendments in a 
controversial law of this kind. 
Eubunus and Lycurgus 
In the last thirty years of the period covered by this thesis, that is, from 355 to 325, 
Athens' finances prospered to an extent not seen since the days of the tribute in the 
5th century. As we shall see later in the thesis, 32 Demosthenes 10 38-39 said in 341 
that state income totalled 400T and that 'not long ago' it had been 130T. Plutarch 
Mora/ia 842F put Athens' annual revenue at 1200T a year in the 320s, and this 
figure has been generally accepted by historians. At the same time one has to 
recognise that there could well have been up to 1 000/o inflation between the 5th and 
4th centuries, and I return to this in Chapter Twelve. 33 
The two men credited with this transformation of Athenian finance were first, 
Eubulus and then, Lycurgus. The former was 'probably the most important 
Athenian statesman of the period 355 to 342'.34 The latter 'played the major part in 
the construction of the city's finances for a period of twelve years', from about 336 
32 See pp 333-334. 
33 Seep 329. Also compare, for example, Loomis Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation In Classical 
Athens, p 257. 
34 According to Cawkwell OCIY p 563. 
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to 325-32435, although Brun's recent article (see note on page 48) cautioned against 
attributing to Lycurgus everything that was done during the 'Lycurgan era'. I am not 
immediately convinced by the totality of this minimalist article and in this Chapter I 
am taking the conventional view summarised by Cawkwell. Eubulus was able to 
achieve what he did by means of his position as a theoric commissioner. Lycurgus 
probably held a position akin to that of a financial overlord. If he had an official 
title, it would have been 6 hrl Tij ototKi]crEt 'the man in charge of administration'. 36 
It seems sensible to look at them together because in some ways Lycurgus built on 
initiatives that Eubulus started. Andreades and others have said of Lycurgus, and 
others have said also of Eubulus, that we know more about how he spent the money 
than how he raised it.37 
I would like to make two more specific points about Lycurgus, since they have a 
bearing on the relevance ofLycurgus to this thesis. 
The first is to consider from what date Lycurgus' influence commenced. I referred 
to this above as about 336 and this is the date historians usually give. I find it a little 
unlikely, however, that Lycurgus would suddenly in his fifties have come to power 
without any kind of political apprenticeship. In fact we know from Demosthenes 9 
72 and [Plutarch] Orators 841E that Lycurgus went on embassies to the 
Peloponnese before that date. And Stephen Lambert has argued, I think 
convincingly, for 'Lycurgan' religio-financial policy being pursued, probably by 
35 Again, according to Cawkwell OCD 3 p 898. 
36 Comp,are Hesperia 29 1960 pp 3-4. Compare also Rhodes 'Athenian Democmcy after 403 BC' pp 
312-3 i5 on how Eubulus establiShed his hold on Athenian finances through the Theoric Fund and, 
after attempts were made by Demosthenes and others to weaken the office, how Lycurgus 
established his position of 'the man in charge of administmtion'. 
37 A History of Greek Public Finance pp 376-378. 
287 
Lycurgus, in the 340s. 38 I believe, therefore, that it is likely that Lycurgus cut his 
political teeth before 336 rather than that he was seen at the time of Chaeronea 'as a 
dignified elderly man best known through his performance of religious rituals' as 
Sally Humphreys has described him. 39 
The second point I would like to make concerns the nature of his achievements. 
Sally Humphreys' judgement is that 'the rationalisation of the Athenian economy 
had less lasting effects than his encouragement of donations from wealthy 
benefactors'. Lycurgus certainly was successful in the latter but I believe that this 
judgement does less than justice to Lycurgus' achievements in pulling round the 
Athenian economy from the state it was in in the 350s and that Lycurgus would 
himself have seen encouraging such donations as an integral part of his handling of 
the economy anyway. As Stephen Lambert has said in his Rationes Centesimarum 
(page 291), some of Lycurgus' policies have resonances with our own time and 
what might have seemed in the fourth century anti-democratic measures would be 
seen in modem European terms as anti-socialist, Americanising or 'Thatcherite'. 
The relevance of these two points for this thesis is first, that it is likely that 
Lycurgus was responsible, either alone or initially with Eubulus, for putting Athens' 
finances on a sound footing from the 340s and this included taxation (see my 
calculations of the contribution taxation made to the Lycurgan economy in Chapter 
Twelve);40 and second that Lycurgus had a wider vision of the Athenian economy 
than his predecessors and that this included taxation (I give more evidence of this 
below but compare, for example, his apparently innovative use of the pentekoste to 
38 See 'The Sacrificial Calendar of the Marathonian Tetrapolis' ZPE 130 2000 p 68. 
39 
'Lycurgus ofButadae' p 200. 
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fund the Festival of the Little Panathenaea41 and of the hekatoste and eponion to 
fund the religious treasuries).42 Eubulus was active in the 350s- 340s. We have no 
evidence for cooperation between him and Lycurgus, and Eubulus was opposed to 
Demosthenes whereas Lycurgus supported him. So the process was perhaps more a 
matter of Blair stealing Thatcher's clothes? Both found new ways of getting and 
spending money, and themselves controlling the process. 
Primitivists have argued that the revival of Athens' finances during this period was 
wholly consonant with an economy that remained fully embedded. 43 Others have 
sought to 'adjust' the primitivist model to accommodate the increased economic 
activity. 44 Another wider issue posed by this increased economic activity is how, or 
if, Athenian democracy changed from the 5th century to the 4th century, and if it did, 
how it came about.45 Millett argues against the privileging of fifth century over 
fourth century Athens by historians which goes back at least as far as Grote and 
against the labelling of changes in democracy in Athens, like 'radical' as applied by 
Hansen to the fifth and 'moderate' as applied by him to the fourth century. 
I see Athens being less involved in taking the Greek stage in the Lycurgan period 
than she had been (for example, no confederacy), and having the time to 
concentrate on looking after her own interests at home. The battle of Chaeronea 
underlined this more settled state. Athens after Chaeronea was likely to have been 
40 Seep 343. 
41 Seep 116 et seq. 
42 See pp 50-52. 
43 Compare, for example, Austin and Vidal-Naquet Economic and Social History pp 147-152. 
44 B1l:fke 'The Economics of Athens in the Classical Em' p 201 et seq, who argued that the onset of 
coriiniert:ialism had as a precondition a variety of economic activity which was in no way related to 
trade and that central to that activity were the widespread and long-term cash subsidies provided by 
the state to its citizens. 
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in some kind of pragmatic accommodation with Macedon, although the details of 
this are open to debate.46 Some have seen under Lycurgus' direction the 
implementation of a programme of patriotic renewal, aimed ultimately at resisting 
further interference from Macedon. 47 Or to put it more specifically, Athens under 
Lycurgus was not going to oppose Macedon while there was no chance of success, 
but at the same time wanted to be ready to seize an opportunity if one arose. 
Eubulus in the late 350s-340s tried to end Athens' rarely successful military 
adventures, and between Chaeronea and Alexander's death we do not know that 
Athens did any fighting (compare Demosthenes 19 292 and 18 70). All these 
considerations were right for continuing the process that began in the time of 
Eubulus of pulling Athens round after a period of poor finances, for developing 
Piraeus as a centre of Greek commerce and encouraging non-Athenians to come to 
Athens and trade. Eubulus and Lycurgus seized the moment and by their financial 
acumen took advantage of the circumstances. 
Evidence for taxation 
There is no reason to doubt that the taxes that had been enacted earlier in the fourth 
century continued during this period and indeed increased in view of the increased 
state expenditure which I shall discuss in Chapter Twelve. 48 I believe that there is 
substantial evidence of taxation in the time ofEubulus and Lycurgus. 
45 Compare Millett 'Mogens Hansen and the Labelling of Athenian Democracy' in Polis and Politics, 
2000 p 337 et seq. 
46 Burke 'Lycurgan Finances' GRBS 26 1985 p 251. 
47 Like Mitchel Lykourgan Athens: 338-322 pp 211-214. 
48 Seep 334 et seq. 
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First, the most celebrated recently discovered evidence is the Law on the Little 
Panathenaea of 335 discussed in Chapter Three.49 Aristonicus of Marathon, the 
mover of the Law, was a supporter of the Lycurgan programme. For example, he 
supported Lycurgus' decree to send ships against pirates (JG ii2 1623 276-308) and 
he was later executed along with other anti-Macedonians after the Lamian War. 50 
As we have seen, 51 the Law on the Little Panathenaea imposed a maritime 
import/export tax of 2% on traffic at the border at Oropus that Athens acquired 
about 335 (if with me you believe that it was a maritime tax, subject of course to the 
identification of Nea, which could change). I have referred to the greatly expanded 
harbour facilities at Piraeus during this period and, although I have not discovered 
any specific reference to a maritime import/export tax at Piraeus at this period, I 
imagine that there would have been detailed regulations for it in view of this 
increased traffic. 
Second, some references in tax arrangements which Athens made with other states 
during the period are evidence of Athens levying other taxes in this period. Athens 
honoured loyal Acarnanians in 337, giving the Acarnanians exemption from the 
metoikion and equality with Athenian citizens in paying the eisphora (Tod 178 = 
R&O 77); a grant of isote/eia to Asclepiodorus (JG ii2 276 = Schwenk 12); a grant 
of isote/eia to Phanostratus (JG ii2 113 = Schwenk 60); and Athens honouring 
Heracleides of Salamis (JG ii2 360 = Schwenk 68 = R&O 95) which gives evidence 
of the eisphora. One may, however, add the large number of proxeny and other 
honorary decrees in Schwenk's collection, at least some of which may have given 
the relevant proxenoi and others exemption from taxation, even though the 
49 Seep 116 et seq. 
50 Mitchel Lycurgan Athens: 338-322 p 36. 
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inscriptions as preserved do not specify this. It is likely that there was a substantial 
influx of metics to Athens in the more settled conditions of this period (compare 
what I have said in various parts of this thesis about measures taken to increase the 
prosperity of Piraeus), which would have increased the yield of the metoikion and 
the xenika. Athens honoured Eudemus of Plataea in 329, giving him certain 
privileges, including paying the eisphora along with the Athenians (Tod 198 = 
R&O 94). I think that we can assume, in the light of these inscriptions, that the 
metoikion and the eisphora (pre-existing taxes) were flourishing during this period. 
Third, the epigraphical evidence of 341 of what Robin Osborne called the 
'cautionary tale' of Meixidemus' public debt which arose from his going surety for 
various tax-farmers, who had failed to produce the tax payments due from them. 52 I 
referred to this lengthy extract from the poletai lists of Agora XIX P 26 in Chapter 
Five. 53 This extract gives a clear indication that the metoikion, the silver tax and 
various religious taxes were being levied during this period. 
Fourth, I mentioned in Chapter One the epigraphical evidence for an eisphora as a 
regular tax of 1 OT a year. 54 I have said that I think that the well-known eisphora 
would have raised more than this and I have suggested that this looks like a 
different tax for which the same Greek word was used. One possibility is that this 
was a tax paid by metics alone. Although we do not know what kind of tax this was, 
it was clearly a tax and should be included with the evidence for taxes levied during 
this period. 
51 Seep 116 et seq. 
52 Demos pp 1-2. 
53 Seep 171. 
54 JG ii2 244 19; 505 15. See p 32. 
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Fifth, the hekatoste, which I described in Chapter One. 55 This is attested by sixteen 
fragments of inscriptions dated between 343 and 325, recording a 1% tax on sales 
of land by groups of Athenian citizens to individual Athenians in Attica. This sales 
programme seems to have been part of the work ofLycurgus to raise revenue and to 
improve the exploitation of Athens' land resources. 
The golden age of Athenian taxation 
Both Eubulus and Lycurgus were famous for their financial acumen. 56 As Schwenk 
says, the decrees she lists as having been proposed by Lycurgus, and others we 
know from literary sources, concern important matters and show the many ways in 
which Lycurgus tried to revitalise Athens. I believe that it would be surprising if 
taxation did not play an important part in the financial programmes of Eubulus and 
Lycurgus on which they embarked to fund the increased state expenditure they put 
in train. (I make an attempt to quantify Lycurgus' programme in Chapter Twelve of 
this thesis.) In this sense I would rank the period ofEubulus and Lycurgus as some 
kind of golden age of Athenian taxation. 
55 See p 47 et seq. 
56 On Eubulus Plutarch Moralia 812 et seq : 'by putting himself in charge of financial affairs, he 
increased the national resources and, from them, greatly benefitted the city'. On Lycurgus a decree 
quoted in [Plutarch] Orat 852b: 'in his public life he made good laws for his country, and becoming 
treasurer of the public revenue for 3 periods of 4 years, he disbursed from the public revenue 
189001". 
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TEN 
COINAGE AND THE PAYMENT OF TAXES 
Coinage and taxes often have common points of reference, and I refer to coinage and 
taxes in ancient Athens several times in this thesis. In particular, the silver tax and the 
significant effect that Laurium had on the Athenian economy in Chapter Two, 1 my 
suggestion that coin hoards may sometimes have been used for tax evasion in Chapter 
Five2 and coinage as evidence for the quantum of state expenditure in Chapter 
Twelve. 3 I propose in this Chapter to supplement these references with a brief account 
of the introduction of coinage in Athens; and how taxes were paid (and kept when 
they had been paid) in Athens. 
The introduction of coinage 
The general view is that coinage first appeared in western Asia Minor before the 
middle of the sixth century, spread to Greece a little later and was introduced in 
Athens just before Pisistratus. But some argue that it was introduced in Athens later 
than this, for example, Price and Waggoner, who date archaic Athenian coinage 
from c 545 or later to 4754 and more extreme still, Vickers, who argued against 
coinage in Solon's day and suggested that much of the Solonian legislation reflected 
1 See pp 60-65. 
2 See pp 175-177. 
3 See pp 328-329. 
4 Archaic Greek Coinage. 
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conditions prevailing in Attica in the later 460s. 5 Vickers, however, evoked a 
reaction from Root, who was not convinced by the evidence produced by him and 
urged earlier dates. 6 
Athens was achieving a settled government under Pisistratus, but why did 
Pisistratus initiate (or develop) Athenian coinage? Kraay believed that although the 
exports of Athenian olive oil and black figure pottery were increasing, foreign trade 
did not seem to have been his object. 7 If it had been, 'his coins would surely have 
carried some less variable and more explicit indication of their origin, and would 
have been found far from Attica instead of usually within her borders or in their 
immediate neighbourhood'. Kraay thought that it was more likely that the coinage 
was intended for internal use; 'the stable rule of Pisistratus and his sons allowed 
trade and wealth to increase, making civic life far more complex than hitherto; 
taxes, harbour dues and fines were exacted; payments were made for public works, 
for private monuments and for mercenary troops. All such transactions would be 
greatly simplified by the creation of an official medium of payment, the use of 
which could be made obligatory; the early existence of a whole range of fractional 
denominations below the standard didrachm suggests that these coins were 
generally adopted into local trade, at least in the city of Athens itself. Martin says 
5 
'Early Greek Coinage, a reassessment' Numismatic Chronicle 145 1985, pp 42-44. 
6 
'Evidence from Persepolis for the Dating of Persian and Archaic Greek Coinage' Numismatic 
Chronicle 148 1988, pp 10-12. 
7 Kraay Coins of Ancient Athens, pp 1-3. Kraay wrote the words I quote in the next few lines in 
1968. They differ in some respects from what seems to be the general perception of Kraay's view 
that coinage was at first issued only in large denominations, and that it could not have been used for 
everyd(ly purciJases (cf Ste. Croix Athenian Democratic Origins p 415). The latter position was 
presumably Kraay's original view (see JHS 84 1964 pp 76-91). Kraay's 1968 view has been 
developed by Kim - see what I have written on payment of taxes later in this Chapter. 
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that 'coinage naturally ... suited Pisistratus's new strategy for meeting the fiscal 
needs of the city - his system of taxation - and his personal need for defence, which 
he met by hiring mercenaries'. 8 
It is generally bel~eved that during the reign of Pisistratus' son Hippias the varying 
designs of the Pisistratid coinage were replaced by the invariable types of the 
helmeted head of Athena on the obverse, and of her owl on the reverse. Moreover, 
the owl was now accompanied by an inscription which gave the first three letters of 
the name of the Athenians. No literary text tells us the purpose behind these new 
types, but Kraay says that we can hardly be wrong in deducing that they were 
intended to do what they do so clearly, namely to inform users of the origin of the 
coin~ and since Athenians would presumably know their own coins, the users so 
addressed must have been outside Attica. In other words, Kraay believes that these 
new large coins with their explicit Athenian designs were intended to serve the 
purposes of foreign trade, as is clear from the distribution of coins found in Sicily 
and south Italy, in the Aegean islands, in South Asia Minor and in Syria, Egypt and 
Cyrene. 
This thesis is not the place to engage in a debate about the generally accepted 
account of the introduction of coinage that I have given above. I find the thrust of 
the account convincing, although it is not accepted by all numismatists. 9 
8 Martin 'Why did the Greek Polis Originally Need Coins?' Historia 45 1996 p 273. Martin recalls 
that Parke said long ago, echoing Herodotus, Pisistratus 'rooted his tyranny with many mercenaries 
and much revenue'. 
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The payment of taxes 
I now look in more detail at the use of coins to pay taxes. There were three peaks of 
mint production at Laurium during the period of this thesis - the first two decades of 
the 5th century, the 450s to 415 and the second half of the 4th century. 10 One cannot 
draw any specific conclusions from this, beyond commenting that the second and 
· third of these periods were periods of substantial payments of tribute and taxes 
respectively and there is here a possible correlation between taxation and coinage. 
Payment in kind 
However, we should step back a moment. As Kim has said, coinage should not be 
seen as the starting point so much as a milestone along a much longer road in the 
use of money. It is clear, for example, that tax payments were made in grain in 
Ptolemaic Egypt, that 'the granaries held deposit accounts for individual 
landowners, who through the sito/ogoi could make payments by giro transfer, either 
for tax in their own name due at another village, or to the accounts of other 
individuals held at the same or a different granary. Thus we can say that in Roman 
Egypt wheat itself served some of the functions of a currency'. 11 Another example 
of tax being paid in kind is Caesar extracting three million pounds weight of olive-
9 Compare Trevett 'Coinage and Democmcy at Athens' in Meadows and Shipton Money and Its 
Uses in the Ancient World, p. 23 et seq. 
10 Conophagos Le Laurium Antique table facing p 57. 
11Rowlandson in Money and Its Uses in the Ancient Greek World p 147 (P O.zy 31 2588-91, 38 
2863-72). 
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oil from Leptis Magna annually (Caesar Bellum Africanum 97 3), 12 thereby 
incidentally reducing her from the status of an independent 'friend and ally of the 
Roman People' to that of a 'stipendiary' or subject city. Wine also had a part in the 
extraction of rent, tax or tribute. 13 Examples are the part wine played in the system 
of tax and tribute in the economy of the Minoan palaces, 14 the dues owed to the city 
of Genoa by the people of the Ligurian Apennines, including the payment of one 
sixth of the wine they produced in the late second century, and the annual tax 
payments in jars of wine in Cherronesus between Cyrenaica and Egypt in the 
second century AD. 
Payment of Athenian taxes 
Historians generally take the view that most Athenian taxes were paid in coins (the 
Grain-Tax Law was an exception). Compare, for example, Demosthenes 34 7 where 
he prayed in aid the entry made in the books of the customs officers 
(pentekostologoi) to show the value of goods carried by a ship from Athens. But it 
is sometimes doubted whether small farmers at the time of Pisistratus would have 
used coins to pay taxes (that is, whether it is right to assume that they did not pay 
their taxes in kind). I mentioned above that Kraay had suggested that coins might 
have been used for paying taxes in the time of Pisistratus. Work has been done in 
recent years by some numismatists, particularly Kim, on fractional coins, indicating 
12 Compare D J Mattingly 'Olive Oil Production in Roman Tripolitania' in D J Buck and D J 
Mattingly (edd) Town and Country in Roman Tripolitania p 27 and p 32 where Mattingly calculates 
that this could represent the production of some 213.000 trees. 
13 See Horden and Purcell The Corrupting Sea p 218. 
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that much more fractional coinage was issued in the sixth century than had been 
previously realised. Kim has cited, in particular, a number of early sources which 
document the use of small change in a range of legal, religious and commercial 
activities. For example, he has cited scratchings which appear on the feet of Attic 
pottery from the last quarter of the sixth century, indicating their price in obols. 
Small change also appears in a number of inscriptions relating to religious 
ceremonies. 15 I believe that this work supports the belief that early coins might after 
all have been intended for use in everyday transactions, including paying taxes, and 
that Athenian taxes were indeed paid in coins, perhaps even from the time of 
Pisistratus. 
How were the coins kept? 
How were the coins kept when the tax had been paid and where was the tax kept? 
On the first question, I attach two photographs at the end of this Chapter. One is the 
well-known top of the inscription recording the appointment of the tribute collectors 
(ML 68). This shows jars and sacks, and it is likely that this is how taxes were kept 
after the tax had been paid. The second photograph shows what I understand is the 
only other extant Athenian relief which could relate to the keeping of money. It 
comes from the Ilissus Temple, dating perhaps from the 420s, and shows what look 
like two sacks tied at the top. 16 One cannot deduce much from this because it is 
14 McGovern The Origins and Ancient History of Wine pp 283-284. 
15 See Kim, 'Small change and the moneyed economy' in Money, labour and law in Ancient Greece 
pp 44-51. 
16 Picon 'The Ilisssos Temple Reconsidered' American Journal of Archaeooigy 82 1978 p 51 figure 1. 
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likely to be a mythological scene but there could be some relevance of sacks to 
temples in the sense that money was often kept in temples (like the Parthenon) 
because they were secure places, but the sacks could, of course, have contained 
things other than money. Money was kept in sacks in the story of Gylippus, who 
was sent by Lysander back from his campaign in Asia to Sparta with sacks of 
money. Gylippus, however, opened the sacks and took out some of the money for 
himself The sacks contained a written list of the money, unknown to Gylippus, 
who was then detected and fled the country. 17 I might add that money of the 'sacred 
chest' and the 'public chest' was kept in jars in Delos in the second century 'on 
which was indicated the provenience of the contents or the purpose for which it was 
earmarked'. 18 
This leads on to the second question. We know that in the fifth century the taxes 
were given to the apodektai, who paid them into the central treasury, and that after 
that the kolakretai made payments from the central treasury, and that in the fourth 
century the taxes were given to the apodektai, who apportioned the money to the 
relevant spending authority, but where was the money kept during these processes? 
We do not know the answer to this question, but what are the possibilities? Neer has 
said that securely identified treasuries are known only at Delphi and Olympia. 19 
Normally these treasuries were used for storing dedications and sacred things, but 
other things were stored. The Siphnians at Delphi placed a tithe of their mining 
17 Diodorus Siculus 13 106 and Plutarch Lysander 16. 
18 See ~~An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome IV p 341 and BCH 1882 pp 60, 77 and 84. 
19 
'Framing the Gift : The Politics of the Siphnian Treaswy at Delphi' Classical Antiquity 20 2000 pp 
273-336. 
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revenue in their treasury at Delphi. Generally these buildings were secure with 
restricted access and no windows. 
Some have argued that taxes were kept in the demosion, below the Acropolis, in the 
fifth century. This was the view of the authors of The Athenian Tribute Lists. 20 It 
has been suggested that taxes were kept in both the fifth and fourth centuries 
somewhere in the Agora, possibly somewhere in the Bouleuterion complex of 
buildings. I have discussed this with Dr Julia Shear, who does not think that this 
complex would be anything like secure enough. The aparchai of the tribute were 
probably kept in the Opisthodomos on the Acropolis,21 and Diane Harris has argued 
that accounts and receipts must have been made when the treasurers withdrew 
money from the Opisthodomos. 22 It is not clear where this was. The Opisthodomos 
usually meant the rear chamber of a temple. 23 The most obvious location would be 
the western portico of the Temple of Athena Parthenos but it could have been the 
back (western) room of the Old Temple of Athena between the Parthenon and the 
Erechtheum. We do not, then, know where taxes were kept, but I believe that this is 
a possible site, although the references in the Financial Decrees of Callias (ML 58) 
to the Treasuries of Athena and of The Other Gods sharing the Opisthodomos (with 
the implication that, wherever the city treasury is, it is not there) are not 
encouraging. 
20 Hesperia 26 1957 pp 186-187; also Gomme HCT 2 pp 31-32 and Mattingly AER p 359. 
21 Compare Thucydi~. 2 13 rererring to Athens' capital wealth in 431 being kept EV 'rl.i CxKpolTOAEI. 
22 
'Freedom of Information and Accountability' in Lewis Ritual, Finance, Politics p 220. 
23 Harris The Treasuries of the Parthenon and Erechtheion p 40. 
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Payment in foreign currency : the coinage decrees 
Could Athenian taxes, for example, the import/export tax and for that matter the 
tribute, be paid in foreign currency? This question has been linked with the two 
coinage decrees of the period of this thesis, the coinage decree of the fifth century 
dated between roughly 450 and 415 (often referred to as the Standards Decree 
because it dealt with weights and measures as well as coins) and the Law of 
Nicophon on silver coinage of the fourth century (375-374).24 
The fifth century decree was set up in every state of the Empire and survives in a 
number of fragments from different states. 25 The latest fragment to be discovered -
from Aphytis - was published together with an earlier fragment from Aphytis by 
Hatzopoulos in 2004. 26 The two fragments do not make a physical join but the new 
fragment clearly fits below the earlier fragment with only one line missing. See the 
photographs at the end of the Chapter. The text of the latest fragment and the full 
revised text are in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. The general 
view has always been that the decree enforced Athenian currency throughout the 
Empire and was an overt act of imperialism. Figueira had recently rejected this 
view and argued for a more modest provision to the effect that allies who still 
minted their own coins had to hold valid Athenian coins and standards as well, and 
instead of harsh punitive clauses Figueira saw efforts to police the more limited 
24 There is a further law on public finance of 354-353 - Agora I 7495 - which John Camp and Molly 
Richardson are preparing for publication (see Stroud Grain-Tax Law pp 1, 25 and 45). 
25 ML45. . 
26 Horos 14-16 2001-2003 pp 31-43. 
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reception of allied coin and its replacement in Athenian coffers. The final lines of 
the new Aphytis fragment, however, make clear that the aim of the decree was to 
ban explicitly the use of any coin, weight or measure other than those of the 
Athenians. There has been much debate on the date of the decree, but the general 
consensus now seems to be the 420s. A later date, like 415, is suggested by a 
reference in Aristophanes Birds 1040-1042, parodying the language of the decree. 
The Law of Nicophon of 375-374, published by Stroud in 1974, provides for 
measures to restore the credibility of Athenian coins in the light of attempts to 
counterfeit such coins. 27 Officials known as dokimastai were to examine silver 
coins brought to them presumably by those engaged in transactions in which 
disputes arose about the quality of coins of Athenian type. The Law required coins 
that were officially struck to be accepted as payment in transactions in Athens. 
Unofficially struck coins which were debased in some way, for example, because 
they had bronze or lead cores, were defaced and removed from circulation. Foreign 
silver coins, if they were not debased, were returned to their owners. This decree is 
not in the mode of the earlier decree, which would have been contrary to the spirit 
of the new Confederacy. The Law chiefly aimed, in Stroud's view, at restoring the 
reputation of coinage of Athenian type - whether officially struck by Athens or by 
foreign institutions - so that consumers would readily accept them in transactions. 
Stroud's view of the foreign coins that were not debased has been criticised but I 
believe that Engen's recent review of the debate supports Stroud's argument.28 
27 Hesperia 43 1974 pp 157-188. 
28 
"'Ancient Greenbacks"' Historia 54 2005, pp 359-381. 
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What view can we take from these decrees on the question of whether taxes (or 
tributel.syntaxeis) could be paid in foreign currency? It is generally accepted that 
both were paid in Athenian currency and the decrees do nothing to displace this 
view. But the ban on foreign coinage in the fifth century refers only to silver coins 
and does not include electrum. Electrum staters of Cyzicus are one of the 
commonest Greek currencies in the second half of the fifth century. Many have 
been found in Thrace and the Euxine lands, and Athenian traders commonly 
changed Attic drachmas for Cyzican staters before entering the Euxine. 29 But 
Cyzican staters were less popular in Athens. Together with Lampsacan staters they 
were included in the first year's grant to the commissioners of the Parthenon but 
they were handed over from board to board each year without being spent -
presumably contractors insisted on Attic coin. 30 !socrates 8 82 referred to the tribute 
being paid in talents, but only the highest payers paid several talents, and this 
reference does not take us any further. 31 
Stumpf has argued that the Law of Nicophon was tied to the creation of the 
Confederacy and the symmories of378-377, that is that the original dokimastes was 
instituted in that year to make sure that the .syntaxeis and eisphora were in genuine 
Athenian coin and not imitations or counterfeits of indeterminate value. This is 
speculative, but Stroud's view certainly leaves open the possibility that taxes or 
29 Com~ Demosthenes 34 23. 
30 JG 3 435-451; and MeiggsAthenian Empire pp 167-168. 
31 Compare Rhodes JHS 123 2003, pp 111-112. 
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syntaxeis could be paid in coinage of Athenian type, whether officially struck by 
Athens or foreign institutions. 32 
Hellenic coinage? 
The phrase [ TavTa o' ElTlTEAeV niv OVI-11-10 Jxlav on line 31 of Hatzopoulos' 
reconstruction of the Standards Decree has led Andrew Meadows to argue33 that 
this was an early manifestation of Hellenic coinage, as opposed to a local coinage 
(epichorion) to which Plato refers in Laws 5 742 a-b. He believes that this is 
consistent with Lisa Kallet's vision of a relationship between the decree and the 
eikoste, as a harmonisation of Greek tax. And that this vision continued with the 
}:YN coinage (and compare the reference to the Symmachikon in Aristotle Ath Pol 
39 1-2 relating to the Spartans' attempt to use synteleia rather than phoros as the 
term for the money they levied from their allies after the Peloponnesian War)~ and 
the Chian weight coinage at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the 
fourth century.34 Certainly there are signs of Athenian and Greek coins generally 
being used well beyond their frontiers by the 440s. The Forgotten Empire the world 
of Ancient Persia exhibition at the British Museum (9 September 2005 - 8 January 
2006) showed, for example, the large and valuable Malayer hoard of Greek coins, 
32 An interesting modem parallel with the universality of Athenian coinage is the use of US dollars 
throughout the World today. Some sixty per cent of all US currency in circulation in 1995 ($250 
billion in cash in the form of Federal Reserve Notes, not electronic holdings) was held outside the 
United States- see Engen "'Ancient Greenbacks"' p 364. 
33 In a paper on the Coinage Decree given at the Institute of Classical Studies London Classical 
Archaeology Seminar on 5 October 2005 and in an earlier paper on the same subject held in Oxford 
in Easter 2004. 
34
. Compare Ashton et a/ 'The Hecatomnus Hoard' containing l:YN coins from EphesUs, Cnidus, 
Rhodes and possibly Samos. 
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including from Athens, dated 440-430 found at Ramadan, north of Susa. It will be 
clear from what I have said earlier in the thesis about the eikoste that there is no 
evidence for Lisa Kallet's theory about a relationship between the Standards Decree 
and the eikoste, but I assume that the phrase in Hatzopoulos' reconstruction leaves 
open the whole subject of Hellenic coinage. 
'faxes and coins 
I should perhaps mention before leaving the payment of taxes that it has been 
suggested that taxes played a major role in the development of coinage from metal 
to weight, since the units provided by coinage formed the ideal basis for measuring 
the tax required. Particular denominations of coins of a particular weight standard 
might be stipulated for payment on any occasion. 35 Rhodes sees coinage as 
developing from the use of uncoined silver, citing the references to the silver of the 
naukraroi in Solon's laws in Aristotle Ath Pol 8 3 ( Comm Ath Pol pp 152-153 ). 
35 Carradice and Price Coinage in the Greek World p 102. 
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ELEVEN 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ATHENIAN TAXES TO ATHENS' INCOME FROM 
EMPIRE AND CONFEDERACY 
In this Chapter I give some brief background to the income Athens received from 
Empire and Confederacy in the fifth and fourth centuries respectively and seek to 
summarise its relationship with Athenian taxes. 
The fifth century 
Most of the literary and epigraphical evidence for the income Athens received from 
Empire in the 5th century has been authoritatively gathered together in The Athenian 
Tribute Lists. 1 This included a reconstruction of the tribute lists or rather lists of the 
1/60 (aparche) of the tribute that was dedicated to Athena (from 454) on stelai in the 
Epigraphical Museum in Athens (see the drawing at the end of this Chapter). These 
had stood on the Acropolis, recording the tribute received from the various states of 
the Empire. A further few fragments of the tribute lists were published in the early 
1970s and were incorporated into the stelai at that time. More recent work on the 
tribute lists has focused mainly on who contributed ships rather than tribute (see 
below) and how the tribute was assessed.2 
1 Published in four volumes by Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor (edd). 
2 Nixon and Price The Greek City from Homer to Alexander Murray and Price (edd) 'The Size and 
R~ur~~ <}f qree~ qq~· pp 14~-151. Nix<>!l at1d Pri~ specula~ on the crit~a, which t!J.,e_Athenians 
could have used in assessing tribute payments. They concluded that any attempt to establish a simple 
correlation between tribute and population or tribute and agricultural land was doomed to failure, and 
that the key lay in what they called the concept of resources, a flexible term which covered all the 
possibilities they bad discussed, including population and land. 
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The origin of the Empire was, very briefly, the decision by certain Greek states 
(including Greek states in Asia Minor), but not Sparta, to ask Athens to take the lead 
against Persia after the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks in 4 79 (Thucydides 1 96), 
and after the Spartan commander Pausanias had made himself unpopular in 478. The 
Delian League was founded - so called because meetings of the League were held on 
the island of Delos3 - and the first tribute that was assessed amounted to 460T with 
some states contributing ships (it should be said in passing that this amount looks on 
the high side, judging by the evidence of the Athenian Tribute Lists published after 
454, unless a larger amount of tribute was raised at this time because it was not long 
after the Persian Wars).4 The League gradually became an Empire and the transfer of 
the League's Treasury to Athens in 454 was a recognition of this (although the Aegean 
may genuinely have seemed unsafe after the disaster in Egypt). After this time the 
tribute lists (or rather the lists of the 1/60 given to Athena) were published on ste/ai on 
the Acropolis in Athens. The tribute raised in the next 30 years or so was about 400T a 
year. As we have seen, the tribute assessed was substantially increased in 425 in the 
early years of the Peloponnesian War. 5 In 413 the tribute was replaced by a 5% tax 
(eikoste) (Thucydides 7 28) and the eikoste is in tum generally thought to have been 
replaced by the tribute in 410. The tribute came to an end with the defeat of Athens by 
Sparta in 404. 
When historians refer to the tribute lists, they tend to refer to them as if they were 
certain information. I should therefore say that Lisa Kallet has recently questioned the 
3 The Delian League is a modem term. 
4 There has been a great deal of discussion on this. Rhodes The Athenian Empire pp 7-8 gives a short 
conspectus. 
5 ML 69, and on theATL orthodoxy there was an earlier increase in 428. 
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placement of fragments of the tribute lists between 421-420 and 415-414.6 I believe 
that she is right to do this, if she is right in saying, as she does, that with one exception 
none of the fragments of tribute lists placed in these years necessarily belongs there; 
and that given that each hypothesised list consists primarily of non-joining fragments, 
it must remain uncertain whether fragments associated with one another are associated 
in every case correctly. The replacement of the tribute in 413 by the eikoste and 
whether the tribute started again in 410 are also relevant issues. Lisa Kallet argues that 
all this 'strongly suggests the necessity of a thorough re-examination of the whole 
series of tribute lists, beginning with understanding and questioning the principles, 
approaches, and assumptions that guided the assemblage of the lists'. 
My view is that, if a re-examination were generally thought worthwhile, it would be 
more fruitful to start by using modem technology to see whether all the non-joining 
fragments do, on other grounds, belong together. Pritchett described how he used 
geological analysis (with expert advice) in assigning various fragments of the Attic 
Stelai to different inscriptions. 7 As he said, the geological structure of the marble 
cannot prove that two stones must go together but it may prove that two pieces cannot 
go together. Meanwhile, I shall be discussing in the next few pages the relationship 
between Athenian income from Empire and Athenian taxes on the basis of the 
generally accepted arrangement of the tribute lists. 
6 
'Epigraphic Geography: The Tribute Quota Fragments Assigned to 421/0- 415/4 BC'. Hesperia 73 
2004 pp 465-496. 
7 Hesperia 22 1953 pp 235-236. 
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Relationship with Athenian taxes 
There are, as I see it, three main points of relationship with Athenian taxes. 
The first is the fact that while I believe that it is possible that there were taxes in the 
Pentakontaetia to finance civil expenditure, the existence of the tribute meant that 
Athens could afford more civil expenditure than it could otherwise have done. Athens 
did not spend tribute income directly for internal purposes until the 440s. 8 
The cost of the building programme cannot be estimated from what survives of the 
published accounts but Thucydides 2 13 implies nearly 4000T for buildings and the 
campaign in Potidaea, and Thucydides 2 70 says that the siege of Potidaea cost 2000T. 
A sum of 3000T is recorded as voted to, and recently received by, Athena in the first 
Callias Decree of probably 434-433.9 The Strasbourg Papyrus dated 450-449 or 431-
430 seems to indicate, in the context of the construction of the Propylaea and the 
Parthenon, a tribute reserve of 5000T to be brought up to the Acropolis and placed in 
the keeping of Athena and (in the edition of Meritt and Wade-Gery) a further 3000T to 
be brought up to the Acropolis while building work was going on (their explanation of 
the 3000T in the first Callias decree, although some do not believe this). 10 The 
Strasbourg Papyrus is very uncertain, and the most one can do is argue that a 
reconstruction of it may support what one believes on other grounds. Heliodorus (ap. 
8 Kallet in Classical Antiquity 8 256-266 has argued against virtually everyone that tribute did not fund 
the Parthenon. I make clear below that the various possible sources of civil expenditure during this 
period are not free from doubt but I believe that to say, as Kallet does, that temples did not cost all that 
much and that there would have been enough in the Treasury of Athena to fund the Parthenon is going 
too,farthe,other way. This is not a crucial issue for this. thesis but !believe that, to the extent that it is 
relevant to this thesis, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. 
9 IG e 52A, 3-4. 
1
° Fornara 94 translates three reconstructions: Wilcken Hermes 42 1907 p 414; ATL Vol 2 D 13 p 61; 
Wade-Gery and Meritt Hesperia 26 1957 pp 164-188. 
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Harpocration, s.v. ITpom1Aata Ta\iTa) recorded the cost of the Propylaea at 2000T 
and ML pp 164-165 believed that this was a credible figure for the combined cost of 
the Parthenon, the cult-statue and the Propylaea, allowing some 700-SOOT for the 
Parthenon. ML 60 = JG i3 462 13-17 - almost wholly restored - states that the building 
of the Propylaea was funded by the quotas of 1/60 (aparche) paid to Athena out of the 
tribute. The inscription detailing work on the Athenian Water Supply dated 440-432 
(although Thompson Athenaeum 49 1971 328-335 prefers about 430), records that the 
work was financed by 'money which [is] paid into the tribute of the Athenians [after 
the goddess has from it] received her accustomed share'.n However, only about half of 
the crucial passage is on the stone : this is an amendment - was the use of the tribute 
for this purpose not originally intended? 
The income from Empire funded military expeditions during the 5th century after the 
Persian Wars. A number of members of the Delian League contributed ships, rather 
than tribute, from the inception of the League. The authors of The Athenian Tribute 
Lists argued that seventeen members may still have been contributing ships in 454, the 
cost of 14 of which has been estimated at 67T!2 There has been some discussion about 
what happened to the ship-payers when the League's treasury was moved to Athens in 
454 and the tribute lists started. 13 However, it seems likely that Athens would have had 
a substantial number of the League's ships at her disposal at least until that time. Our 
earliest surviving record of military expenditure lists three payments totalling over 
1400T made by the Treasurers of Athena to the generals engaged in suppressing the 
II JG e 49, trans. Fornarn 117. 
12 ATL Vol ill pp 267-268. 
13 Woodhead 'West's panel of ship-payers' Bmdeen and McGregor (edd) Phoros : Tribute to Benjamin 
Dean Meritt pp 170-178; Lewis 'The Athenian Tribute Quota-Lists 453-450 BC' BSA 89 1994 pp 285-
301. Ship-providers were down to Lesbos, Chios and Samos by the end of the 440s. Samos ceased in 
440 and Mytilene in 428-427. 
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revolt of Samos during the two years 441-440 and 440-439. 14 A further not 
insubstantial incidental benefit to Athens from this military expenditure was that it 
secured a grain supply to Athens during the 5th century. 
An indication of the size of the income from Empire is that, according to Thucydides 2 
13, there was at one time 9700T of coined silver 'in the Acropolis' (probably in the 
Treasury of Athena) and 6000T by the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, although 
there is some doubt whether the figures were as large as this. The arguments have been 
summarised in Alec Blamire's article 'Athenian Finance 454-404 BC'. 15 
There is another aspect of this first relationship between taxes and income from 
Empire at this time. I said above that some fragments of the tribute lists were 
published in the early 1970s. One of these fragments showed that the tribute from 
Carystus in southern Euboea was 12T in 454-453. We already knew from the existing 
tribute lists that the tribute of Carystus was 7 l/2T in 450 (/G e 262 i 33) and 5T in 
449 (/G e 263 iv 26). One interpretation of these three figures is that the first 
reduction from 12T to 7 l/2T reflected the settlement of a cleruchy in Carystus in 
453-452 or 452-451 and that the second reduction in tribute in 449 was made in 
response to a plea that the original reduction had been insufficient. 
Roger Brock has, however, suggested another possibility, that is that Athens reduced 
the tribute for the first time because of the cleruchy and for the second time in 
exchange for exemption from harbour taxes at Geraistos for Athenian vessels (and/or 
14 IG e 363. Rhodes takes the view that the payments mentioned in Callias' First Decree (in the previous 
~graph) are repayments of these sums History of the Classical Greek World pp 68 and 91-92. 
5 Hesperia 70 2001 pp 99-126. 
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those sailing to Piraeus). 16 French had already suggested that important harbours in 
subject states might have paid their contribution wholly or in part in 'goods or 
services'. Geraistos lay on the most direct route for transporting grain from the Black 
Sea to Athens, and the reestablishment of Persian power in Egypt would have 
disrupted imports of grain from there, at least in the short term, and therefore 
rendered the Athenians more concerned to make at least one source of supply as 
secure as possible. And in view of the widespread disaffection of member states at 
this time, it would have been entirely prudent for Athens to exchange future tribute 
income for security of this kind. 
Brock accepts that to some people this will seem too modem or sophisticated a 
picture, even as a hypothesis. But I think that it is an interesting suggestion not only 
for Carystus but for other member states~ and one should not discount the possibility 
that there could have been a more widespread relationship between tribute and tax of 
this kind. Nixon and Price have referred to two aspects of the tribute lists which have 
a relevance to taxes of the states which contributed the tribute, rather than Athenian 
taxes. 17 The first is that it is likely that the assessment of tribute would have taken 
into account taxes levied by the state, like harbour dues. The second is that tribute 
may have been raised at least partly by taxes in the states, the greater part of which 
were likely to have been contributed by the more wealthy, perhaps from agricultural 
mcome. 
The second main point of relationship between Athenian taxes and Athens' income 
from Empire was the fact that the income from Empire was clearly inadequate by 428, 
16 
'The Tribute of Karystos' EMC 15 1996 pp 368-370. This suggestion assumes, of course, that there 
were harbour taxes as early as this. 
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three years into the Peloponnesian War, when Athens had to levy an eisphora of 200T 
'for the first time' (Thucydides 3 19), 18 and if the ATL dating of the tribute lists is right, 
made an extraordinary assessment to begin increasing the tribute. I suggest in other 
parts of this thesis that the Athenian state had been borrowing from the sacred 
treasuries to an unacceptable extent : the loans to the Athenian State from the Sacred 
Treasuries in ML 72 show the very large sums borrowed between 432-431 and 429-
428. During the three financial years to 429, the Athenians borrowed over 3800T from 
the sacred treasuries : an estimated 1145T in 432-431, 1370T in 431-430 and an 
estimated 1300T in 430-429. I have also suggested that it is possible that the eisphora 
was imposed before 428. We can, however, certainly say that it was imposed in 428 
and that it was likely to have supplemented the tribute even after the latter was 
substantially increased in 425. ML 69 suggests that the total tribute assessed in 425 
was almost certainly between 1460 and 1500 talents. Three fragments deriving from 
the next assessment list (IG e 77) dated 422 suggest that the total sum may have been 
scaled down to about 1000T, and Aristophanes in the same year in Wasps 656-660 
suggested that Athens' total income was in the area of 2000T. This latter figure may be 
exaggerated but if anything like 1 OOOT tribute was collected, total income could have 
been between 1500T and 2000T. 
The third main point of relationship with Athenian taxes was the decision to replace 
the tribute with a 5% tax ( eikoste) in 413. Once the Sicilian Expedition looked as if it 
was in trouble, extra revenue for the military budget needed to be generated as a matter 
of urgency and the annual tribute was replaced with an ongoing 5% levy on seaborne 
trade throughout the Empire (Thucydides 7 28). Assuming that the tribute totalled by 
17 Murray and Price The Greek City from Homer to Alexander p 149 and p 151. 
18 I set out in Chapter One the various interpretations of these words (pp 26-28). 
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this time about 900T a year, it must have been expected that the eikoste would produce 
at least this amount but I would guess that this result was not in the event achieved, not 
least because of the likely administrative costs of collecting it. 
Five fragments survive of another assessment list (/G i3 I 00) which perhaps dates to 
410, and in 409-408 the generals in the Hellespont negotiated an agreement with the 
satrap Pharnabazus, whereby Calchedon was to pay her regular tribute plus the arrears 
which had accumulated since her defection (Xenophon, Hellenica 1 3 9). Mattingly, 
however, argues against this supposed revival of tribute. 19 In his view /G e I 00 should 
be dated to 4I8, and the payments from Calchedon treated as a special case. About this 
time Alcibiades and his colleagues, previously dependent on emergency levies 
(Xenophon Hel/enica I 3 9}, now provided themselves with a regular source of 
income by establishing a fortified customs station at the southern entrance of the 
Bosporus, where they proceeded to collect a I 00/o duty on the cargoes carried by Black 
Sea shipping (Xenophon Hel/enica I I 22). They also plundered the Hellespont 
generally to alleviate the burden of the eisphorai (Diodorus 13 64). Even so, at about 
this time, the first of two eisphorai was levied by the restored democracy (Lysias 21 
3). 
Before we leave the subject of Empire, perhaps I might cross-reference what I said 
about the kolakretai earlier. 20 They are not heard of after 411 and were probably 
abolished in that year, and an enlarged board of Hellenotamiai administered both the 
city's funds and the funds ofthe Delian League (compareAth Po/30 2). Alec Blamire 
has argued that at some date in the 440s, probably between the conclusion of the 
19 BSA 1967 pp 13-17 =The Athenian Empire Restored pp 205-208. 
20 Seep 153. 
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Peace of Callias and the inception of the Acropolis building programme, the decision 
was taken to merge the funds of the Delian League with the funds of Athena. 21 He 
admits that this is a controversial premise. I would simply say that there is no 
evidence for it. The kolakretai still existed in about 422 (/G i3 78 51-52) and in 418-
417 (/G i3 84 28). 
The fourth century 
The income of the Confederacy in the 4th century was an altogether much smaller 
affair. 22 The Confederacy was founded in 378, exactly 100 years after the founding of 
the Delian League, and was an attempt by Athens to form a similar alliance in the 4th 
century to the alliance in the 5th century but, at least ostensibly, without the imperial 
nature of the 5th century alliance. The stated aim of the Confederacy was different 
from that of the Delian League. Whereas the Delian League was anti-Persian, the 
Confederacy was anti-Spartan. The inscription establishing the Confederacy (see the 
photograph at the end of the Chapter) read 'so that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks 
to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in 
security'. The inscription originally continued (according to a restoration) 'and so that 
the peace and friendship sworn by the Greeks and the King in accordance with the 
agreements may be in force and endure' (presumably a reference to the King's Peace) 
but this was later erased presumably reflecting some anger against the Persians. 
Some 70 cities quickly joined, encouraged by the prospectus in which the Athenians 
swore to avoid the sort of behaviour which had attracted opprobrium in their previous 
21 Hesperia 10 2001 pp 99-126. 
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empire, especially by occupying or otherwise exploiting the territory of their allies. 
One of Athens' promises was not to collect phoros : I argue that Athens did collect 
'contributions' (syntaxeis), but the sums involved were not large, and the little 
evidence that we have suggests that the assessment, collection and spending of the 
money were not left entirely to Athens. As we have seen, the League was weakened 
by the Social War of 356-355(?) and finally ended when Philip of Macedon enrolled 
Athens in his new League of Corinth in 338-337. 
Brun estimates the first payment of syntaxis as 195T and that in 346 as about 67T (see 
the tables at the end of this Chapter).23 Aeschines 2 71 suggests 60T in 343-342 and 
Demosthenes 18 234 suggests 45T in 339-338. These, however, are late dates, by 
which time many allies had been lost to the Confederacy. 
Relationship with Athenian taxes 
There are, again as I see it, three main points of relationship with Athenian taxes. 
The first is the fact that the Athenians in the first quarter of the fourth century had for 
the first time for eighty years or so to live without income from Empire. This seems to 
have contributed to two things. First, it is likely that the maritime import/ export tax 
was doubled to 2% about this time. Second, Thrasybulus tried to drum up revenue in 
the form of the eikoste, as evidenced by the inscriptions in /G ii2 24 in Thasos 
(Harding 24) and /G ii2 28 in Clazomenae (Tod 114 = R&O 18), and the dekate in the 
Hellespont following the failure of the pentakosioste and the tessarakoste about 392 to 
22 Confederacy, like Delian League, is just a modem term (some use the word League again). The 
ancient term for both organisations was 'the Athenians and their allies'. 
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raise revenue. Presumably, however, Athens needed a greater income than these 
produced and this led to the establishment of the Confederacy described in outline 
above. 24 
The second main point of relationship with Athenian taxes was, then, the fact that 
Athens in the second quarter of the fourth century was able to count on the income 
from the Confederacy to reduce dependence on taxation. The syntaxis helped to 
finance a foreign policy which was still more than Athens could afford : it needs to be 
stressed that until the late 3 50s Athens was spending far too much on foreign ventures 
which were often unsuccessful. We are not, of course, talking about amounts of the 
magnitude of the tribute of the 5th century but rather perhaps half of this (compare 
Brun on the 370s mentioned above). If there is any substance in the argument of Ste. 
Croix that the eisphora produced very little at this time,25 the shortfall in state income 
would have been compensated for by income from the Confederacy. But, as I argue in 
Chapter Twelve, Ste. Croix's arguments really do not seem feasible. 26 The Athenians 
during this period went to great lengths to ensure that the eisphora - which is 
frequently attested in the works of the Athenian orators - was properly collected with 
the establishment of symmories and the proeisphora : they surely would not have done 
this if they had not needed to make up the shortfall of Confederacy income (in 
comparison with the Empire income of the 5th century). 
23 Eisphora, Syntaxis, Stratiotika pp 140-141 and p 139. 
24 It has been argued that what led to the establishment of the Confedemcy was not financial need but 
indignation at Sparta's behaviour after the King's Peace (and the realisation that this provided an 
opportunity for Athens). It has also been argued that, given Athens' emphatic promise not to collect 
phoros, it. is not likely $it the Confedemcy was founded to boost Athens' income. On this reading Atliens' motiVe wasCcprim3iily paliticiil, "arid syntaieis were nof introoucixt until· a few years without 
them had shown that levies of some kind were needed. However, I think that the reasons which I have 
gven for the establishment of the Confedemcy are more likely. 
5 Class et Med 14 1953 p 69. 
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The third main point of relationship with Athenian taxes was the fact that once the 
Confederacy started to weaken, there seems first to have been a period when Athens' 
income and presumably expenditure were distinctly modest. Demosthenes 10 38-39, 
who suggested that state income totalled 400T in 341, said that 'not long ago' it had 
been 130T. But these incomes must have risen substantially to help to finance the civil 
and military expenditure incurred in the time of Eubulus and Lycurgus. Lycurgus 
directly or through his friends controlled Athenian finance from the mid 330s to the 
mid 320s. And I calculate that it was necessary for Athens to fund this expenditure 
partly from taxes to produce over 400T - roughly what the tribute produced in the 5th 
century. 
This expenditure will be listed in more detail in the next Chapter,27 but I should say 
here that as far as civil expenditure was concerned, there was a substantial 
programme of public building (the theatre of Dionysus, new construction on the 
Pnyx, the council complex, the law courts, the wrestling school and the gymnasium in 
the Lyceum), financed partly by private donations?8 As far as military expenditure 
was concerned, there would have been little or no expenditure on fighting during the 
period ofLycurgus' financial power, but the fleet was increased from 300 to over 400 
warships (some of the new ships were quadriremes and quinqueremes) and there was 
a 2-year period of military service for young men. It may be added that the increase in 
the fleet was misguided expenditure : Athens was not threatened by a naval power 
and could not have manned that many ships. 
26 Seep 340 et seq. 
27 See pp 334-336. 
28 Compare R&O 94 with commentary. 
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I said above that the third main point of relationship between Athenian taxes and 
Athens' income from Confederacy was that the end of the Confederacy for a time 
marked a decline in income and expenditure. The reverse of this coin, however, was 
that this decline was followed by a revival of income and expenditure under Eubulus 
and Lycurgus. The end of the Confederacy thus paved the way for the powerful 
financial supervisor - 6 hrl Tij StotKi}oet29 - that came to be the norm in subsequent 
Athenian history and with it a tempering of democracy with efficiency. 30 
An ad hoc relationship 
It will always be difficult - because of the piecemeal evidence - to see exactly the 
relationship between Athenian taxes and Athens' income from Empire and 
Confederacy, but I suggest that the three points of the relationship that I have 
postulated for each of the 5th and 4th centuries give an indication of that relationship. I 
am not suggesting that there was necessarily ever a formal policy at Athens on the 
relationship between income from Empire or Confederacy on the one hand and taxes 
on the other, in the sense that Athens decided to have one or the other or indeed a 
combination of the two. I am simply suggesting that a picture emerges of Athens 
needing taxes as and when income from other states declined and wars were embarked 
on. In both the fifth and fourth centuries Athens pursued an active foreign policy, for 
which it needed allies who contributed forces and/or money. It was, in short, an ad hoc 
relationship. Nevertheless it is hard to resist the thought that intelligent Athenians -
29 Compare 'Athenian Democracy after 403 BC' Hesperia 29 1960 pp 3-4. 
30 As Rhodes says in 'Athenian Democracy after 403 BC' Classical Journal 75 1979/80 pp 305-323, 
tile tfe!ld -~lltiJluedJnto tile Hellenistic period : the powerful financial supervisor had come to stay. 
Meritt believed in Hesperia 29 1960 pp 3-4 that the title 6 hrl Tij 8totKl')aet may not have been a firm 
title until after the restoration of democracy in 307-306 and that it is significant that when the title 
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certainly the apodektai making the merismos (allocation of funds) to the different 
spending authorities - would have seen the relationship between the two sources of 
finance, at any rate in the 4th century. 31 
appeared - after the restoration - the first incumbent was Lycurgus' son Habron. See also Lewis 
Si!/ectedPaperspp 212:.229. " 
31 The fixing of allocations for the different spending authorities is a sign that the state is working out 
a budget, deciding how much it can afford to spend for different purposes, and not simply hoping that 
it can muddle through' (Rhodes again in the same article). 
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GLAUCON'S QUESTION :THE CONTRIBUTION OF ATHENIAN 
TAXESTOTHEATHE~ECONOMY 
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Socrates in Xenophon Memorabilia 3 6 asked Glaucon, who was aspiring to public 
office, 'Now tell me, from what source are the city's revenues at present derived and 
what is their total?' and 'Well ... tell me the expenditure of the city'. Aristotle Rhetoric 
1 4 1395b says that 'the orator who is going to give advice on ways and means should 
be acquainted with the nature and extent of the state resources . . . further, he should 
know all the expenses of the state'. Glaucon did not in the event know the answer to 
either of the questions he was asked. But what can we say about the contribution 
Athenian taxes made to the Athenian economy? 
The Athenian economy 
When I referred above to the Athenian economy, I used the term in its modern sense, 
roughly to denote Athenian state income and expenditure, not what the Greek word 
oikonomia signified - the art of managing one's oikos, one's household - from which 
our word 'economy' is derived. 1 This brings us back to the primitivist/modernist and 
substantivist/formalist arguments, on which I touched in the Introduction to this 
thesis. 
This thesis is not the place to launch on a full-scale discussion of these arguments. 
Whole theses have already been devoted to such discussion, most recently the one 
1 Xenophon's Oeconomicus was a guide for the gentleman landowner, and Aristotle's Oeconomica 
referred to various kinds of public revenue but our word 'economics' is a more modem development 
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written by Mohammad Nafissi and published by the Institute of Classical Studies. 2 
Nafissi reviews the origins of the debate and the work done by Weber, Polanyi and 
Finley, widely recognised as sympathetic to the primitivist cause. 3 The arguments 
centre, very broadly, on the extent to which, if at all, the market played a part in the 
Greek economy. However, Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden introducing a 
collection of articles on the ancient economy 'to take stock of this debate' have said 
that 'as our knowledge of numismatic, epigraphic and papyrological material from the 
margins of the Greco-Roman world continues to improve, claims that Finley 
underestimated the scale and significance of monetisation and market exchange are 
' I 4 mountmg. 
A fair amount of work has been done on these issues in recent years. Kirsty Shipton 
concluded that the evidence in her study pointed 'to an inter-connected economy 
where public and private, non-landed and landed, urban and rural economies were all 
linked in the pattern of inter-dependence'. 5 Robin Osborne has argued that rural 
production was as dependent on urban markets as the city was dependent on 
agricultural products. 6 Claude Mosse seems to allow that Greek man at the end of the 
fourth century, while not homo economicus, had certainly moved in that direction on 
the evidence of such activities as trading in the Piraeus and the Laurium silver-
mines. 7 Edward Harris looked at the organisation of production in classical Athens 
and its influence on the nature of exchange in the Athenian economy, and concluded 
2 Ancient Athens and Modern Ideology. 
3 Although on a recent re-reading of The Ancient Economy I was struck by the moderation of much of 
what Finley wrote, for example, 'we have, I suggest, to seek different concepts and different models, 
appropriate to the ancient economy, not (or not necessarily) to ours' (p 27). 
4 The Ancient Economy (edd Scheidel and von Reden) p 3. 
s Leasing and Lending p 95. 
6 The Ancient Economy (edd Scheidel and von Reden) p 114 originally published as 'Pride and Prejudice, 
Sense and Subsistence', 1991. 
7 The Greeks ed Vernant p 50. 
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that the average Athenian sphere of exchange would have expanded far beyond the 
limited circle of friends, neighbours and family. This led to a market economy, both 
at home and abroad. 8 Paul Millett has argued that 'the Greek economy was neither 
primitive nor did it foreshadow capitalism~ but as an integral part of a complex 
culture and society, it possessed its own distinctive sophistication. It was, at the least, 
all so very different'. 9 Most recently Engen has argued that the numismatic policies of 
Athens, specifically its long retention of an archaic coin type and the Law of 
Nicophon, facilitated commerce, fostered a market economy, and promoted exports~ 
and that such policies showed that the Athenian state 'did have some productive 
interests in an economy that was more market-orientated than is currently held by the 
prevailing view'. 10 
There has been some discussion on what this mixed economy consisted of Ste. Croix 
argued strongly against a 'commercial aristocracy'. He accepted that in the late fifth 
century and in the fourth century there was mercantile activity (in the sense of trade 
flowing into and out of Attica), but he said that there was no evidence to connect this 
trade with the wealthiest and most politically important or influential : a large part of 
'Athenian' trade was in the hands of metics and other foreigners and not a single one 
of the citizen merchants we hear of was a man known to have taken any part in 
politics, to which Ste. Croix added in a footnote 'Andocides is the exception who 
proves the rule'. 11 Cartledge saw 'a genuinely urban sector of the Athenian citizen 
population concentrated in what was almost a second city around the port of Piraeus 
but that most of those directly or exclusively engaged in Piraeus commerce, as in 
8 Money, Labour and Land (edd Cartledge, Cohen, Foxhall) pp 67-99. 
9 Classical Greece (ed Robin Osborne) p 51. 
10 
"'Ancient Greenbacks": Athenian Owls, the Law ofNikophon and the Greek Economy', Historia 54 
2005, pp 359-381. 
324 
other non-agrarian sectors of the Athenian economy, were non-Athenians'. 12 Reed's 
recent study of maritime traders catalogued 72 certain or possible emporoi and 
naucleroi. Of these there were 12 citizens and 49 non-citizens in the fourth century. 
Reed says that this catalogue does not pretend to be representative but his research is 
an interesting exercise. 13 As we have seen in this thesis, Ste. Croix was right to 
mention Andocides as an exception. As we have also seen in this thesis, we can add 
Agyrrhius. 
Loomis sought to show that in terms of wage inflation Athens had more of a market 
economy than is often believed, but there are some problems with his approach. 14 He 
painstakingly (and usefully) assembled a vast amount of data on wages etc paid in 
classical Athens, but his conclusions take insufficient account of other factors, like 
demographic changes, such as that the population of Athens halved during the 
Peloponnesian War or that increases in payments may reflect political considerations, 
like payments for attending the Assembly, or mere fashion, or that the inflation of 
other states might have had an effect on Athens' inflation. 
I would add to this range of work two small case studies - one ancient and one 
modern. First, the ancient. Nicholas Cahill has examined the archaeological evidence 
in Olynthus - a polis that was occupied for 84 years at the most. 15 It was then 
destroyed, leaving tens of thousands of artefacts in its houses and was for the most 
part never reoccupied. Cahill argues that this information gives us a unique 
opportunity to seek to understand the economy - or economies - of Greece in the 
11 Athenian Democratic Origins f 406. 
12 In 'economy, Greek' in OCD pp 503-504. 
13 Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World pp 93-132. 
14 In Wages, Welfare and Inflation in Classical Athens. 
325 
fourth century. He believes that the most important contribution that Olynthus makes 
to the debate on the ancient economy is that the site documents a variety of economic 
strategies pursued by its households. Most of its citizens were probably farmers, but 
trade and industry are well attested 'in household workshops, shops and rooms for 
retail trade, and equipment for household industry'. Different kinds of exchange were 
practised at the same time. Barter was widespread but by the fourth century, as in 
Kirsty Shipton's study, the market and money were important economic factors. 
Cahill concludes that 'Olynthus thus offers important evidence in favour of a complex 
and multifaceted economy with a variety of economic systems at work 
simultaneously'. 
I suggest as a modem case study the French economy, where land has been- and still 
is but now to a lesser extent - an important element. Even today, go to Ia France 
profonde and you get very much the picture of a household economy that I imagine 
you would have got from going to Attica during the period of this thesis. In the 
Herault village where I live for part of the year, the family, the family house and 
agriculture are the most important elements of life. Finley's 'wall between the land 
- - - -
and liquid capital' in The Ancient Economy (page 48) could not be better illustrated. 
But go to nearby Montpellier with its high-tech trading environment and you are far 
from the land, as I imagine you would have been if you had gone from the depths of 
Attica to the Piraeus in the fourth century. 
I, therefore, see the Athenian economy developing from a largely land economy at the 
beginning of the 225 year period of this thesis to being a mixed economy - household 
15 Household and City Organization at Olynthus pp 223-224. 
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and urban, as Kirsty Shipton has argued- by the end of the period. When, then, in this 
Chapter I talk about the contribution of Athenian taxes to the Athenian economy, this 
is the context of my argument. I see the taxes themselves as payments made to the 
democratic polis by Athenians and non-Athenians alike as their contribution to the 
needs of the polis as they arise. I do not see the wealth taxes (the eisphora and 
liturgies) as being particularly redistributist as modem wealth taxes generally are, 
although Cleon's outburst certainly showed some class animosity. 16 In my view the 
wealth taxes were a substitute for the modem income tax in levying money from the 
wealthier part of the population - citizen and metic - to finance state expenditure in 
time of war. 
I am not joining the primitivist /modernist or substantivist/formalist arguments but I 
am agreeing with Millett's concept of differentness. In this context I like the words 
used by the modem historian Keith Thomas in his wide-ranging and authoritative 
fifth British Academy lecture delivered on 20 November 2001 on the life of learning : 
why schoiarship matters - or ought to : 'although the past can sometimes appear 
disconcertingly similar to the present, its essential appeal lies in its dissimilarity and 
"otherness". The insights we gain from studying it are crucial for our self-knowledge 
and our understanding of others and of the world'. 17 
Quantification of the Athenian economy 
Despite Moses Finley's warning against attempting to quantify matters of Greek 
economics, a number of attempts have recently been made to quantify the ancient 
16 Aristophanes Knights 773-776 and 923-926. 
17 Edited version in TLS 5149 7 December 2001 p 13. 
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economy, particularly the Roman economy. 18 Peter Temin has written several papers 
on this as an economist, rather than an ancient historian, 19 and is shortly to publish an 
estimate of Roman GDP. To attempt a quantification of the Athenian economy on 
these lines is beyond the scope of this thesis but, as Finley said in The Ancient 
Economy, although ancient states did not have budgets in the modem sense, 'Greek 
and Roman statesmen had a fair empirical knowledge of annual revenues and 
expenditures, they could subtract one from the other. In that sense, they budgeted ... 
these were not simple societies . . . and they could not have functioned at all without 
some budgetary predictions'. 20 My approach in this thesis is to look at two points 
during the period of the thesis and gather together what evidence we have for the 
contribution taxes might have made to the Athenian economy at these two points -
one towards the end of the 5th century and one towards the end of the 4th century. I 
look first at the evidence about 428 when Thucydides said that an eisphora of 200T 
was first levied. I then look at the evidence about 328 when Lycurgus was in the 
ascendant. I have selected these years arbitrarily and artificially, but I readily admit 
that they fell in the two periods in each century when the yield from taxes was 
probably the highest. 
Athenian taxes were, as a generality, levied to meet the state's expenditure. There was 
no idea of deficit budgeting in ancient Athens or a national debt. Apart from the 
smallest token coins, money was worth its content of precious metal, so that a 
government could not print 'money' as it needed it.21 For example, there were 
occasions when sittings of the law courts were suspended because there was no 
18 I am grateful for the opportunity of attending Prof Alan Bowman's seminar in Oxford 2005 on 
attempting to quantify the Roman economy. 
19 See particularly 'A market economy in the early Roman empire' JRS 91 2001 pp 169-181. 
20 The Ancient Economy, p 174. 
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money in the fund which paid the jurors' salaries. Another example is Thucydides' 
description of the imposition of the eikoste in 413 (Thucydides 7 28 : 'for their 
expenditures were not the same as before, but they were greater, inasmuch as the war 
was greater; on the other hand, their revenues were perishing')?2 I am therefore taking 
it that income roughly equalled expenditure and since there is more ancient evidence 
for income than expenditure in the case of the year 428, I will argue in an admittedly 
rough way expenditure from income for that year, and since there is more ancient 
evidence for expenditure than income in the case of the year 328, I will argue in the 
same rough way income from expenditure for that year. 
I have considered whether it is possible to cross-check these ancient literary and 
epigraphic sources by looking at coinage. Keith Hopkins tried this approach a number 
of years ago in the context of the Roman Empire, 23 but I accept that we are here 
talking about much smaller mint production and in very different circumstances. I 
found two pieces of work helpful in this context. First, Richard Duncan-Jones has 
suggested that state expenditure in the Roman period exceeded mint production by 
four times. 24 Second, Conophagos has calculated that mint production at Athens in 
- -
430 was roughly of the order of 600T a year and in 330 was roughly of the order of 
SOOT a year?5 An average figure in the region of 1500T is suggested for state 
expenditure by Plutarch Moralia 841 C and 852B in the latter part of the fourth 
century. It is therefore plausible - taking into account the ancient sources, including 
mint production (subject to the fact that, as I said above, we are not exactly 
21 Stockton The Classical Athenian Democracyp 14. 
22 Kallet Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides pp 196-197. 
23 1'~~ aqd Tntde in ~e ~():rn@ E!DPire (20Q BC - AD 400)' JRS 1980 pp 101-125, and in Hopkins' 
restatement and refinement of his i>osition in Kodai : Journal of Ancient History VI/VII ( 1995-1996) EP 41-75, now reprinted in The Ancient Economyedd Scheidel and von Reden pp 190-230. 
4 Money and Government in the Roman Empire p 46. 
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comparing like with like) -to postulate state expenditure of perhaps 1200-1500T at 
both 428 and 328. 
An added complication is inflation. It is generally agreed that there was inflation 
between the fifth and fourth centuries. Loomis argued that there were stable wage 
levels during the first twenty years of the Peloponnesian War with a 50% to 100% cut 
in wages between about 412 and 403. Between about 403 and 330 Loomis argues that 
there were uneven rises in wages with a median increase of 1 00%, which he 
interpreted as very slight and gradual inflation 'during a long period of sustained 
prosperity and growth in the silver supply, with the greatest increases for workers in 
short supply and high demand'. 26 If 1500T income and expenditure was about right 
for 428, 1200T could be right for 328, if you believe that the economy was much 
smaller in 328. And it was surely much smaller in 328 both because of demographic 
changes - the population in 328 was only half what it had been in 428 - and because 
there had been no wars since Chaeronea in 338 in comparison with the Peloponnesian 
War with its huge drain on resources in 428. 
I accept that all this is necessarily by and large, and the figures quoted are general 
orders of magnitude in two years which are no more than points of reference for years 
towards the end of each of the two centuries. They are not, in short, the kind of 
precise - I would say over-precise - figures that make up budgetary calculations in the 
420s in ATL Vol ill pp 326-345. Also, this approach is lumping together the three 
kinds of funds which existed in Athens. That is, the polis fund, which was drawn on 
for polis expenses; the temple treasuries; and, where relevant, the tribute from the 
25 Le Laurium Antique table facing p 57. 
26 Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens p 257. 
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Athenian Empire. These were, of course, very much three separate funds (at least 
until411 as we have seen). But it is perhaps reasonable -notwithstanding the limited 
conceptual difference between temple and secular treasuries I argued in Chapter 
Eighe7 - to lump them together for this purpose, because in the last resort they could 
all be used for state expenditure. 
The result of my calculations is on charts at the end of this Chapter, on the lines of 
those published each year by the UK Treasury in the annual Budget Statement. 28 
428 
For income for 428 we have Xenophon's statement (in Anabasis 7 1 27) that Athenian 
state income from home and abroad was 1000T in 431, and Thucydides 2 13 says that 
the tribute from the Athenian Empire totalled 600T a year on average. This would 
leave 400T for rents from state property, income from the silver mines at Laurium 
and court fees. The Athenian tribute lists, however, show that Athenian tribute about 
this time totalled more like 400T. Income from places like Amphipolis (important in 
the provision of ship timbers and the supply of money according to Thucydides 4 108 
but never appearing in the tribute lists) and Samos, from land confiscated from the 
allies and from other sources may have totalled 200T, which could explain the 
difference between the 600T postulated by Thucydides and what is recorded in the 
tribute lists. Lisa Kallet lists also income from the mines at Thasos (Thucydides 1 
27 See pp 260-262. 
28 I discussed this attempt at quantification when I gave a paper at Professor Robin Osborne's AHRB 
seminar on The Athenian Cultural Revplution 430 - 380 BC in QJ!nbf!~~ ip Novem\)er 2002. While I 
was nervous about bow Moses Fililey (in whose old departineni the seminar was being held) would 
have viewed what I was doing, I was encouraged by the discussion to continue developing the 
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101) and rents from sacred land in Lesbos (Thucydides 3 50), Aegina (/G iv 29) and 
Euboea (IG i3 418)?9 The next figure is the eisphora (property tax) which Thucydides 
3 19 says produced 200T (that is, nearly half a year's tribute from the Delian League 
at a pre-war rate). 
Reserves and loans may be to some extent the same thing, in the sense that the 
reserves were held by the sacred treasuries. But looking at the evidence for the two 
separately, for reserves I have already mentioned the reference in Thucydides 2 13 to 
6000T of coined silver in 431 (the maximum amount had been 9700T, from which 
expenditures on the construction of the Propylaea and other buildings would have 
come, as well as the costs of operations at Potidaea). Some have sought to amend 
these figures with other evidence. It is possible to argue that the MSS do not give 
Thucydides' authoritative account of the position. However, the argument is not 
central to this thesis and I am taking the figures as they stand. 30 I am assuming that 
Athens in 428 still had some of this amount in reserve. For loans we have the 
epigraphical evidence for the loans from the Sacred Treasuries (ML 72) to which I 
have already referred. That is, that 1145T was borrowed in 432-431, 1370T in 431-
430, 1300T in 430-429 and 600T in 429-428 (some of this was taken before spring 
431, to which the 6000T above refers, and I take the 6000T to be in the Treasury of 
Athena only, with 'not a little' in the Treasury of the Other Gods - see Thucydides 2 
13 5). We do not know how much the latter contained, but between summer 433 and 
summer 432 the state borrowed about 821T from the Other Gods and 4778T from 
approach, provided that I recognised (as I most certainly do) the limitations of it. I am very grateful for 
the helpful comments the seminar gave me. 
29 Democracy, Empire and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens edd Boedeker and Raaflaub p 357 notes 6-7. 
30 Compare Samons IT Empire of the Owl p 150. 
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Athena (ML 72 = IG e 369).31 An eisphora was levied in 428 presumably because the 
loans were being spent at an unacceptable rate but it is clear that these loans 
continued later into the 420s (ML 72 records total loans from Athena Nike, Athena 
Polias and the Other Gods of 5599T during the eleven years 433-432 to 423-422). 
For expenditure, we know from various sources that Council and court costs totalled 
about SOT. Aristophanes' figure in Wasps 660 of 150T for jurors' pay must be 
exaggerated. 32 The gaps are therefore the main expenditure - military and civil, for 
which I have postulated I SOOT overall. 
Military expenditure must have been substantial at the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War and I have allocated - arbitrarily but I think not without 
justification - the greater amount to it, notwithstanding the possible use of tribute 
from Empire for such purposes. To give some indication of figures, according to 
Thucydides 2 70 the siege ofPotidaea (432-430) cost 2000T. 
Recent research has suggested that civil expenditure did not, however - contrary to 
what used to be argued from Callias' decrees - cease on the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War. Margaret Miles has argued, in the context of the building of the 
Temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous, that the accumulating archaeological evidence 
shows that construction in sanctuaries continued during the Peloponnesian War and 
that religious feeling (probably with an admixture of practical and political concerns) 
was a primary motive for dedications, embellishment of temples and additions to 
31 Rhodes Thucydides History II p 195. 
32 See Hansen GRBS 20 1979 pp 243-246. 
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sanctuaries. 33 After the plague and the lawlessness and impiety that accompanied it, 
many Athenians must have felt a need to return to devotion to traditional religious 
customs, or search for new ones in the hope that they would be effective. The 
uncertainties brought by war and Spartan raids could only have added impetus to this 
feeling. The Temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis could have been built about 
425. There must have been other expenditure for religious practices, but this will 
often have been met by the private income of the temples, including the religious 
taxes. 
My figures for 428 suggest that only a modest amount of Athenian income in that 
year was taxes. However, there are grounds for believing that there is more to it than 
that. What, for example, did Aristophanes have in mind in Wasps 656-660 when he 
referred to the 'many one-per-cents'? And, we have seen that he postulated an overall 
income of 2000T. It is hard to believe that there were no maritime import/export taxes 
in 428. There were surely exports before 428, on which an export tax might well have 
been levied, and the invasions of Attica in the early years of the Peloponnesian War 
presumably lessened agricultural yield and increased the need to import foodstuffs, on 
which an import tax might well have been levied. 
328 
Now, the evidence for 328, when Lycurgus was in the ascendant in charge of 
administration. He played the major part in the control of the city's finances for a 
period of twelve years, raising the revenue to 1200T a year (Plutarch Moralia 842F), 
33 
'A Reconstruction of the Temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous' Hesperia 1989 pp 137-249. 
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a figure without precedent for almost a century. Demosthenes 10 38-39 in 341 says 
that state income totalled 400T and that 'not long ago' it was 130T. 
State expenditure under Eubulus and Lycurgus 
About the time when Eubulus was coming to a position of influence Xenophon wrote 
his Poroi, which was a set of proposals for increasing state revenues and acquiring 
new ones. We have already seen that the financial administration of Athens 
developed during this period with the merismos and the apodektai (the apodektai 
being a survival from the fifth century and the merismos in use by 386). The new era 
begins with the creation of the theoric fund and its treasurer, dating possibly from the 
late 350s.34 Xenophon said that if it was not possible for further eisphorai to be made, 
'keep down the cost of administration during the next year to the amount that the 
taxes yielded' the previous year. This suggests that taxes played an important part in 
financing public expenditure under Eubulus and Lycurgus. 35 And there is clear 
evidence of substantial state expenditure under Eubulus and Lycurgus as follows. 
First, the regular expenses incurred in the general administration of the state. It seems 
reasonable to estimate the general expenses of the state at least at 400T, comparing 
the 400T arrived at by deducting the allies' tribute of 600T36 recorded by Thucydides 
2 13 in 431 from Xenophon's (Anab 7 1 27) total state income of 1000T at the same 
time. More specifically, Burke estimates the expenditure on dicasts, members of the 
34 Compare Rhodes Comm Ath Pol p 514. 
35 Xenophon Poroi 4 37. Of course, taxes were not the only source of Athenian prosperity at this 
time. Th.ere were also liturgies and ep~doseis. Compare Hakkanainen in Early Hellenistic Athens pp l-
32 and ilie concepts of philotimia and charis. 
36 As the chart at the end of the Chapter makes clear, I take the view that the 600T consists of 400T as in 
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boule, and those in attendance at the assembly at something like 200T a year. 37 There 
were also expenditures for religious practices, but these may have been financed 
where possible from the private income of the temples, including taxes paid to them. 
Second, civil and military expenditure. In relation to the former, it is generally 
believed that Lycurgus carried out a building programme comparable to that of 
Pericles. Indeed Lycurgus seems to have modelled himself on Pericles in the 
conception and implementation of the programme. The programme was part of the 
wider policy of maintaining Athens' standing and reviving its morale in the aftermath 
ofChaeronea. He could hardly compete with Pericles on the Acropolis, and he wisely 
left this alone for the most part. He could, however, and did strengthen the Long 
Walls and made the Piraeus into what Xenophon Poroi 3 1 described as 'the finest 
and safest accommodation for shipping'. A number of measures were taken to make 
Piraeus a particularly good place for not only Athenians but Greeks generally to do 
business. 38 Among the building projects in Athens itself, the theatre of Dionysus was 
rebuilt and extended. The assembly place on the Pnyx was reconstructed and a new 
wresting school and gymnasium was built in the Lyceum. Burke estimated the 
expenditure on the building programme at 200T a year spread over 12 years. But 
Lycurgus -like Pericles before him but much more than under Pericles- also brought 
in private money. Eudemus ofPlataea was honoured for his help in the programme in 
330-329 (Tod 198 = R&O 94), and Eudemus would not have been the only one 
the tribute lists which survive and 200T of other 'tribute' from Thasos, Amphipolis, Lesbos, Aegina, 
Euboeaetc. 
37 
'Lycurgan Finances' GRBS 26 1985 pp 251-264. 
38 Lycurgus personally proposed measures to suppress piracy in the Aegean (JG ii21623 276-308). He 
~so [fiOVed ~s in 333 to give e1J~esis to Cypriot merchants to wors~p their OWil gods in Athens 
(Trnf 189 = R&O 91). FiD3lly, clUiDges were made to the legal SyStem whiCh -oontributed to groWing 
use of the system by non-Athenians. Dating from the 340s (and therefore probably under Eubulus 
rather than Lycurgus) litigations involving commercial transactions had to be adjudicated within a 
month and dikai emporikai admitted to litigation individuals irrespective of nationality. 
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persuaded to make a contribution. Compare, for example, Xenocles (JG ii2 1191), 
who built a bridge at Eleusis, and see Lambert ZPE 135 2001 pp 57-58 and 141 2002 
pp 123-124. 
Military expenditure was also an integral part of Lycurgus' political agenda. The 
policy was to build up a military force capable of seizing the opportunity if one 
presented itself Athens did little or no fighting during this period. But clearly quite a 
lot of money was spent on the navy. The fleet increased from 300 warships in 354 
(Demosthenes 14 17) to over 400 in 330 (in various epigraphical sources) and more 
ships were built in the mid 320s, with quadriremes and quinqueremes gradually 
replacing triremes. Athens sent a colony to the Adriatic (Tod 200 = R&O 100). More 
generally on the military side, there was a 2-year period of national service for young 
men, who were subsidised by the state and armed at public expense (see Tod 204 = 
R&O 88 for the ephebic oath and, more pertinently, Aristotle Ath Pol 42 and the 
inscriptions collected by Reinmuth39 which attest to an overhaul of the system about 
335-334). The ephehoi performed patrol duties in Attica using the state fortresses and 
military posts, like Rhamnous, as bases. Burke estimated the cost of the ephebic 
reforms at 40T a year. Total military expenditure could have taken the greater part of 
the balance of total expenditure, perhaps in the region approaching some SOOT. 
The amount of taxes 
Anyone reading Aristophanes and Demosthenes talking frequently, as we have seen 
in this thesis, about taxes of various kinds might reasonably conclude that taxation 
39 
'The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century BC' Mnem Supp 14 1971 p 123 et seq. 
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was fairly commonplace in Athens. But what specifically were the main revenue-
raisers for which we can suggest at least plausible estimates of tax yield? 
First, the maritime import/export tax. It is generally believed that the maritime 
import/export tax yielded the most tax. It is less easy to quantify the yield. As we 
have seen, there is plenty of evidence that the Piraeus was a substantial centre for the 
flow of commercial goods in the ancient Greek world during the period of this thesis -
Thucydides 2 38, !socrates 4 42 and [Xenophon] Ath Po/2 7.40 And, as we have also 
seen, a number of measures had been taken by the time of Lycurgus which would 
have increased its use - procedures for the hearing of commercial disputes (of 
Athenians and non-Athenians) had been speeded up; special efforts had been made to 
suppress piracy in the Aegean; the fleet had been refurbished and enlarged to police 
the Aegean better; and after Chaeronea maritime traffic was able to move without 
harassment. 
However, we have only two indications in the sources of actual yield. First, we have 
seen that in 402-401 the right to collect the 2% duty on imports and exports was sold 
for 30T and in 401-400 for 36T (Andocides 1 Mysteries 133-134). Most historians, 
but not all, take the view that for a period of even modest prosperity these figures 
seem low and it has been suggested that Andocides' figures may reflect only a part of 
the yield, say the revenues secured from the import of grain - a later speech, 
Demosthenes 59 27, refers to 'the two per cent tax on grain'. They argue that the 
Peloponnesian War had only recently ended; the population had been severely 
reduced by the War; the farm land of Attica, ravaged by war, was only beginning to 
40 Seep 81 et seq. 
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recover (Lysias 7 6; Aeschines 2 147); the fleet had been reduced to twelve triremes 
(Xenophon Hellenica 2 2); and pirates and Sparta controlled the seas (Xenophon 
Hellenica 5 1, !socrates 4 115).41 
Hansen has recently revived the Bucher-Meyer controversy on this passage and has 
concluded with Bucher that while the Andocides passage sheds light on the overseas 
trade going on in the Piraeus and presumably in other harbours of Attica, it cannot be 
used as a yardstick of Athenian imports and exports, and that there is good evidence 
of a transit trade (compare, for example, Xenophon Poroi 3 2).42 I have referred 
earlier in this thesis to transit trade in the context of the ellimenion. 43 It is generally 
believed that the Piraeus served as an entrep6t, an intermediary station where goods 
and materials produced in one place were brought, purchased and shipped elsewhere, 
The deigma was used to facilitate this purpose and under such conditions the tax rate 
would effectively have amounted to 4% (2% in and 2% out).44 
The second piece of evidence of the quantum of the yield of maritime import/export 
taxes comes from Demosthenes 23 11 0 in relation to a 11p6aooos of 200T from 
El..m6pta of the Thracian Chersonnese in 352. A H M Jones seemed to be equating 
this with taxes, 45 and he may well have been right but it may have not consisted only 
of taxes. 11p6aooos normally covers revenue of all kinds, from taxes, rents etc -
compare Thucydides 2 13 on Athens in 431 and forms of 11pomevm in Demosthenes 
10 37-38 for a contrast of Athens' state income ou TiaAat and 431. The Thracian 
Chersonnese was a very rich area - in mineral wealth (iron, lead and copper, gold and 
41 To quote the arguments of Burke 'Lycurgan Finances' p 262. 
42 
'The Concept of the Consumption City Applied to the Greek Polis' pp 40-41 Appendix 2. 
43 See p 86 et seq. 
44 See Burke 'Lycurgan Finances' p 263. 
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silver) agriculture (vines, fruit and com) and wood46 and its commercial activities 
would have been different from those of the Piraeus, the key elements of which 
would have been silver and the invisible exports of trade and tourism (to use Finley's 
phrase)47 and imports of grain. Nevertheless, to the extent that this is evidence of 
substantial maritime import/export taxes in the fourth century, it supports the case for 
a substantial yield from the maritime import/export taxes of the Piraeus. 
Burke argued for a yield from the maritime import/export taxes of 300T.48 Some 
would regard this as excessive, but on the basis of the circumstances I have set out I 
would suggest that it may have been somewhere in the region of200-300T. 
Second, the metoikion. The yield from the metoikion should in theory be easier to 
compute because we are talking about twelve drachmas for a man and six for an 
independent woman. The main problem is to establish how many metics there were. 
Whitehead's one and a half pages on the size of the metic population are the definitive 
work on this49 (Finley says his work 'replaces all previous accounts') but it is clear 
that there are no easy answers. It seems that the best one can say is that the male 
metic population fell to 10000 in the late fourth century. So the yield from the 
metoikion would have been at least 20T. 
Third, the Laurium silver tax. From Herodotus 7 144 it seems that in the 480s the 
Athenian state might have received some SOT a year (or a period of years) from the 
45 The Roman £c01;10my p 153 n 10. 
46 See Casson Macedon, Thrace and 11/yria pp 52-79. 
47 The Ancient Economy p 139. 
48 
'The Economy of Athens in the Classical Em: Some adjustments to the Primitivist Model' p 214 
49 Ideology of the Athenian Metic p 97. 
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Laurium silver mines. 50 Aperghis believes that the Laurium silver tax towards the end 
of the 225 year period we are considering could have been as much as 10% of the 
silver receipts, partly to help to account for the increase in Athenian state income 
from BOT to 400T in 340 recorded by Demosthenes. 51 On this footing, he suggested 
that 500 mines might have produced 1 OOOT of silver, which would have yielded 1 OOT 
tax. The argument for as much as a 1 OOT Laurium silver tax is not anything like as 
strong as for the tax yields I have suggested for the maritime import/export tax and 
the metoikion, and Conophagos estimated mint production in 330 at 500T (see page 
327 above). However, Aperghis argues persuasively that there is substantial evidence 
of large mining activity at this time. 52 A 1/24 tax - on the basis of the reference in the 
Suda mentioned in Chapter Two53 - would have produced about 40T on the figures 
Aperghis works out and, in spite of the reservations expressed by others, I think that 
that figure is not implausible. 
What about the eisphora and the remaining taxes? 
Thucydides said that the eisphora of 428 raised ZOOT. The eisphora was not, 
however, a regular tax. It looks as if the Assembly decided to levy an eisphora, when 
the money was needed, and at what rate. Demosthenes 22 44 suggested that the 
eisphora raised 300T from 378-377, although it is not clear whether this refers to a 
single year or more than one year. Ste. Croix played down the yield from the 
eisphora. 54 He said that the references to megalai eisphorai, pollai eisphorai and 
50 Herodotus said that it was proposed that each man should receive ten drachmas from the revenues of 
the Laurium mines, which would amount to 50T on the basis of 30000 citizens. 
51 
·A. Reassessment oftlui L3Wi.onM1nliig Lease Record81 i3icS42 1991-1998 p 11 et seq. 
52 Compare Hopper BSA 48 1953 pp 247-254: the silver mines were at their most active in the 340s. 
53 See pp 64-65. 
54 Class et Med 14 1953 p 69. 
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even pol/ai kai megalai eisphorai in Lysias and others 'have unduly impressed 
themselves upon the minds of many modem scholars. It should now be clear, 
however, that they are stock formulae, not to be taken very seriously'. He took the 
reference to 300T to be to 300T over about 20 years, and calculated that the burden of 
the eisphora over time was equivalent to an annual income tax of between 2 1;2% and 
5%, taking the average return on capital as between 5% and 10%. 
300T for 20 years does, however, seem very low. Perhaps the eisphora raised 300T 
from the creation of the symmories in 3 78-3 77 (?) until the institution of the 
proeisphora first attested in 364-363 in Demosthenes 21 157. It seems likely that 
about 1% - 2% of the total taxable capital (timema) of 57 SOT or 6000T was fairly 
typical for a year. Demosthenes 3 4 recorded a vote of 60T eisphora in 352. As we 
saw in Chapter One, there is some epigraphical evidence for an eisphora as a regular 
tax of lOT a year in 347-346 but this looks like a different tax. 55 An indication that 
the eisphora was still up and running in 329 is the fact that, when Athens honoured 
Eudemus ofPlataea in that year, he was given certain privileges, including paying the 
eisphora along with Athenians. 56 
Various attempts have been made to scan through the ancient sources for evidence of 
the number of times the eisphora was levied. Brun, for example, has listed 17 
occasions between 395 and 338- see the Table at the end of the Chapter. 57 !socrates' 
statement 'for while this Council (the Areopagus) maintained its authority, Athens 
was not rife with law-suits, or accusations, or eisphorai, or poverty, or war' suggests 
that in his time levies of eisphora were not uncommon (7 51). 'We have no statistics', 
55 Seep 32. 
56 Tod 198 = R&O 94. 
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Ste. Croix continued, 'for the third quarter of the fourth century, but as the dominant 
figures in the financial administration were Eubulus, from about 354 to 339, and 
Lycurgus, from 336 to 326,58 we can be fairly certain that during this period the 
eisphorai did not increase unduly'. Obviously there can be no certainty in this debate 
but I take the view that 300T for 20 years seems low in the light of the references to 
pollai eisphorai etc and that there is no reason to believe that the yield of the eisphora 
remained static at least under Eubulus when Athens was fighting wars (although the 
eisphora was not a 'war tax', it was normally levied in time of war), if it did under the 
peaceful conditions ofLycurgus' rule. 
As to the remaining taxes, it is not clear whether the eponion (sales tax) applied to 
sales generally, or just to sales of confiscated property. But confiscations must have 
been an important source of revenue : in an incomplete document of about 340 at 
least six are recorded.59 The sale of the confiscated property ofDiphilos raised 160T. 
With a 1% eponion this would have produced 1.6T in taxes. However, I have 
suggested in this thesis that the evidence of the Grain-Tax Law points to the 
possibility that the eponion could have been a more general sales tax, in which case 
its yield could have been much higher. Lambert has suggested that the sales of land in 
Attica raised ofthe order of300T,60 which at a rate of 1% would have raised 3T of 
hekatoste. 
This leaves other income, including confiscations and epidoseis. The evidence for 
confiscations was given in the previous paragraph. As an example of epidoseis, 
51 In Eisphora- Syntaxis siratiotika p 55; also compare Bnmt JHS 86 1966 pp 245-247. 
58 If, with Lewis and Rhodes, you do not think that his quadrennia have to be Panathenaeic quadrennia. 
59 Agora XIX P 26. 
60 Rationes Centesimarum p 273. 
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Plutarch in Moralia 849F quoted 40 people contributing 40 triremes in 340, which it 
is assumed would amount to about 40T. 
How much taxes added up to 
So how much did taxes add up to? I have suggested 300T for the maritime 
import/export tax, 20T for the metoikion and 40T for the Laurium silver tax in 328. 
There is not enough evidence to say how much the eisphora and the remaining taxes 
yielded but if - and I suggest that it is a fragile but plausible if - they totalled 
something of the order of, say, 65T, that would make total taxes of some 425T 
altogether. 
By the last quarter of the 4th century, therefore, Athenian taxes could have comprised 
something like a quarter to a third of the total income of the state of 1200T, that is up 
to 425T, or a little more than the tribute from the Empire in the 5th century. Put 
another way, if we take the view that expenditure in 328 was not much less than in 
428, Athens would have had to have found the money without tribute and borrowing 
from temple treasuries, and taxes look the only plausible source. This is also one 
answer to the question why, if democracy in Athens depended on the resources of 
Empire in the 5th century, it survived for another eighty years after the loss of Empire 
in 404. And, of course, that 425T is in addition to the cost of liturgies of between 77 
and 87T a year as estimated by Gabrielsen.61 
61 Financing the Athenian Fleet p 216. 
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NOTES ON THE CHARTS OF ATHENIAN STATE INCOME AND 
EXPENDITURE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE WIDCH EXJISTS 
428 
INCOME (CHART ONE) 
Xenophon Anab 7 27 1000 
Thucydides 2 13 tribute 600 
Rents, Laurium, court fees 400 
Tribute per tribute lists 400 
Other 'tribute' {Thasos, Amphipolis, 
Lesbos, Aegina, Euboea etc) 200 
Eisphora 200 
Reserves, loans (ML 72), say 300 
1500 
328 
INCOME (CHART TWO) 
Plutarch Moralia 842F 1200 
of which 
Rents, Laurium, court fees 500 
Taxes hnponvexport 300 
metoikion 20 
Laurium tax 40 
eisphora 
remaining taxes 65 425 
Confiscations 
Epidoseis 275 
1200 
EXPENDITURE (CHART THREE) 
Military 
Civil 
Council and court costs 
1100 
350 
50 
1500 
EXPENDITURE (CHART FOUR) 
Plutarch Moralia 852B 
ofwhich military 500 
civil 500 
Assembly, Council and 
court costs 
1000 
200 
1200 
Philippe de Byzance et Perinthe et la vigoureuse reponse athenienne; un 
1ier escadron , sous Chares, reunissant quarante trieres, puis un second, 
1ande par Kephisophon et Phocion (peut-etre de 120 unites) furent assures 
On discerns mal une origine autre que l 1 eisphora pour le financement de 
puissantes expeditions de secours. 
Nous avons tente de definir la frequence des eisphorai jusqu'a 
ataille de Cheronee: il nous !aut maintenant recap~tuler, ce que nous 
~s faire dans le tableau suivant. 
meee Objet Nombre Sources (2) supra 
15 - 392 Guerre de Cor in the 2 Isocr. XVII.41 p.26 
12 - 389 
-
2? Lys. XIX .29, 42-43, 57 p.26 
388/7 Expedition a Egine 1 Xen. Hell. v .1,5 p.27 
387/6 Operations en Egee 1 Ieee X.20 p.2? 
378/7 Chabrias en :Beatie p.40 
et dans les .tles 1 
376/5 CampB8Jle de Na.xos 1 p.40 
576/5 Campagne d 1 Occid. 1 X en. !!!ll,. VI .2 , 1 p.40 
573/2 2° camp. d'Occid. 1 Xen • .!!!!.!· VI .2, 11 p.41 
[Dem3 XLIX.23 
170/69 Aide a Sparte 1 ])em. XVI.12 p.41 
i66/5 Timothee a Samoa 1 Ieocr. XV.108-111 p.42 
1.365 Aide au.x Arcadians 1 Xen. ~- III.7 p.43 
,63/2 Mantinee 1 Xen. ~· III .7 p.43 
62/1 Escadre contre 
Alexandre de Pberee 1 [Dem .J L.B p.44 
- 355 Guerre dee Allies 3 Xen. Rev. IV.40. Isocr. p.44-
XV.1os;-VII.51; VIII.12 45 
IDem.] XLVII. 54 
49/8 Secours a Olynthe 1 p.48 
~0/39 Secours a Byzance p.54 
et Perinthe 1 
19/8 Preparatifs ultimes 1 Din. I .69 p.54 
112 2351 1628 1.438 sqq. 1629 1.959 sqq. Dem. XVIII.88-91. Plut. 
4,3-6. cf. K.J. Beloch: Griechische Geechichte III2 1 p.556. . 
;te colonne "sources" est· vide loreque seules des presomptione exis-
_:.~~-
The eisphora is mentioned 17 times 
between 3 95 and 3 3 8 (Brun Eisphora 
Paris 1983) 
3 4 3.. ' 
.~· 
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CONCLUSION 
Two substantial works were written by Boeckh and Andreades in the 19th and early 
20th centuries respectively about Athenian taxes and their place in the Athenian 
economy; a large number of inscriptions bearing on Athenian taxes have been 
discovered since then; and there have been calls from historians (Lewis, Stroud, 
Migeotte, Kallet and Davies) for Athenian taxation to have a closer scrutiny. 
It goes without saying that Athenian society was very different from modem British 
society. Paul Millett quotes in this context L P Hartley opening The Go Between 'The 
past is a foreign country: they do things differently there'. While moving away from 
the primitivist/modernist debate as others have done, I have argued in this thesis that, 
notwithstanding these differences, Athenians did need and did levy taxes to finance 
civil and military expenditure, as states do today; and that the Athenians budgeted for 
these needs, as today's Governments do, albeit in a different way. I have argued that 
Pericles amassing 9700T in the 5th century and the 4th century merismos when the 
Athenian state allocated funds for civil and military purposes to the theorikon and 
stratiotikon respectively are indications of this budgeting, not to be sure at the 
sophisticated level we see Governments budgeting today with, for example, deficit 
financing, but nonetheless at a credible budgeting level. 
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It is clear that there were taxes in Athens in the latter part of the 6th century -
Herodotus and Thucydides attest this~ that there was a property tax (eisphora) yielding 
200T (about half the revenue from the Delian League in an average year) at the time of 
the Peloponnesian War~ that the eisphora, although an irregular tax, was well 
documented in the writings of the orators in the 4th century~ and that the maritime 
import/export tax raised substantial amounts of revenue, not only in Athens but in the 
Greek world generally, in the 4th century. 
I have described how there was, at the same time during the 5th and 4th centuries, a 
strong element of voluntariness in citizens supporting the Athenian state. Liturgies 
placed the elite under an obligation to perform public services, notably the trierarchy 
(which involved responsibility for a ship in the navy for a year) and the choregia 
(which involved the production of a chorus at music and dramatic festivals). The 
annual cost of these liturgies to those Athenian citizens financing them was nearly 
1 OOT a year. Epidosis, whereby citizens voluntarily paid amounts to state funds in time 
of emergency, was the other side of voluntariness. 
The structure of the thesis 
I identified in Part One sixteen or so Athenian taxes in the 225 year period of this 
thesis : six taxes on Athenians (in Chapter One) -the eikosteldekate, an early tax on 
agricultural income~ the eisphora, a property tax on the more wealthy~ the eponion, a 
tax on the sales of confiscated property (or possibly a sales tax more generally)~ the 
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pentakosioste and the tessarakoste (it is not clear what taxes these were but they were 
likely to be taxes or at least proposed taxes); and the hekatoste, a tax on the sales of 
some state property: five other Athenian taxes (in Chapter Two) - a tax on silver 
production; the pomikon, a tax on prostitutes; the metoikion, a tax on resident aliens 
(and the xenika, a tax on their trading activities); religious taxes; and local taxes by 
reference to demes: and five maritime taxes (in Chapter Three) - the e//imenion, a 
harbour tax; the eikoste, which replaced the tribute temporarily; the dekate, a transit 
tax on goods passing from the Black Sea; the pentekoste, the standard import/export 
tax, which produced the greatest yield of all Athenian taxes; and the dodekate (the 
nature of this tax is still not clear). 
The centrepiece of Part One is the newly-discovered Grain-Tax Law of 374-373 in 
Chapter Three, a handsome 61 line inscription found covering the Great Drain in the 
Agora in 1986. Its interest is considerable, giving us details of a tax of which we were 
previously unaware. But its main significance lies in what it does not tell us and 
which, by implication, makes clear that there were tax laws and regulations, of which 
we have no record. And it leads us to hope for more discoveries when a further stretch 
of the Great Drain and the Eridanus River is finally excavated in Hadrian Street on the 
edge of the Agora, and the Cerameicus. 1 See the photograph of the Eridanus River at 
the end of this Chapter. 
1 Although not as soon as had been hoped. Hadrian Street by the Agora has now been closed to traffic 
and is a pedestrian precinct. An official notice says, however, that this is temporary (February 2004). 
John Camp told me that that would put back any excavations. These could, however, be carried out 
further along the Eridanus river towards the Cerameicus. Camp said in Hesperia 72 2003 p 278 that 'two 
more houses and a short stretch ofHadrian Street (are) all that stand in the way of fulfilling the original 
commitment by the American School to fully excavate the civic center of anCient Athens 3tid to present 
it as an archaeological park.' 
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Part Two of the thesis dealt with tax administration. I looked first in Chapter Four at 
how taxes were enacted, and then at how taxes were collected. Most taxes were 
collected by tax-farmers, whose contracts were administered by the poletai on behalf 
of the boule. The apodektai were responsible for receiving the taxes from the poletai 
and paying them into the state treasury for onward distribution by the kolakretai in the 
fifth century, but in the fourth century they apportioned the money among the various 
spending authorities (merismos). There is some, but not much, evidence of state 
records of individual taxpayers and taxation seems to have been based on self-
assessment. The main tax offices of which we are aware were the poleterion and part 
of the bouleuterion in the Agora, at harbours and - at the outposts of Empire - at 
Chrysopolis in the Hellespont, where the post, including a garrison, collected the 10% 
tax (for a relatively short time) from ships passing from the Black Sea to the Aegean. 
I looked second in Chapter Five at attitudes to tax compliance and the extent to which 
tax compliance was achieved. Most of the references in the orators were to people 
paying their eisphora, even bankrupting themselves in the process. I discussed 
sanctions on taxpayers and officials. There is evidence of people placing or keeping 
their property in the 'invisible' economy, including in coin hoards (where financial 
assets - deposits and loans - constituted the least traceable form of unseen property). 
Tax compliance is the main problem for all modern tax administrations and was a 
problem for the Athenian state as well. 
348 
In Part Three I drew some comparisons and parallels with other states. Information is 
sketchy but by no means negligible, and the archaeological evidence that has come to 
light in recent years suggests that taxes in other states could have assumed a greater 
importance in those states than has hitherto been thought. I also looked at inter-state 
tax arrangements. First, at those arrangements made by Athens with some other states. 
These were sometimes decrees made to honour various individuals for services 
rendered, and exemption from taxation was one of the ways in which appreciation was 
shown. But they were also part of a wider policy regulating international tax 
relationships and have some similarities to the double taxation agreements which 
modem states make with each other today. I looked second at the arrangements made 
by some states other than Athens with each other on the same pattern as those made by 
Athens with other states. I also looked at proxenoi and diplomatic immunity 
In Part Four of the thesis I discussed five central themes. First, the nature of Athenian 
taxes, where I argued that there was little evidence for the often-stated proposition that 
the Greeks saw taxes - at any rate direct taxes - as symbols of oppression and that the 
reason for the absence of an income tax was that this is a sophisticated modem tax for 
which Greeks (including Athenians) were unprepared. I discussed several aspects of 
the wealth taxes, taxes on foreigners and on farming, and the relationship between 
sacred and secular taxes. Second, I looked at Athenian taxation between 550 and 325 
in the wider context of Athens' history in the period from a small city-state, through 
Empire and Confederacy and finally to the more sophisticated government of 
Lycurgus. Third, coinage and the payment of taxes, where I argued that the latter was 
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one of the reasons for the former. Fourth, there was likely to have been some 
correlation - in the eyes of at least some Athenians - between Athenian taxes and 
Athenian income from Empire and Confederacy, and I looked at the relationship 
between the two, that is that the two varied inversely with each other. And fifth, I 
argued that during the Peloponnesian War taxes of at least 200T a year could have 
accounted for perhaps fifteen per cent of the state budget, and that by the end of the 
period of this thesis, taxes of perhaps 425T a year could have accounted for as much as 
a quarter to a third of the state budget. This goes a great deal further than has been 
generally argued. 
The overall burden of taxation (and liturgies) on the main players and the 
incentives and disincentives it created 
What, very broadly, has this thesis shown was the overall burden of taxation (and 
liturgies) on the different players in ancient Athens during the period of the thesis; and 
what incentives and disincentives did this create? (Unlike the copious evidence of, say, 
ancient Egyptian taxes, the evidence of ancient Athenian taxes is not sufficient to 
make any kind of detailed economic analysis). Chapter Twelve made clear that the 
main cumulative burden of taxation fell first on the more wealthy, that is those liable 
to the eisphora and liturgies, and second on those subject to the maritime taxes (that is 
import/export/transit/embarkation taxes). 
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Eisphora and liturgies 
I estimated in Chapter Twelve overall amounts of taxation received from these taxes. 
As far as individual burden is concerned, between 1200 and 6000 men, probably 2000, 
were liable to the eisphora and liturgies. The eisphora was levied on between 6% and 
10% of citizens, if one takes the number of citizens after the Peloponnesian War at 
between 20,000 and 30,000. It was a wealth tax, the total capital assessed being around 
6000T and the average eisphora (not every year) was perhaps 1% or 2% of capital. 
Ste. Croix and A H M Jones argued that the eisphora was not in reality very 
burdensome, but I have argued that they were wrong. A H M Jones, for example, 
believed that only 300T was raised in eisphora between 377 and 357, that is 0.2% on 
an assessment of 6000T but I believe that this is not the correct figure for the eisphora 
yield during those years. I have indicated some amounts paid by individuals (for 
example, 30 minas and 4000 drachmas between 411 and 402 as recorded by Lysias 
and in the examples at the beginning of Chapter Five - the first yielded forty minas and 
a total for eisphora and liturgies of 15T over a period of years, the second an eisphora 
of 30 minas and the sixth paid the proeisphora and could not recover it because he was 
on trierarch duties). 
A choregic liturgy cost between 1200 and 3000 drachmas and a sole trierarchy 
between 4000 and 6000 drachmas. To be liable to liturgies men would have to have 
had property to the value of at least 3-4T, and to give an idea of comparative wealth, 
invalids were entitled to a maintenance grant if their property was valued at less than 
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300 drachmas, which means that liturgists would have had 60-75 times the property of 
invalids. A range of exemptions ensured that men were not liable to liturgies every 
year. The largest epidosis recorded is a gift of 40 triremes : assuming that the cost of a 
trireme was about lT, this would be the equivalent of 40T from 40 individuals- also 
see the figures in the epidosis inscription number 25 in the Epigraphical Dossier. 
Other taxes 
The other main burdens of individual taxation were those that fell on the metics, and 
those that fell on citizens from local taxation by reference to demes. Male metics paid 
12 drachmas a year. This was roughly equivalent to the daily wage of a skilled 
labourer, which rose from roughly one to two and a half drachmas during the fourth 
century. The burden was therefore more a psychological one than a financial one, but 
if metics were within the wealthy categories set out in the previous paragraphs they 
were liable to the eisphora and liturgies as well. Deme taxation fell on all citizens, but 
it is not possible to assess what specific burden it was because of lack of evidence. The 
enktetikon was possibly levied only on those from other demes, and the purpose of the 
tax could have been to deter people from holding property in demes other than their 
own. 
No one boasted about how much in the way of maritime taxes they have paid, any 
more than people now boast how much VAT they have paid, and I imagine that the 
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burden would have been felt less heavily in individual cases in spite of the fact that 
cumulatively it produced a substantial figure. The maritime tax was, nevertheless, a 
burden, particularly if it was paid twice (once in and once out of the Piraeus in the case 
of transit trade). If there was, say, a 1% tax on sales, whether or not including the 
hekatoste, this could have been a burden that fell on all who lived in Athens. The 
details of the silver tax and the tax on prostitutes are, again, unclear but presumably 
they were a burden on those who paid them, The main religious taxes were small and 
should not have posed any great individual burden. 
Incentives and disincentives 
The burdens of the eisphora and liturgies seem from the evidence to have created an 
incentive to move to the invisible economy. The most well-known example is 
Demosthenes. In the ten years of his minority, when his property was administered by 
his guardians, they had to pay 1800 drachmas on a fortune that was assessed at 15T. A 
H M Jones calculated that this is 0.2% a year and if you take income as 10% of capitaL 
that is 2 to 2 and a half per cent income tax. Later Demosthenes paid only 50 drachmas 
on a house (at 1% the house would then have been worth 5000 drachmas). I have 
argued that Demosthenes and his family must have been concealing their true wealth 
in some way to avoid tax. There is no indication that the maritime taxes had a 
disincentive effect on trade. The fact that imports and exports were taxed at the same 
rate suggests a neutral effect. The port of Piraeus was enormously prosperous and does 
not seem to have been affected by the maritime taxes. It is likely that such taxes were 
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pretty common in Greece generally and traders could see the facilities that had been 
provided in the Piraeus. There is no evidence for any particular incentive or 
disincentive effects in relation to the remaining taxes I have mentioned 
Changes during the period 
This thesis shows a gradual increase in taxes over the period, but it is not possible to 
track this very definitely because of the piecemeal nature of the evidence. One change 
of note during the period of the thesis was the fact that the beginning of the period saw 
what was possibly a burdensome tax on small farmers, which apparently disappeared 
after the Pisistratids and did not return. The other trends to note are the possibility of a 
tendency for epidoseis in preference for the eisphora in the latter part of the period of 
this thesis and certainly in the following century, and that liturgies seemed to fall away 
towards the end of the period of this thesis. 
Lewis, Stroud, Migeotte, Kallet, and Davies 
Doubts still remain about some of the big issues of Athenian taxation. Whether, for 
example, there were taxes following the fall of the Pisistratids and whether the 
eisphora can be dated earlier than the 430s. And about the relationship between all the 
payments which Athenians made to the state (or demes). We have seen that some were 
clearly voluntary (or quasi-voluntary because people often made them under pressure), 
and others were clearly taxes as we understand the term today. But this thesis has tried 
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to demonstrate that historians were right to suspect that Athenian taxes would repay 
further study, and I hope that I have been able to make some progress in the directions 
that concerned them. The inscriptions recording taxes that have been discovered since 
the days of Boeckh and Andreades have enabled us to move on substantially. As 
Boeckh and Andreades did, I have on occasions drawn some comparisons with 
modem taxation, although such comparisons are not a primary purpose of the thesis. 
But perhaps the most exciting thing of all is that discoveries are still being made, and 
the breathtaking discoveries that have been recently made in excavating the new Metro 
system in Athens may lead us to hope that there may be still more discoveries to come. 
The bed of the Eridanus river near the Sacred Gate 
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EPILOGUE 
I conclude this thesis with a few words on what came after the period of the thesis. 
That is, mainly in the century after, which Woodhead called Athens' 'Macedonian 
Century'. 1 In fact, Woodhead's century started in 307. Others, including most 
recently Stephen Tracy, have seen the change taking place not on the death of 
Alexander but in 338 at the battle of Chaeronea.2 Whatever the start date, one can 
perhaps generalise and say that during this century or so Athens lurched between 
democracy and oligarchy, and came under the influence, to a greater or lesser 
degree, ofMacedon. 
Although Athens was not always a sovereign power during this period, it never 
relinquished control over its internal affairs (compare Habicht, 3 for example), and it 
is generally assumed (compare Rostovtzeff,4 for example) that taxes continued in 
Athens during this period, although I have not found many references to them. But 
the fact that there is a paucity of references to Athenian taxes in this century, as 
compared with the two previous centuries, does not necessarily mean that there 
were fewer taxes in this century. The nature of the literary and epigraphical sources 
in the fifth and fourth centuries produced a certain number of references to taxes, 
but it may be that the nature of the literary and epigraphic sources in the next 
century was different. For example, it may be that there were fewer Athenian 
proxeny decrees in this century because Athens was not the international power it 
1 Agora XVI p 217. 
2 Athens and Macedon p 9. 
3 Athens from Alexander to Antony p 2. 
4 The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World Vol ill p 1374. 
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had been or it may be that it was less customary to record them on stone in this 
century. 
Taxes in other Greek states 
There are plenty of references to taxes in other Greek states. Herodas, the writer of 
mimes who lived (it is not clear where, possibly in Asia Minor or Alexandria) about 
300-250, refers to someone working at home, selling on the quiet 'for every door 
shudders at the tax-collectors'. 5 Austin has listed the main ancient sources for taxes 
in these states and it is convenient to refer to them in this form - the numbers of the 
texts follow the description.6 In Teos about 300 there was a provision under which 
the export tax could be declared in the agora without bringing the corn there, and 
there were advance payments suggesting an eisphora : this provision was set out in 
two letters from Antigonus the One-Eyed who dominated the eastern region of the 
Mediterranean after the death of Alexander until 301 and is an indication of his 
taxation policy - 40;7 also in Teos new citizens were exempted from tax for four 
years and many other taxes on particular commodities were listed - 99. 
Import/export taxes were recorded in Halicarnassus in the 3rd century - 100. In 
Delos in 279 import/export taxes yielded 14,910 drachmas - although not very 
impressive in comparison with even Andocides' figures for Athens at the end of the 
fifth century, and there was a 10% tax on houses occupied by visitors - 1 04; in 
Delos there were also regulations for import/export tax declarations on the sale of 
wood and charcoal, referred to earlier in this thesis - 1 09. In Apollonia there was a 
reference to taxes over which the city has control, implying other taxes controlled 
5 6 64. 
6 The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest. 
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by the King- 187. Various tax exemptions were recorded in old Magnesia- 182. In 
Erythrae tax exemptions were given by Antiochus I or IT - 183. And in Cyzicus 
various tax exemptions were given by Philetaerus in 280-275- 194. 
Gabrielsen's study of Rhodes in Hellenistic times has shown the enormous 
prosperity of that island at this time. 8 Indeed Rhodes may well have taken the place 
ofthe Piraeus as the commercial centre ofGreece.9 According to Polybius 30 31 12 
the yield from certain duties had amounted to a million drachmas a year from which 
it dropped to 150,000 drachmas a year by 165-164 (still much more than that of 
Delos mentioned above) because the Romans had declared Delos a tax-free port 
(ate/es). 
There are many references to taxes in Ptolemaic Egypt (tax-farming provisions to 
divert the quota of produce from vineyards and orchards to Arsinoe Philadelphus -
235; regulations for the oil monopoly- 236; and the valuation of goods imported to 
Egypt by Apollonia- 237); and in Ptolemaic possessions in Samothrace in the reign 
of Ptolemy Ill (269), Miletus about 262-261 (270) and Telmessus in Lycia in 240 
(271 ). A striking feature of the Egyptian tax provisions is their length and 
complexity, not least in relation to tax-farming. There is also much evidence of 
taxes in the Seleucid empire, the principal successor state of the empire of 
Alexander the Great, which stretched at its peak from the Mediterranean to the 
borders of India. The taxes were wide-ranging, covering land, natural resources, 
market centres, travel and transport by land and sales, animals etc. 10 
7 Billows Antigonus the One-Eyed pp 289-290. 
8 The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes. 
9 Compare Isager and Hansen p 55. 
10 The taxes have been detailed in The Seleucid Royal Economy by Aperghis pp 137-179. 
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Polybius 4 46 6; 52 2 states that the Byzantines briefly revived the dekate in the 
Hellespont in 220. Nearer to Athens a number of proxeny decrees from Eretria 
recently gathered together by Knoepfler give exemption from import and export 
taxes down to 196, marking the existence in this period of such taxes. II 
Taxes in Athens 
In Athens, Demetrius ofPhalerum- who effectively ruled Athens for ten years from 
317 to 307 - introduced a wide range of measures during his rule, including 
financial measures. As I said in the Appendix to Part One, I2 he abolished the 
choregia and the trierarchy (although the agonothetai, who had responsibility for a 
number of festivals subsequently, were often involved in considerable personal 
expense). 13 Duris of Samos records that he increased state revenues to 1200T 
annually, the same as Lycurgus achieved, and presumably a significant part of this 
came from taxes. There are a number of references to the eisphora in inscriptions, 
for example, in which the Athenians honoured Euxenides of Phaselis in 306-305 
(also a reference to isoteleia), I4 and in which the Athenians honoured Nicandrus 
and Polyzelus in 302-301. IS After this references to the eisphora are few and far 
between- honours for the Tenians paying the eisphora with the Athenians in 285-
284I6 and, perhaps most important, a reference to the proeisphora in 229 which 
11 Eretria XI. 
12 See pp 128-129. 
13 The earliest known agonothetes is commemorated by a momunent at the entrance to the Theatre of 
Dionysus dated 307-306. Stephen Lambert has recently argued that he was not Xenocles, as is 
r,enerally believed, but his brother Androcles: see Horos 14-16 2000-03 pp 99-105. 
4 Sylf 329. 
15 Sylf 346 = IG 2 270. 
16 IG II/Ill2 660. 
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Migeotte suggests was in connection with the financial need to release Athens from 
the Macedonian garrison after 229. 17 
There are by contrast a number of references to the epidosis and historians have 
discussed whether the epidosis replaced the eisphora. We have an inscription 
recording the great epidosis e[s -nlv owTT)ptav Tfis n6Aews Kal -nlv q>vAaKnv 
Tfis xwpas in the year ofDiomedon's archonship. This was earlier thought to date 
from 245-244 or 244-243 but is now thought to date from 248-247. It is believed 
that the residents of Athens thought that the countryside was about to come under 
attack and the city under siege following the actions of Alexander, son of Craterus, 
governor of Corinth and Chalcis. 18 Habicht has described the inscription as the most 
important document of the period that survives to us. It lays down a minimum of 50 
drachmas and a maximum of 200 for gifts. A long list of subscribers is appended in 
three columns. On the preserved part seventy persons contributed 200 drachmas 
each, others a smaller amount. It records as contributors many leading members of 
Athenian society at the time. Woodhead says that more than half of the Athenians 
appearing in the list are known from other sources. There are six foreigners. It is 
estimated that it raised between 4 and 6 talents. A photograph of the inscription 
follows this Epilogue and the text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this 
thesis. Eurycleides, who was responsible for this epidosis, was also responsible for 
another epidosis which has survived. This was for the protection of the little 
harbour of Zea. 19 One cannot, of course, base any theory on just two inscriptions. It 
is possible that epidosis could have taken at least part of the place that the eisphora 
17 Les souscriplions publiques dans /es cites grecques pp 45-46. 
18 Hesperia 11 1942 pp 287-292; Agora XVI pp 302-305. See the comments in The Macedonians in 
Athens 322 -229 BC (edd Palagia and Tracy) by Kralli on p 65 and M J Osborne on p 74, and by 
Tracy Athens and Macedon p 124. 
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had in earlier times (although Migeotte believes that this was not the case) but 
Kuenzi in an earlier study of epidosis did not find more than ten or so inscriptions 
relating to the epidosis after 30020. 
I assume that the existence of taxes in the Greek world generally and the Athenian 
taxes I have mentioned suggest that Rostovtzeff was right in saying that taxes 
continued in Athens as they had in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
Taxes a developing phenomenon 
Whereas there is debate on the position of taxes during the period of this thesis (and 
a little after), there is no debate on the position of taxes in states of later times, like 
Egypt and Rome. The inscription listing the taxes on the island of Cos in the 2nd or 
1st century is evidence of how far taxes had percolated through the economic life of 
a Greek state. There was possibly a direct per capita tax. Foodstuffs and food 
products were taxed : wheat, barley, bread, beans and salt-fish. There was a tax on 
Coan and Calymnian wine. Raw materials were taxed - wood and wool. There were 
taxes on farm animals. Owners of vineyards were subject to tax on their skilled 
vine-workers, as were brothel owners for hetairai. There was a tax on rented 
houses. The sellers of frankincense were subject to tax. The text of the inscription is 
in the Epigraphical Dossier at the end of this thesis. 21 Cicero was able to claim by 
the first century that 'taxes are the sinews of the state' ( vectigalia nervos esse rei 
publicae). 22 This neatly demonstrates the main theme of this Epilogue that taxation 
19 JG ii2 380. 
20 Epidosis pp 51-56. 
21 SJG3 1000; Susan Sherwin-White Ancient Cos pp 229-235. 
22 Pro Lege Monilia 17. 
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continued to develop in the Greek and wider classical world in the years following 
the period of this thesis. 
Inscriptions are still coming to light showing taxes as a developing phenomenon. 
An unpublished inscription from Chios dating from the first century AD (it contains 
a reference to the Emperor Tiberius) refers to people paying the eisphora. 23 At this 
time Chios was still autonomous under Roman rule, and this is the latest example of 
the Greek eisphora that I have seen. I would like, however, to conclude this 
Epilogue by looking much further into the future - at a recently-discovered 
inscription from Didyma in Asia Minor of the sixth century AD published in 
2004?4 The inscription is in three parts and I would suggest that it illustrates how 
sophisticated and 'modern' taxation had become by that time. A photograph of the 
inscription follows this Epilogue and the text is in the Epigraphical Dossier at the 
end of this thesis. 
The first part of the inscription is an edict of the Emperor at Constantinople 
agreeing to a request from the people of Didyma that their tax liability should be 
transferred to the people of Miletus, whose land had increased by alluvial deposits 
by the river Maeander. The Emperor modified Gaius Inst 2 70-71 and Theodosius 
20 on the law on property eroded or augmented by alluvial activity and foreshadows 
the judgment of Lord Wilberforce Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v State of 
Southern Australia [1982] AC 706. Gaius and Theodosius and Lord Wilberforce 
took the view that if land is eroded, the landowner is treated as losing that land 
whereas if an addition is made to land which was previously water, the landowner's 
23 Chios Museum inv 594. I am grateful to Peter Derow, who was editing the inscription for JG XII 
6 before he recently died, for drawing this inscription to my attention. 
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title should extend to it. The Emperor in modifying this principle in this inscription 
effectively agreed that the tax liability was also moved accordingly, provided that it 
did not result in any loss to his treasury. 
The second part of the inscription is an interesting vignette of what went on in the 
offices of officials in the aftermath of the Emperor's edict, which was brought to an 
abrupt halt by a 'can-do' civil servant pronouncing that 'this shall be done' (To\iTo 
yevnoeTat. Edantur). The third part of the inscription was an edict from the 
Governor carrying out the Emperor's edict. 25 
24 Chiron 34 2004, pp 285-365. 
25 I am grateful again to Peter Thonemann for introducing me to this inscription at a meeting of 
Professor Parker's Greek Epigraphy Workshop in Oxford in 2005. 
A Decree calling for voluntary contributions (epidosis) to a 
defence fund (248-247) 
l~l. . l 
161 . j 
. t. ... :' •. 
The Didyma inscription 
363 
EPIGRAPBICAL DOSSIER 
This Dossier contains twenty-seven inscriptions relevant to this thesis, arranged in 
the order, by chapters, of their appearance in the text. Details of the inscriptions 
are given in the text. Photographs of some of the inscriptions appear at the end of 
the chapters where they appear. 
eisphora from the second Financial Decree ofCallias (434-433) 
5 
[£ooxa£v 'TEL {JoAiL Ka~ 'TOL olpm, K£Kp01T~~ E1TpV'Tclii£V£, Mv£ul0£]-
[ o~ €ypaf'fLilT£V£, E]~v[ E]L0Ed E7TEUTcln, K]~Las ~Tv[ e ....• I I ...... ] 
[ .. 5 ... Ta A.LWwa Ka~ -ras Nt[ Ka~ Tas x]uvaa~ Ka~ 'Ta llpo[ mAaLa .. ... ] 
[ .... 9 ..... ]£Bit 1Taii'T£Aos [ ... 7 .... ]aEt xpiaOat a1T[ . .... I I. ..... ] 
[ .... 9 ..... ] Ka-rd. Ta E~Er/Jt[ O'~Jia ], Ka~ 'TEv aKp&7ToAw [ ..... I 0 .•••. ] 
[ .... 9 ..... ]py~va Ka~ £m[ O'KEVcl],£11 OEKa TclAaJI'Ta a[vaALaKoii'Ta ]-
[ s 'TO EVLaV'T ]o h£KclO"TO Mo~ [ av . .•. ]Oit Ka~ E1TtO'K£v~[ u06 ho~ KclA ]-
[ALUTa" uvv£]1TLUTa-roVT[ o ]v ~[€ TOt lp ]y[ o )t [o ]l Taf'LaL Ka~ [ol EmUTcha)-
['. TO 8€ ypclf' ]~ 'TOV apxtTEK[ TOJia 7T0t ]iv [ O)U7T£p 'TO/:' llpo[ 1TVAalov· hov]-
lO [-ro~ 8€ E11tf']~Uu[Oo] f'£Ta To[v E7TtO"T]-;tTOV h01TOS aptO"T[a Kai Elh-EA£1-
[ O"TaTa . • 5 ... ]EO'ETat hE aKu[ &7ro.\ts] Ka~ E1TLO'K£Vaa0£[c1£-rat Ta 0£0]-
[f.'Ella' TOtS O]E aAAotS ~~[aw TOt]~ TiS }4fl£Jiala~ TO[t~ 'T£ vVV 3at]-
[v Ef' 1TOAEL K ]ai hcf.TT' av -r[ o] Ao[t1TOV av]ac/JEpETaL f'E xpia[O]a[t 
f'£8€ a11a ]-
[vaALaKEv a]1T' ath-ov £[s] li.Uo I:'[£0EV €) E~ TaVTa hV1Ttp f'V[p]L[as 
opawaJ-
15 [sEES E7TtO'K]EVEv Uv 'TL OEE[t· ES li.U]o 8€ f'EOEv xpia[O]a[t TOtS' xp/~]­
[aw Eaf' f'E T]Ev a0£tav ~£c/J[la£Tat] 0 OifWS Ka0a1T£p l[af' c/Ja£c/JluET]-
[at 1TEpi £ac/J]opas· lav OE -rt~ [Ei7Tn €] £m~Er/J/[u]Et ~ l[~Er/Jtu,dvE]­
[~ 1TO 'TES aOEl]as xpiuOm To[t~ XPEI-']auw TOt[s] Tis 140E[vaLas EvEXlJ-
[uOo TOtS' a]VrotS' ho'i0'1TEp U[v Tt la]c/JEP£11 Ei7TEt € E7T~[aEr/Jlan· BE]-
110 [otS' OE 7TM]H' KaTaTtOEva.t ~e[a-ra ro]v EvLaV'TOV Ta hEICcl[O"Tot ~.\6]­
[f'EIIa 1Tapa T]9tS' Taf'laat TOV [TES' 148]Evalas TOS' lMEVO[Taf'las· mE]-
[ tOav 8' a1To] T[ o]v OtaKoalov Ta[Aaii'TO ]v hd. ES' a1TOOOO'tv lc/J[ aEc/JlaaTO h} 
[o OEf'OS' 'TOt]s li.Uots 0£0tS' a[1ToOo0]it Ta ~AOf'£Jia, Ta[f'tEvEuOo T]-
[a f'Ev 'TES" 140]~valas XPE~Ta [lv Tot] E1Ti OExaui TO '07na[8o8&fW, ro 
~1-
2 eponion from thePoletai Records (414-413) 
20 [1]11 .61'1-H- £ntKOP.T:IHOJ 
8piat 
[1]11 l:ll:l tmKapnia 
'AB~ovol 
KEqlGAOlOV OUV tnovlo[tc;] 
25 XXXXf'lHH!:ll:ll-1-HIIII 
noAUOTp6To TO l:lt0[~6po] 
'AyKuMBev 
H-I HHI+ nlmoc; 
[~] l:lill:ll:l ~ ~ tmKapnla 'Ay-
JO KUA£01 
--- ·" -··-- -· ·-··- ,. ___ 
K£qlGAOIOV OUV tn6vio[ tc;] 
H Hl:ll:ll:lllr I+ I 
Kecptoo~6po ~ETOiKO t~ nepa[t£1 oiKOVToc;J 
1-1- HfTltlr 8pOITTO 3 b s-
3S I-III Hlltlllr 8pOITTO 
[1-JI- HfTlllll epatxc; 
I-I-II I HHllllt:.t:. .Lupoc; 
(I-JIII Hr Kap 
1-1- H fTlt:.t- htMupt6c; 
411 I-I-III HHllll 8patna 
I-ll I Hllr epatxc; 
I-III Ht:.t:.t:.t:.H--t-1- .l:Ku8t:c; 
I-III Hllt:.l- htAAupt6c; 
1-1- HfTlt-1-1- KoA.xoc; 
45 1-1- HfTlt:.t:.l-1-1-1- Kap nalc; 
1- fTlt:.lll-1- KaptKOV nm5iov 
( ... J 1-1-1 HHHr .Lupoc; 
frJr HfTlt- M£AtTT(t:v6c; ,e/ Evt) 
1- fTlllllll r r . .J! l\u6t 
3 hekatoste from the Rationes Centesimarum (330) 
(Stele 4, Faces A and B) Non-stoichedon (max. c. 31-32) 
[Face A, col. 2] 
5 
[Face A, col. 1] 
[phyle 2] 
( £-r£pav) ecrx[ <X'tUlV -) 
[rovTJ ct>eto]6A.e~~ il>e(t]oo[mpatou Kuoa(vtiOTJ~) -] 
~tepCX:v e~xat~av ·£~ K u~[ avno&v] 
[wv]ry NtKOKAll~ AucrtKAeou~ Kuoav: HF'~I-1-111 
€upov xcopiov ey Kuoavno&v 15 
[wv]TJ NtKoxapTJ~ 8EOq>iA.ou Kuoav: X 
. €u:pov xropiov ey K uoavtt 
mvTJ 'AvttKAetOTJ~ 'Avny£ Kuoa ~~~~HF'~~r 
[ phylai 5-6 ] 
[entjlEATJt]~~ E~<paVTJ~ [-- -] 
[an£ ]ooto £crxanav Keq>aA.fJcrt 
WVT] NtKOjl<XXO~ noA.uA.aiou EK ~~~[(&v)? 
P'~l-1--111] 
v. 1 EKatocrt~ IIICT 
OiKat&v entjlEATJt~~ l:tpatrov 
MvT]crt<pavou~ Ko8roKtOTJ~ 
aneooto xcopiov £y Ko8roKto&v 
mVTJ l:"tpatcov MvT]crt<pavou~ Ko8ro: H EKa"to 1--
4 four possible new fragments ofthe Attic Stelai (414-413) 
fin. s. V linit. s. IV a.(?) 
5 
Col. I 
lacuna 
[-----------]c;t<; vvv 
[------------] vacat 
[---(Heading?)-] vacat 
~---------~~: o~w 
[------------] vacat 
[--------------]y~ 
lacuna 
Col. II 
lacuna 
vacat 
Al'~t[--------] 
vacat 
lllv[--- ---- ---] 
vacat 
~ Ill [- ------ - -] 
lacuna 
NON-:ETOIX. 
med. s. IV a. (?) 
lacuna [------- -] t ~ v [ ------------------------] 
[------- -]vacat [ -----------------------] [------ -] t ~ ~ [ -------------------------] 
[-------]~ ~ ~ 11[------------------------] 
5 [------ -] vacat [------------------------------] 
[-------Jt ~ 1- v [------------------------] 
[-------]II v v [------------------------] 
[------ -] t ~ [---------------------------] 
lacuna 
ca. 4-00-330 a. (?) NON-ETOIX. 
5 
lacuna 
[------ -)ovLxoc; [-----------------------] 
[------ -] vacat [ -------------~----------] 
[------ -] vacat [ ------------------------] 
[------ -]oo vacat [ -----------------------] 
[------ -] vacat [------------------------] 
[-------]~fl. fl. v[ -----------------------] 
[------ -Jc; vacat [------------------------] 
[------ -]cxoo v [------------------------] 
lacuna 
post m£d. s. IV a.? ETOIX. 
5 
lacuna 
[-----------------------------]A [ 10 J [----------------~------------: .]~;~~[: :~: :] 
[ -----------------------------.. ] xe:cpcxl,.[ •.• ]-
[ -------------------------------.•• , hlt@OOl') 
[ -------------------------------••• ~ •••• ]~l') 
lacuna 
5 lease of public land by the deme Piraeus (321or318) 
Kara ra8E t-wrOofJcrtiJ fiELpatElS' fiapaAlal' Kat 'A'Ap.vpt-
8Ja Kat TO 8rycnlov Kat ra"A"Aa TEflEI"TJ arravra. TOV~ fLlUew-
(j" ]aJ.LE~'OVS' urrf.p : L1 : opaxpa> Ka0ta-Tavat arro7tf11Jf1a ri)S' j.L-
a t]a-Owa-EWS' atloxpEWIJ, TQVS' OE El!70S' L1 8paxf{ w]v €yyvryr~-
l'] drro8t86J.LEI'OV ra €avro.fJ rry> pta-Bwa-<M. f.rri rola-8E J.L-
J e ~ , , ' , \ ~ , ' ~, , r!. ' I (]" OL'Ull' ai'E1f1Tlfl!]Ta Kal aTEi\Tj' EaiJ OE 7£) El(]"'t.opa y-
t]yvl)Tal drro TWIJ xwpfwv TOV Tlf11lflaTOS', TOVS' Ol)JlOTU.S' E-
i]a-¢EpEil'. n/1, 81: D"Au, Kai n)1· Y'l~' p~ i:g€a-n.~> E~aytw ro-
' 0 t']s- pta-ewa-afL,EliOV<;, fl'lTf EK TOV el)UElOV flrJTE EK TQJI' QAA-
wv TEflfYC~W. fll/Ofc n')z• i;,\IJI' r{,\.\v_,/ 1i TfP xwptrp. Ol flLoT[8:)j 
rrr;J.ii=:/'(1~· 7"1~ ef•] J.iO¢/Spull' K((; ;-;) -;·or; Lxou·oliJ'-;-"0'; J<.'(f.; [S}.r) 
lj 
aA.A.a ~llllDjlta T~l' J1L0"8w[ 0" ]w KaTa8ryO"OVO"L Tryj1 JlEI' 1JJ1LO"-
eall ~ll Tip 'EKaTOJl{3at&wt, n'w OE 1jj1LO"Eall Ell Tip noO"LOE-
WIJl. ol Jll0"8WO"G-jlEIIOL napaAlal! Kat 'AA.fwp[oa Kat TO ei)-
O"€l01l Kat TIXA.A.a d rrov TL EO"Ttl', oO"a atoll TE Kat 8EfLL7ov 
EO"Ttll f.pyaO"LJla rroiiv, Kara TaoE f.pyaO"o11rat, Ta fLEil €-
llllf.a E71) 01T"W~ all {3ovAWI'TaL) Tip 8€ OEKarcp h[ E} 71Jl' 1J-
JllO"Eal' dpoVI! Kat Jlry rrA.Ef[ w], orrw<; ctl! rip J1L!Y8wO"af1EI'iu 
:'0 wra -rauTa E~f? VTTEpya{EIYBat aTTo <>)> fl(7))) ir.l 6ix 
a TOV 'A v8w<7]pt&wo<;· £c.w GE TTAEiw ripofJ"!l ij n}i' 'J.Ul(J"f'-
all, Twll OTJJ-lDTwll ~O"Tw o Kaprro~ o TTAEtwl•. n)1· o(K[w, .. ;![,· 
Ell 'AA.fLVP ]lot O"TEYOVO"av rrapaA.aBC.w Kat op(h')l' Kara 7 
.. opl3ai 
6 possible lists of deme taxation (4th century) 
5 
10 
15 
traces? 
[ ....... ' 14 ....... ]pto ~ 
[ ...... max 11 ..... ] 
[ •••. c. 7 ... ]0-o~ 
[ .. o1trH811~ 'Avny£vo~ Hf61 
[Kll<pt]cr6owpo~ 'Avny£vo-; f' 
[ .. ]orrri811~ K11<ptcro06to 
[Kll]<ptcro<pwv 45 
"~Kpurrto~ f61 
'AJlttVlXO~ 
Tiu8oKAll~ 'AJl£lVtXO 
0r6ooto~ 'Ajl£1VtXO f' 
[EuJxapio% ~~ so 
<?~a'i:o~ Timavtru~ Fr 
[Eu]<pp6cruvo~ Tiatavtdu~] Hf61 (or f61r) 
f~aUKt1t1tO<; (-?] . 
8Eoo6crws 
..:\TjjloqnAos: ~Ewcr[-rpaw -?] 55 
vac. 3.0 em. 
'Ayvo8£o 8iacro~ 
'Ayv68w~ "Ayvwvo~ 
[ .... c ' .... ]i.wi-1 
me-. 8.3 em 
'A vwp&vo; 8iucro~ 
'Avwp&v11; 'Aprcrio [ -?] 
'Aprcria; 
C)(J 
'Av8pod.ri811; ~ 
'Avn<pav11; Eu~)(vu11 r0.;l ~ 
N i Kl1trtQ-; ~ 
Kmvn); 
'Avwpwv Nauw [-?] 
'A Vtl<jllAO; [-?] 
'A .. 4 .. cop 
.Utol\t,J1.; [ -?] 
<1>1i,o81w i&[ 11?]_; [- ?] 
<t>riomno.; ~ 
navt&p~~[o-; -?] 
me. 4.2 em. 
:.".10-fEvo.; 8\aoo; 
.:110y£vq.; 
20 "Ayvwv 'Ayvo8£o 
~[u]~i8£[o]~ "Ayvwvo~ ~~ 
0-~1t1:tVll~ '0AUJl1tlOOwpo ~ 
<?~6rroJlito~ F 60 Ttp61-la:Xci; 
[ .. [ .. ].]o~ KaA.A.irtrro 
25 'Apxecrtpato~ Irrou8ioo 
Xmpio:~ 
Iwcrio111lo~ f61r 
<l>iA.trr1to~ ~ 
<l>mvmn:iol]c; ~ 
Kp!-rwv ~r 
.:1168ow.; 
'Ap1GWKp&tr]; 
.'\ucrl81wo; 
6" Tt~lOKpan1; 'Aplcnul\o: r-·)1 
..'lt<pti.o; .:1tOt-:/.£o.;-~1 
Xiu)\' P 
ri.u.{n;:wn:o~ .[-·:•j 
E{;opopo~ ~ 
<Pti.oxci.[p]IJ[~- )] 
E iqu p [ ... ]. [- ''] 
'0/,uprrtQO[(l)po-.:- ?] 
:\UI\:lCJI(O; [-"] 
I [-] 
,-ac_ or rrLlces :;5 em. 
30 
35 
40 
Tq..tacrieeo~ 
K'tT]crtKA.Ei8TJ<; KT]<ptcro<pwv( we;) ~ 
K1l<ptcr68wpo~ Kq<ptcro<pwv( to; J H 
Kt~crwv KaA.A.tcr'tpO.w 70 
[K]aA.A.tcr'tpaw; K 1:~crwvoc; 
(K]~ncrt KA£tOT]~ K •~crwvo; 
fr]ACt.UKEtll~ rlcCClJKETO Kq<ptll}tf:tl;) 
,\t,CJuvopo; i\0mi5o.; £t,c,Jvl U!tE(,;J 
[.6]\cptA.o; L'uwvioo '7 5 
'Avn ~[p]a•TJ~ L'lt~JVioo 
<t>wvmnio% ~[t]Q![vJioo r::' 
D.autortrro; Eu06~o f!1 
Kp6:-r11s ~ 
me. to botfom o(stone 
80 
'Apt0tllt01F <t>opucn:\8o [-''j 
'E1tiKtclh '£rru.;),£o.:: jl 
Kt110ia.;; 
0E07tcl8llc; 
rv0.8w;; 
Ev<ppO.vwp Eu<pp~v9plo; -q] 
EtHppovio w[; [-"] 
~Tpa:t:(l)V ~~ 
Eu.t:iem: 
':> -
'Apx1vo; 'AypuA.ii(8£v) ~~ 
Itpato<pwv 'AypuA.i'j(8£v) 
"Jnncuv 'Aypu}.~(8Ev) [-?] 
j~~twv 'AypuA~8(Ev) 
Dpw'tEU~ f:x KEp(al..l£wv) (or K110[wv]) 
~~~apxo~ · · · · 
KT]<pt<noc; Eu<ppo 
tlT]I-;l~P.~~oc; 'AypuA(~8Ev) 
'Apx£cr-rpa-roc; 'Aypu(A.il8Ev) 
me. to bottom ofstone 
o [15e \mep aU. a ( ? ) ] 
h6:~ [ aVTo vac. ] 
9paOVKAfj<; 9paaVAAO 
EV6v5tKOS 'AKea6:v5p [ o l 
vacat 
5 E\TrpoTio<; KoA.oto 
9ovyehwv 9eo5wpo 
Ev5TJJ.J!5TJS Ev5fJJ.Io 
'Ovf)al'TT'TTOS 'OvaaaVTOS 
<l>tA.eas AlxJ.IoKA.ei5o 
10 <l>6:A.av6os ilTJJ.ITJTpio 
'Aya6apxf5TJs Ev<p6pf3o 
['A ]VTi5wpos 'EpyoTeA.os 
'laoT!J.IIOTJS IJ.I!Kpio 
oi5e &rrep aliTo h6:~aVTo 
vac. to bottom 
of stone 
15 ['I ]aoKAfjs, IJ.ItKpfwv, <l>tAIO"Tt5TJs· 
(E)V6VSTJilOS 'AK(e)a6:v5po 
Xatpfas Ovppfo 
OpwTOilOXOS OpwTio 
(E)v5pCxJ.IWV 0apJ.IOVi50 
20 MVTJaiJ.Iaxos IaA.aiTiwvos 
OtO"TOKAfjs OtaTfo 
KaAA.fas 'ATioA.A.o5wpo 
NavafO"Tpcrros ITp61-1f3wvos 
KoAA.VTIST)s MT)StJ.16:xo 
25 Ev~feeos KaA.A.io 
ilepKvAIST)s tlepKvf..o 
OtO"Tfas K66wvos 
KTf}awv Etrr\Jxo 
/\valllaxi5TJs Kaf..f..io 
30 'lepoKA.fjs·~ApxeO"Tpcho 
"Av5pwv AlcrxvA.o 
EliKA.ef5TJs EliKAE15o 
'ApfO"Twv 'A5eiO"To 
'Allelvias 9eo5wpo 
35 9ovyehwv 9w5wpo 
il165oTo<; lliwvos 
Iwaif3tos Iwawevos. 
vacat 
7 a 1% harbour tax ( 420s) and /G e 130 as republished by Matthaiou 
Decree I 
[ "E8oxs-e:v TEL {3of...EL KaL TOL 8€/.J.m, - -- -] o:v [- -- E7Tptmf:veve, -:_-]-
a r---- E'Ypap.fLrLTEVE, ------- bmrT] 6.re, [------- et7TE"] 
[- - - - -- - - -- - -- - - - - - - - -] LKa [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --] OJI~ [- - - - - - - -- -- - - - -] 
5 [---- -------------- -]vq.[-- ------------ -] 
Decree II 
lacuna 
[ -- --~----]a[------------~--------] 
[- - - - ~ - - - - /'] p [a] !J-p.a [ TE- - - - - - - _!B_ - - - - - -] 
[--- -2- - - , Av] noxl.8et Ka~ [ <'Pavou8EVEL - - - - ~ - - - - J 
[- - - _! - - -] ~r; 'AOevatoLc; Ka.L [- - - - - - - E- - - - - - -] 
5 [---1.:!..---]opac; Kat Ta aX'A..a hor[------2~-----] 
[--- _t:----] Tov 8Ep.o:v Tov 'A8e:va[[ o:v--- ...2~----] 
(---- -
1:!....----) Kat :viJv awoc; KaL [----- .2."_---) 
[ ho7TOS' a:v ho OEp.o ]S' /zoe; 7TEpt 7TOAAO 7TOLO [ Jl ¢aL:VETaL TOS' €u6. y]-
c [ O:VTaS' KO] 7TEar; [ Ka J L xapw a7T00ouo:v TO A [ OL7TOV" a'EfLtOS' 8€ TO]-
10 [ KO he#<] f!.TOUTO T [or;] K07TEac; hoc; eyayo:v 0 [ LK08Ev OOJITOV TOLS'] 
( Tpt] Ep07TOLOLS' K (at) hot TpLEp07TOLOt E ( v8vc; 7Tapaf...a{3oVTES') 
[nO] EJITOV Er; TO va [ v] 7TE/'LO:V Kat €av Se [ OJI'Ta,; af...f...o TL:VOS' hoL] 
[ UT] paTEyo£ XP6u8o [ v ¢p] a'OJITES' TEL ,$ [ OAEL Kat hap,a a7To8L8]-
[ 6v] TES' TEll TErayp,lv [ EJ/ J TL!J-E [ v] · Kat ho [ L vaV7Teyot A.oyt,6u8o]-
15 [ v TO] 'ic; TptEp07Tow [ l:r; Ta TE] Tayp,l:v [a· E7Tet8e o3v 'AVTwx£8e]-
[ r; Kat] Cf>avouOlves- TO [ v 8ep,ov Tov 'A8eval.o:v ev 7TOLETOV Kat 7T]-
[ ep'i av] ro ho heAAEIIOf ( ap.£ac; - - - - - - - - 2.4- - - - - - - - -] 
[ ---9---] r; XPEo-8at. Er; r( OJ/ 7TOAEp.ov ----- _2o_-- ---] 
[-_} __ aw]o'iv d.yayoJI'T(ow ---------".2..--------] 
20 [- -- ..! - - - -] opcu, E1TaW (eo-a~. p.ev 'Avnox£8& Kat <llavoufJeve]-
[ v h6rt €8t] q.Kovea-aTE [ v Ta TErayp,lva· €av Se Twoc; 8ela-Oov] 
d [ 7Tapa TO 8ep.o] 7Tpoua-r. [ EV awo TOS' 7TpVTa:VES' ES' TOJI 8€p.o] !' [ Er; T]-
[ E:V 7Tp0TEV EK] KAEULq. [ v· 7Tp6uo8o:v 8€ JvaL awo'i:v ES' TE], ,BoA. [ E]-
[ v €av 8elu8ov a] ~~Q [ TLJIOS' 7Tp0TOLV !J-ETa Ta htepa· TO] 8{€} ¢ue [ ¢]-
25 [ tup,a TOOE avaypar/JuaL TOV ypap.p.aTEa TOV TES' {3oA.] ES' E:V UT [ E]-
[ AEL A.d}ivEL Kat Oevat E:V aKp07TOAEL" a7Top,w8oua] L OE TOS' [ 7T J-
[ OAETclS'' a7To8ovaL 8€ TOS' KOAaKpETac; TO apyr}pw:v· - - - _!.- - -] 
[----------------·~------------ - -- -] 
e TLE7TaL [--- -- -- - - ----4..!:.----- - --- --- - - -]-
30 'EVEpyETaS' E:V [UTEAEt.•l:vat 8€ awo'ic; h~vplu8aL hov av 8€]-
0VTa.£ 7Tapa 'AO&[aiov· ypa¢uaL 8€ 'Avoptoc; ( ?) E:V TEL awe'i UTE]-
AEI. EvEpyETaS' 'A{) [ Eval.ov EJI aKp01TOAEL TOV ypap.p,area 'l'es-] 
,BoA.es- :X: 
[ ... ]NO[.],O[.] I~!Oil[----------------] 
2 [ .. ]! TEl 6yopoa TEl EB.[- - - - - - - - - - - - - -mp]-
!TTov mp\ Ti'jS ElTapXE[S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
4 cuev To li1epo. Tos 5' EJ..J.. [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] 
[ ... li1]epov &l\Ao E es TON[- - - - - - - - - - - - -J 
6 [. fio ypafl]flc;XT~[u]? fio r~ [f3oi\Es - - - - - - fio1] 
[oe 1TOAETa )i Cx'!J'Ofll0'~9~[ CxVTOY - - - - - - - - - - -) 
vacat 
8 dekate from the first Financial Decree ofCallias (434-433) 
[.!8]oxa£v -rit f3o..\it Kal Tot 8£p.ot, K£Kpo1Ti<; E1TpvTav£v£; Mv£al0w<; £-
[ ,1--·· I E' II} • , U_\\1 9 , _!:>- -0-Y.JI"'t"IJ4TEV£, V1T£L11£<; £1T£UTaT£, .ll.U/\1\La<; £t1T£' a1rooovat TOt<; £Ot<; 
[ ] 
I I · I ~.l. \ f I . !:> I - 'AO I I 1\ _! \ T a XP£p4Ta Ta "'f'EI\Op.tva, £1T£w£ Tn n £vatat -ra TPLUXIJ\ta -ra~~aVT-
[a] aV£VEV£YKTaL E<; m)..\tv, hO. lcpalcptUTO, vop.wp.a-ro<; h£p.£8am5. ~:boSt-
5 [8]ovat OE am) TOV XPEp.a-rov, a ls a1To0oalv EUTLJI TOt<; 0£oL<; £cpa£cptap.-
[ !l I I A <\ \ I " A I ~ \ \ " I I ( JVa, Ta T£ 1rapa TOt<; EIVIEVOTap.tat<; OVTa VVV Kat TUIV\a a £UTt TOVTOV 
[-ro]v XP£p.cl.Tov, Kai TalK TE> OEKa-r£<; E1TEt8d.v 1rpaOiL. >.oytaaaOov OE h-
[ Ot ..\ ]oytUTaL hot -rptclKOVTa ltoL1T£p VVV Ta ocpEAop.£va TOi<; 0£0L<; aKp-
[t/36]<;, avvayoyi<; OE To..\ ..\oytaTOV E {3o..\E a?rroKpa-rop EU'TO. a1T000VTOV 
10 (8£ T]a ')(pEp.a.Ta hot 1TpVTavEs fLETa Ti<> {3o..\i<; Kai. £xaa..\ncpoVTov £7Tn-
[ ~:> \ ] > _ !:> A Y I I I I I - 1 t I oav a1roooaw, .,.£T£UaVTE<; TaTE 1TtvaKta Kat -ra ypap.p.arna Kat Eap. 1T-
[o a..\]..\oOt lt y£ypap.p.£va. a1TocpatvoVTOV OE -rd. y£ypap.p.£va hot 'T£ htEp-
[is K]al hot ht£po7TOLOL Kat (L 'TL<; tl.Uos olOEV. -rap.la<; OE a1TOKVap.EV£-
[ ] 
I A I h I \ -"\ \ > I (} I I A h v TO v-rov Tov XPEfLaTov o-rap.1TEp Ta<; UIV\a<; apxa<;, Ka a1T£P TO<; TOV t-
15 [Epo]v -r6v -ris .:40Evalas. hoiiTot OE Tap.tEvov-rov £p. 1roA£t £v TOt 'OmaO-
[~o]p.ot Ta Tov 0£6v XPEfLaTa hOaa 8vva-rov Kai. oawv, Kai avvavotyov-
-rov ICal avyiCAELOVTOV Ta<; Ovpa<; TO •oma8o8op.o Kai. avaaEp.atv&aOo-
v rois -rov Tis .:40£valas Tap.lats. 1ra.pd. OE -rov vilv Tap.t6v Kai. T6v £ma-
-ra-r6v ICal TOV rn£po1TotOV TOV £v TOt<; ht£pois, hoi. vVV 8taxEpl{o[ at]-
20 v, a1Tapc.8p.Eaaa0ov Kai a1TOUT£ad.a0ov Ta '}(PEp.a-ra lvav-rlov TE<; {3o>.[i]-
<; £p. 1TOA£t, Kal1Tapa0£XUaaOov hot Tap.lat hot >.axov-rE<; 1Tapd. TOV vv[v] 
t I \ ' 1\ I ,J._ I ,.. ft (}' " I apxoVTOV Kat £V UTEI\(L avaypa't"'aVTOV p,.tat a1TaVTa Ka EKaUTOV TE 
6 8 6 \ I L _ _ I I I r I I I .L_! \ 'T v £ v Ta Xf'EIJ4Ta 1'101Toaa £UTtV £KaUTot Kat avp.1rav-rov KE'f'D.I\aLO-
' I I I \ \ I \ \\ \) ..J.I h v, xopt<; 'TOT£ apyvptov Kat TO XPVUWV. Kat TO I\Ot1TOV avaypa'f'OVTOV -
t I I > 1\ I }..(...- 8-IH -1> " I 25 CH ac.EL Tap.LaL ES' UTEI\£1' Kat nvyvV WOVTOV TUV T£ OVTOV ')(P£1.14'TOV 
\ ,.. I '"' 0 ... \ J I '[ J ___ \I \ \ ) Kat 'TOV 1TpoUWVTOV TOt<; £0t<; Kat £all TL a 1T aJIQI\tUKETUt KaTa TOll £-
VtaVTOV1 1rpo<; TO<; ..\oytUTa<;, Kai EMvvas 8t86v-rov. Kai £K Ilava8£vat-
ov £., IlavaOlvwa -ro..\ ..\6yov 8t8&v-rov, Ka0a1T£p hot Ta -ris .:4.0tvalas T-
[ J 1 I 1.' I 1\ > ~ 01 > l.l. I I I h a p.t£VOVTE<;. Ta<; o£ UT£1\a<;, Ev at<; av avaypa'f'aoat -ra XPEfLaTa Ta t£p-
so [a, 0E1v-rov £p. 1TOAE£ hot Tap.lat. E1T£t8d.v OE a1T00£0op.Eva lt TO£<; 0EOL<; 
[
I ]' I \ I \ \ I ,.. ""' .-.8 I Ta XP Ep.a.Ta, ES TO VEoptov Kat Ta THX£ TOt<; 1T£ptoat XP£U at XP£11-aa-
~~----------------------------------------~ 
9 the Grain-Tax Law (374-373) 
(B)Eo[. 
E1Tt I:wKpaT{Oo apxovTOS 
VOfA-OS 1T£pt Tfjs Ow0EKUT1JS Tov a{Tov"" 
TCnv v~awv. vacat 
5 J1yuppws £l1T£V' 01TWS av TWL O~fA-WL at[To]-
s ~~ EV TWL KOtVWL, T~V OW0£KUT1JV 1TWA[ Ei']-
v T~v £v A~fA-VWt Kat "lfA-f3pwt Kat I:Kvpw[t K]-
at T~V 7T£VT1JKOUT~V ULTO' ~ o€ fA-EptS E(<[a]-
(JT1] laTat rrevTaKoawt fA-EOLfA-VOt, rrv[pw]-
IO v fA-EV EKaTOV, KptOwv o( TETpaKOUWL. [ KO]-
p..tei: TOV ai:Tov KLVOuvwt TWL <favTo o \I'[P]-
HifA-Evos Eis Tov flELpata Kat d.vaKOfA-t[ E)-
i' Eis TO UUTU TOV ULTOV TEAEatv TOtS ~[v]­
T!5 Kai Ka>rav~aEt TOV ai'·r:ov Eis TO Ai1[ K)-
15 E!OV' UTEyov OE Kat TE{)vpWfA-EVOV rrap¢[g]-
EL TO AiaKetov ~ rr6Ats Kat d.rroaT~aE[' r)-
ov ai'Tov Tfjt rr6A1J' TptaKOVTa ~fLEPWI! [a] 
rrptUfA-EVOS' E7TEtOav civaKOfA-{U1JL ds [a a]-
TV, TEA Eat TOLS' aUTO' E7TELOdv OE d.vaK[ op..]-
20 {aEL Els TD O.aTv, Evo{KLOV oV 7Tpd~Et [ ~ 7T]-
6-\ts- Tovs- -rrptap.Ellous-· Tovs- -rrvpovs- 4[-rro)-
OT~OEL o -rrpuJ.p.Evos- EAKOVTas- -rr/vn ~[ K]-
T€(a)s- n) TaAavTov, Tos 8€ Kpt(8)ds i-\Ko[ua]-
(a)s- n)ll p.€8tp.lloll nf-\aliTOll tTJpds- d-rr9a[ T]-
25 ~aEL Ka8apds- alpwv, TO a(~)Kwp.a €-rrl Tij[ t ']-
wv(TJ)t OTJKWaas-, Ka8a-rrEp oi aAAot €p.[-rr]op[o]-
L' -rrpoKaTa{3o,\~ll ov 8~aEL o -rrp{ap.E[v]o[s- d)-
,\,\' EmfJVLa KaL KTJpVKELa KaTd T~ll [p.)Ep(£8)-
a EtKoat 8paxp.(O.)s-· EYYVTJT(d)s- KaTaaT~a[E]-
3o , o 7Tptap.Ellos- 8vo KaTd T~fL wp£8a dtt[o]-
XPEws-' oiJs- av iJ {3ov,\~ DoKLfLUOTJL: avp.[p.op]-
{a €aTat iJ p.Epls- Tpwx{-\wt p.EDtf:«-[llot], 
f.'t UliDpEs-· iJ 7TOALS' 7TpMEL T~V avp.p.op[ta]-
v TOll OLTOV K(a)l 7Tap' EliOS' KaL 7Tap' a7Tav[ TW]-
35 v TWV EV TTJL avp.p.op{at OVTWll, lws- ~v T[d a]-
UTTJS' d7ToMf3TJc aipda8w 8€ o 8ijp.os- 8[/K]-
(a) (a)v8pas- Et :487/va{wll a7TclliTWll Ell Tijt [EK]-
KATJatat, oTaV7TEp Tovs- aTpaTTJyous- a(ip]-
WliTat, OLTLliES E7TLfLEA~aovTat Tov atl T)-
40 o· oVTot 8€ d7ToOTTJaap.Evot TOll ai'To!' K[a]-
Td Td yEypap.p.€va 7TWADliTWll Ell Tijt dy[op]-
at, OTall TWL 8~p.wt DoKijt· 7rWAEV 8€ !L~ E[tE]-
Lllat E7TLrPTJifJ£aat 7Tponpov Tov :4ll8w[ T]-
TJPLWVOS p.TJVOS. o OE OfJp.os mtaTw T~V T(t)-
45 /L~ll TWll 7TVPWll KaLTWV KpdJwv 07TOOOV x[p]-
~ 7TWAiv TOUS alpEfNvTas· TOV o€ a(i')Tov (o)-
; 7Tptctp.EVOL T~V Owi>EKUTTJII KOp.tOUVTW-
ll 7TpO TOV Matp.aKTTJptWliOS p.TJv6s· oi 8€ q.-
ipE8EliTES U7To Tov 8~p.ov Emp.EAova8w-
5o v 07TWS all Kop.{,TJTaL 0 OLTOS Ell TWL XPD!'-
WL TWt EipTJp.Evwt· E7TELDdv 8€ d7To8wl1Ta-
t oi aipE8€vTEr; Tov afTov, Aoywaallw[v] 
€v TWL D~p.wt Kat Td XP~/LaTa TJKQliTWV if;[ E1-
povTES' Eis- TOll 8-ijp.ov Kat EOTW aTpaTt[w]-
55 nK(d) Td EK To alTo yEvop.Ella· T~v 8€ 7Tpo[K]-
aTaf3o,\~ll T~v EK TWll v~awll p.Ep{aat To[v]-
s d7To8EKTa<; KaLTijr; 7TEVTTJKOOTijs, oao[li]-
7TEp 7TEpv~nv (TJ)VpEll EK TOLll 8uo(v 8EKctT[.]-
'"• TO p.€v VUll Elvat Eis T~v 8w{KTJat[v K]-
6o at TO Aomov p.~ (d)l/;atpEw nv 8vo 8EKaT[.] 
EK TWV KaT(a)f3aAAop.€vwll XPTJ!LUTWll. '''' 
10 earlier inscription from Lemnos (387-386) 172 
Fragments a and d. 
( E'8ofw r'ijt {JoA.f,t Kaf. 'TWL 87/p.wt· 6eo~oro<; iJpxe· - - - - - - - - -) tS' 
e?Tpvnivevev· [. ]p~[. ~a:~. iypa]p.p.arevew [--- e?Terrrarn·--- -] 
2 ( ei7TEV" evfarr8at plv rov KT/pvKa aVrtKa p.aAa .... c~. ~ ••• ) t Kat rot ( S') 
8w8eKa Oeo"is-, E [ av ... ~· ~ ... ] UVJIEVEtKT/L [- - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - Ovrrf.av Kat 7Tporro8ov 7TOLT/ue] uOat Ka06n av 
rwt [ 8 ]7/p. [ wt 8oK'ijt · mil] m p.ev 17vx [Oat, e?Tet8~ 8€ - - - - - - - -] 
4 (- --- -- - - - - - -- --- 8e8]6x8at rwt 87/p.wt 1rpos- ros- [KA17-
p6xos- ros- o HKoJJTas- iv [AT/p.vwt------------------] 
[---------------- E7Tt roil 8e"iva ap]xovros- iv AT/p.v[w]t 
E)'EJIE'T [ 0 •. !'a: ~-~ 0 •••• ] 'TOLS' Ta<; alir [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
6 [ ,, ~, ' ]' ""' ~,I.., .,.., , , -A - - - - - - - - - eav oe TLS' - -·- - 1rap a ravra 17 tpaLV17L 17 a?Ta'Y17' 17 
[ ••. • c~. ~ 0 •••• ] a?Toypacp~ [ v - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - - 817p.] evO'ijt ri,s- wv a?Toyeypap.p.E [ v17s- y)js- . c.a .• '. ] 
ra iy AT/p.v [ WL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -· -] 
8 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] iKTef.rrwuw i1rl. rf,s- iva'T17'> [ 7Tpv-
rave£as .. ] 7T€JI bn [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] av rcw iut.oJJTa ivt.avrov K~ [ . . . . 
.•. '.a .• ~.3 ••• ] Owv [ __________________________ ] 
10 [--------------- -],BoA.~s- etre rpe'is- Kara rw 8[ ..... 
• • ~a .• 1.3 ••• ] 0 [ _________________________ ] 
~- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7TI' .~·)a 'TWL 817rrELWt EV ~LTLVt 
av f]p.i [pat - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
12 [ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] t 7TEV'TaKOULOP,E8tp.VWV 
TOV [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -· - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]at 'TOLS' KA77POXOL<; ra 
re EKTEw[p.ara--------- --------------- -- ·] 
14 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] EL<; rwv olKtWV TWJI SeSruLE [ v-
p.i~v-----------------------------1 
[ '] A , ' , • , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E )' 77P,JJO ELUa)'OrTtJJ 07TO-
UOL av [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
16 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T] WL 817P,OrTLWL 07TOrTOL av 
p.~ EK'T[ ELuWrTL------------ ---- ---- -----] 
(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -'-] wv· CJ7TOU17V 8' avrot 
i}pya,ov [To - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
18 [- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 'T] a OP17 Kat ra cicpopLo--
J.Lara iu [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[---------- --- -- - ------ - - - - - - ]r7]<; a~ 7} 
,.,.w-Owut<; mf1rpar [at - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
20 [------------------------ To"i.:; KA17]p6xo'" 7} iv-
ocplA.euOal. 'TLS' K [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ocpeA) OJITES' rwt. 
87]J.Loul.wt eixov E7T [- - - - - - - - _:_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
22 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T] wv KA17p6xwv Ta 
plv aA.Xa [- - - - - - - - - - - - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
(---------- ---- - - ---- - - - -- -) ap.cpLU{J7]TWV Tf,.:; 
y-ij.:; 7} T-ij [ S' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
24 [-------------- _,---------- 8]1.Kats-, iav 8E p.~ 
A.ax11, 8£., [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - -] 7] 8tK7] TT/V TE ava-
KpLULV 7T [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
26 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] wv is- ro 8tKaur'T/pwv 
1rapa [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[----------- ---------- :--- cip.cpt] u [,Bhrwv lvq. ~«?Y.9:f 
?TP.f[--------------------------- ---] 
Fragment b. 
28 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] w [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - O'T710'] 4Tw EV aKp01TO [ AEt - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
30 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - -] o>.wv Kat p.Tj f.teva [' - - - - - - - - - - -] 
(- -- -- - - - /J.~TE - - - - - -- -]vat /J.~TE IJ.'O'(}wo-at 1TA'Tjv (- - - - - -] 
32 [- - -- -- - - - - - - - - w] vo~ IJ.71VO<; TO p.ETa ®Eo [ 8o-rov apxov-ra - - -] 
(- ---- - - - - - - - - -] yijv TOt; KA71p6xo~ Kat [- - -- - - - -- - - -] 
34 (- ---- - - - - - - --:- - Ka0a?T] Ep TOL<; e<; !.a>.ap. ['iva -- - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --O..qnK] vopivwv E [- - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
36 :C- - - - - - - - - - - - - -] - . I . V n '· [- - _ - __________ ] 
lacuna 
Fragment c. 
[- ---- - - - - - - - - -] \,' 0' [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
38 [---- --------- -hrra£ o q.[- ---------------- -] 
(- - - - - - - - - - - - ovop.a-r] a ?TaTpo(}ey (- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
40 [-- - --- -- - --- ---]a ey A.f]p.vo E<; [----- ----- --- -] 
. [------------- -] ~~'17JI /J.718EVL /1.71.[--------------] 
42 [- - - - ·- - - - - - - - - - -] 77 Twv KA71P [ 6xwv - - - - - - - - - - - - J 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] ~v &n-o [- - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
44 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] O't Kat T [- - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -] 
(------ --------- ---- -) 'T (---- -- -- - - - - - - J 
lacuna 
Fragment e. 
46 [- - - - - - - - - -] ~ ... ~[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - - a] ?To86u0at TO<; KA 71P [ oxo~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
48 [- - - - - - - - -] v 9lryo-wv l~ Aijp. ( vov - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - -] 
[- - - - - - - - e] av p.Tj l>-071' o q. [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J 
50 [---- -----J v olKout ev A~p. ( vwt------------------] 
[-- ----- --J v TOL<; EV AT}p. [ V~t -- ------ - --------- -] 
52 (- - - - - - - - - - -) utauaVTE<; (- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] 
.r-------------Jo-77' or-------------------1 
11 
(BE)o(t] 
the Law on the Little Panathenaea (~ l >} [ thri C9 a]pxovTos-· 
[ 16 ]q[ .... ]".f1ptaTOVtKOS" .f1pt[aTon'Ao]-
[ us Mapa8wvws- EC7T ]Ell" TV)p)t dya8ijt TOV a~fl-0'! [ TOV .:487]]-
5 [va[wv, 01TWS" av Tijt] .f187)ViiL ~ 8va[a WS" KaAMaT[7] ~~ llava]-
[87]valots- TOtS" ji-]tKpOtS" KUL7Tpoao8os- ws- 1T,\E{[aT7) y€v]-
[ 7JTaL iEpo1Tow]!s-, 8ES6x8at Toi"s- vofl-o8€T[a]t[s-· T~v f-LEV] 
[N€av f-LWBovTw]aav 8€Ka ~fl-EpaLS 1Tp6npov !'[ ] 
[oi 1TW,\7)rai 8€K](a) Er7J KaTa 8tKA7)p{av Tuu TO 1T[A<LaTov] 
10 [8t86vn TUU 1Tp]oTEpwt ETE! ~ JJ, av ~ LIA.AJYTI[ J 
[ 10 fl-'] aBwTa[s- €yyv7JTOS ,\afl-,Bavo'![ at. rous- 8]- . 
[ E 7TW,\7)TUS" r~]v 1TEVT7JKOUT~V 1TWAEtV Ti]v EV T1][t N€at xw]-
[pis TWV aAAw]v. TOUS" 8€ 1TpUTaVELS" 1Tpoypa¢m[v ,BovAijs-] 
[ f:opav ds- T~]v fl-{a8watv Tijs- Nias- 8tapp~87)v [Kai rijs- 7T]-
15 [ EVT7JKOUTijs-] T~V 1Tpiiatv Tijs- Ell Tijt N€at xwpt[s- ] 
---"'-- ~ 1Tp6] ao8os- ye'v7)Tat 8vo£v TaAavTo[ tv KaTa EV]-
[taVTOV U7TO T]wv KT7Jj-LaTWV TWV EV TijL N€~,I[t] K[---"----
---'-- v1Ta]pxELv Tijt .f187Jviit. ToiJTo [ 13 
---'--flav]a87)valwv Twv f-LLKpwv T[ 9 oi 8€ d]-
2o [ 1To8iKTat f-LE]P.t~ovTwv atho Eis- Tau[ Ta Tots iEpo1Tow]-
[is ]ova J dval Kai TOj-L 1Tp0 14 
[ 11 ]at ji-ta8ovv Ka8o- " ( 16 
[---1'-'1--)t. TOV 8€ Taj-LLQV [----'1'-"9---
[---'-'12~-] ONT A.ETH.E[.] "( __ ___,2o~--
25 [ 13 ] -----
B 
[---------------]![ .. ] 
[-------07TW<; Ul' -------EV]a[ E,B]ws- KU-
[/ 29 ] KaT' EvtaVTOV K-
[a/ y{yvT}Tat ~ 8ua{a 1T]apt:aKt:V[aaji-]~ WS" apLUTa TijL ./1-
[0TJVnL KaO' J'KaaTo]v TOv &,avrov lnr!p Tov B~fl-OV Tov .:4-
5 [BTJvatwv Kat TdA.]A.a oua SEt SwtKijTaL 7TEpt T-TJv EOPT+ 
[v T~V ayOj-LEVTJV r]ijt BEwL KaAws- V1TO TWV LEp01TOLWV Eis-
[ TOV UEt xpovov, E)ip7J</J[u8at TWL S~ji-WL, TU j-LEV aAAa Ka86.-
[1TEp Tijt ,BovAijt, B]vELV 8€ TOUS" iEp07TOLOUS" TUS" j-LEV 8vo 
[8vu{as- T~V TE rijt] .f181Jvlit Tijt 'YytE{at Kat TiJv & TWL dp-
w (xalwt vEwt 8vo]f-LEV7JV Ka8a1TEp 1TpaTEpov Kat vdfl-aVT-
[as- TOLS" 1TpVTclV]EUtv 7TEI'TE j-Lt:p£8as- Kal. TOtS &via ap-
(xovatv TpEt>] Kat Tajl-Lats- Tijs- 8c:oiJ fl-{av Kat Tots iEp-
[o1TOLOLS" j-L{av] Kat TOt'> UT[pa]T7JYOLS" Kat TOtS" Tattapx-
[ ots- TpEI.s- Kat T ]ois- 1TOfl-1T[ Evat]v TOtS" .f181Jva{ots- Kai Ta-
15 (Ls- KaVTJ</Jopot]'> KaTa (Ta) dw[86Ta], Ta 8€ aAAa KpEa .:48T}valo-
[t'> fl-Ept~Etv· d]m] 8€ Twv TE[ TTap]aKovm f-Lvwv Kat Tijs- f-LL-
[iis- Twv EK Tijs- f-L]w8waEws- Tij'> N€as- ,Bowv~aavns- oi i~:p-
[ 07TOLOt ji-£Ta T ]wv ,Bowvwv 1TEf-LiflavTE'> T~V 7TOfl-1TiJv TijL 8~:-
[wt 8voVTWV Ta]vTas- TUS" ,Bovs- c.baaas- E7TL TWL ,Bwj-LWL TijS" 
20 ( .f187Jvas rwt f-LE]yaAwt, fl-{av 8€ E7Tt Twt Tijs- NIK7]> 7TpoKp{-
[vavTE> EK Twv KaAAwTwovawv ,Bowv, Kat Bvaavns- Tij-
[t .f187]vlit Tijt] floAtaot Kat rijt .f187]viit Tijt N{KTJL a1Taaw-
[v Twv ,Bowv Tw ]v a1To Twv TETTapaK9VTa f-LVwv Kat f-Ltlis- Ew-
[v£T}fl-Evwv vE]fl-OVTWV Ta Kp€a Twt S~ji-WL Twt .f187]va[wv Jv 
25 [KEpaj-LELKw]t Ka8a1TEp Ell Tats aUats- KpEavop.{aw U?T-
[ovEji-ELV 8€] TUS" wpt8as- Els- TOV SijfLOV EKaUTOV KaTa [T]-
(ous- 1TEfL7TOV ]Tas- o1Toaovs- Civ 1TapEX7J' o SijfLos- EKaaTos-· [E)-
[ls- 8€ Ta tLLJaBwfLaTa Tijs- 7TOjl-7Tijs Kal TO fLayELptKOv Ka[i] 
[KOUfL7JUtv] T.OV ,BwfLOV TOV fLEyaAov Kai TtU,\a oaa 1Tpoa-
30 [ ]Eia8at 7TEpt T~v f:opT~v Kat Els- 1Tawvxt8a 
[8t86vat]: F: SpaxfLas· To us 8€ iEpo1Towvs Tovs Swt[K]-
[ovvTas- T]a flava8~vaw Ta KaT' EvtavTov 1TOELv TiJv 1Ta[v]-
[vvx{8a] ws- KaA,\{aTYJV rijt 8Ewt Kat T~v 1TOfL1TiJv 1TEfL1TE[t]-
[v afLa ~]Mwt UVLOVTL, ~7)fLLOVVTas- TOV fL~ 1TEt8apxo[iJvr]-
35 [a Tai"s- EK] Twv VOfLWV ~7JfLLats-· f:Ma8at 8€ TOv Sijji-[ov ... ] 
[ 18 a]v[ 8]pas- Et .f187)va{wv U7T[ clVTWV 0]-
12 regulations for the festival of Amphiaraia (330) 
-------------------------------------------- Jr [ ----------------------
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J ~t 5 A.ct ,\~~ Tf.!J [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 ----------------------------------------- w]<; t'>LKmomr(ct---------------
>I l )I ) I )I [ 
-------- - ------ - - - -- - - - ---- --------- OVT E ClAAO<; Ef.l.OL OVI E - - - ------ - - - -
----- - -- - ------- - --- -- -- --- --- -- rroA.A.n] ifctt aY,ctOa · ~i of. 1-l. [ ~--- - -- --- -- - -
------------------------------------ -] J!.~ L11T('(K0V(J7?L Kct[---------------
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10 ------ --- ------------ - - - --- - - - - - - ayw] l't(Ea-Om 8f. .-o1,[ '> ') ----- - - - --- - - - -
~] - ' ' [' ') 
----------------------------------- TW l' </>VAWl' ctf.Lct Kct L . -------------
------------------------------------ ] Qt' 8f. Act XOI'TE k ------------------
____________ - ____ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J To v rrii xo ,, r- -------------------
------------------------------------- ] TOv irrrro8pof.Lo[v----------------
15 -----------.--------------------- a-TE</>avovhw avTov OaA.~[ov rrTE<I>avwL ---
'] ~ ~ ' ''[ ' ? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - et V TWL 8tuo VaL a f.1.et K('( L . - - - - - - - - - -
---------------------- -------- -- Tov<; 8U f3ovA.Evnxo;; 8t~ [ - ---------- - -- - -
----------------------------------- KaO]arrEP. [E]rV[f.l.l'!-15 q[ -------------
-------- -- --.--- ---------- ------- ---- --] o 7TOAEf.l.ctP¥,0'> rr( --------- - -----
20 -------------------------------------- ]TA[. ~ .]~I;IMI[----------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] KaT~ T~VT~ EUTW · [ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
---------------------------------------- ] 4\ [. . 4 •• ] 4\..:\QO y [ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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25 -------------------------------------- ]w 1TaTP.[o]~EV Ka~ (TOV fHJf.l.OV ?---
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] Tw v 8f. ~Mw v E K [ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] yriJOE~~ [. :! . ] ~E [- - - - - - -- - - - - - - -
- - - -- - -- - -- -- - - - - ---- - - - - - - -- - - --- - - - - ] J;:KA TJ;:~ [. .]QIJOT~ [-------------
~] ' ' ,, " ~ [ ') 
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------ .. ----------------------- -·------- ]wva v E'[K]aTOl' o;~ [ -------------
--------------------------------------] o rrot..i.[f.L]ClP.XO'> TP.[t-------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ] ~ IJ R \ ~ [.] 9~ E v TWL ~ [ - - - - - - - - - - - -
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- - - --- - - - - - -- - - - - ] NNJ;:AN [.] NJ;:ENEIO [ ----- - -- - --
35 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T] 0L El'WVTWL TWL E [ 7T'] 'EN ----------
----------------------------------- K]aOarrEp Y[. .~ .. ]rOIL .]or[---------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - K] ~ m HP-71 m L TfiJL AN[. . ]IK [- - - - - - - - - - -
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• ] - ,I ~ I [ ? 
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------------------------------------- ], .. rraTpoOn· Kai TOv 81} [f.Lov--------
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! 45 
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13 a Choregic Monument (313-312) 
8 0 \, 
1'/\AY:<II'.HC C.uclnnOY €in€N' EnEII'.r. oi XOPHrOI A fo tA~ 
C A Y'TOKM:OYC K.•i ¢1/\0HN\I'.HC ¢1,\lnnOY KA,\cDC ~ i<A~ 
';1 .P!,\OTI,..·WC c;<..)PHri-iCAN · ~E .c:.0X8AI TOIC 6HMOT •. A. 
I·C CTEt.PNCCAI .~.)Tl):C XPYCuJI CTE·.l.ANWI ~t<AT£ 
o ·or; ;no EKATON L:.PAX,"-WN EN rw1 &EATPwl role KW 
MwiL>oic roic META 8e:OO$PACTON AFXONTA. on0.·c AN 
[0$]1/\0T!MGJNTAI KAi ol A/\/\01 XOPHro1 oi ME/\/\ONT€C 
(xjoPHre:rN. l>OYNAI l>f AYTOIC KAi ElC 9YCiAN L>€KA A 
PAXMAC TON AHMAPXON 'HrHCi/\€WN KAl TO~C TAMi 
Ill AC, ANArPA'fAI At KAi TO 'fH<I>ICMA TOI'.E TO~C TAMiA 
C tN CTH/\HI /\19iNHI KAl CTfkAI tN TWI 9€ATPWI, onwc 
AN Ai.IwNe:ic ,i.e:) ~'c KA/\1\ICTA . r,i..; ~IONYCIA no/wCIN. 
14 a liturgy list (333-332 or 332-331) 
3_13:·2 ----- ----------------------------------------------
or [ ... . 7 ... ]0[ .. 4 .• ]0[--------------------- tot~ 8£ AT)ttoupyou?]-
332•1') cnv £~£1v~qpaljf~t 1 r.L .. E[---------------------------- J-
ou ml. : 1- : 1ca-ra -ro~ av8pa · d~ 8€ [ -r~v avaypa<p~v -ril~ cr-r~All~ ? - ] 
r&:n 8~ 1-!Wt 801cil t. 
5 OlO£ EATJ tpwu[py]TJO'UV E1tl [- - - - - - apxovw~]' 
coL I 
[c]Um~iw; 0£[--
'Epcx8TJ·ioo~ L1. [--
coL 2 
K J1<ptcr68wpo~ Mtt8iou 'A[ va]yupacrw<; : r' me.? N t[ 1e? - -
Apx£Pto<; 'ApxcPta8ou Aallrt(-r)pEu~: F me.? A.l[--
stoich. 
non-stoich. 
1 o A iYT)·ioo<; · · A£wv[-ri8o~ Louvt£1~?] 
0E01t0jl7t0<; fluppivou ra[py]~Hto<;: F \·ae.? '. ··Hy[--
NucOJcAil; meat Ku[8a.]vti8~~: F ,·ae. 1 flu[9?--
flav8wvi8o; . A[- -
1to<pavw~ 1torrd8ou[; Mu]pptvou(crw<;l: F[-?] A[--
15 flajl<ptAo.:; [X]atp£<ptAou fl[~ta]vtEu<;: F[-?]. iE[--
Atwvri8o<; ;I~[rr- -
AEUKto-; 0coKAEou; I[ou]vtEU<;: F[-?] ~.1. [-
flu8w':' flu8o[K]A£ous L[ou]vtEu<;: F[.~":].[-?] . A[--
'A x:cq..tav-ri8o.:; .. f[- -
20 'Av8[p]oKA~~ :::£ivt8oc; L[<p~t]no<;:. [.~·:.].[-?] Au[--
'ErrtrEAT)<; meat [Gopi]Kw.;:. [-?] . 0: [--
[O]i~~i8;-; : Y[--
LjltKpo; meat ['Ax]apv£u<;: F.[-?] <I> I[--
M£[v)mrro.; LlTJilOKpawu[~ 'Ax]apvEu~: F.[-?] <I> I[--
25 K£Kporri8o.:; Ko~[ WV£1~] 
.30 
XaptOTJ!l·o~ A icrxuA.ou 'A8[11o ]vcu; : F me. :) <t>'a[i v- ? 
Xa[p]fl; .. [.c >3.). ou Ai.~wv[~u;]: ~~~~rl:-1-1-1- ,._ K~£[--
"Irrrro8wv-ri8o.:; A EU~·[ ovo£1~] 
Xmp£8[ 111.1 ]o<; meat £~ Olo':J : ~ ,·ae. :) .... [ 
Aiavri8o; 
0£01.1VTJO'W.:; t·acat 
( .. ]I-!00'8EVflC: 1·acat 
['Avno]xi8o; 
[·Pa~..t]voucrto~: Fl- ,·ae. 
['Pa]~voucrto;: F me. 
Nt[K?--
. 01:-[-
fl~[~o~iom 
15 Decree ofCyparissia (4th or 3rd century) (e e] 9 ~- ·11 I 
~[f] Tic KA ~c..\r~;~ eic TAN ni!N KYnAPICCI€-
16 Law ofDelos (220) 
<!JN XOOPAN, ~nei KA ~~€AHTAI TA ~ .. m6PIA, .t.n[o-) 
rPA'fAcew noTi TOYC neNTHKOCTOA6r[oY-] 
S C KAi KATABAAElTW TAM nelnHKOCTAN, n(Pl-) 
N AN..\reiN Tl A nwA£1N · ei A€ M8, .t.non:lc.A.-
Tw A£KAnA6AN" CST1 A€ Tic KA ~~Art;l KATA 
e..\AACCAN, .t.norPA'fAM€Noc noTi ToY.c 
neNTHKOCToA6royc KAi KA TABAAwN TA-
l o N neNTHKOCT~N, ANTie€cew nAPAKAA€-
CAC TOM neNTH~ocToA6roN, nP6ceeN 
AE MH ANTieece<!l· ei A€ MH, AnoTEICATI!l 
A£KAnA6AN TAN neNTHKocTAN KAT[ A T -] 
[.A.]~ c.Y.rrPA<I>ON· ei AE Tic KA oAirOTIMACHI 
16 (~n]!KA91UlTAI g neNTHKOCTOA6~o(c], ·' 
[wN KA] >_<~HZHI KATA TAN ~.Y.rrPM><J[NJ. 
"Av8p«~e«c; ~l"}c3E. pu~ouc; ~l"J[cSE. ~uA« oc; av ~~ xpfJ-J 
't<XL 'tOLe; O't<X8~oi:c; 'tOLe; ~UAl"}poi:( c; 1 ~~ Tic.:>AELV' ~~] 
7tptci~Evov e.v ~iJ>.c.:>t Tic.:>AE"Lvl ~llae. o[V't« E.v 't&tJ 
TIAoi.c.:>t 1 'tou'tc.:>v ~l"JBE.v Tiptci~Evov· Ei.c; «\ho[ v] 
1) 't~V cXTioyp«<J>~V TIOLl"}OcX~EVOV Tic.:>AELV' ~l"}c3E 
ETILK:l"}puooo~EV<X K:<X8toci~Evov Tic.:>AELV 1 ~l"}-
c3E. 'ta &Uo'tpt« ~u>.« ~l"}c3E. pu~ouc; ~l"}c3E. av-
8p«~e«c;' ~llae. e:~to'tc.:> Tic.:>AELv &n· «u'toi:c; 'toLe; 
Ei.ociyouotvl ~l"}c3E TIAELovoc; Tic.:>AELV li ooou av 
10 cXTioypcilj.Jc.:>V't<XL Tipoc; 'tOUc; TIEV'tl"}ICOO'tOAO-
youc; ~ ll c3E. E.Aaoovoc; · aTioyp«<J>Eo8c.:>o«v 
at IC<XL Tipoc; 'touc; ayop«vo~ouc; ol. ELO«y«yov-
'tEc; Tipo 'tOU Tic.:>AELV ooou civ cXTioypa'Jic.:>V't<XL 
Tipoc; 'tOUc; TIEV'tl")ICOO't[ 0 JA6youc;· Eav c3E 'tlc; 
1 a TI«pa 'ta yEyp«~~EV<X Tic.:>AEL 1 TIEV'tfJICOV't<X 
5p«x~ac; o<J>EtAE'tc.:> I ~e«t e:~to'tc.:> Ei.o«yyt>.-
AElV 't&t 13ou>.o~Evc.:>L 't&~ TIOAt't&v Tipo-
c; 'touc; &yop«vo~ouc;· ol. c3E: &yop«vo~oL ELO«-
yov'tc.:>v 'tac; Ei.o«yyE>.i.«c; 't«U't«Dc; Ei.c; 'touc; 
, - -- ---' - ci iii ,_ • ~ .,., :»\ , 20 'tpt<XICOV't<X IC<XL EV<X EV 'tC\lL ~l"}VL EV C\ll <XV ELO<Xy-
YEA8EL' 'tOV ae. ~to86v 't&t cStiC<XO'tl"}pi.c.:>L TI«p«-
6<XU£o8c.:> o Ei.o«yyEi.A«c; • E:av c3E o<J>AEL 1 
'tOV 'tE ~to8ov cXTIO'tELOcX'tc.:> 't&t TI«p«6<XAO~E­
Vc.:>L IC«t 'tou yEyp«~~tvou ETitn~i.ou 'ta Mo 
25 ~EPl"JI 'tO ae. 'tpi.'tOV ~E.poc; 't&t (c3)'1~ooi.c.:>tl IC(XL ol. ay[ o-] 
p«vO~Ol TIP<X~Oc'tC\lO<XV <XU'tQV c3EIC<X ~~Ep&v a<J>' ~[ c;] 
av o<J>AELI cXVEU8UVOl OV'tEc;' E.[ a Jv ae. ~~ c3uvc.:>V't<Xll 
E:l;o~6o«V'tEc; 1 Tipoo8i.v'tc.:>v «lhov IC«i. 'ta «u-
'tou 't& L Ei.o«yyE'LA<XV'tL1 IC<XL cXV«ypcilj.J<XV'tEc; Ei.-
30 c; 't~v o«vi.8« ou ~e«i. 'ta >.oma ypci~~«'t« TI«p«c3o-
[ 't )c.:>O<XV Ei.c; 'tO 8'1 ~OOLOV 'ttl L 13ouAfJ L. vide. 
or BE cX'tEAELc; OV'tEc; dociyouotv l;ub li pu~ouf c; l 
IC<Xl ~~ E:l;i.o'tc.:> «U'tQi:c; ~fJ'tE TIAEl.ovoc; ~fJ'tE E.-
>.cioovoc; Tic.:>AELV fJ ooou aTIEypcilj.J«v'to' E:av 8£ 'tt-
vEc; l·ni TIEtB«px&otv 'tOLe; yEyp«~~E:votc; 1 ol. &yo-
p«v6~ot <XU'tOLc; ~~ c3t86'tc.:>O<XV ~fJ'tE 'ta l;uya ~fJ'tE 
40 'ta ~E'tp<X 'ta &v8p«1Cl"}pcil IC<XL 'tOU 'tOTIOU ou av <XU-
'tOLc; ICEl~EV<X ~l 'ta ~VA« TJ oi. av8p«ICEc; TJ ol. pu~ot 
<J>Epi.'tc.:>o«v 'tf]t TIOAEt ~to86~ 'tf]c; ~~i.p«c; 5p«-
X~~v Ec.:>c; av apc.:>OLVI IC<XL ol. &yop«vo~OL Tipcx~Oc'tc.:>-
---~· __ J~----'-- =-··-·'-0 .... -- 3;! ____ -- --~-~-
17 Two Decrees on tax-farming in Colophon ( c 250) 
'En:t Kovvirovo~, j.lT]VO~ nom8n-
oovo~, oyOOlJ clVOj.lEVOU' vac. 
£8o~EV Tiit ~OUA:iit KOl TOOl O~j.l(Ol' nocrii~ [Al-
4 n:oU.coviou £n:E\j/ll<JltcrE, yvffi1111 rc!)V E:rrl t]-
llllVicov· £rrn8~ nvE~ roov n:oA.rtcov, £v 
tOt~ Ej.lrrpocr8Ev xpovot~ ayopal;ovp::(~] 
TEAT] ou rrapa til~ noA.Ero~ aU' &AA.o8ev, £vox(A.o]-
8 uv wu~ tv£KTTJIJ.EvOU~ wu~ tv Tf]t 
xwpat napa TO 8i KatOV' 8e86x8at Tilt ~Q[ u ]-
Aiit KOl TO)l b~j.l(J)l' llll t~et Vat TOOV noAt-
Toov 1J.TJ8ev11111Te trov oiKounrov tv tilt 
12 KoAO~(J)Vl(J)V TEAT] ayopacrat &AA.o8ev 
~ tK KoA.o~oovo~ Tii~ tn1 8aAaTTTJt · o~ 8[£] 
ayopa<JY]t ~ j.lETO<JXT]t f] auAilt DE~T]Tat 
TOUt(I)V nva, O~EtAET(J) EKO<HO~ &p-
16 axj.la~ XtAia~ tepa~ Trot AnoAA.rovt• ~a[t]­
VEt(J) &£ o ~uAoj.l.Evo~ tnt. Trot ~11-icrn 
npo~ TO~ VOj.l.O~UAOKa~· EOV ()£ n~ a8t-
KTJ8ilt -rrov i&troTrov ooo nvo~ Trov T£-
20 A.rovoov flo T£AWVTJ~ U7to toov i&troTrov, 
d Vat OUTOl~ 'TO~ KAll<JEl~ KO'TO TOY vo-
j.l.OV, tO~ OE btKO~ yivecr8at clj.l.O Tal~ tpyrov(t]-
KOl~ KOt teA(J)VlKOl~ KatO 'TO Dtaypaj.l.-
24 j.l.O TOU j3amA£ro~· avaypa\jfat ()£ TOO£ 
tO \Vll~tcrj.l.a ei~ cr'tllATJV At8i VYJV Kat 
crtilcrat ei~ to iepov wu An6AA.rovo~· 
avaypa\jfat o£ Kat TO tn1 Ll naco~ \j/TJ-
28 ~tcr8£v o einav oi E1tlJ.lllVtot omo~ j.lTJ-
8£1~ TEATJ anoTi VlJ -roov noAt'Trov na-
pa To &i Katov· w~ &£ nroAT]Ta~ 
ano&ocr8at TO £pyov' to ()£ apyupto[ v] 
32 wu £pyou oouvat tov oiKOVOj.lOV. vac. 
'ETt\. Ltnaoo~, j.lTJVO~ MnayetTVtoovo~ £[~86]-
lllJ avoj.lEvou· e&o~ev tilt ~uAiit m\. TOOt o~11rot, So[ul-
w~ tn£\jlll~W£, YVWj.lTJ TOOV tmj.lT]Vl(J)V' onro~ av 1111[8£1~] 
36 TroY noAnrov anoTi VlJ tEAT] napa tO &i KOtoV' oe&ox8at tilt 
~ouAT]t Kat TOOt 81l11rot· tav n~ &iKTJV 'TEArovtKflv [tm]-
8tKa/;TJTOi nvo~ KoA.o~rovirov toov KatOtK01JVTrov 
tv NO'Tirot ~ KoA.o<jlrovt<Ot> (f]) Tol.~ <jlpoupiot~ toi~ KoA.o~rovicov 
40 nA:iw ocrot ypa~roVTOt tv Notirot fl tv KoAo<jlrovt, vac. 
o~eiA.Etv tOY tm8tKO<Jclj.l.£VOV ~j.ltOAtOV TO apyuptov 
tav Kam&t Ka( /;)TJTat · tflv 8£ npa~t v et vat nap· auT[ ou] 
Ka8an£p ty DtKT]~ D£DlKO<Jj.lEVY]~ a8(t)K<l>OU vac. 
44 a<jlatpE<J£(1)~' o<jleiAEtV o£ amov KOl UOl eeoot vac. 
&pax11a~ xtA.ia~· ~m vETro &£ 6 ~uA.o11evo~ tn1 [Trot] 
~j.ll<J£l. 
18 an Athenian decree giving a foreigner exemption from 
the eisphora (late fourth century) 
[- --- - - - h 1\Trrr[--- - - - - 0 J 
[- - - - - ] ~Ls- ITpoK~ [- - - - - - -] 
[ELm:· €] ?Tatveam IT~ [ vr ......... cf)LA.]-
[ OTLft] [as- lvEKa r [ 1}s- Els- 'A(}7Jva[ovs- Kat] 
5 [ CTTEcp] avw [ (7"] at XPV [ crwt crTEc/Javwt cl1TO] 
( 1TEVTa) KO [ cr£] WV 8p [ aXftWV - - - - -] 
[Kat Ei]vaf Uavr[ .......... 'A(}7Jva]-
[Zov Ka]L rwv Elcrcp[-------- -] 
[ •.•.•. ] ft'YJ e~Et [~at - - - - - - - -] 
10 [- - - - - - -] t~ [- - - - - - - - - -] 
19 a tax treaty between Erythrae and Hermias of Atarneus 
(350-342) 
[ 0 0 Eelv DE 'EpuBpa'iot EKnBwvTa[ T]-
[t Es-] !~!-' ~wpav T~)J [~pfL[t]ou K[at Twv <'1-
[ T ]a[pwv 1TOA€fLOU EVEKEV, El[vat du]-
~ia m:lvm Kat Tel EK TOVT(w)v [yEv6w]-
[v]a, TTATjv oa' av T!<; U1TODwTato [TwV DE TT]-
5 [p]1]8£vTWV Tl')t_E{TW 1TI'VT1JK[OUT~Vo E]-
1THDelV D€ dp~v1J y£v7Jmt, [ dmzyw]-
Bat Jv Tpt~KovTa ~fLipat<;;' [ ielv DE fL]-
~ dmiy1]Tat, nAE{Tw ni TiA[7]o EKT£0]-
wBat DE ETTayy<'{)o.avTa<;; D[tKa[wc;J-
Io dvat DE Kat 'EpfLtat Kat To['ic; hat]-
pot<;;, Jav TL f3ov(>.)wvTat EKT[{BwBa]-
t, KaTel mvTao ofL6aat DE 'Epu[Bpa{ou J-
<; 'EpfL{at Kat TOiS_im{pot[c;. 0 DE op]-
KO<;; EUTW oDE' {3o7]8~aw 'EpfLt1 at Kat T]-
1:0 1 oi<; hatpOt<; KGl KQTfl y>jl' /Kat KIIT]-
fl fhiAaaaal' 1Tfli'Tt a0£1'Et ~<[ani TO 8]-
~ParOP, Kat' rd tit\..\a €11tT€A[£w KnrrlJ 
[ T ]~ WfLoAoyryfLEI'U 0 E1TlfLEAw[ Bat DE T J-
[ov]c; UTpaTTJYOU'). opKWU(ll D[c dyy£.:\]-
~0 [ouc; J]M6vmc; 1rap ''E[p]fL{ou K[ai Twv i]-
[ m{p]wv fLETel Twv aTpaT7Jyw[v (?) TWV Jv] 
['EpuB](p)aic; i.Epo'ic; n>.dot[c;· Tel DE t1-
[Epel 1T ]<;tpixm T~v 1r6>.w. DfL[o[wc; D€] 
[Kat 'EJP.fLLav Kat TOU<; ETa£p[ ouc; o~o]-
25 [ aat D]!' dyyi>.wv f3o7J8~am ['EpuBpa]-
[{otc; K]at KaTel y~v Kat KaTel [Ba>.aaa]-
[av TTav]Tt aBivH KaTel TO Du[vaTov, K]-
[ at Tel a]>.>.a E1TLTEAE'iv KUTel [ Tel·<OjtO>.]-
[oy7]]!;LEVa. OfLVVVat DE Bwu<;; [TaU<; op]-
:l" [K{o]\1>- ypa!f;atDc Tat:ITa JaT[~>.7Jv>.t]­
[ 8[v1J]v, Kai UT~aat 'EpuBpa[[ ouc; fLEV J 
[Js To] {Epov T~s :487Jva£7Js, 'E[pfL[av D]-
[€ Js T]o I.Epo•' TOV :4mp,£wc;. [vacat] 
20 a proposal ofproxenies for three Megarians (340-339) ] fj 0 
On moulding: [n]eo~Evia <f>roKivrot Kal. NmivC>prot Kal. ~E~l. [. _3--4.] fr 
Relief 
340/39 [f.nt 8Eocppa]cr-r[ou] &px[ov-r]o[<;] f.nl. 'til<; ['I]nno8rov-r[i]C>o[<;] f.va- stoich. 
['t'll<; npumve]ia<; ~t "Acr[n]E[-ro]<; ~[rn.t?]ocr-rp&.[-ro]u [K]uef]ppto<; 
5 [f.ypa!l!lU'tEu]e~. £v8EKa't'll[t -r]~[<;J 1tp[u-r]a~Ei[a<; ·] -roov 1tp~e<>­
[prov E1tE'Jfl1cpt~E ]v "A v'<>p·o~A.~s ''\ y[~~u ]q~~s: eo[ o~j E[ v 'tOO ]t. [ ofl]-
[!lffil. ~T\!lO<J8EvT\]<; ~T\!lO<J8e[ VOU<; na l<X ]vtE[ U<; d1t] EV . [ .. 4 .. ] 
[ ...... 12 ...... ]C>~!lO<; ·EnA[ ... 6 ... ]N[ ... ·:.9 .... ]0[ ... 5 .. ] 
[ ..... _12 ...•.. ~u]~!l[a]xo[ .. ]. [.]. ... [ .. ] .. [ ..... _11 ..... ] 
10 [ .......... _22 ........... ]KA. [ ......... 17 ........ ] 
[ .................... _42 .. : : . ................ ] 
[ .................... _42 ..................... ] 
13 [ ............ 24 ............ ]A~[ ........ 16 ........ ] 
c. 1-4 lines missing 
16 [ ........ 15 ....... ] .. [ ............. 25 ............ ] 
[- dvat- -1t]po[~evou<; -rou Oil!lou -rou 'A~vairov? a]-
[ u-rou<; Kat EJCYO ]vou<; Kal. [ E1tt!lEAE'icr8at mhoov -rllv Pou ]-
[A.T,v Kal. 'LOU ls <J'tpa-rmo:U<; [onro<; av !lT\0' ucp' EVO<; &.C>tKOOV't ]-
20 [at. &.vaypava]t <>£ -rflvoe -rllv [1tpo~eviav -rov ypa!l!la-rea] 
[~<; pouA.~<;] EV <JTllAT\l A.t8i[VT\l Kat (J~(J<Xl. EV aKp01tOA]-
'[et· Ei<; o£ -r]T,v &.vaypacpl)v· ri\[<; cr-rflA.ll<; Oouvm -rov 'ta!lia]-
[v -rou Oll!l]ou etKom <ipax!l[ix.<; EK -roov Ka-ra 'l'llCf>t<J!la-ra &.v ]-
. [aA.tcrKo]!le~rov -root [<i]iJ!lrot. KaA.[ecrat ()£ au-rou<; Kat f.1tl. ~£]-
25 [vta ei]s ~o npu-rave'iov ~~S ~[up.wv]. 
crown [crown] 
·crown 
21 three decrees from Calymnos giving tax exemption to 
proxenoi (4th century) 
"£8olr: rfi hK'Anrr{a n£ Ka'Au-b ' ., ' ' 
ftv{wv, fl1Jvor 1 Aprap.tdou, f.rr 'A-
ptrrroA.a{lJa, n app.r:v{rrKOIJ TOll I A-
'Ar:gt8{Kou ~p.r:v d.~r:pyerav Ka(l 
't. K , , , ' 'r 5 1Tpo5 EIJOIJ ai\Ufl-1/tWIJ Kat aUTOLIJ 
IO 
Kat YEVOf af! Kat ~fl-€11 avTOtf ty-
KT"/rTtl! f.y K aA.vp.vf!- Kat <.he'Aeta(v 
,..... 'l. " ' ' ~ rwv e5ayop.Evwv Kat Errayop.evwv 
Kat EJ.l rroAfprp Kal f.v lp&"'f· 
fr. 
"£ 8ogE rtf. EKKA1Jrr{f!- Trf Ka'Aup.v{-
wv, fl-"/I!Of KapvE{ou, f.rr1 AeuKapou, 
.1waKoup{8av rov -1E'A¢ov Ka1 1 A'A~:­
~[8tKov evepyeTM Kal rrpogeVOUf 
I 5 ~flEY K a'Aup.v{wv Kat avTOVf Kat EKY~ 
vour Kat ~fl-EY auTOtf f.y KaA.vp.Vf!-
20 
' ,, ..... , " ' 't aTEI\Etav Twv Errayop.evwv Kat El>a-
"£ 8og< KaA.up.v[otf NtK6J.laX-
ov 
1 A AKa{ou ~ tKuwvwv rrp6-
~r:vov KaA.up.v{wv ~flEJI Ka(t 
I ' \ I , \ 1" 
avrov Kat eyyovour Kat 1JflE-
v aUTOlf aTEAEtav Kat trrrrA-
2 .'i OUIJ Kat gK7TAOUY Kal f.J.l 1TOA-
22 tax in Thasos (c 400) 
............ Q ...... II .............................. . 
[. . . xocp7to] AOYOL (1.~ opxwcrocv-rec; ....................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . xocl. -ro ~p.ucru njc; 6wLlj<; ...................... . 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . 7t0CV't"OC<; p.ljvoc<; Tij L 8eu ( 't"EpYJ L ? ................. ) 
[. . . . . cruvo] AOV ? 't"O YLVOp.evo . ou8e .................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . p.-f) -r(c; p.oL 8oxljL -ro -reAo(c; .................. ) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . xoc cr-rocnjpocc; o<peAe-rw .................... . 
8 ........... &]v 8' lcroocc; lc; -ro 7tAoi:o[ v ................... ] 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c1v ecro~L · ocv 8t ot xoc[p7toMyoL ......... ] 
. . . . . . . . . . . 8mA )YJcr(occ; -ril.c; 6wLil.<; o( <flEAOV't"WV . . .......... ) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 't"OV 0:lcrLoV 7tAEO .................... . 
· 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . creL -reAoc; -r-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V T~<; 't"L(l.YJ-
...................... 0 8E: ~€-
[vo<;? ............. Iloc)xdYJ<; 
16 .................. IHKOI: .. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v oc7tocyeL -r. 
... ' 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O"'t"W . OCV OCU't"-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wv xocl. occr-roc; x-
20 [oct ~evoc; ? . . . . . . . . . oc 7tpLocp.evWL 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O't"E 8 E7tpLOC't"O 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ocm) cr-rocnjpo<; 
' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wcroc-rw ov ocve 
24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . oc xocp7toMywv 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pee; xocl. 8exoc p.-
[. . . . . . . . . . . . . . oc ]7to8wcreL ev8-
. . . . . . . . -ro x . . . pov 8wcreL 8-rL 
28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ov 't"O ( ye ]ypOCflflEVOV 
vacal 
23 exemption from tax in Pistirus (c 359) 
ca 20 ] IKI/ 
ca 12 ] ~ENNY .. H £1 8£ .. 
[ca 4 O!J.Vth]w Tov ~t6vuaoy x.cd 
-l [ca 4] o<pe:tAhw· ll TL &v 8£ n~ Twv 
[t!J.7t]optTtwv bnx.ocA~L o ETEpo~ T-
[wL t]Ttpwt x.plvt::allocL ocu-:-ou~ t7tl T-
[or~] auyye:vtaL x.oct llaoc O(j)ELAETOC[ L] 
8 -;ot~ E!J.7top£Toct~ 1tocpoc Tot~ Elpoct~-
[l]v, TOUTWY X.PEWV cX7tOK07tOC~ IL~ 
;:oLe:ty · y~y x.ocl (3oax.~v llal)v &x_oua-
Lv E!J.7tOpLTOCL, Toci.iToc IL~ cX<poctpe:t-
12 [ a!l]ctt · t7tocUALaToc~ !J.~ 7tt!J.7tELv To-
[r:;] E!J.7toptT<Xt~· rppoup~!J. !J.l)8t!J.t<Xv 
d~ n tanpov K<XTOCO~OOCt !J.TjT£ <X-
[u-:]o!J. !J.T)T£ oc}.Awt £mTp£7mv · 
16 [x).]Tjpou~ DtaTLPlJVW!J. !J.~ OCAA-
[ xaa ]e:L!J. !J.l)8t OCAAWt E7tt7ptm:tv. 
[-;:X] •wv E!J.7tOpLTEW!J. !J.7j8E: oc'lpe:-
[ a!l}JtL !J.T)Te: OCOTO!J. !J.T)-r( £ TO ]u~ E-
20 [ OC'JT ]oG . TEAE<X KOCTOt TOC~ o8ou~ 
11-T, 7tpf)aae:tv, &act e:t~ Mocpwve:toc[ v] 
[da]&:ye:T<XL EK DtaTtpou 'I) tK TWV E:-
[!J.}·mplwv ~ 'y Mctpwve:£7)~ d~ nlaT-
24 [ tp ]ov ~ TOt E!J.7t6pta BEA<X\IOC n paae:-
[ vw ]v . TOU~ E!J.7tOp1T<X~ TOC~ &.!J.O:~-
(oc~J );!.<XL ocvo£ye:ty K<XL KAdEL\/" a!J.<X 
[ xoc!l]&:rre:p K<XL E7tL Koruoc; . ocv8pa M-
28 [ ocpw ]vtTl)V OU 8f)aw ou8t cX7tOKT-
[EVE ]w ou8E: tX(j)<XLpf)ao!J.OCL X.PiJ!J.a-
(-;oc] ouT£ ~WVTOt; oUT£ ocrro!locv6v-
[ 70:.~] OUTE <XUTOt; OUT£ TWV E!J.WV 
32 (ou)8e:£:; · oU8£ 'ArroAAWVtl)TEWV, ou8-
(E: 8)occrlwv, llcroL E!J. lltaTtpwt dcrl(v], 
(ou]TE ilmoKTEVtW ou8tv<X, OUTE 
[8f)aw] oun ocq~ocLpf)cro!J.OCL x_pf)!J.<X-
36 ( T<X ouT£] ~wv-:-o~ ouT£ a1to6av6-
[ VTO~ OUTE] <XUTO~ OUTE TWV E!J.WV 
[ ou8d~ .. Et 7t~] TWV otx.7jT6pwv 
[ 14~16 ]TWV 00 0 E!J.7tOp-
40 [ 14-16 ]ov dcrlv AIM-
[ 14-16 ]v, tdt!J. !J.~ AM-
[ 14-16 T ]L~ oc8tK~L TO-
[ v 8e:i:viX t•el -•)c; 8e:i:vot~ .... J T£ EY.QAAAA 
44 [ ... ocviX8o- t>el bo8o]xe:u~ ~v £rr-
[ 5-6 8t' £x.ocaTou] E:vtocuTou 
[ ............................. ]A. 
24 the Standards Decree preceded by the latest fragment - - - -J ~ EA N ~ [ .. .5 .. J 
- - - -] ILlETO'PHcD[.] 
from Aphytis (420s) · - - - -J A<.?!;:NAEKA~ 
- - - -] OPAITE/\E~I 
L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J PO~GENTOAPr 
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] XIANEAMMHA YT 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]QrKHPYKATONION 
8 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -]~:rPA'PAILlEKAinPO 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -] ~MATEATH~BOY/\H~K 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J NOMI~MAPrYPIOEN 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ]ATIA/\M21HH21A8HNA 
12 [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jf\OI~HTOI~AGHNAIONK 
[ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J vac. 
L;wtx. 4L 
[- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - o] 
[\ 8e 6€<Yf.106ETal 'TTE- ..... 9 .. .. ]aVTwv[ ... ... 12 ...... -a). 
[crt EKaCYTOV' U:xv 8e TIS &Alios T]wv apxov[Tw~ EV Talcrt Tro]-
[AECYIV f..ITJ Troti;t KaTa Ta EIJ'T)qncr]f..1eva ii Twv [TroAtTwv ii Tw]-
4 [v ~evwv, lhtf..IOS E<YTW Kai TCx XPTJ]f..laTa 8T)f..10cr![a ecrTw Kai] 
[ Ti;S 6eov To em8eKaTov· Kai El f..1 ]f) Eicrt &pxol'[ TES 'A6T)v]-
[alwv, ETrt- ....... 13 ...... ev Twt] IJ'TJ<plcrf..laTt ol [apxoVT]-
[~s ol eKacrTTlS Ti;S TroAews· eav 5€ f..1] i] Trotwcrt KaT a [ Ta EIJ'Tl]-
8 [<pl<Yf..IEVa, ....... 14 ....... OVTWV] TO\JTW~ TT'Epl CxT![ ... ) 
[ ....... 14 ....... EV 5€ TWI apyvp]<;>KoTriwt TO apyu[pto]-
[v .......... 2° .......... f..ITJ eAaT]Tov ii fif..1vcru Kai c;x[ .. J 
( .............. 27 ............. ) 1 a\ TrOAEIS TrpaTT<;>-
12 ( .............. 27 ............. ) 8paXf..1CxS CxTT'O Ti;S f..IV-
[as ............ 23 ........... KaT)aAAaTTEV i'j EVOXO-
( us elvat KaTCx TOV VOf..IOV' 8 81: &v TT'Ept]ylyvT)TOl apyup(o-
[ .............. 28 .............. ]cr6at i'] TOlS O'TpOT-· 
:16 [11yols ii .......... 19 ......... · em]!8av 8€ aTro8o6i;t. 
[ ........... 21 .......... Ti'jt 'A6TJv]c;iat Kai Twt 'H<paicr-
[ TWI ...... 11 ..... Kai eav TIS ElTT'T)l ii] ETT'lljJT)<plcrT)I mp-
[i TOI.JTWV ........ 15 ....... E) OAAO J Tl xriicr6at ii 8ave-
2 0 [l~ecr6at, aTrayecr6w auTIKa f..ICxAa Trpo J s To us ev8eKa· o\ 8-
[e ev8eKa 6avaTwt ~Tlf..ltwcrav-rwv· Uxv] 8€ Cxf..1<ptcrf3f1Tfit, ecr-
[ayay6VTwv es TO 8tKacrTi}ptov· Ki}pvK]as 81: eAecr6at TO-
[v 8i'jf..10V CxTrayyEAOVVTOS TCx ~T)<pl<Yf..l]eva, eva f..IEV ETT'I Ni}-
2 4 [ crovs. eva 8€ ETT'I 'lwvlav, eva 8€ E<p' 'EA.A.i}crTro J VTOV, ev[ a J ~~ ~­
[ Trl TCx eTri 8patKT)S' Tolhots 8€ TTJV Tropelav eKacrTwt crv ]-
[ yypaljlaVTES ol O'TpOTT)yol CxTT'OO'TEACxVTW) \'' eav ~[e f..ITJ, EU )-
[6vv6cr6Wf..1 f..IVplatcrl 8paxf..1alcrt• avaypaiJ'a]t 81: TO IJ'TJ<Jl[~]-
2 8 [ O'f..IO .:!:68e TOUS apxovTas !v Tal crt m)Aecrt K)c;x~· ~va EKOO'-
[ TOV' 6evat 81: ev O'TTJAT)l A.t61VT)I ev Ti;t ay ]opal TEAEO'l . 
[eKCxO'TT)S TT'OAEWS Kai TOS ETT'IO'TCxTaS Ef..1Tr]pocr6ev TO apy-
[ vpoK;;;io- TavTa 8' emTEAEv TTJV crVf..1f..1a Jxlav, ECxf..l f..ITJ auT-
32 [ol f3ouA.wvTat· 8eT)6i;vat 8€ auTwv T]9y Ki}pvKa Tov 16v-
[ Ta ocr a KEAeuovcrtv I\6T)vaiot· rrpo ]<!YPCxiJlat 81: Kal rrpo-
[s TOV opKOV TOV Ti'js f3oA.i;s TOY ypa]f:lf.IOTEO Tiis f3ovA.fis K-
[ai TOV 8f}f..10V Ta81· eav TIS KOTT'TT)t] VOf..llO'f..la apyup{o EV 
3 6 [ Talcrt TroAecrtv ii XPiiTat vof..1{crf..1]c;xTt &A.Awt ii TWt 'A6T)va-
[iwv ii crTa6f..1ois Kai f..IETpots &A.J~ots ii Tois l\611valwv K-
[ a\ Tlf..IWPTJ<YOf..lal Ka!_j T)f..IIWO'W). vac. 
vacat 
25 a decree calling for voluntary contributions (epidosis) to 
a defence fund (248-247) 
T ex ~ t ex ~ a 't p ex 't ~ w ['t ~ x w v] 
E I) p v x A. t t & 'I) ~ M ~ x t w v o ~ [K 'I) cp ~ a ~ & 6 ~] 
['E]nl ~~~t&OV"t~ !pxovto~ tnl "~ [[~'l~'l"P~«&od &tx«"'l~ np] 
V'texwtex~ ~~ «Jopvaxt&~ 'Ap~a"to~tvov 'A[Aw~ttx~O&v typex~«] 
5 [u]vtv· 11 'EA.excp'!PoA.~v~ fvt~ xexl vtex~ t~[(3oA.t~w~, 3tu"ttpcx~ 't] 
[~] npu'texvetex~· txxA.Y)atex· 'twv npot&pwv t[~tto/ww~&v KexUta] 
['tp]ex'to~ TtA.&atvov 'Epx~t[v~ x]exl av~[np6c&po~]· 
~~tv 't6>~ &~wl: 
[9t]6<p~ T~xA.tovc Mcxpcx66>v~~ tt~tt[v· 11 a~ &v XP'l~«'twv] 
10 [~t]opi.CJ6tvtwv IXtl 6 't'CX(.&L~ ~tplCtw 't'& [&t4ttvex, tvcx xex't'& 't'O] 
(v x)ex't'«AOlltOV xp6vov 't'OU tv~exV'tOU avvx(o~w()(i)aw ol tx y~~J 
· [x]cxp~tol f.'.E:'t'~acpc:tAtlex~, 11 ~yexOtl 'tVXtl &t[Mx6exl 'ti)l (3ouA.tt 11] 
['t]o~ A.exx6vtex<; npot&poV<; d~ 't~v tlt~O[a]exv tXxAJ)atexv XP"l~ 
(ex]'tlaexl~ttpl't'ou'twv, yvw~J)V 3~ ~u~illt[a)Oex~ 'ti)<; (3ouA.~<;, an 
1 15 &ox&t 'ti)l (3ouA.tt 11 'tO~ (3ouA.o~tvou<; 'tw[v] ltoA~'twv xexl 'twv &A 
A.wv 'tcUV otxouv"twv tv 'ti)~ n6A.t~ tlt~~6[vex]l d<; 't~V aw'tJ)P(ex 
v 't~<; n6A&W<; xexl 't~V q>UAexx~v 'ti)<; x6>pex~ t[v) 'tW~ 3~~Wl ~ tv 'ti)~ (3 
ouA.&t ~ npb<; 'tov~ a"tpct't'I)YOV~ ~ltoypcx~[~]tvou~ ~txp~ 'toO Mo · 
UVLXI.C>voc;• v ~~ t~tutc.> at ~Y)6t~ tn:l&>~atlLJ n:A.tov HH" l}p«X~Ci>V 
20 ~~'fAat't'tOV v fll•V e{vatL &t 'tOL<; tm&o0aL(v x1atl XOLV9' Xatl l&lat ] i 5 
L tltatLVt6ijVatL Xatl 'tL~Y)OijvatL (Jn;o 'tOU &~~U Xat96'tL &v e{ !~L 
oc; fxatutoc; atli'twv· v 'tov &e yp~~at'ttat 'toO &(~1~ou &:vatypli~cxL 't6 
[31e 'tO ~t)q~L(~cx1 xcxl •« ov6~cx'tCX 'tWV tmM'Y't[c.>1v tv (Tt~tL AL6lv 
tL x[cx1l uti)acxL tv 'ti)L &:yop&L, lSn:c.><; &v qxlvtp[&1 ~L &n:cxaw ~ cpiAo't 
25 L~lcx 'tWV ~oul..o~tvc.>v eoepynetv 't(ov1 3ij~(o1v· v 'tO 3t &:vlil..c.>!-4CX 't 
o yev6~tvov etc; n -rijv ~'I" xcxl -rijv ci(vcxy1pacp~v 'tWV ovo~li• 
(J)\1 !J.tp(crcxt 'tOY tltl 'ti)L 3LOLX~a£L' 'tO 3t ~~(cp)~cx 't'6&, tn:el-3~ 
n:ept n6pou XPTJt.J-6:-rc.>v tutlv O'tp<X"tUJ.)"'CLXC>[v, &1tav) dvat tlc; rpu 
Acxx~v ·~~ xwpa..;. meat 
30 0 t 3 t t n: t 3 c.> x ex v t t c; t ~ v a c.> [•1 'l p l ex v 't i) <; 1t [6] 
1.. t c.> c; x ex l • ~ v cp v 1.. ex x ~ v t ij c; [x] w p ex c; x ex • & • [o1 
~~cpLa~cx toO &~~ov. vacal 
'Av't'Lcp(;)v • EpxL HH .1.pcxxo'Y'tt3Y)c; • EpxL HH (-- -1xl..ij[c; E1cp~• [-- -] 
Eopvxl..tt&l')c; Kl')cpLa HH 'ApLutocpwv 'EpxL HH [ .... ]6~cxxoc; 'Ojj6 [---1 
35 MLXlc.>v Kl')tpwL HH • Iepoxl..i)c; EovvL£ HH [ ...• 1oo'toc; 'Axa.p (-- -1 
[~1po~tcxc; 'EpxLe HH MLXlc.>v 9pLiiaL HH [ ... ~ ... 13')<; Ilp[-----1 
[~L01xl..ijc; ['E]pXL£ HH En:ov&lcxc; TeL6¢ HH un:tp CXU'tOU xcxt (-coO oov1 
[-------------------] ( .... 1opoc; 9Y)~cxx HH ( ... 1In[.1Ia0[-------1 
[-------------------1 ( .. ~ ... 1pcxc; 'Acpl-3 HH ( ... 1xl..iic; 'Ar;['lv1 [----1 
40 [-------------------1 [-------1 Elpta HH 'A[v-c1Lcpli't'Y)c; [-------1 
[-------------------1 [-----tx K1oiA H(H) [ .. ~ .. 1c.>n:oc; [-------1 
locrma 
[------------------1 [ .... 1c.>vt&Y)c; Kol..c.>v [----------------1 
(------------------1 un:tp au-coO xcxl 'toO ooO HH 'T[-------------1 
45 [-------------]v HH Eoooc; 'AAcxLt\)c; HH Av[--------------1 
[---------t~1 otou HH Z~vc.>v 'AAcxL£\)c; HH Se[--------------1 
[------------1cx6o HH NLXcxy6pcxc; •EpxL HH Kcx(--------------1 
( .•. 6 ..• 1'lc; Mcxxt HH Avalcxc; KwwL£ HH tl.l..(--------------1 
( .. ~ .. 1c.>v 'Acpl.3vcxt H EtplitLoc; Ecp~n HH At(---------------1 
50 [ .. ~ .. 1yvc.>'toc; 'A.Ac.>n: H llcxvat~cxxoc; tx Kol.. HH K't(--------------1 
EC~cxxoc; Ec.>xpa'tOI) ncxvatcxc; ll<XLCXVL HH .1.(---------------1 
Eun:vpt&Y)c; HH Ec.>atf310c; laon JEll 'lep[------------1 
tiAtaxoc; llCXfJl3<.> HH xcxl ()Jttp 'tOO ooC 'ltp(------------) 
'ApLut61..cxc; ·EpxL HH ~10(v)vatov TLfJ[-------------1 
55 9ov~6pLoc; EOc.>v HH Etv(6>]v •Aaxl..l')n:Liioov TL[IJ-------------1 
•ApL«Ttcxy6pcxc; tx Kol.. HH tul..aaLoc; [H)H At[---------------1 
(E1evoxl..i)c; Ecp~n HH •Aaxl.f)n:Lii3'l[c; E1tvc.> •.ux[-----------1 
[E1av6LJrnOt; 'EpXL ·. HH ~~·~l..[a)~ HH .1.Y)Il[-------------) 
(Z1wn:~ Eupcxx HH E\)ci~ ~L).cxt HH •va:[-------------1 
60 (.UIJ~" 'Oij&Ev HH K?j(pL<Jocp[wv 'A61~v HH fKWL[a---------JJ 
[.1.1Y)(J6cpi.Aoc; t~ O't HH "Apxcxv3poc; 'EI..tvatv HH tel-3(-------------1 
'Eplc.>-coc; Me:I..L-c HH Xcxtpe«p(;)v El'ttcxL H .1.wy[------------1 
NLXoxl..ijc; tl..ve HH 'Aptatc.>v llcxLcxvL HH tw[-------------1 
NLXoaatVY)<; tl..u HH ·A'Y'ttn:cxtpoc; ficxLCX\1 HH nveo[------------1 
65 tL[A1oxl..i)c; Koptv HH ['Ay)vox[pli't)Y)<; 'A.AcxL HH 'A(.loL[-----------1 
.1-LOut&Y)c; tvl..a HH tup6(J[cx)xoc; Ett(L)pL HH 'ApLut(-----------J 
Tl(Jc.>v Ecp~nL HH Ataxp6>v llcxLCXvL HH 9ecx(t)t[f)toc;--------1 
'An:oUO&>poc; E6>ytv 'An:oUocpaVY)c; 'AI..6>n: HH •Em(cp)a(v'l<; --------] 
ov • OtpvvtUc; HH l::c.>aLytVY)<; ficxLcxv H fipcx~Lt[ti..Y)<; 'l'Lf.lapxov] 
70 Killl!Jcxxoc; HH 9V!JOXapY)<; Ecp~nt HH Elpca[l&f)C ---------] 
AIJxc.>v q~V.6cro HH 9e6no...n:oc; Acq.aJt-tp HH 9o6xp[ltoc; --------) 
"A.Ae[~]l[c;] tvMaL HH Ao-ctcxc; 'Axa.pve. HH [.1.(a)pl6>v)[---------1 
'Excx-ccxtoc; MtOY)ll/3pl HH 9e:6n:~n:oc; AtyiA HH A~xap[Y)<; ----------] 
Nix~-cl')c;"lle:pycxai) H Aooi6eta~ 'Epxt. HH EL!Jlcxc; ~(----------] 
15 [NLX1ox¢['t'l]c; Mel.. HH tiA6etoc; tpeappl HH 9[c)IJ[L1uto[--------J 
(------"----] Ecp~'t' HH Al')(J6<p1Aoc; tpeappl H (N]LX6(Jcx(xoc; -------1 
[ .. ·19~(tv)'l<; Eq~~t HH E6xp1Aoc; Kollvt HH MUJ1 
NLX~toc; 4)1..ve [- -) 'ApLutlc.>v 9Y)(JCXX H 
[9pa1auUoc; 'EI..e:va HH [------]oc; t>.veu HH 
: 80 (A1vala3l)c; t~ otov HH K[.]l..(--- Et]peat H 
(A]val!Jcxxoc; otvat HH 'It;t{n:6]~[o]~o(c; - -J I:IH 
26 Taxes on Cos (2"d or 1st century) 
olv ao.o opa.zp.av -.pta( xov Jl•a. xa.t 'P6owL am) opa.zp.av -rplaxovtr:x. 
n 6 ~· ( ') , • • rr • n 1 ' •• UU V!Wl uS X(l 'tlX 't(J.UT'X X(J.l uO:JOl XlX OXO'Ita; JJ.t0tJ011tOtljOWV'tO.L "lj 
" '~ ' n ' U ~- ' K- ... ' ' ~ -EXWVrl LUtW'tlX'XV JLS:f..I.L:JllWJLEVOL OtEWO:'JL Xlll !p OW lXO.O upazp.r:x•l 
20 , I ' 'P6~ , ' ~ - ' .l " .,. -rptaxo'l •ex xt:tt owL ao.o upa.zp.a.v -rptaxov•a ~:;; o xa. ljt auvecrTij-
xu'la. a axomi. UuovtwL OS xa(t-a -r]laura X(ll (•)ot p.s·ci~OAOL -rol 
EV ro'l; lz6o:m Ho!sLMVL xed Kq> Ot'J ar.o opa.zp.iiv tptcixon[rcx xcx!] I 
'P6owt olv ad opo:zp.Civ -rptlfxona. Du6nwL OS xara 'talha X(ll rol 
vawho(, At:tp.~.Xvo( n:;:;] I op.olwc; Y.(lt oihot 16 r.a.pa 'i:W'I -.ap.Lii'l opaz-
p.a; e~+,xona.. Uu;f.wt OS xat 0 vaoapzo; -r(wt rio]l•e:toiivt Ot'l &...0 
opazp.iiv -.puhono: xo:! Kwt oiv ar.o opo:zp.ii" -rpuhona. xo:l 'P6owt 
25 o(t]'l I &ito opazp.Ci'l •ptchov;:a.. otaypo:<pecr0wt17 OS aonilt r.a.pa TW'I 
-rap.teiv op.,;zp.Q.:; h::·rrlxo]lna. Uo6vtwL OS )((l'i:a raod xat OXrJ.'I0-
1t'XjEb6w·l Z'l.O::J!O~ rwv -rpnwxpzwv, Uuov[-.w ]It oi TWt no.ad5iivt olv 
' , " - I , K- "' ., , ~ - , ,. ']I ar.o opa.z:w.v •pt'XY.O'I<c.t xat wL otv ar.o opazp.av -rpta.xo'l'tL o: xo:t 
'P'... l' , ' ~ - I 1 B , ~· ' - ., OOWt Ol'l !1.1t0 opaz:J.(1.'1 -rptaY.OV't0: 1 1\r/.f-li IX'IOV'tWL oz XO:l TOOTOl 1ta.p11. 
TWV Tap.t(Civ] I [op }:.:zp.rl; evsv+,xona. Uu6nwt oa XO:l 'tOt Y.(J.pr.o-
30 J...oyaun.s; 18 -rwt rlo<:;toiJ.·It ol" &(r.o] I [op].,;zp.iiv -r.sacrapaxona x.,;\ 
Kwt Ol'l. ch:o opiJ.(z)p.ii·l -.;:.crao:p~xona xat 'Poowt olv &[r:o op Jle<zp.iiv 
-.scrcr;.pd.xo·rw.. Ouo·I•Wt oa xd -.o! tm'ljp<ho:t Tii'l p.axpii•l V'l.W'I rio-
TStOii'll xal [Kwt Ol'l d.)/;ro op!!zp.av -rpt[ d.xona. 'l.O. ]! 'PoowL [ Ot'l a. .. ~ 
opazp.Civ -rptd.x ]'lV'tC(. Uu6vtwL OS xa.l TOt --lot ex TW'I ·lHt''JPE[ tlY.W'/ 
dolwvl9 Ot'l &r.o] I opiJ.zp.iiv •(:;::;cre<paxov:a --] 
:.:.:: .. 
27 an inscription from Didyma (533 AD) 
t Mijvumc; ~-rot otoucrxuA.iu tfic; crfic; urrEpoxi']c; liiJA'J (-1:-yovE(v) 
tq'> TJJ.!E'tEQ<!l xg(m 1tEQlEXOUO"U tOU<; olxij-rogac; tfi<; 
'IoucrnvtavourroA.mov liui tfic; f:moEOOj.!EVT]<; 
4 rrug' Utlt&v OlOUcrxaA.iuc; OtOU~£ 'tTJV j.!EV xut' au-roue; 
rroA.tv XWJ.!T]V Etv£ rruA£, tfic; of: tlJ.!EtEQU<; EuwxiJon-
cruv 1tQOO"T]YOQiuc; oixma rroA.Eox; fO"XT]xEV£' xui TOUt; 
cruvtEAOUJ.!EVOU<; E~ autfic; q>OQOU<; £imp£g£mtat nj tfi<; crfi(c;) 
8 lJ1t£Qoxfic; 'tQ(l1tE~l] XU'tU~UAAOj.lEVOU<; oui tfic; MtAT]O"l(J)V rroA.( Hoc;) 
cruvu)v de; tmcruguxovm rrgoc; np /;vi xgucrooc;, mTc; of: frtimc; 
TJJ.!OOV A.ugymomv Ei:xocrl' 'tTJV OE 1tOO"O'tl]'tU TUU'tl]V EX 'tOV arro-
yEwitevtrov ton:wv l'tuA.uniwv n:gotEQOV ovtrov, urrO<po-
12 gwv of: yEVOJ.!EvWV tij MtAT]criwv rroA.t dmpi;gml'tm, tfic; 'Ioucrn-
vtavounoA.n&v XOUq>l~Oj.lEVT]t; 1tUO"T]<; tfic; rrocrOtl]TO<; mu-
tl]c;· xai tij f.!T]VUO"El 1tQOc; 'tTJV TJf.lE'tEQUV EUO"E~tav xgijcramtm 
Eq>' <i)t£ x(ui) 'tfJV UU'tOOV Ultl]crtV 1tQOO"OE~Ucrful x(ai) frEtq:lltQUYJ.!U-
16 nx<P rurrq:l itEcrnicrat to TJJ.!lV nagacrtl]ITOJ.!EVOV. 0mni~o~(v) 
wivuv 'tOVO£ 'tOV l'tdov 1tQUYJ.!U'tlxOV W1tOV rrQ<'>c; 'tTJV am 
U1tEQOXTJV xatarr£J.trrov-r£c; xai too OTJf.!Ocriou rrmijcracrfut 
nQ6votav x(ai) 1tQOcrtu~at roue; J.!EV tfic; 'Ioucrnvtavoun:oA.(tt&v) 
20 !!.9(A.Eroc;) oixijrogac; J.!TJOEJ.!ia(v) Emytyvrocrxtv cruvtEA£tav, wuc; 
o€ /;~ijxovta xai eva xgucrouc; t<!l OTJJ.!Ocrlq:l dcrq>EQ£crfut 
EX t&v anoyEwl'tEV't<OV 't01t(J)V rov xai J.!VTJJ.!TJV E1tOlTJ-
crato t1 tfic; crfic; U1t£Qoxflc; J.LiJvumc; x(ai) roue; J.!EV tmcraguxovm 
24 nQ<'>c; tql €vi xgucrouc; tij 'tflc; crfic; U1t£QOXfic; tQU1tE~l], tui:c; 
of: l'tEimc; iJJ.t&v A.agymocrtv -roue; A.moJ.!i;vouc; Ei:xom. 
TT)v yag cruvtEA£tav rriicrav rf)v EX tflc; 'loucrnvtavourroA.t-
t&v !!.9(AEW<;) £imp£QOJ.!EVT]V cruvxrogficrat tOt<; tfi<; autfi<; no A( Ero<;) 
28 olxijwgmv to TJf.!EtEgov f:ooxiJ.LacrEv xgutoc;. ToutQ yag 
t<P tQOrr(fl x(ai) to OTJf.!O<nov a~iJJ.!toV cpuA.ax{tijcrEt£ x(ai) wu 
E'tTJl'tEvto<; ot tfjc; 'IoucrnvtavounoA.n&v oixijtOQ£<; 
EV arroA.aucr£1 YEVTJO"OV'tat. Ta toivuv 1tUQUO"'tUV'tU ~iv 
32 x(ai) ota toUO£ tou itEiou ngayJ.!anxou OTJAOUJ.!EVU tunou 
ij crT) U1t£QOXtl EQY(fl x(ai) 1tEQU'tl 1tUQUOOUVUl crnwcrutro ... 
Dat(um) cal(endas) Apriles Const(antinopoli) d(omino) n(ostro) Justiniano per-
p(etuo) 
Aug(usto) III cons(ule). a 
36 t D(OMINO) N(OSTRO) IUSTI(NI)ANO PERPETUO AUG(USTO) III 
CONS(ULE) D(IE) !III 
NON(AS) APRILES CONSTANTINOPOLI. Ex offi-
c(io) p(er) Dominum aug(ustalem) et agentem nume(ru)m sc(c}rinii dio-
ec(eseos) Asiane d(ictum) est: E>Eiov 1tQ<l'YI!Umwv nmov xum-
40 1tcl!qrl}i:vru 1tQO<; -ri)v D!!ETEQUV qnA.uvttQU>n(iuv) exov~~ 
J.umi xciQU<; unof3aAA.o!!EV ITQO<; -ro 1tUQtcr<ai!Evov. 
Fl(avios) Mariano(s) Micael(ios) Gabriel(ios) Arcangel(ios) Ioannes 
0 megalopr(epestatos) eparc(os) ton ier(on) pr(aitorion) top ce apo up(aton), 
44 F({)(avios) F(a)ustos, Fl(avios) Bonos d(ixerunt): TIQOcrq>oQ<O<; avuytyvmcr-
xf:oitm. Qua(e) lec(ta sunt) in antel(atis) praefu({)ge(n)t. 
Fl(avius) Marianus Ioannes o megalopr(epestatos) eparc(os) ton 
ier(on) pr(aitorion) toP ce apo r0(arwv), Fl(avios) F(a)ustos, Fl(avios) Bonos 
d(ixerunt): KQa-
48 ri]crEt 8ta m'tv-rmv x(ui) {;~ TJI!Eri:Qa<; 'l'iJ<pou -ra bTJ-
A.oui!Eva Tql avayvmoitf:VTl fu;icp 1tQU'Y1!UTlXQl 
TU1t<p 'YEI!OVTU q>tA.avitQmrria<; x( ai) ti)v mu I!EYU-
f..ou f3amA.f:m<; 1tQO<; mo<; U1tTJxOoU<; EUI!EVtav Em-
52 btXVUI!EVa. Ex offic(io) p(er) Dominum aug(ustalem) d(ictum) es(t): 
Ei rraQicr-ramt 'YQU~a<a yEvf:critat ITQO<; -rov AUJ.I-
1tQ(6-ramv) liQXOVTU rii<; E1tUQX(ia<;) tq>' QlTE d()f:vE UUTOV ra 
TE itEtobffi<; itEcrmoitf:vm x(ai) J.!EyaA.oq>uffi<; 1tQOmaxtt(f:vm) 
56 pos(t) cetera: touro y~:vi]crEmt. Edantur. a 
& Fl(avius) Mar(ianus) M(ic)hael(ius) Gabriel(ius) Ioannes (E)utropi(u)s v(ir) 
sp{ectabilis) com(es) et cons(ularis). 
KQatT]cr~::t -ra naQumavm f3amA.i TQl KQatimcp x(ai) rij J.IET aurov 
CtQXij x(ai) ot'>~i<; TO AOl1tOV dcrnQa~t 'IoucrnvtuvounoA.(iTa<;) iiv dcr(E)x61!t/;o(v) 
60 t<j:l bTJI!O<Jt(!) 1tQO TOUtOU <j>OQUV btU tO avncraxitfuc tau~ tEitE<J-
1ttcrit(at) 1tUQU rii<; f3amA.ia<; bta tOOV anoyEmitf:vtffiV t'.mo tOU MEUV-
8QOU 1tO'tU!!OU T01tffiV i<; toV3J.11tQOcritEv xQ6vov ttuA.unimv OVtffi(V), 
rruQuq>uA.anoucrus; muta tijs nn'toJ.IEVTJ<; J.lot ta~t:m<; x(ui) nacrTJ<; xma 
64 & t6nov noA.tttxft<; x(ui) bTJf.tocriu<; emxouQia<;. Edantur. & 
389 
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